JUDGMENT : R.C. Patnaik, J. - This is an application for the quashing of a proceeding initiated u/s 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the ground of pendency of a civil suit between the parties relating to the subject-matter of the dispute. 2. Being satisfied on a police report that a dispute likely to cause breach of the peace existed, a proceeding u/s 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ( hereinafter called 'the Code') was initiated by the Magistrate. Later on motions were made on behalf of the police for attachment of the property as there was likelihood on mutual assault and bloodshed. By order dated 28-2-1985, the Magistrate considering the situation to be one of emergency, directed attachment u/s 146(1) of the Code despite the contention that a civil suit between the parties for partition respecting the property was pending before the learned Subordinate judge, Dhenkanal in Title Suit No. 80 of 1984. 3. In this motion for quashing the proceeding, it is contended by Mr. M. Patra, the learned counsel for the petitioner that initiation of the proceeding u/s 145 of the Code during the pendency of a civil suit in respect of the very same property which is the subject-matter of the dispute u/s 145 of the Code was without jurisdiction and inexpedient. Though number of authorities were referred to, reliance is placed mainly on Champabati Dibyd v. State 25 ( 1959) C. L. T. 557 and Ram Sumer Puri Mahant Vs. State of U.P. and Others. Mr. M. N. Das, the learned counsel for the opposite parties, has sought to repel the submission urging that pendency of a civil suit without anything more does not oust the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to initiate a proceeding u/s 145 of the Code. He has referred to an unreported decision of this Court in Gharjugi Padhanen and others v. Radhika Majhiani, Criminal Revision No. 245 of 1967 decided on March 12, 1968 and Kubar Padhan v. Chaturbhuja Kuar and others 36 (1970) C. L. T. 689. 4. There cannot be an absolute proposition of law that pendency of a suit or institution of a suit or institution of a suit relating to the subject-matter in dispute u/s 145 of the Code would oust the jurisdiction of the Magistrate or denude him of jurisdiction either to initiate or continue with the proceeding u/s 145 of the Code. 4. There cannot be an absolute proposition of law that pendency of a suit or institution of a suit or institution of a suit relating to the subject-matter in dispute u/s 145 of the Code would oust the jurisdiction of the Magistrate or denude him of jurisdiction either to initiate or continue with the proceeding u/s 145 of the Code. Section 145 is primarily concerned with maintenance of peace or order. Chapter X in which Sections 144 and 145 occur contains provisions for maintenance of public order and tranquility. Section 145 clothes the Magistrate with jurisdiction when he is satisfied from a police report or upon other information that a dispute likely to cause breach of the peace exists concerning any land, by water or boundary thereof within his local jurisdiction. As it has been said, the powers are police powers of the Magistrate to maintain peace and tranquility. The consideration, therefore, has to be from that angle, without any theoretical slant. Action is taken to avoid breach of the peace, clash, bloodshed etc Therefore, pendency or Institution of a suit by itself does not render taking of action u/s 145 unnecessary. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case before him, the Magistrate has to decide whether or not any action under the Code is to be taken. And if he decides to take action then whether u/s 107, Section 144 or Section 145 of the Code. It would be inexpedient to lay any hard and fast rule. When there is a dispute likely to cause breach of the peace but the civil Court has not passed an order of restraint or injunction or made arrangement regarding the property by appointment of receiver, the Magistrate shall not lose jurisdiction to initiate a proceeding u/s 145 if the requirements of the provision are satisfied. Mere pendency or institution of a suit would not deny him jurisdiction. True, no doubt, there ought not to be two parallel proceedings in two Courts but the two parallel proceedings should be of the like nature If the civil Court has intervened by appointment of receiver or passing order of injunction or restraint, there ought not to be a parallel proceeding u/s 145, otherwise, there would be a vacum; peace and tranquility would be disturbed. Therefore, either the civil Court must take charge of the situation or the Magistrate. Therefore, either the civil Court must take charge of the situation or the Magistrate. I am fortified in this view by two decisions of this Court, one by Justice R. N. Misra (as his Lordship then was) in Ruber Padhan v Chaturbhuja Kuar. In the said case the proceeding was dropped by the Magistrate on the premise that relief was available from the Revenue Officer in the proceeding pending before him under the Orissa Land Reforms Act. On reference this Court observed : "It has now been settled on good authority that mere institution of a civil suit or a revenue proceeding the ultimate decision of which may be taken to be from a competent Court does not take away the jurisdiction of a learned Magistrate to institute a proceeding u/s 145, Criminal Procedure Code. The purpose for which provision for such a proceeding has been made in the Code of Criminal Procedure is well known. It is essentially to avoid the breach of the peace and, therefore, mere pendency of a suit for a revenue proceeding cannot be a substitute relief for such proceeding. In the circumstances unless there is an interim arrangement made by the civil or the revenue Court in the matter of possession by injunction or receiver the apprehension continues and notwithstanding the pendency of a civil suit or a revenue proceeding a Magistrate has jurisdiction to continue the proceeding u/s 145, Criminal Procedure Code............" To the same effect are the observations of Justice G.K. Misra (as his Lordship then was ) in Gharjugi PaIhanen v. Radhika Majhiani. He held : "....mere institution of civil suit would not necessarily result in dropping proceedings bereft of facts and circumstances as to Whether there was apprehension of bream of peace or not ..... The aforesaid views appear to be convincing and cogent. I follow the same. Now I would refer to the two dicisions which have been relied on by Mr. Patra for the petitioner. In Champabati Debya v. State. 25 ( 1959 ) C. L. T. 557. Narasimham C. J. observed that once a party had moved the civil Court for adjudication of his rights there has not point in starting a proceeding u/s 145, Cr. P. C. Either of the parties could move the civil Court for appropriate relief. Patra for the petitioner. In Champabati Debya v. State. 25 ( 1959 ) C. L. T. 557. Narasimham C. J. observed that once a party had moved the civil Court for adjudication of his rights there has not point in starting a proceeding u/s 145, Cr. P. C. Either of the parties could move the civil Court for appropriate relief. While so observing, however, in the last paragraph, on the submission that there was apprehension of breach of the peace till an order from the civil Court was obtained, he observed : "... The learned Magistrate may take such interim action, as he may deem advisable, till the parties apply to the Subordinate Judge, Puri, and obtain interlocutory orders for the preservation and management of the disputed property and the standing crops." The direction to the Magistrate has, therefore, diluted the rule. The primary consideration was preservation of the breach of peace and the Magistrate did not lose jurisdiction to take action until interlocutory orders for the preservation and management of the standing crops were obtained. This decision, in my opinion, does not support the contention of the petitioner. It is in line with Kuber Padhan's case The trump-card of Mr. Patra is a decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Sumar Puri Mahant v. State of U. P. and others, AIR 1985 S. C. 472. It does not lay down a ratio as Mr. Patra contends. It does not lay that a proceeding u/s 145 of the Code is without jurisdiction during the pendency or institution of a civil suit. To appreciate the observation, it is necessary to know the facts. A suit for possession and injunction on the basis of title had been dismissed and an appeal had been carried and was pending. It seems a proceeding u/s 145 of the Code was initiated during the pendency of the appeal. The initiation of the proceeding was challenged as without jurisdiction. In that context the Supreme Court observed : "...When a civil litigation is pending for the property wherein the question of possession is involved and has been adjudicated we see hardly any justification for initiating a parallel criminal proceeding u/s 145 of the Code. There is no scope to doubt or dispute the position that the decree of the Civil Court is binding on the criminal Court in a matter like the one before us. There is no scope to doubt or dispute the position that the decree of the Civil Court is binding on the criminal Court in a matter like the one before us. ..." Their Lordships further observed that perallel proceedings should not be permitted to continue and in the event of a decree of the civil Court, the criminal Court should not be allowed to invoke its jurisdiction particularly when possession is being examined by the civil Court and parties were in a position to approach the civil Court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during pendency of the dispute. They further observed that multiplicity of litigation was not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigations. The decision of the Supreme Court lays down the proposition on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. There the plaintiff had lost. Obviously the finding on the question of possession had gone against him. He had carried an appeal. It was, therefore, inexpedient that at his instance a proceeding u/s 145 should be initiated. 5. Once we consider that public order, peace and tranquility are the concern of the Magistrate, the matter cannot be left to the parties. The civil Court acts on the motion of a party. Neither of them might move the civil Court for an order of injunction or appointment of a receiver or for an interim arrangement. The situation emanating from the dispute between the parties cannot be brushed aside because 0f the inaction of the parties to move the Court. The Magistrate has therefore, to intervene. But as 1 have said, there cannot be any absolute proposition, the facts and circumstances would determine the approach. 6. I, therefore, decline to interfere. It is open to either of the parties to move the Court for an interlocutory order. Until an interlocutory order is passed or some arrangement regarding the property is made by the civil Court, the proceeding u/s 145 is not inexpedient or without jurisdiction. 7. In the result, the revision is dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed