JUDGMENT : G.B. Patnaik, J. - This is an appeal u/s 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act against the judgment of the Second Motor Accident Claims Tribunal directing the appellant to pay a sum of Rs. 10,000/- as compensation to respondents 1 and 2 who were petitioners before the Tribunal. 2. The son of respondents 2 and 3 aged about 3 years was killed being dashed by a motor cycle bearing No. ORG 4469 belonging to the appellant on 2-8-1976 at 5.30 p.m. in front of the Veterinary Hospital gate on Berhampur-Chhatrapur road. Respondent No. 3, Lingaraj was the registered owner of the vehicle and respondent No. 4 was the insurer of the vehicle. On the date of accident while the deceased was standing near the culvert on the morrum portion of the road, a rickshaw fitted with microphone was proceeding from Berhampur side towards Chhatrapur. The appellant came at a high speed with the motor cycle without blowing any horn and suddenly swerved to its right and dashed against the deceased boy who was standing near the culvert on the right morrum portion of the road as a result of which the boy received multiple injuries and ultimately succumbed to the injuries at the Berhampur hospital. The parents of the deceased boy filed an application before the Tribunal claiming compensation alleging that the accident was solely due to rash and negligent driving on the part of the appellant, Purna Chandra Senapati. Respondent No. 3, Lingaraj was added as a party as he was the registered owner and the Insurance Company was also made a party to indemnify the insured from the damage payable by him to the claimant. The claim for compensation was to the tune of Rs. 50,000/-. 3. The appellant in his written statement denied that the accident was due to rash and negligent driving of the motor cycle and according to him though he was driving the vehicle at normal speed taking all precautions, a rickshaw fitted with microphone was moving ahead of him. While he was slowly overtaking the rickshaw in front of the Veterinary hospital gate, the deceased boy all of a sudden rushed from the right side of the road towards the left. The appellant immediately applied brakes, but however, the deceased was so near the vehicle that he fell down on the pitch road. While he was slowly overtaking the rickshaw in front of the Veterinary hospital gate, the deceased boy all of a sudden rushed from the right side of the road towards the left. The appellant immediately applied brakes, but however, the deceased was so near the vehicle that he fell down on the pitch road. According to the appellant the vehicle never dashed against the deceased. He further took the stand that on the date of the occurrence, Lingraj (respondent No. 3) was the registered owner of the motor vehicle and he was driving the vehicle with permission of the registered owner and, therefore the compensation, if any is payable by the said Lingaraj and the Insurance company, respondent No. 4. 4. Respondent No. 3 Lingaraj in his written statement averred that by the date of occurrence the vehicle had already been sold to the appellant with effect from 2-8-76 and an application to the R.T.O. for transferring the vehicle to his name had also been made. Thereafter he had no responsibility as it is the appellant who was the owner of the vehicle. 5. The Insurance Company took the stand that in view of sale of the vehicle by respondent No. 3 in favour of the appellant, the policy which stood in favour of respondent No. 3 had lapsed and since the appellant had not insured the vehicle the Insurance Company could not be made liable to indemnify and damage or compensation which is payable by the appellant. 6. On these pleadings the learned Tribunal framed as many as five issues and on issue No. 2 recorded a finding that the accident resulting the death of the deceased boy was solely due to the rash and negligent driving on the part of the appellant in driving the motor cycle. On issue No. 3, the learned Tribunal came to hold that it was the appellant who was the owner of the vehicle with effect from 2-8-76 notwithstanding the registration book standing in the name of the respondent No. 3 and the transfer in question was complete upon payment of consideration and delivery of the vehicle to the appellant and, therefore, respondent No. 3 who was the registered owner could not be made liable to pay compensation. It was further held that since the policy in question lapsed after sale of the property in favour of the appellant having not insured the vehicle, the Insurance Company (respondent No. 4) cannot be made liable to indemnify the appellant in respect of the award of compensation made against him. On other issues, the learned Tribunal determined the quantum of compensation at Rs. 10,000/- which is in question. It is this direction of the Tribunal which is being challenged in this appeal. 7. Mr. Palit, the learned Counsel for the appellant, does not challenge the finding of the Tribunal with regard to the rash and negligent driving of the vehicle is question nor does be challenge the quantum of compensation. But he seriously challenges the conclusions of the Tribunal absolving respondent No. 3, the registered owner of the vehicle, as well as respondent No. 4, the Insurance Company of the liability to pay compensation. Mr. Palit contends that under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, a transfer of a vehicle becomes complete only when the transfer is effected by the competent authority in the Registration book. Until such transfer is effected, the registered owner is the owner of the vehicle in the eye of law and, therefore, if the vehicle meets with an accident at that point of time, then liability of the registered owner arising out of the provisions under the Motor Vehicles Act must continue. In other words, Mr. Palit contends that the registered owner's liability does not cease notwithstanding the transfer of the property in favour of another until the vehicle itself is registered in the name of the transferee and in that event both the registered owner as well as the Insurance company must be held liable to pay compensation. Mr. Palit next contends that beneficial provisions have been inserted in the Motor Vehicles Act with the obvious object of protecting third party's interest in getting compensation if the vehicle causes accident and under the statutory provision it is the Insurance Company which has to pay the compensation though the owner of the vehicle causes accident. This intention of the Statute would be made nugatory if a dishonest owner joins hand with the Insurance Company and takes up a plea that by the date of accident the ownership had been transferred. According to Mr. This intention of the Statute would be made nugatory if a dishonest owner joins hand with the Insurance Company and takes up a plea that by the date of accident the ownership had been transferred. According to Mr. Palit, it is vehicle which is insured and when that vehicle meets with an accident, then the liability of the Insurance Company accruing under the Act must continue. 8. Mr. Basu, the learned Counsel appearing for the Insurance company, however, contends that transfer of ownership of the vehicle is not dependent upon the transfer of the name of the transferee in the registration book. It becomes complete as soon as the property passes under the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act and thereafter it is the transferee-owner who would be made liable if the vehicle meets with an accident even though the registration book of the vehicle continues in the name of the transferor. He further contends that the policy of Insurance is a contract between the transferor and the company and by the said contract the company takes upon itself the obligation to indemnify the transferor. After the transfer is effected, the contract of insurance lapses and, therefore, the Insurance Company cannot be made liable if the vehicle meets with an accident in the hands of the transferee. The rival contentions require careful examination. 9. Ext. B/2 is a receipt granted by Lingaraj, the original registered owner of the vehicle, in favour of the appellant, the transferee, on 2-8-76. that document clearly reveals that the title in respect of the vehicle passed on to the appellant on 2-8-76. Ext. A-2/2 is the zimanama executed by the appellant on 30-9-76 on execution of which the vehicle in question was released. It has been clearly stated therein that the vehicle which was seized belongs to the appellant. The appellant in his cross-examination candidly states that he has purchased the motor cycle from opposite party No. 2 (respondent No. 3 herein) for Rs. 7,000/- and Ext. B/2 is the true copy of the receipt granted to him by said opposite party No. 2 on the sale of the motor cycle on 2-8-76. This being the evidence, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the appellant is the owner of the vehicle on 2-8-76 though in the registration book the name of Lingaraj continues as the owner. 10. B/2 is the true copy of the receipt granted to him by said opposite party No. 2 on the sale of the motor cycle on 2-8-76. This being the evidence, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the appellant is the owner of the vehicle on 2-8-76 though in the registration book the name of Lingaraj continues as the owner. 10. Chapter VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act deals with Insurance of Motor vehicles against third-party risks. The provisions contained in the said chapter make insurance of a vehicle compulsory in respect of third-party or compensation from the owner or driver, who had no means to satisfy the Claims of the injured or the dependents of those killed, it was felt necessary to have the vehicles insured compulsorily against third-party risks and the provisions contained in the said chapter imposed duties on insurer to satisfy judgments against persons insured in respect of third party risks and further prevented the insurer from evading liability under the policy except in the case of bona fide accident and accidents due to the negligence of the third party. Thus the provisions contained in Chapter VIII ensure that third parties who suffer on account of the user of a motor vehicle would be able to get damages for injuries suffered and that their ability to get damages will not be dependent upon the financial capability of the driver of the vehicle whose user led to the causing of injuries and, therefore, the provisions of the statute must be so construed so as to ensure this object of the enactment. Section 94 of the Act requires that no person shall use except as a passenger or cause or allow any other person to use a motor vehicle in a public place, unless there is in force in relation to the use of the vehicle by that person or that other person, as the case may be, a policy of insurance complying with the requirements of this Chapter. The object of Section 94(1) is to ensure insurance of all vehicles which are to be used in public places so that if a third party suffers any damage due to the use of the said vehicle in a public place, he would be able to get damages for the same straight way from the insurance company and the recoverability of such damages would not depend upon the financial condition of the driver or the owner of the vehicle. Section 95 is the provision which casts duty on the insurer to satisfy any judgment against the persons insured in respect of third party risks. It is because of this provision in the Motor Vehicles Act, the Insurance Companies are being made liable to satisfy a judgment against the insured in respect of third party risks. I am not concerned in this case with other provisions of Chapter VIII. 11. One crucial question crops up for consideration is, what is insured ? Is it the motor vehicle or the person who is said to be the owner of the vehicle ? This question come up for consideration in the case of Geetabai and Ors. v. Hussainkhan and Ors. 1985 ACJ 44 before a Bench of Madhya Pradesh. The learned Judges in the said decision approved the ratio in Mohammad Ramzan v. Sharifanbai 1982 ACJ 445 (MP) which is to the following effect: If a vehicle is transferred by the owner thereof to circumvent any provision of law and the owner continues to remain the registered owner thereof and if the vehicle is also insured in the name of the registered owner and an accident is caused by the transferee or by a servant of or agent of the transferee in such a case if the law laid down in the English decisions cited by the learned Counsel for Banwarilal is followed, the registered owner is not liable. The insurer would also not be liable because the vehicle is insured in the name of the registered owner. In such cases great hardship would be caused to the injured or the dependents of the deceased because the transferee may be a man of straw and they may not be able to recover any compensation from him. The insurer would also not be liable because the vehicle is insured in the name of the registered owner. In such cases great hardship would be caused to the injured or the dependents of the deceased because the transferee may be a man of straw and they may not be able to recover any compensation from him. In my view in such cases the registered owner or the ostensible owner must be held liable for the negligence of the transferee or his servant or agent in the course of his employment or within the scope of his authority; because in transferring possession of the vehicle in contravention of the provision of law the ostensible owner most be deemed to have knowledge that the vehicle will be used by the transferee or his agent or servant and that they might use it negligently or rashly causing injuries to third parties. If with this knowledge the owner transfer the vehicle to circumvent any rule or provision of law there is no valid reason why he should not be held liable for the negligent act of the transferee or his servant or agent. The learned Judges after quoting the aforesaid observation further held : From the cases which have come up before us, we find that the tendency by the registered owners of the vehicles to transfer them by private arrangement without transferring the registration in favour of the transferees is on the increase. There is also the possibility of an unscrupulous owner of a vehicle to avoid his liability to pay compensation to the claimants claiming compensation on account of an accident caused by the vehicle. The principle of vicarious liability must be extended in such cases so that effective relief may be given to the claimants. In such cases there is no valid reason why the registered owner should not be held vicariously liable for the negligent act of the transferee or his servant or agent in driving the vehicle. In this case, it was further held that as the vehicle was insured in the name of the registered owner at the time of accident, the Insurance company also cannot escape its liability. it is this line of reasonings which Mr. Palit adopts in advancing his contention. In this case, it was further held that as the vehicle was insured in the name of the registered owner at the time of accident, the Insurance company also cannot escape its liability. it is this line of reasonings which Mr. Palit adopts in advancing his contention. On the other hand, there are series of authorities of different High Courts taking a contrary view mainly on the ground that a policy of insurance is a contract between the insurer and the insured. The moment a transfer of the vehicle takes place, the Insurance Company cannot be made liable if the vehicle causes any injury to a third party, since there is nothing in Sections 94, 95 and 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act which would make the insurer liable to indemnify some one other than the insured and it is on this line of reasonings Mr. Basu, the learned Counsel for the respondent relies. In the case of Shantilal Mohanlal and Another Vs. Aher Bawanji Malde and Others, where a Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court considered the aforesaid problem and came to the conclusion : In our opinion, neither the said Sections nor this decision of the Supreme Court support the contention raised by him. The policy of insurance is a result of a contract between the insurer and the insured under which the insurer agrees to indemnify the insured against the liability incurred by him. If it is in respect of a motor vehicle, then in view of Sub-sections (1)(b) and (5) of Section 95 of the Act, it must cover any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place and it must indemnify the person or classes of persons specified in the policy in respect of any liability which the policy purports to cover in the case of that person or those classes of persons. None the less the contract is between the insurer and the insured. The motor vehicle is no doubt the subject-matter of the contract and the liability which is sought to be indemnified is the one arising out of the use of that motor vehicle. None the less the contract is between the insurer and the insured. The motor vehicle is no doubt the subject-matter of the contract and the liability which is sought to be indemnified is the one arising out of the use of that motor vehicle. Since, still however, it is the person in whose favour the policy is issued is indemnified and not the vehicle. This is the position under the general law and we do not find anything in Sections 94, 95 and 96 which would make the insurer liable to indemnify someone other than the insured. Section 96 which casts a legal duty on the insurer to satisfy judgments restricts it to those judgments which are obtained against persons insured by the policy. Therefore, we do not agree with the contention that the object was the relevant provisions of the Act require us to construe the policy in the manner suggested by him. The learned Judges of the Gujarat High Court in coming to the aforesaid conclusion relied on the decisions in M. Bhoopathy (Died) and Others Vs. M.S. Vijayalakshmi and Another, ; Roshanlal Bhalla and Anr. v. Sudeskumar and Ors. AIR 1968 J&K 2 ; The South India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Purna Chandra Misra and Others, : Ind. Mutual Insurance Co. v. Vijaya Ramulu 1978 ACJ 366. The same view has also been taken by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Gulab Bai Damodar Tapse v. Peter K. Sundar 1975 ACJ 100 and in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thekkeyil Rajan and Others. Mr. Basu, the learned Counsel for the respondent also in support of the said contention places reliance on the decisions in Insurance Company Limited Vs. Vimal Rai and Others, ; Automobile Transport (Rajasihan) Private Ltd and Anr. v. Dewelal and Ors. 1977 ACJ 150 and New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Jolly Engineers and Contractors (P) Ltd. and Ors. 1985 ACJ 488 . In the case of P.K. Panda Vs. Smt. Premalata Choudhury and Others, a learned Single Judge of this Court considered this problem and held: The legal position is well settled that once there is a change or a transfer of ownership of the vehicle, the policy of insurance automatically lapses and the insurance company stands totally absolved from the liability to indemnify the insured. Smt. Premalata Choudhury and Others, a learned Single Judge of this Court considered this problem and held: The legal position is well settled that once there is a change or a transfer of ownership of the vehicle, the policy of insurance automatically lapses and the insurance company stands totally absolved from the liability to indemnify the insured. The learned Judge in the said case, has agreed with the conclusion of the Tribunal to the effect that change of registration u/s 31 of the Act is not a condition precedent for transfer of ownership of the vehicle and its absence does not make an otherwise valid sale as illegal or ineffective. 12. In view of the large number of authorities of almost all High Courts including this Court referred to earlier holding that a policy of insurance is a contract between the insurer and the insured in respect of the vehicle and lapses as soon as the insurer transfers the title in respect of the vehicle, and in view of the legal position that transfer of title in respect of a vehicle does not depend upon the transfer of the registration as contemplated u/s 31 of the Motor Vehicles Act as well as in view of the language used in Section 95 of the Act which is not susceptible to any other construction than a construction to the effect that under the terms of insurance policy the contract is to indemnify the insured against any liability at law incurred by him in respect of the death or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle, 1 fail to persuade myself to agree with the contentions raised by Mr. Palit. the learned Counsel for the appellant. 13. In the result, therefore, I do not find any merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case, there would be no order as to costs.