Judgment :- 1. The declarant in a ceiling case is the petitioner. The Taluk Land Board, Chittoor (for short 'TLB' hereinafter) has determined the extent of land held by the declarant as on the specified date and found that he should surrender an area of 2.93 acres as excess land. This was as per order dated 27-12-1976. Pursuant to the said order the declarant, it is said, has surrendered that area. Subsequently the TLB has reopened it under S.85(9) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (for short'the Act') and decided to issue notice to the declarant on 25-8-1978. Following the procedures prescribed in S.85(9) of the Act, the TLB has prepared a draft statement on 29-11-1980. Subsequently it determined that the declarant shall surrender an additional extent of 1 acre, as excess land. 2. Mr. Sugunapalan, learned counsel for the petitioner, has contended that the action of the TLB taken under S.85(9) of the Act is not within the time allowed by law. 3. S.85(9) provides that "the Taluk Land Board may. at any time, set aside its order under sub-section (5) or sub-section (7), as the case may be. and proceed afresh under that sub-section" if it is satisfied of one of the three conditions enumerated thereunder. The second proviso to the said sub-section reads thus: "Provided further that the Taluk Land Board shall not initiate any proceedings under this sub-section after the expiry of three years from the date on which the order sought to be set aside has become final". 4. s the TLB has decided to reopen the file on 25-8-1978, the learned counsel did not contend that the bar of limitation affects that stage. His contention is that as the draft statement was prepared only on 29-11-1980 which is beyond the period of three years the bar of limitation operates at that stage. As an aid to his argument the learned counsel seeks to vivisect the functions of S.85(9) into two stages. In the first stage the power of setting aside "its order" must take place. The second stage is "to proceed afresh" under either S.85 (5) or S.85(7) of the Act. As an aid to his argument the learned counsel seeks to vivisect the functions of S.85(9) into two stages. In the first stage the power of setting aside "its order" must take place. The second stage is "to proceed afresh" under either S.85 (5) or S.85(7) of the Act. The learned counsel gives emphasis to the word 'any' in the second proviso to S.85(9) of the Act "and contends that it must be understood as either the first stage or the second stage in S.85(9) of the Act and according to him the action should have been initiated within the period of three years for both the said stage. In other words the argument is that it is not enough that the action is initiated within three years as per the first stage but the action for the second stage also should have been commenced within the aforesaid period. 5. A construction of the said provision in that manner does not fit in with the scheme and setting of S.85(9) of the Act. The word 'any' in the second proviso does not warrant to be read in isolation from the rest of the words. When it is said that the TLB shall not initiate any proceedings under the sub-section, it must be understood that the legislature bad intended the entire sub-section should operate as a whole, although its operation can be implemented in different stages. The purpose of initiating the action to set aside the order of the TLB is to enable it to proceed afresh under S.85(7) of the Act. Otherwise the setting aside of the earlier order will become meaningless. That apart, the legislature has used the expression "at any time" in S.85(9) of the Act for setting aside the earlier order, and the second proviso fixes a time limit for initiation of the action for such setting aside. If the action for that process is initiated just before the expiry of the period of three years should there be any time limit for the setting aside of the order. Not only that no time limit is indicated, but the indication is to the contrary by using the words "at any time". If the action for that process is initiated just before the expiry of the period of three years should there be any time limit for the setting aside of the order. Not only that no time limit is indicated, but the indication is to the contrary by using the words "at any time". When the order can thus be set aside at any time, it sounds illogical to suggest that the process for the second stage also should have been initiated within three years from the date of the earlier order. Thus the TLB is within the time allowed by law when they passed the second order under S.85(7) of the Act. 6. No other point has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner and I do not find any other point necessary for consideration in this revision. For the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any merit in this Civil Revision Petition. It is accordingly dismissed, without any order as to costs.