Judgment :- Sathiadev, J. 1. Petitioner claims that it has been manufacturing a pharmaceutical product known as 'Helmizole' since 11.4.1981, and the trade mark was advertised in the Journal No. 849 dt. 16.10.1984 at page No. 478. Third respondent claims to be the adoptee of the trade mark 'Helmizol' from July 1982, and filed its opposition in Form No. TM5 to the first respondent under Section 21 of Central Act 43 of 1958 (hereinafter called as the Act). First respondent forwarded a copy of the said opposition to the counsel for petitioner for filing counter-statement, and it was received by him on 20.2.1985. In his diary, instead of noting the last date for sending the counter-statement as 20.4.1985, by oversight he noted it as 20.5.1985. It is, thereafter realising his mistake, he wrote a letter on 17.5.1985, forwarding the counter-statement in form No. TM6, with a letter explaining the reason for excusing the delay of one month. However, second, respondent by communication dt. 20.5.1985 informed the petitioner that the first respondent had directed him to state, that the counter statement having been filed beyond time, it has been rejected because Section 21(2) is mandatory and does not allow any discretion to be vested in him to condone the delay under any circumstances. Aggrieved against this order, this writ petition is preferred. 2. Respondents I and 2 have taken up the stand that Section 101 or Section 102 of the Act cannot be relied upon empowering the Registrar to excuse the delay, and it is not as if petitioner is without any other remedy because, it is always open to petitioner to file a fresh application which is the true and appropriate remedy open to him. 'Under Section 21, the time limit provided is mandatory in specifying a time limit of three months, and, thereafter allowing only a further period of one month, and beyond the said period prescribed, there is no jurisdiction in the Registrar to entertain the application; whereas under Section 21(2), no such outer limit is prescribed. The contention of respondents is that, Sections 2l(l) and (2) must be read together, and that no discretion having been conferred on the Registrar under Section 21(2), the time-limit prescribed therein is equally mandatory as found in Section 21 (1). 3. The contention of respondents is that, Sections 2l(l) and (2) must be read together, and that no discretion having been conferred on the Registrar under Section 21(2), the time-limit prescribed therein is equally mandatory as found in Section 21 (1). 3. When no outer limit is prescribed under Section 21(2), it necessarily enables the Registrar to extend time, as found in Section 101(l). Once a sufficient cause is shown for extending time for doing any act, in such of those instances where no time is expressly provided in the Act, then subject to such conditions as he may think fit, he can extend the time. The expression 'not being a time expressly provided in the Act' is referable to the outer time limit provided under the Act. If no such outer time for compliance with the provisions of the Act is stipulated, then Section 101 (1) has to be read along with that section. Hence on this point alone, the writ petitioner succeeds. 4. Yet, he would point out quite rightly, that there is an obligation on the part of the Registrar when he had come to know that the petitioner is in default in filing the counter statement, to call upon him to remedy the default within a specified time, and in the event of non-compliance with such directive, then it would necessarily get abandoned. This aspect was also not taken into account by the first respondent. 5. No doubt, respondents 1 and 2 have stated that, the only remedy available to petitioner is to file a fresh application. This is no answer, because when there is a provision to excuse the delay there is no need for petitioner to adopt such a procedure. It is not made out clearly as to what they mean by stating that petitioner could file a fresh application when it is expected to file only a counter-statement. When the right to file a counter-statement had been already lost, how then it could file a fresh counter-statement has not been satisfactorily explained. 6. Learned the documents that have been filed by the plaintiff for the purposes of showing that the name "Apple Computers" has become associated in the mind of the public in America, internationally, and even in India, with the computers which have been made by the plaintiff company. Mr. Shankardas states that "Apple I Computer" was sold in a kit form. Learned the documents that have been filed by the plaintiff for the purposes of showing that the name "Apple Computers" has become associated in the mind of the public in America, internationally, and even in India, with the computers which have been made by the plaintiff company. Mr. Shankardas states that "Apple I Computer" was sold in a kit form. "Apple II Computers" were made as personal computers. Both the computers were well received by the public, with the popularity of the personal computers, even the largest of the companies, started manufactur counsel for the third respondent had relied upon Presentation Convent v. Corporation of Madras, (1985) 98 Mad LW 465, to claim that, unless extension of time is specifically provided for, there is no power in the Registrar to extend time in exercising his inherent powers. There is no question of any inherent power being exercised, because of the statutory power conferred under Section 101, which is required to be exercised by the Registrar; when this section has to be read along with Section 21(2), the rationale of the said decision has no application to the instant case. Section 23(3) is also referred to, but in the light of what has been already held, there is no need to refer to that section. 7. Learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 adverts to the decision in Jackson and Co. v. Napper, 1887 Reports of Patent, Design and Trade Mark Cases, Vol. IV No. 2, page 45, claiming that petitioner should go to Civil Court, but when power to condone defect is available in the Act itself, and as first respondent has misconstrued his powers, the impugned order is hereby set aside directing the first respondent to dispose of the application filed for condoning the delay on its merits. No doubt, third respondent would point out that the application has not been filed in the proper form. But this is again an aspect on which petitioner could be called upon to rectify the defects. 8. Hence, the writ petition is allowed. No costs.