JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE petitioners, employed as Assistant Engineers under the respondent No. 1 in their Public Works Department, feel aggrieved by fixation of their seniority in the cadre vis-a-vis the respondent Nos. 2 to 78 and seek a writ of certiorari for quashing the seniority list (Annexure-P-10) by filing this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 2. ) WE begin examination of the petitioners grievances with a note of distress at the manner in which their learned counsel made his oral submissions for a little over six hours extended over three days and repeated the same submission over and over again without any concern for others waiting for their turn and without even pausing to consider advisability of such a move. Should the lawyers be brief, to the point and luminously limited in citations or unfold aggressive orality, punctuated by irrelevant and unnecessary case-law in the question which we would like to present for consideration of the Bar. Though we do not claim perfect knowledge of law and would love to be educated, we found the advocacy nothing but a wasteful lullaby and were compelled to stop it even at the cost of annoyance of the learned counsel. It must be realised that judges, in present context of long pendency of cases and their sense of urgency to decide them, cannot permit argumentum ad libitem by unnatural extension of audi alteram partem. We do not wish to belong to the category to Judges who allow "advocates to go on arguing questions of law or fact almost ad nauseam and, thereby, be responsible for Laws Delays, (See: Laws Delays - G. M. Divekar, (AIR 1981 Journal 89 ). We would, however, appreciate if Bar Members themselves suitably answer the question posed by us above. ( 3. ) THE petitioners claim that they are senior to the respondents and should have been shown as such in the seniority list. Their claim is based on their submission that ad hoc service rendered by them between 22-7-1971 when they were first appointed (Annexure-P-3) and 22-11-1972 when they were regularly appointed after selection (Annexure-P-6), should also have been counted for purposes of their seniority in the cadre in view of decisions of the Supreme Court in Baleshwar Dass v. State of U. P. ( AIR 1981 SC. 41 ) and G. P. Doval v. Chief Secy. Govt. 41 ) and G. P. Doval v. Chief Secy. Govt. of UP. (AIR 1984 S. C. 1527 ). They, in the alternative, claim that their seniority vis-a-vis respondents 16 to 53, could not have been fixed above them by giving weightage of experience as overseer. For these very reasons, the petitioners claim that final seniority list is illegal and should be quashed. The respondents have resisted this claim and have submitted that the seniority has been fixed as per rule and is otherwise correct. They also submit that petitioners cannot claim any advantage of their ad hoc service as they were not selected on merits for the said purpose and were ineligible for such consideration at that time. ( 4. ) PROMOTION to the post of Assistant Engineers is admittedly governed by madhya Pradesh P. W. D. (Gazetted) Recruitment Rules, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as 1969 Rules ). According to these Rules, Junior Engineers, Overseers Head Draftsmen and Draftsmen are eligible to be considered for this promotion on. their obtaining requisite experience. Each of these categories has a fixed quota of its own. and, hence. they compete with each other and promotions remain consequent to their respective quota. A Departmental Promotion Committee (hereinafter referred to as the D. P. C. the constitution of which is also prescribed in these Rules, is required to consider names of all eligible candidates on merits and judge their suitability in all respects for higher posts, duly tempered by their seniority. The D. P. C. is also required to arrange the names of selected candidates in order of their seniority, unless a junior is considered exceptionally meritorious. This list is then sent to the P. S. C. through the State government for their consideration and approval. The list as approved by the P. S. C. is called the select list and promotions are made from the same in the same order as the names are arranged in the list. The State Government has, however, been given the authority to appoint any one not included in this list, if administratively exigencies so require and the vacancy is not likely to last for more than three months. The petitioners were initially em loyed as Overseers and were promoted as Junior Engineers on 23-8-1969 (Annexure-P-1) and 12-9-1969 (Annexure-P-2) respectively. The State Government has, however, been given the authority to appoint any one not included in this list, if administratively exigencies so require and the vacancy is not likely to last for more than three months. The petitioners were initially em loyed as Overseers and were promoted as Junior Engineers on 23-8-1969 (Annexure-P-1) and 12-9-1969 (Annexure-P-2) respectively. Both of them were further promoted as Assistant Engineers on purely ad hoc basis in exercise of the powers of the State Government under the proviso to Rule 19 (1) of 1969 Rules in exigency of service. The "exigency of service" compelling these appointments is also mentioned in the said order and is as under:-"since adequate number of Junior Engineers with requisite qualifying service are not available for appointment as Assistant Engineers and but for these promotions, large number of Assistant Engineers posts would remain vacant, adversely affecting the construction works. " It was also mentioned in this order that, "these appointments will not be deemed to determine seniority as Assistant Engineer for any purpose whatsoever. " It appears that after some time, several Junior Engineers became eligible for being considered under 1969 Rules and, hence, process under those rules was started, which ultimately resulted in the regular appointment of the petitioners and others by order dated 22-11-1972 (Annexure-P-6 ). Relying on the conditions stated in the first appointment of the petitioners (Annexure-P-3) the respondent-State has not counted their ad hoc service from 22-7-1971 to 22-11-1972 for purposes of seniority and has fixed their seniority only from 22-11-1972. The petitioners main grievance is that this method of counting their seniority is arbitrary and violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The petitioners, therefore, claim that their ad hoc service should also be counted for purposes of their seniority as Assistant Engineers. ( 5. ) THE respondents belong to three distinct groups. Respondents 2 to 15 are those Junior Engineers who were promoted as Assistant Engineers along with the petitioners by the same order (Annexure-P-6) and their seniority in the list (Annexure-P-1) reflects their placement in the order of their appointment. The learned counsel for the petitioners when informed of this position, did not challenge their placement in the seniority list The other group consists of respondents Nos. The learned counsel for the petitioners when informed of this position, did not challenge their placement in the seniority list The other group consists of respondents Nos. 16 to 53 who were Overseers and promoted directly as Assistant Engineers in their own quota, though on the same date as the petitioner, i. e. 22-11-1972. From the return of respondent No. 1, it appears that the D. P. C, which considered the petitioners for promotion as Assistant Engineers, also considered these respondents and selected them. The D. P. C, however, did not arrange their names in one list, but prepared a separate list for each of the eligible categories. The respondent-State had, therefore, to arrange their names in the seniority list, which they did in 1976 by following the principles of Rule 14 of Madhya Pradesh p. W. D. (Non-Gazetted) Recruitment Rules, 1972, (hereinafter referred to as 1972 rules ). Since these Rules require giving of weightage to the service as Overseer for counting seniority in the cadre of Junior Engineers and since these respondents have longer service as Overseer, they were made senior to the petitioners in the cadre of junior Engineers. As far as the cadre of Assistant Engineer is concerned, their seniority has been fixed on the basis of their date of eligibility as Junior Engineer in view of Rule 14 (2) of these Rules. Though Rule 14 (3) of 1972 Rules was challenged as constitutionally invalid in the petition, no arguments were addressed in this behalf and the learned counsel remained satisfied by stating that these Rules had become wholly Otiose. The third group of respondents consists of direct recruits who were appointed on 7-8-1972 after their, selection through the P. S. C. in accordance with 1969 Rules. The seniority of the petitioners vis-a-vis these direct recruits is dependent upon their claim to counting their ad hoc service for purposes of seniority. ( 6. ) IN the context of facts aforesaid, the most important question for consideration of this court is : whether the petitioners are entitled to count their ad hoc service for seniority ? Before answering this question, it would be just and proper to consider the real nature of this appointment. ( 6. ) IN the context of facts aforesaid, the most important question for consideration of this court is : whether the petitioners are entitled to count their ad hoc service for seniority ? Before answering this question, it would be just and proper to consider the real nature of this appointment. The fact that the petitioners were not eligible to be considered for promotion as Assistant Engineer on 22-7-1971, is not denied, as they had not completed two years service as Junior Engineer as required under Rule 15 of 1969 rules. It is also not in dispute that no D. P. C. was constituted and there was no selection on merit as required by 1969 Rules. The appointment order clearly indicates that it was on purely ad hoc basis in exercise of powers under the proviso to Rule 19 (1) of 1969 rules. It is true that this proviso permits the authorities to appoint a person not included in the select list only if the vacancy is not likely to last for more than three months. It is also true that petitioners appointment continued for more than three months. The question, however, is : if the appointment of the petitioners made for an unlimited period, was legal appointment ? The petitioners are not willing to accept that their appointment was illegal for being in violation of the powers of the appointing authority under the proviso to Rule 19 of 1969 Rules. Their contention is that it should be treated as regular or substantive appointment, as it had continued for more than three months. Reliance is placed on Rule 7 (4) of 1969 Rules to support this submission. ( 7. ) THE argument based on Rule 7 (4) of 1969 Rules has to be rejected for the simple reason that it deals with methods of recruitment and permits the State government to adopt any other method than those provided by this Rule. Clause (1) of this Rule provides for normal methods, which include promotion as one of them. Since the petitioners case is covered by the prescribed method of recruitment by promotion, there would be no occasion to adopt any other method. We are, therefore, unable to hold that petitioners were appointed under Rule 7 (4) and not under the proviso to Rule 19 of these Rules. Since the petitioners case is covered by the prescribed method of recruitment by promotion, there would be no occasion to adopt any other method. We are, therefore, unable to hold that petitioners were appointed under Rule 7 (4) and not under the proviso to Rule 19 of these Rules. It must, consequently, be held that petitioners were appointed on ad hoc basis without any selection by the D. P. C. as required by these Rules. The question, however, is : if continuance of their appointment beyond the statutory period of three months, would convert it into a regular appointment or render it illegal ? The appointment cannot be accepted as regular because it was not made in accordance with the Rules and petitioners were not eligible for this appointment under the rules. Was it then illegal ? In case it is held that the requirement of three months is mandatory, it will have to be held that their appointment ceased to be legal after the expiry of statutory maximum. This, however, is not the intent of the rule. The proviso is intended to facilitate the appointment in cases of emergency which actually existed in the intant case. It is also not disputed that the petitioners could have been reappointed after the expiry of three months. Under the circumstances, it is not possible to hold that the requirement of three months is mandatory requirement sufficient to render the appointment illegal. As a necessary corollary, it must. be held that petitioners continued ad hoc Assistant Engineers even after three months of their appointment. ( 8. ) THERE seems to be enough authority for the proposition that ad hoc services of an employee need not be counted for his seniority the regular cadre. In Tejinder singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1978 S. C. 1326) such a claim was negatived by the supreme Court by holding that such appointments are not enough to disturb the seniority of an otherwise senior person in service. In Satyabrate D. Chaudhary v. State of Assam (AIR 1976 S. C. 487) the Supreme Court did not count the period of officiating service for purposes of seniority in the promoted cadre, as these appointments were emergency appointments intended to avoid delay and were defeasible, giving rise to no legal rights in favour of the parties. In Satyabrate D. Chaudhary v. State of Assam (AIR 1976 S. C. 487) the Supreme Court did not count the period of officiating service for purposes of seniority in the promoted cadre, as these appointments were emergency appointments intended to avoid delay and were defeasible, giving rise to no legal rights in favour of the parties. In S. Ramaswami v Union of India (AIR 1976 S. C. 2394) the Supreme Court did not count the period of ad hoc service for counting eligibility of such employees to higher post In S. P. Vasudeva v. State ofharyana (AIR 1975 S. C. 2292) the Supreme Court held that an ad hoc appointment was an appointment "for any special or particular purpose" and an appointee could be discharged as soon as the purpose was over. Such an appointment gives no right to the appointee to the post and, hence, his reversion to his substantive cadre cannot be said to be illegal. In B. S. Gupta v. Union of India (AIR 1974 S. C. 1618) the Supreme Court rejected the claim of an ad hoc officer to seniority from the date of his continuous officiation. Even this Court in V. K. Jain v. State of M. P. (1980 (2) M. P. W. Note 205) has rejected such a claim of an ad hoc appointee after holding that right to hold the post accrues to an ad hoc employee only when he is regularised. In Dalpat Singh v. State of m. P. (1978 M. P. L. J. 747) another Division Bench of this Court considered the rights of an employee appointed on emergency under Rule 12 of the M. P. Educational service (Collegiate Branch) Recruitment Rules, 1967 and held that such appointees have no right to the post. If fact of this petition are to be appreciated in the light of these decisions, the petitioners would not be able to count their ad hoc service for purposes of seniority and the petition would deserve dismissal. The learned counsel for the petitioners, however, submitted that this law is no longer current in view of Supreme court decision in Baleshwar Dass and Dovals cases (supra) and hence, their seniority as assistant Engineers. Since the sheet anchor of the petitioners case is the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Baleshwar Dass and Dovals cases (supra), we may examine these two decisions. ( 9. Since the sheet anchor of the petitioners case is the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Baleshwar Dass and Dovals cases (supra), we may examine these two decisions. ( 9. ) IN Baleshwar Dosss case (supra), the Supreme Court was considering competing claims to seniority between three groups of Engineers belonging to U. P. service of Engineers (Irrigation Branch), viz. , Graduates recruited directly by the Public service Commission by competitive examination, Graduates appointed in numbers but subsequently absorbed in consultation with the P. S. C. and Diploma Holders promoted as Assistant Engineers. The Court noted that the order of appointment to the service is decisive of seniority and went on to ascertain when is an Engineer appointed to the service. In this context, the Court found that until an Engineer gets "entry into the service, he cannot claim to be appointed to it. " The Court, therefore, examined when an engineer would become a member of the service under the Rules. The Rules defined member of the Service to mean persons appointed in a "substantive capacity. " investigating the matter further, the Court discovered that a cadre under the Rules consisted of "permanent" and "temporary" posts. It further found that even temporary appointments were made in the same manner as permanent appointments and even the public Service Commission was consulted and had, in fact, concurred. It, therefore, held that every indicium of regular appointment is thus present in appointments against temporary vacancies. The Court, under the circumstances, concluded that even the holder of a temporary appointment against a post included in the cadre was a member of the service. The Court, thereafter, examined the meaning of substantive capacity in the context of service rule and observed that, "substantive capacity is a flexible expression which cannot be frozen by current officialese nor by the conditions that obtained in the remote past when the rule was framed. " The Court was of the view that real meaning of the word must be understood in the context of Article 16 of the constitution and, hence, even appointments to a temporary post of long duration would be the appointment in substantive capacity. " The Court was of the view that real meaning of the word must be understood in the context of Article 16 of the constitution and, hence, even appointments to a temporary post of long duration would be the appointment in substantive capacity. On these conclusions, the Court applied the normal rule of counting seniority from the date of continuous officiation, as laid down in N. K. Chauhan v. State of Gujarat (AIR 1977 S. C. 251) and S. B. Fatwardhan v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1977 S. C. 2051) and directed the State to refix the seniority of temporary engineers by giving them the benefit of their temporary service. This is fully illustrated in the following passage of the judgment :- "26. We see no reason to hold that when engineers are appointed to temporary posts but after fulfilment of all the tests for regular, appointments, including consultation with the Public Service Commission, they are not appointments in a substantive capacity. In Service terminology, perhaps, eyebrows may be raised when we say so, but then, we must remember that the State itself in its counter-affidavit has construed Rule 17 of the Rules as providing "that all persons appointed to the Service who are not already in the permanent service who are not already in the permanent employment of the Irrigation department shall be placed on probation for four years" (since reduced to two years ). This means that persons who are not permanently appointed but only temporarily appointed are also placed on probation and officers are not put on probation unless they are on their way to membership in the Service on completion of probation. That is to say, although they are temporary appointees, if their probation is completed and other formalities fulfilled, they become members of the Service. It follows that merely because the person is a temporary appointee, it cannot be said that he is not substantively appointed if he fulfils the necessary conditions for regular appointment such as probation and consultation with the Public Service Commission etc. From this stand of the State Government, it follows that the temporary appointees, whose appointments have received the approval of the Public Service Commission and who have run out the two years of probation, must be deemed to be appointed in a substantive capacity. From this stand of the State Government, it follows that the temporary appointees, whose appointments have received the approval of the Public Service Commission and who have run out the two years of probation, must be deemed to be appointed in a substantive capacity. The only advantage for permanent appointees, i. e. Assistant Engineers who have been appointed to vacancies in the permanent cadre is what belongs to permanent Public Servants under various rules in different areas of official life. " ( 10. ) BALESHWAR Dass case (supra)does not overrule earlier Supreme Court cases noticed in para 8 above. It is, however, an authority for the proposition that form of an order is not conclusive of its real character and the Courts are entitled to go behind it and as certain if every indicium of regular employment are present in a particular case. It is also the authority for the proposition that if an appointment is found to be regular in nature and character and not ad hoc the entire period should be counted for seniority. This approach does not appear to be new and has been followed, though in different context, in Appar Singh v. State of Punjab (1970 (3) S. C. C. 338), State of Punjab v. Sukhraj Bahadur (AIR 1968 S. C. 1089) and Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1974 S. C. 2192 ). These decisions authorise the Courts to lift the veil and ascertain the true nature and character of the impugned order because the form of order is not decisive of its real character and content. In Baleshwar Dasss case (supra) the Supreme court, on examination of facts, held that concerned appointments, though temporary, were on posts included in the cadre, were made on merits after selection as in the case of regular appointments and even the approval of the P. S. C. was obtained. The Court, therefore, found no valid reason to treat such appointments differently than regular appointments and, hence, gave the benefit of temporary service for seniority. This approach is not contrary to the approach adopted by the Supreme Court in earlier cases where appointments, without dispute, were ad hoc. This, however, does not mean that every ad hoc appointment will have to be treated as a regular appointment. This approach is not contrary to the approach adopted by the Supreme Court in earlier cases where appointments, without dispute, were ad hoc. This, however, does not mean that every ad hoc appointment will have to be treated as a regular appointment. There may still be cases where appointments may be ad hoc in the real sense of the term and may be made without considering competing claims of all eligible candidates. If an appointment is ad hoc in its true nature and content, the ratio of Baleshwar Dosss case (supra) would not govern the same and earlier decisions of the Supreme Court would remain decisive of these cases. There may, however, be cases where an appointment made by the competent authority while exercising its powers under the relevant Rules and after following the procedure prescribed by the Rules and satisfying the requirements of Article 16 of the Constitution, may be termed as ad hoc for not completing certain administrative procedural requirement. In such a case, the court would not be bound to accept the labelled classification of the State of applying the ratio of Baleshwar Dosss case (supra), would be able to treat such an ad hoc appointment a regular appointment for all purposes. Unfortunately, the facts of the case do not permit this Court to apply the ratio of Baleshwar Dosss case (supra ). In the instant case, though a procedure has been prescribed by statutory rule, the same has not been followed while making these ad hoc appointments. Then, the petitioners were not even eligible to be considered for a regular appointment under the rule on that date. The appointment order also mentions that it was an ad hoc arrangement for a period till Junior Engineers acquire eligibility to be considered for regular appointment. These facts clearly distinguish the present case from the facts of Baleshwar Dasss case (supra) and leave no scope for applying the diets of Baleshwar Dasss case (supra) in the present case. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the submission of the petitioners based on balesh war Dasss case (supra ). ( 11. ) IN U. P. Dovals easel supra}, the Supreme Court was considering the true nature of appointment of Khandsari Inspector made in 1960 without consulting the p. S. C. These posts were initially temporary but had continued indefinitely. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the submission of the petitioners based on balesh war Dasss case (supra ). ( 11. ) IN U. P. Dovals easel supra}, the Supreme Court was considering the true nature of appointment of Khandsari Inspector made in 1960 without consulting the p. S. C. These posts were initially temporary but had continued indefinitely. From the facts of the case it appears that subsequently these posts were brought within the purview of the P. S. C. and their concurrence obtained. However, while fixing the seniority of such appointees, no benefit was given to them for their service rendered before the approval of the P. S. C. The State relied upon an Order issued in 1940 to support its contention, but the Court held that the said Order does not contain any binding rule in this behalf. The Court, therefore, observed that the continuous officiation, should apply in the instant case. Inspite of it, the Court examined the contents of the model set out in 1940 Order and held that even according to this model, if a temporary appointment is followed by confirmation, the seniority would count from the date of first appointment. Inspite of it, the Court examined the matter further on the assumption that there was no binding rule governing the seniority and observed as under :- "15. Now if there was no binding rule of seniority it is well-settled that length of continuous officiation prescribes a valid principle of seniority. The question is : from what date the service is to be reckoned ? It was urged that any appointment of a stop gap nature or pending the selection by Public Service commission cannot be taken into account for reckoning seniority. In other words, it was urged that to be in the cadre and to enjoy place in the seniority list, the service rendered in a substantive capacity can alone be taken into consideration. We find it difficult to accept this bald and wide submission. Each case will depend upon its facts and circumstances. If a stop-gap appointment is made and the appointee appears before the Public Service commission when the latter proceeds to select the candidates and is selected, we see no justification for ignoring his past service. At any rate, there is no justification for two persons selected in the same manner being differently treated. If a stop-gap appointment is made and the appointee appears before the Public Service commission when the latter proceeds to select the candidates and is selected, we see no justification for ignoring his past service. At any rate, there is no justification for two persons selected in the same manner being differently treated. " These observations are strongly relied upon by the petitioners to support their case that even the period, during which they were ineligible for being appointed as Assistant engineers, should be treated as period of continuous officiation and counted for purpose of seniority. True that these observations, if considered by themselves and divorced from the context, may give rise to such an argument, but we do not think that the argument would be correct. These observations will have to be considered in the context of the facts of the case and if so considered, they do not support the petitioners case. A stop-gap arrangement may be as good as a regular arrangement as in the case of Baleshwar Dass or even G. P. Dovals case (supra), but every stop-gap arrangement need not necessarily be of that character. Indeed, each case will have to be judged on its own facts. In both these cases, the stop-gap arrangement was made after selection on merits by adopting the required procedure. Persons appointed were fully qualified to hold the post. In such a case, if stop-gap arrangement is followed by confirmation, the ratio of Dovals case (supra) would oblige this Court to count the entire service from the date of first appointment for purpose of seniority. Can we hold that ad hoc appointment held by the petitioners is like the temporary appointment of Baleshwar Dass or stop-gap arrangement of Doval ? We have already considered the true nature and character of petitioners appointment and have held that (i) it was not in accordance with statutory 1969 Rules and (ii) the petitioners were not even qualified to hold the appointment on the date of the order. Both these elements are missing in the appointment considered in baleshwar Dass and G. P. Dovals cases (supra ). The appointments of the petitioners, as we have concluded earlier, were ad hoc in the real sense of the term. Both these elements are missing in the appointment considered in baleshwar Dass and G. P. Dovals cases (supra ). The appointments of the petitioners, as we have concluded earlier, were ad hoc in the real sense of the term. The word "ad hoc" has been borrowed in English from Latin and means "for this special purpose" and, hence, an ad hoc appointment is treated to be an appointment for a particular purpose and ceases as soon as the purpose is achieved. This is the way in which the ad hoc appointment has been understood in S. P. Vasudevas case (supra ). An ad hoc arrangement is usually made without considering merits of all incumbents entitled to be considered and is usually a local arrangement made till a regular arrangement in that behalf is made: It is not unusual to find that due to administrative exigency, a person locally available is usually asked to take over the job without affecting claims of others to hold the post on regular basis. Such arrangements are usually ad hoc and confer no right whatsoever on the holders of such an appointment It appears that in due course, even otherwise regular appointments were labelled as ad hoc appointments and benefit denied to the holders without justification. Baleshwar Dass and Dovals cases (supra) illustrate this unwarranted extension of ad hoc arrangement One should, therefore, not be surprised if the Supreme Court committed as it is to do justice, did not approve the action of the authorities and limited the application of ratio of its earlier cases to appointments which were truly ad hoc. Then, the existence of statutory rule in the instant case would also be a point of distinction and would be sufficient to make the above-quoted observation inapplicable. Under the circumstances, we are unable to agree with the petitioners on this score and are constrained to hold that their original appointment was an ad hoc appointment in the real sense of the term and, hence, they are not entitled to count the period between 22-7-1971 and 22-11-1972 for their seniority in the cadre. ( 12. ) WE may now examine the petitioners case against respondent Nos. 16 to 53, who have been made senior to the petitioners because of alleged weightage given to them for their service as Overseer. ( 12. ) WE may now examine the petitioners case against respondent Nos. 16 to 53, who have been made senior to the petitioners because of alleged weightage given to them for their service as Overseer. Long arguments were addressed by the learned counsel on the basis of 1972 Rules, which admittedly do not govern either the appointments or seniority of Assistant Engineers. These Rules admittedly govern the lower cadre of Junior Engineer/overseer/head Draftsmen/draftsmen and would be irrelevant for determining the inter-se seniority of these persons after their promotion as assistant Engineer. What had actually happened is this: The D. P. C. considered Junior engineers/overseers/ Draftsmen for promotion as Assistant Engineers in their respective quota and prepared three different select lists, each containing names of selected official in his own category. Accepting the recommendations of the D. P. C. the state appointed the selected officials on the same date, by different orders. Later on, the government was required to determine the inter-se seniority of these persons and, thereby, integrate them into one cadre of Assistant Engineer. Since 1969 Rules do not provide the manner of determining the inter-se seniority of persons recruited from various sources, it adopted the following formula :- "in the cadre of Assistant Engineers, the date for reckoning of seniority was the date on which the Junior Engineer or Overseer or Head draftsman/draftsman completed the respective span of service for eligibility. " (See para 7 of the return of respondent No. 1 ). It is not disputed that this principle has been uniformally applied in all cases, including the petitioners. It is stated that this method had become necessary because of Rule 14 (2)of 1972 Rules which entitled an Overseer to be promoted as Junior Engineer on his obtaining engineering degree or qualifying for AMIE, subject only to the availability of vacancy, several overseers acquiring this right to be promoted as Junior Engineer, were not promoted, even though vacancies existed. In order to avoid injustice to such overseers in future, the aforesaid formula was devised. This, according to the respondent-State, is just and proper and meets the requirements of Article 16 of the constitution. There is no dispute that in all cases, the date on which an Overseer became eligible to be promoted as Junior Engineer, has been taken to the date for determining the seniority. This, according to the respondent-State, is just and proper and meets the requirements of Article 16 of the constitution. There is no dispute that in all cases, the date on which an Overseer became eligible to be promoted as Junior Engineer, has been taken to the date for determining the seniority. By this method, every Overseer is deemed to have been junior Engineer and their names as Assistant Engineer are arranged in the same order in which they would have been promoted as Junior Engineer. This method, according to respondent No. 1 avoids perpetuation of injustice which these Overseers have suffered because of their non-promotion as Junior Engineer. It must be conceded that in the absence of any statutory rule, the State had the authority to determine inter-se seniority of Assistant Engineers, subject only to Article 16 of the Constitution. The burden of showing how this rule violates Article 16, was on the petitioners, but nothing has been stated by them to show how it is arbitrary or unjust. An attempt of the State to avoid perpetuation of injustice among their employees must ex-facie be held to be in conformity with the intent and purpose of Article 16 of the Constitution. The method otherwise appears to be just and proper and has been uniformly applied in all cases. We are, therefore, constrained to reject the submission of the petitioners based on arbitrary or discriminatory fixation of seniority as Assistant Engineer. ( 13. ) AN attempt was made by the petitioners to submit that disturbance of seniority in the cadre of Junior Engineers by applying Rule 14 (3) of 1972 Rules was illegal and arbitrary, as it has the effect of disturbing their seniority in the cadre of assistant Engineer during the period they remain as officiating Assistant Engineer. Reliance is placed on Rule 12 of MP. Civil Services (General Conditions of Service)Rules, 1961. This submission apparently relates to respondents 2 to 15, who were Junior engineers like the petitioners and were promoted by the same order along with the petitioner. This argument should not detain us any longer as the promotion order dated 22-11-1972 itself indicates that their names have been arranged in order of their merits as determined by the D. P. G This is in conformity with Rule 19 (1) of 1969 Rules. This argument should not detain us any longer as the promotion order dated 22-11-1972 itself indicates that their names have been arranged in order of their merits as determined by the D. P. G This is in conformity with Rule 19 (1) of 1969 Rules. In such a situation, their inter-se seniority, during the period of their officiation as Assistant engineer has to be determined in accordance with their order of merit as per proviso (i)to Rule 12 (c) of the aforesaid Rules. Since this has been actually done, there could be no legitimate grievance about it. ( 14. ) FROM the discussion aforesaid, it is clear that seniority of the petitioners vis-a-vis the respondents, has been properly determined and their grievance against the seniority list is without any substance. ( 15. ) THE petition, consequently, fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsels fee Rs. 250/- in favour of respondent No. 1 alone. No costs to other respondents. The outstanding amount of security deposit, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioners. Petition dismissed.