ORDER K.P. Singh, J. - This is a plaintiff's writ petition arising out of a partition suit under S. 176/182 of the U.P. Z. A. and L. R. Act. The plaintiff petitioner had filed a suit for partition of his share which was decreed by the trial Court and the judgment of the trial Court was confirmed by the first appellate Court and in second appeal an order was passed on 24-9-1974 to the effect that preparation of final decree would go on but the final decree would not be signed till the decision of the second appeal. Before the trial Court in a proceeding for preparation of final decree under S. 182 of the U.P. Z. A. and L. R. Act the defendant contesting opposite party preferred an objection which was rejected as is evident from the order of the trial Court dated 23-8-1975 contained in Annex. III attached with the writ petition. An appeal against the judgment of the trial Court at the instance of the defendant opposite party was dismissed as is evident from the order dated 9-3-1977 contained in Annex. IV. Thereafter the defendant opposite party preferred a second appeal. The second appellate Court has decided the claims of the parties through the impugned judgment dated 10-5-1978. Aggrieved by the judgment of the second appellate Court the plaintiff petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends before me that the second appellate Court has patently erred in observing that the first appellate Court had condoned the delay in preferring the appeal by the defendant petitioner. The second appellate Court has failed to consider the question of condonation of delay in preferring the first appeal by the defendant opposite party against the order under S. 182B of the U.P. Z. A. and L. R. Act on a wrong ground that the delay had been condoned by the first appellate Court in the circumstances of the present case. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the first appellate Court had observed that the appeal was barred by time and also decided the claims of the parties and held that the preparation of Kuras was correct and the appeal had no merits. Therefore, it was dismissed. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the first appellate Court had observed that the appeal was barred by time and also decided the claims of the parties and held that the preparation of Kuras was correct and the appeal had no merits. Therefore, it was dismissed. In short, it has been emphasised that the second appellate Court could not decide the claims of the parties unless it had examined the question of delay in the defendant's appeal against the judgment of the trial Court under S. 182B of the U.P. Z A. and L. R. Act. 3. Second contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the second appellate Court has patently erred in dismissing the plaintiffs suit under S. 176 of the U.P. Z. A. and L. R. Act on the ground that the plaintiff petitioner was not recorded in revenue records so he could not maintain the suit for partition under S. 176 of the Act. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner even an unrecorded co-tenure holder can maintain a suit for partition under S. 176 of the U.P. Z. A. and L. R. Act. 4. The learned Counsel for the defendant contesting opposite parties has tried to support the impugned judgment. According to him the first appellate Court had condoned the delay and had proceeded to hear the appeal on merits, therefore, the observations made by the second appellate Court in the impugned judgment were fully justified. No exception can be taken to the impugned judgment which does not suffer from any error of law. He also submitted that the plaintiff petitioner being unrecorded cotenure holder could not maintain the suit for partition under S. 176 of the Act. It was incumbent upon the plaintiff petitioner to have sought a relief for declaration under S. 229B of the Act and the second appellate Court was justified in rendering the impugned judgment. He has placed reliance upon the ruling reported in 1983 Rev Dec 179 (BR) (FB), Darshan Singh v. Kanwar Singh for the proposition that it was incumbent for the plaintiff petitioner to seek relief of declaration under S. 229B of the Act in the circumstances of the present case. He has placed reliance upon the ruling reported in 1983 Rev Dec 179 (BR) (FB), Darshan Singh v. Kanwar Singh for the proposition that it was incumbent for the plaintiff petitioner to seek relief of declaration under S. 229B of the Act in the circumstances of the present case. The learned counsel for the defendant opposite party has also invited my attention to the ruling reported in AIR 1982 SC 18 : 1981 All LJ 1344, Wadhyamal v. Prem Chand Jain for his contention that the second appellate Court had condoned the delay and was fully justified in dealing with the claims of the parties on merits. He has also placed reliance upon the ruling reported in AIR 1971 SC 1531 , Bachan Singh v. Gauri Shankar and has contended that on the mere possibility of raising a question of law this Court would not be justified in interfering with the impugned judgment. 5. I have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. I find that the second appellate Court has not approached the problems between the parties from correct angle, hence its judgment deserves to be quashed. The fact is that there were two appeals before the second appellate Court one against the preliminary decree and the other against the final decree but the statement of facts given by the second appellate Court does not indicate that the second appellate Court was conscious of the pendency of two appeals and the points involved in those two appeals. The perusal of the impugned judgment indicates that there is some confusion in the impugned judgment. The question of limitation has been decided in connection with the appeal arising out of proceedings under S. 182B and thereafter the plaintiffs suit has been dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff could not get declaration of his title in a suit under S. 176 of the U.P. Z. A. and L. R. Act. In my opinion the approach of the second appellate Court to the problems between the parties is patently erroneous in the circumstances of the present case. It is well known that in a suit for partition the determination of the plaintiffs title to the subject matter in the suit is always involved. Without determination of the plaintiffs title in the subject matter of the suit, a suit for partition cannot be decided. It is well known that in a suit for partition the determination of the plaintiffs title to the subject matter in the suit is always involved. Without determination of the plaintiffs title in the subject matter of the suit, a suit for partition cannot be decided. Even in the ruling cited by the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party and reported in 1983 Rev Dec 179 (BR) (FB), Darshan Singh v. Kanwar Singh it has been suggested that the plaintiff could get his suit for division converted into a suit for declaration also and after giving reasonable time to the State under S. 80 C.P.C. the claims of the parties could be decided. Viewed from this angle I think that the second appellate Court has patently erred in dismissing the plaintiffs suit and in observing that the plaintiff should get his title as co-sharer in the land in dispute declared by a competent Court and thereafter should file a suit for partition. The second appellate Court has not given due consideration to the principle that multiplicity of suits should be avoided. Even in this litigation the second appellate Court could have asked the plaintiff petitioner to implead the State of U.P. and after giving reasonable time to the State of U.P. the claim of the contesting opposite parties could have been decided. In not doing so, the second appellate Court has patently erred in dismissing the plaintiffs suit. In 1967 All LJ 92 : AIR 1967 All 481 , Ram Das v. Board of Revenue, U.P. a learned single Judge of this Court has indicated that State of U.P. is only a pro forma party in a suit for partition under S. 176 of the U.P. Z. A. and L. R. Act. In 1967 All LJ 92 : AIR 1967 All 481 , Ram Das v. Board of Revenue, U.P. a learned single Judge of this Court has indicated that State of U.P. is only a pro forma party in a suit for partition under S. 176 of the U.P. Z. A. and L. R. Act. Therefore, the second appellate Court should have heard the State of U.P. after giving reasonable opportunity and should have examined whether the decree passed by the subordinate Court suffered from any illegality contemplated by the provisions of S. 331(4) of the U.P. Z. A. and L. R. Act read with S. 100 of the Civil P.C. The contention of the learned counsel for the opposite parties that this Court should not interfere with the impugned judgment on the basis of mere possibility of raising a question of law is not acceptable to me because the second appellate Court committed patent error in dismissing the plaintiffs suit without adhering to the dictum of law laid down by this Court in 1967 All LJ 92 : ( AIR 1967 All 481 ), Ram Das v. Board of Revenue, U.P. as well as it has failed to give due weight to the dictum of law that multiplicity of proceedings should be avoided as far as possible. 6. My attention has also been drawn to the ruling reported in 1970 Rev Dec 383, Ram Charan Singh v. Udai Narayan Singh wherein a learned Member had indicated that an unrecorded cotenure holder could maintain a suit for partition under S. 176 of the U.P.Z. A. and L. R. Act. It is noteworthy that the aforesaid case may not be of much help to the petitioner in view of the ruling reported in 1983 Rev Dec 179 (BR) (FB), Darshan Singh v. Kanwar Singh. The impact of the latter case of the year 1993 should be examined by the second appellate Court hereafter in the light of the dictum of law laid down by this Court in 1967 All LJ 92: ( AIR 1967 All 481 ). 7. As regards the contention of the learned counsel-for the contesting opposite party that the first appellate Court and the second appellate Court had condoned the delay, it is sufficient to observe that the second appellate Court has not specifically considered the question of delay and condoned the same. 7. As regards the contention of the learned counsel-for the contesting opposite party that the first appellate Court and the second appellate Court had condoned the delay, it is sufficient to observe that the second appellate Court has not specifically considered the question of delay and condoned the same. Rather, the second appellate Court has assumed that the first appellate Court had condoned the delay in preferring the appeal by the defendants against the judgment of the trial Court in proceedings under S. 182B of the U.P. Z. A. and L. R. Act. I think that the second appellate Court is not quite correct in making this assumption. A perusal of the judgment of the first appellate Court indicates that the first appellate Court held that the appeal filed by the defendants against the judgment of the trial Court in proceedings under S. 1828 was beyond time and it also dealt with the claim of the parties on merits. Therefore, a legitimate inference can he drawn that the first appellate Court had dismissed the appeal filed by the defendants on both the grounds, namely limitation as well as on merits. The second appellate Court could have examined the question of delay and could have condoned the delay in preferring the first appeal by the defendants after giving cogent reasons but it has patently erred in dealing with the question of delay on the ground that it would he assumed that the first appellate Court had condoned the delay in the circumstances mentioned above. To my mind, the inference drawn by the second appellate Court in this regard is not correct. The first appeal filed by the defendants in proceedings under S. 182B was dismissed on the ground of limitation as well as on merits. The observations of the second appellate Court in the impugned judgment on the question of limitation also appear to me suffering from patens errors of law. Therefore, the impugned judgment needs he quashed. The ruling cited by the learned counsel for the opposite party and reported in AIR 1982 SC 18 : 1981 All LJ 1344, Wadhya Mal v. Prem Chand Jain is inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case because the second appellate Court had not condoned the delay after applying its mind to the question of delay. The ruling cited by the learned counsel for the opposite party and reported in AIR 1982 SC 18 : 1981 All LJ 1344, Wadhya Mal v. Prem Chand Jain is inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case because the second appellate Court had not condoned the delay after applying its mind to the question of delay. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have indicated in the aforesaid ruling that the High Court was in error in not condoning the delay and they set aside the judgment of the High Court dismissing the appeal on the ground of limitation and condoned the delay but in the present case the second appellate Court has failed to consider the question of delay on a patently erroneous ground that it would he assumed that the first appellate Court had condoned the delay whereas the first appellate Court had observed that the appeal before it was barred by time. No doubt the first appellate Court also decided the claims of the parties on merits but that would not lead to an inference that the first appellate Court had condoned the delay. Rather, it would lead to an inference that the first appellate Court had dismissed the appeal on the ground of limitation as well as on merits. 8. In view of the above discussions, the impugned judgment appears to me suffering from patent errors of law and requires to he quashed. Accordingly I allow the writ petition and quash the impugned judgment and direct the second appellate Court to re-examine the claims of the parties in the light of the observations made above. There would be no orders to costs.