JUDGMENT N.N. Mithal, J. - Having lost in two courts below, the defendant has come in second appeal in a suit for specific performance of contract dated 9-6-1968 by which the appellants had agreed to transfer his land in favour of the plaintiff after acquiring Bhumidhari rights in respect thereof. 2. The defendant-appellant denied the execution of the agreement and set up transfer of the property in favour of the defendants second set. This prompted the plaintiff to file a suit after serving a notice on the defendant. 3. In the memo of appeal, the bar of S. 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act was not taken but the plea was allowed to be added at the time of admission of appeal. Later on the appellants once again moved an application for permission to argue this point which too was allowed, as the previous order was not then brought to the notice of the court. 4. As the record of the court below was reported to have been burnt down in a fire in the record-room of the District Judge, Allahabad, the parties reconstructed it and all the necessary documents have been included in the paper book. 5. The only submission made is that allegations made in the plaint do not meet the requirements of S. 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, and no decree for specific performance could be passed. 6. Section 16 corresponding to old S. 24 and has undergone drastic changes when in 1963 new Specific Relief Act was passed. For the first time provisions of S. 16(c) were introduced placing a bar on persons seeking specific performance. According to it no such relief can be granted unless the plaintiff averred and proved that he had performed or had always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract liable to be performed by him. We have, therefore, to examine whether this had been complied with. According to the plaint allegations, the defendant was owner of Chak No. 95 which he had agreed to transfer to the plaintiff for Rs. 3,000/- after consolidation operations were over and after he had obtained Bhumidhari rights in respect thereof. The defendant was paid Rs. 2,000/- at the time of the agreement when the plaintiff was delivered possession over the land. The remaining Rs. 1,000/- was agreed to be paid at registration. 3,000/- after consolidation operations were over and after he had obtained Bhumidhari rights in respect thereof. The defendant was paid Rs. 2,000/- at the time of the agreement when the plaintiff was delivered possession over the land. The remaining Rs. 1,000/- was agreed to be paid at registration. In paragraph 3 allegation was made that despite repeated reminders and in spite of cessation of consolidation proceedings, the defendant had failed to execute the sale deed as required by the agreement. The plaint thereafter proceeds to mention about his notice and the reply of the defendant dated 23-5-1973 that he had already executed sale deed in favour of his own daughter and son-in-law. The suit was soon filed on 28-5-1973. 7. As already mentioned, the defendant No. 1 denied having executed any agreement set up by the plaintiff. It was stated to be fictitious and he also pleaded bar of S. 168-A of U.P.Z.A. and L.R.Act. The transferee defendants also filed their separate written statement almost on the same lines but they also pleade that they were bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the plaintiffs agreement. 8. The provisions of S. 16(c) have been subject of consideration in several cases by the Supreme Court as well as by this Court and the legal position stands crystallised that the plaintiff in all such cases must aver and prove his readiness and willingness. It is also well established that there cannot be any straitjacket formula in which such allegations should be made and it would be enough if the necessary allegations are inferable from the language employed in the pleadings. All that is necessary is that the language used must indicate a continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the person seeking specific performance. The forms prescribed under Order VI of the Code are also for the mere purpose of facilitating justice and are not penal in nature. A learned single Judge of this Court in Tajjamul Hasain v. Farid Ahmad, 1984 All LJ 294 : AIR 1984 All 136 held that a literal compliance of the language appearing in Forms Nos. 47 and 48 of Appendix A of the Code was not imperative nor it is a requirement of law. A learned single Judge of this Court in Tajjamul Hasain v. Farid Ahmad, 1984 All LJ 294 : AIR 1984 All 136 held that a literal compliance of the language appearing in Forms Nos. 47 and 48 of Appendix A of the Code was not imperative nor it is a requirement of law. According to the facts of that case the plaintiff had asked the defendant to apply for permission to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and when the defendant had done so, the plaintiff asked him to execute the sale deed in his favour but without any effect. On the contrary the defendant transferred the property to the other defendants and despite plaintiffs request did not rescind it. From these plaint allegations the Court concluded that these allegations were sufficient to infer an allegation of readiness and willingness and thus compliance of S. 16(c) had been made. The appellant has relied on a Division Bench decision of Court in Jagarnath Misra v. Uma Misra, 1984 All LJ 1 and submits that this decision was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge who decided Tajjamul Hussain case (supra). In the Division Bench Case, the Court had found that even the agreement sought to be specifically performed had not been proved. It however, proceeded to decide whether the suit could still be decreed assuming that the agreement had been proved. In the judgment the relevant plaint allegation has been quoted and may be extracted as under : "That we the plaintiffs asked the defendant first set to execute the sale deed but he continued to prevaricate. At last the plaintiffs gave a registered notice dated 19-7-1968 with A. D. in which they made it clear that the defendant first set should execute the sale deed in their favour within a week and that the said notice was refused by him on 20-7-1968". 9. The Bench held that these averments were insufficient to show readiness and willingness for the purpose of S. 16(c) of the Act. 10. It is now well established that to meet the requirement of S. 16(c) the averments in plaint need not necessarily be in the same language as utilised in Forms 47 and 48 of Appendix A of the Code but only in substance the allegations must satisfy those requirements. 10. It is now well established that to meet the requirement of S. 16(c) the averments in plaint need not necessarily be in the same language as utilised in Forms 47 and 48 of Appendix A of the Code but only in substance the allegations must satisfy those requirements. A certain amount of freedom can always be exercised by the plaintiff in making the allegations suiting the requirements and circumstances of the case, yet what is essential is that the totality of the allegations must clearly bring out a case of readiness and willingness either expressly or at least by necessary implication. Willingness refers to the state of mind of the doer while readiness concerns itself with his promptness for action. The entire plaint though conspicuous by the absence of words "willingness and readiness" or its equivalent yet when read together clearly indicates the series of acts which impliedly show the willingness and readiness both. The averments about conduct of the plaintiff and the defendant throw much light to disclose the plaintiffs readiness and willingness. 11. In the instant case the agreement is dated 9-6-1968 and the sale deed was not to be executed until after final allotment of land during consolidation operation and on acquisition of Bhumidari rights in respect thereof. All this was required to be done by the defendant and during this period hardly anything could be expected from the plaintiff. On 8-5-1973 the plaintiff served the notice protesting against defendant's failure to obtain Bhumidari right and then exhorting him for transferring the land to him. The defendant in his reply of 23-5-1973 totally repudiated the agreement and the suit was filed within a week thereafter. A close consideration of these allegations would show that the plaintiff had always been ready and willing to perform the agreement. This readiness is required mainly in respect of those terms which are to be performed by the plaintiff. In my view, the terms of the agreement and other facts clearly distinguish this case from the facts of the case that was before the Division Bench. I find that there has been substantial compliance of S. 16(c) by the plaintiff. 12. The last question raised in this appeal may now be considered. It was urged that the suit for specific performance should not be decreed as the sale would be violative of S. 168A of the U.P.Z.A and L.R.Act. I find that there has been substantial compliance of S. 16(c) by the plaintiff. 12. The last question raised in this appeal may now be considered. It was urged that the suit for specific performance should not be decreed as the sale would be violative of S. 168A of the U.P.Z.A and L.R.Act. It is contended that the appellant was owner of Bhumidari land in this village which was less than 3.125 acres in area and was a "fragment" as defined in S. 3(8)(a) of the Act. According to him, since the agreement covered only two plots, the sale deed executed in pursuance thereof will result in further fragmentation of the appellant's holding which would be barred under S. 168-A. This contention, however, does not appear to be sound. S. 168-A reads as under : "168-A. Transfer of fragments-(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of any law for the time being in force, no person shall transfer whether by sale, gift or exchange any fragment situate in a consolidated area except where the transfer is in favour of tenure holder who has a plot contiguous to the fragment or where the transfer is not in favour of any such tenure holder, the whole, or so much of the plot in which the person has bhumidhari rights, which pertains to the fragment is hereby transferred. (2) The transfer of any land contrary to the provisions of sub-section (1) shall be void. (3) When a Bhumidhar has made any transfer in contravention of the provisions of sub- section (1), the provisions of Sections 167 and 168 shall, mutatis mutandis, apply." 13. The section prohibits transfer of a fragment in a consolidated area but this is subject to certain exceptions : (1) where the purchaser has a plot contiguous to the fragment, or (2) the whole or so much of the plot in which the tenure holder has Bhumidhari right which pertains to the fragment is thereby transferred. The present case will be covered by the second exception. From a copy of C. H. Form No. 45, it is apparent that Khata No. 96 consisted of two plots 109 and 114 having an area of 1 Bigha, 3 Biswa and 17 Biswansi and the whole of this area is covered by the agreement of sale. The present case will be covered by the second exception. From a copy of C. H. Form No. 45, it is apparent that Khata No. 96 consisted of two plots 109 and 114 having an area of 1 Bigha, 3 Biswa and 17 Biswansi and the whole of this area is covered by the agreement of sale. What is prohibited by this Section is a further fragmentation of an existing plot which has been consolidated during consolidation operations. When the entire plot as consolidated is transferred it does not result in any further fragmentation as the whole of it stands transferred to the new owner. In view of this, it is not possible for me to hold that the agreement would be hit by S. 168-A of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R.Act. 14. In the result, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs in this Court.