K. L. SHRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision petition is directed against the judgment dated 5. 1. 1983 passed by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Ujjain in Criminal Appeal No. 161 of 1982 whereby conviction of the petitioner under Sec. 9 (a) of the Opium Act, 1878 (for short the Act) and sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year and fine of Rs. 1000/- passed there under in Cr. Case No. 2063/75 of the Court of Addi. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ujjain have been maintained. ( 2 ) ACCORDING to the prosecution story as embodied in the first information report (vide Ex. P-4) recorded by the Town Inspector Harpalsingh (P. W. 4), Station House Officer Jiwaji Ganj, Ujjain, it was on the basis of information from an informer to the effect that Kamal Kishore, co-accused of the petitioner resident of Nal-Kheda (since acquitted by the trial Court) had with opium in an attache come to him (the petitioner) residing at Ujjain and was to attempt sale of the same to some one near Subji-mandi, cross-road that the machinery of the police was set in motion. Hariram Chouhan, Sub-Inspector Narcotics (P. W. 3) was also informed. Panchas were summoned and they all waited for the miscreants to come. Khayali Ram had also reached the spot. ( 3 ) AT 8. 45 p. m. the petitioner with an attache case in his hand, busy in conversation with Kamal Kishore was seen coming. They were apprehended and from the attache case 1 Kg. and 850 gms of opium was recovered. ( 4 ) AT the trial, the petitioner admitted to have been detained on the spot but denied that any opium was seized from him. Though Gabba (P. W. 2) the only Panch witness examined at the trial did not support the prosecution case that it was in his presence the opium was seized from the petitioner the learned Additional Sessions Judge maintained the conviction relying on the evidence of Khyali Ram (P. W. 3) the Narcotics Sub-Inspector and Harpalsingh (P. W. 4) the Station House Officer who stated that opium was seized from the possession of the petitioner. ( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner urged that the evidence of Khyali Ram (P. W 3) is wholly inconsistent with the prosecution story as laid in the first information report. ( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner urged that the evidence of Khyali Ram (P. W 3) is wholly inconsistent with the prosecution story as laid in the first information report. According to him it was he who had the initial information from the informer and it was at about 2. 00 a. m. that the petitioner was apprehended. ( 6 ) IT may be pointed out that Harpalsingh (P. W. 4) has stated that opium was seized from the petitioner at 9. 00 p. m. Gabba (P. W. 2) has testified to the presence of the petitioner at the relevant time. In the state of evidence it cannot be said that the conclusion that the petitioner was in possession of the opium is perverse. There is no reason for the petitioner being falsely roped in. On the material on record there is no scope for interference with the concurrent finding of fact in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. ( 7 ) THE petitioners learned counsel next contends that even according to the prosecution story, the opium belonged to Kamal Kishore, the co-accused and the prosecution has led no evidence to prove that the petitioner knew that the attache contained opium. He urges that in these circumstances, the petitioner cannot be said to have been in conscious possession of opium so as to be caught in the coils of Section 9 (a) of the Act. ( 8 ) THE contention aforesaid too has no merit and must be repelled. ( 9 ) SECTION 9 (a) of the Act provides that any person who in contravention of the Act or of rules made and notified under Section 5 or Section 8 of the Act possesses opium or any person who otherwise contravenes any such rule shall on conviction before a Magistrate, be punishable for each such offence with imprisonment which may extend to three years with or without fine. In the decision in Bisaulals case1 it has been held that no quantity of opium could be possessed without licence. ( 10 ) SECTION 9 - A added in the Act in its application to Madhya Pradesh provides for liability of the person in possession of opium and also the person on whose account he possesses it provided the latter knows or has reason to believe that the possession is on his account. ( 10 ) SECTION 9 - A added in the Act in its application to Madhya Pradesh provides for liability of the person in possession of opium and also the person on whose account he possesses it provided the latter knows or has reason to believe that the possession is on his account. ( 11 ) IT is clear that Section 9 (a) of the Act makes no reference to any proprietary right over opium. The word possess as used in the aforesaid Section was the subject of interpretation in the decision in Inder Sam v. State of Punjab2. The Supreme Court referred to several decisions according to which if possession of an article is made an offence, then there must be proof that the accused was knowingly in possession of the article and held that as a conviction under Section 9 (a) of the Act would involve some stigma, it has to be held that the Legislature has not intended to make mere physical custody without knowledge of an offence. It was held that knowledge is an essential ingredient of the said offence as the word possess as used in Section yea) of the Act connotes conscious possession or possession with knowledge. ( 12 ) AT this stage reference to Section 10 of the Act is necessary. Providing for a mandatory presumption it is in these terms :- In prosecutions under Section 9, it shall be presumed until the contrary is proved that all opium for which the accused person is unable to account satisfactorily is opium in respect of which he bas committed an offence under this Act. (emphasis supplied) The concept of presumption for possession is not new. It may be pointed out that illustration (a) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act 1872 clothes the Court with the discretion to presume in the event of unexplained recent possession of stolen property that the person in possession is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen. In the aforesaid decision the Supreme Court has held that by virtue of the provisions embodied in Section 10 of the Act it is not however for the prosecution to prove that the accused was knowingly in possession. This is what it observed in paragraph 18 of the decision: In opinion 5. In the aforesaid decision the Supreme Court has held that by virtue of the provisions embodied in Section 10 of the Act it is not however for the prosecution to prove that the accused was knowingly in possession. This is what it observed in paragraph 18 of the decision: In opinion 5. 10 would become otiose if it were held that prosecution must prove conscious possession before it can resort to the presumption envisaged in the section. As we said Section 10 proceeds on the assumption that a person who is in any way concerned with opium or has dealt with it in any manner must be presumed to have committed an offence under 5. 9 of the Act unless, the person can satisfactorily prove by preponderance of probability either that he was not knowingly in possession or other circumstances which will exonerate him. The burden to account will arise only when the accused is in some manner found to be concerned with opium or has otherwise dealt with it. (emphasis supplied) The following excerpts respectively from paragraphs 20 and 22 are also opposite: 20 The practical difficulty of the prosecution to prove something within the exclusive knowledge of the accused must have made the legislature think that if the onus is placed on the prosecution, the object of the Act would be frustrated. 22 It seems to us that by virtue of 5. 10 the onus of proof is placed on the accused when the prosecution has shown by evidence that the accused has dealt with the article or has physical custody of the same or is directly concerned with it to prove by preponderance of probability that he did not knowingly possess the article. ( 13 ) IN the aforesaid Supreme Court decision the accused took the endorsement of the Railway Receipt from the consignee and presenting it before the parcel clerk and obtained the parcel. There was no evidence that he was aware that the parcel contained any contraband substance much less opium. The Supreme Court confirmed his conviction as he was in physical custody of opium and had not known about it. He had totally denied having anything to do with the parcel. Similar is the stand taken by the petitioner in the present case. The conclusion that he was m conscious possession of opium is clearly on firm foundation. The Supreme Court confirmed his conviction as he was in physical custody of opium and had not known about it. He had totally denied having anything to do with the parcel. Similar is the stand taken by the petitioner in the present case. The conclusion that he was m conscious possession of opium is clearly on firm foundation. ( 14 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner next contends that in the context of the fact that about 10 years have rolled by since the date of the commission of the offence and the petitioner has already undergone about three weeks of the sentence of imprisonment imposed on him in addition to a few days of custody in connection with the said offence it is in the interest of justice that he is not sent back to the prison. I find that the contention has force. I am of the view that the ends of justice would be met if the sentence of imprisonment imposed on the petitioner is reduced to the period already undergone by him and the amount of fine imposed on him is enhanced to Rs. 2000. 00. Accordingly the sentence of imprisonment is reduced to the period already undergone and to a fine of Rs. 2000. 00 and in-default of payment of fine the petitioner shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. ( 15 ) IN the result with the aforesaid modification in the sentence, the revision petition is dismissed. Order accordingly. .