JUDGMENT U.L. Bhat, J. 1. What exactly is the scope and effect of sub-s.(3) of S.47 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short 'the Act')? That is the question which arises for consideration in this original petition. 2. Ext. P1 is a notification issued by the R.T.A., Malappuram under Sec, 57 (2) of the Act inviting applications for issue of regular stage carriage permits to ply on several routes mentioned therein, one of the routes being Karakkad Mukkilapeedika - changaramkulam. Petitioner, third respondent and two others submitted applications. R. T. A. considered the applications and decided to grant permit to one of the applicants, P. Sadaka Haji. R. T. A. felt that there was need for one more permit on the route to run on the opposite direction so as to cater to the needs of the pilgrims visiting Kannenkavu temple. Additional permit was granted to petitioner herein and the other applications were rejected. R. T. A. directed the secretary to settle the timings in a conference. Ext. P2 is a copy of the proceedings of the R. T. A. Third respondent, who is a regular stage carriage operator on the route Kuttipuram - Kunnamkulam (it is said that the two routes are common for the some distance) filed M. V. A. R. P. 270/84 before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal challenging only the grant of permit to the petitioner S.T.A.T under Ext. P4 order set aside the decision of the R.T.A. to grant additional permit to the petitioner on the ground that the R.T.A had limited the grant of permits to one and under S.47(3) of the Act it had no jurisdiction to grant an additional permit. This order is now challenged under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. 3. P4 order set aside the decision of the R.T.A. to grant additional permit to the petitioner on the ground that the R.T.A had limited the grant of permits to one and under S.47(3) of the Act it had no jurisdiction to grant an additional permit. This order is now challenged under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. 3. Main contentions of learned counsel for the petitioner are the S.47(3) of the Act would not apply to the facts of the case that R.T.A had not placed any limitation on the number of permits to be issued that determination of number of permits to be issued at a particular time is different from limitation of permits and in the particular case there was no such limitation placed by the R.T.A. Learned counsel also contended that P. Sadaka Haji, the successful applicant was a necessary party to the revision and an revision could not have been allowed in his absence, that the petitioner could at best have grievance about timings and since timings have been settled, the Tribunal should not have interfered. Learned counsel also invited my attention to sub-s.(2) of S.134 of the Act and contended that there might have been irregularity or error in the proceedings of the R.T.A. but since it had not occasioned failure of justice the Tribunal should not have interfered. 4. S.46, 48 and 57 contain the scheme relating to grant of permits, so far as it relates to controversies arising in this case. S.46 deals with application for stage carriage permit. Applications should contain particulars mentioned in the section. S.47 deals with procedure of R.T.A. in considering application for stage carriage permit. The matters have to be taken into consideration as set out in sub-s.(1). The section also contains provisions relating to preferences and reservations Sub-s.(3) states that R. T. A. may, having regard to the matters mentioned in sub-s.(1) limit the number of stage carriages generally or of any specified type for which stage carriage permits maybe granted in the region or in any specified area or on any specified route within the region. S.48 deals with grant of stage carriage permits. S.48 deals with grant of stage carriage permits. Sub-s.(1) states that subject to the provisions of S.47 R.T.A. may, on an application made to it under S.46 grant a stage carriage permit in accordance with the application or with such modifications as it deems fit or refuse to grant such a permit. Sub-s.(3) deals with the conditions which could be attached to the permit. S.57 relates to the procedure in applying for and granting permits. It is unnecessary to go into the details of the procedure. Proviso to sub-s.(3) states, inter alia, that if the grant of any permit in accordance with the application or with modification would have the effect of increasing the number of vehicles operating in the region or in any area or on any route within the region under the class of permits to which the application relates, beyond the limit fixed in that behalf under sub-s.(3) of S.47 R.T.A. may summarily refuse the application without following the procedure laid down in the sub-section. Exact scope and effect of S.47(3) of the Act has been considered by the Supreme court in Abdul Mateen v. Raht Kailash ( AIR 1963 SC 64 ) R. O. Naid v. Addl. S.T.A.T. Madras (AIR 1969 AC 1130) Mohd Ibrahim v. S.T.A. Tribunal, Madras ( AIR 1970 SC 1542 ) M.S.R.T Corporation v. S.T. Authority, Bombay ( AIR 1972 SC 2110 ) and Gajendra Transport v. Anamallias Bus Transport ( AIR 1975 SC 386 ). 5. In passing an order granting or refusing permit, R.T.A. has to act subject to the provisions of S.47 of the Act. S.57 lays down procedure in applying for and granting permits. Power of the R.T.A. to grant permit is found in S.48. This power is subject to S.47. Sub-s.(3) of S.47 gives power to the R.T.A. having regard to matters mentioned in sub-s.(1) to limit the number of stage carriages in any region, area or route. When R.T.A. proceeds in the manner contemplated in S.57 to consider application for permit, it has to exercise its power subject to S.47. If the R.T.A. has limited the number of stage carriages under S.47(3) grant by it under S.48 has to be subject to such limit. R.T.A cannot ignore the limit. Of course, order under S.47(3) can be modified by the R.T.S in appropriate cases and in appropriate ways. If the R.T.A. has limited the number of stage carriages under S.47(3) grant by it under S.48 has to be subject to such limit. R.T.A cannot ignore the limit. Of course, order under S.47(3) can be modified by the R.T.S in appropriate cases and in appropriate ways. But modification is not a matter for consideration when R.T.A. is dealing with actual grant of permits under S.48. At that stage what R.T.A. has to do is to choose between the various applicants who may have applied to it under S.46. This is not a stage at which an order under S.47 can be reconsidered for not and has to choose between various applicants where there are more applicants than the number of vacancies that has been notified or where there are more applicants than the number of permits limited under S.47(3) Limitation imposed under S.47(3) has so much significance that proviso to sub-s.(3) of S.57 contemplates in limine, rejection of applications where the grant of any permit would have the effect of increasing the number of vehicles operating beyond the limit fixed under S.47(3) of the Act. Decision to fix the limit under S.47(3) must be taken prior to the consideration of grant of permits. The limit cannot be modified when R.T.A. exercise power under S.48. That is because when the power is exercised under S.48, it can be exercised only subject to S.47 including sub-s.(3) of S.47 R.T.A. has to fix the limit first and after having done so, consider the applications or representations. If decisions under S.47(3) and S.48 are taken together due consideration may not be given to public interest. Personal considerations regarding the applicants may dominate the consideration on the question of grant. The principle underlying S.47(3) is to remove elasticity of number of permits at the time of consideration of the applications. Normally, limit should be fixed before applications for grant of permits are invited under S.57(2) and in other cases before applications for grant of permit are published under S.57(3) so as to enable interested persons to make representations. Applicants and those who will make representations must have knowledge of the limitations so as to put forward their claims and contentions effectively. 6. Decision under S.47(3) could be evidenced by a formal resolution or order; however, it is not a mere matter of form but one of substance. Applicants and those who will make representations must have knowledge of the limitations so as to put forward their claims and contentions effectively. 6. Decision under S.47(3) could be evidenced by a formal resolution or order; however, it is not a mere matter of form but one of substance. Even without a formal order there could be fixation of limit. When there is dispute as to whether there has been such a limitation placed, it has to be decided as a question of fact by looking into the substance of the matter with reference to the records available. If on the records it can be spelt out that R.T.A had fixed the limit before considering the applications there is adequate compliance with he provisions of law. 7. Notification calling for applications for grant of permit may indicate the number of vacancies or the number permits to be granted. But that is not decisive of the fact that R.T.A. had previously fixed that number as the limitation to be imposed on the number of stage carriages for which permits are to be granted. The route in question is a new one. The Supreme Court in Abdul Mateen's case and Mohd Ibrahm's case has indicated that when a new route is opened for the first time and notification is issued calling for applications for such a new route specifying the number of vacancies, it would be reasonable to hold that the number of vacancies, is the number of stage carriages which are to be permitted to be operated on the route and the notification would only be issued on behalf of the R.T.A. calling for applications for the number fixed. In the former case, the notification referred to two vacancies and that was interpreted as indicating the limitation imposed. In the latter case, notification referred to a permit and that has been interpreted as imposing limitation for one permit. Determination of number of permits to be issued and limitation to be placed under S.47(3) are not the same. 8. With reference to the disputed route Ext. P1 calls for applications for the issue of "pucca stage carriage permit". In the normal course, this would indicate that R.T.A had limited the number to one. With reference to another route covered by Ext. P1 notification stated "issue of pucca stage carriage permit". 8. With reference to the disputed route Ext. P1 calls for applications for the issue of "pucca stage carriage permit". In the normal course, this would indicate that R.T.A had limited the number to one. With reference to another route covered by Ext. P1 notification stated "issue of pucca stage carriage permit". Absence of letter 'a' in the context of calling for applications has been commented upon by learned counsel for petitioner. I do not think anything turns on this difference R.T.A in Ext. P2 stated. "RTA feels that there is need for one more permit on the route .................. Hence one more permit is granted ..............." This would indicate that in the view of R. T. A, there was a limitation placed, earlier under S.47(3). Of course, it would have been open for the, petitioner to have requested the Tribunal to call for the records of the R. T. A. and examine the records to see whether limitation had actually been fixed. Petitioner did not do so. Records now available, namely, Exts. P1 and P2 would spell, out that R. T. A. had previously fixed the limit or number of permits to be issued in this new route as one. I am unable to agree that, the, view taken by the Tribunal in this behalf, is erroneous. 9. Learned counsel for petitioner has commented on the non joinder of P. Sadaka Haji in the revision petition before the Tribunal of course he would have been a proper party to the proceedings. But I am not able to agree that this Court should interfere, on that ground. 10. Learned counter for third respondent placing reliance on S.134(2) of the Act, contended that unless failure of justice is made out this Court should not interfere. Sub-s.(2) of S.134 states that no order made by a competent authority Under the Act shall be reversed altered on appeal or revision on account of any error omission or irregularity in the proceedings unless it appears to the prescribed appellate authority of revisional, authority as the case may be that such error omission or irregularity has in fact occasioned a failure of justice. This provision has to be read in conjunction with S.64 and 64 A of the Act. This provision has to be read in conjunction with S.64 and 64 A of the Act. S.64 deals with appeals S.64 states that any person aggrieved by any order as stated therein may file appeal to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, who after giving such person or original authority an opportunity of being heard, give a decision thereon which shall be final. The appellate authority has all the powers to give relief to which the appellant is found entitled. It could exercise all the powers which the R. T. A itself could have exercised. Scope of sub-s.(2) of S.134 is quite different. It does not affect the powers Conferred on, the Tribunal; under S.64 of the Act. S.134(2) has operation in a limited field. This provision deals with only errors, omissions or irregularity in procedural matters which might have been committed by an authority and is intended to make it clear that such error, omission or irregularity in procedural matters cannot the made a ground for interference unless there has been failure of justice as a result of such procedural error, omission or irregularity. I am fortified In this, view by a decision of this Court in Ittyachan v. S. T. A. T. ( 1959 KLT 64 ) facts of the present case do not attract sub-s.(2) of S.134 as no error omission or irregularity in the proceedings of the S. T. A. T. is set up. In the result, I find no ground to interfere with the order of the S. T. A. T. Original petition is dismissed but in the circumstances without costs.