JUDGMENT B.N. Sapru, J. - The petitioner, Daya Shankar Dubey, asserts that he was selected for appointment as a Head Clerk in Kamla Maheshwari Arya Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Mirzapur, under a resolution of the Selection Committee dated 13-4-1977 and he was given an appointment order dated 19-4-1977. The petitioner's further case is that the committee of Management permitted the petitioner not to join immediately and kept the appointment in abeyance and the petitioner was ultimately permitted to join on 30-6-1977. 2. On 2-9-1980 the Secretary of the Committee of Management wrote to the Director of Higher Education informing him that the petitioner had been appointed under an appointment letter dated 19-4-1977 and the petitioner had joined on 30-6-1978. He was requested to fix the salary of the petitioner. The Director of Higher Education fixed the salary of the petitioner with effect from 1-7-1978. 3. The petitioner was suspended on the basis of certain charges on 6-11-1981 and charge sheet dated 25/26-11-1981 was served on the petitioner. The petitioner asserts that he was not given a proper opportunity to defend himself at the enquiry which is denied by the Committee of Management. The petitioner was given a show cause notice dated 13-4-1982 by the Committee of Management to show-cause why his services should not be terminated. A reply to the show-cause notice was submitted by the petitioner on 16-7-1982. 4. It appears that the Committee of Management decided to terminate the petitioner's services and sent a proposal as required by Statute 24.03 of the First Statute of Gorakhpur University (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Statute') for approval. The District Inspector of Schools through his communication dated 13-4-1982 asked the petitioner to explain certain circumstances in connection with the appointment to which the petitioner submitted a reply dated 27-5-1982. Ultimately the District Inspector of Schools by an order dated 25-7-1982 disapproved the proposed termination of the petitioner's services. 5. The Committee of Management preferred an appeal to the Regional Deputy Director of Education under Statute 24.03. The Regional Deputy Director of Education made certain queries from the petitioner and by order dated 30-10-1982 allowed the appeal of the Committee of Management and remanded the matter to the District Inspector of Schools to decide it afresh. 6. The District Inspector of Schools again by his order dated 3-12-1982 decided not to grant approval to the proposed termination of the petitioner's services. 6. The District Inspector of Schools again by his order dated 3-12-1982 decided not to grant approval to the proposed termination of the petitioner's services. The Committee of Management again preferred an appeal which was allowed by the Regional Deputy Director of Education by an order dated 7-6-1983 and proposal to terminate the petitioner's services was approved. The Regional Deputy Director of Education also made certain directions requiring the Management to refund the salary paid to the petitioner to the State Government. 7. This is the appellate order against which the present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner. 8. The order of the Regional Deputy Director of Education was followed by a resolution of the Committee of Management dated 13-6-1983 under which the petitioner's services were terminated. This resolution has been filed as Annexure-CA-1 to the counter affidavit. 9. The Regional Deputy Director of Education while deciding the appeal has held that the petitioner's appointment as Head Clerk was invalid. As far as the charges against the petitioner were concerned, the Regional Deputy Director of Education held all but one of the charges were not proved. The charge that has been found to be proved was of serious insubordination against the petitioner, 10. In paragraphs 29 and 30 of the Writ Petition it is stated that the petitioner was given no opportunity to present his case by the Regional Deputy Director of Education before he decided the appeal. 11. In the counter-affidavit filed by the Committee of Management this assertion is denied. It is, however, not disclosed in what manner an opportunity to present his case was given to the petitioner. There is only a general denial of the assertions made in paragraphs 29 and 30 of the Writ Petition. 12. The standing counsel who represents the Regional Deputy Director of Education, has not filed a counter-affidavit. He was required to produce the record of the Regional Deputy Director of Education pertaining to the appeal filed by the Committee of Management against the petitioner but he has failed to do so. 13. In the circumstances, the Court has no option but to find that the appeal was decided by the Regional Deputy Director of Education without issuing any notice to the petitioner and without hearing the petitioner. It is manifest that the order was made in violation of the principles of natural justice. 13. In the circumstances, the Court has no option but to find that the appeal was decided by the Regional Deputy Director of Education without issuing any notice to the petitioner and without hearing the petitioner. It is manifest that the order was made in violation of the principles of natural justice. It is true that Statute 24.04 does not speak of notice of appeal being served on the other side but it is implicit in that provision that the notice of the appeal is to be served on the person likely to be affected. The order, in appeal, therefore, cannot be upheld. 14. Sri A.K. Sharma appearing on behalf of the petitioner has urged that the Regional Deputy Director of Education had no jurisdiction in an appeal under Statute 24.04 to go into the question as to whether the petitioner had been validly appointed as a Head Clerk. 15. The grounds on which an employee can be removed from service are prescribed in Statute 35.01. The grounds are:- (a) Gross negligence of duties; (b) misconduct; (c) insubordination or disobedience; (d) physical or mental unsuitability in the discharge of duties; (e) prejudicial conduct to activity against Government or the University or the College concerned; (f) conviction by a Court of law on charge involving moral turpitude. 16. When an appointing authority takes disciplinary action under Statute 24.02 and proposes to remove from service an employee, it must necessarily find that the employee is guilty of one or the more grounds mentioned in Statute 35.01. When the appointing authority submits a report of its proposed action to the District Inspector of Schools under Statute 24.03, the District Inspector of School is, inter alia, required to find whether any of the grounds mentioned in Statute 35.01 exists. Of course, in coming to his decision, the District Inspector of Schools while examining the procedural aspect will also see whether the employee concerned has been afforded a proper opportunity of defending himself. The District Inspector of Schools will also have the authority to examine whether the proposed action is vitiated by mala fide or any other irrelevant factor. 17. An appeal lies against an order of the District Inspector of Schools to the Regional Deputy Director of Education under Statute 24.04. The District Inspector of Schools will also have the authority to examine whether the proposed action is vitiated by mala fide or any other irrelevant factor. 17. An appeal lies against an order of the District Inspector of Schools to the Regional Deputy Director of Education under Statute 24.04. It appears that the appellate powers of the Regional Deputy Director of Education are coextensive with the powers of the District Inspector of Schools and the Regional Deputy Director of Education while examining the order of the District Inspector of Schools in appeal is required to determine the very same circumstances afresh which the District Inspector of Schools was required to examine and decide upon under Statute 24.03. 18. Sri S.P. Gupta appearing on behalf of the Committee of Management has very strongly contended that in appeal it was competent on the part of the Regional Deputy Director of Education to determine whether an appeal lay to him against an order of the District Inspector of Schools and for the purpose of deciding this question it was open to him to go into the validity of the petitioner's appointment itself. He submits that it is open to the appellate authority to decide whether an appeal lay and in so deciding to decide all the questions connected with the maintainability of the appeal. This argument cannot be accepted. 19. Statutes 24.02, 24.03 and 24.04 of the Statute run as follows:- "24.02. The appointing authority referred to in Statute 24.01 shall have the power to take disciplinary action and award punishment against the class of employee of which he is appointing authority. 24.03. Every decision of the appointing authority referred to in Statute 24.02 shall before it is communicated to the employee, be reported to the District Inspector of Schools and shall not take effect unless it has been approved by him in writing; Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to any termination of service on the expiry of the period for which the employee was appointed: Provided further that nothing in this clause shall apply to an order of suspension pending enquiry but any such order may be stayed, revoked or modified by the District Inspector of Schools. 24.04. An appeal against the order referred to in Statute 24.02 and Statute 24.03 shall lie to the Regional Deputy Director of Education." 20. 24.04. An appeal against the order referred to in Statute 24.02 and Statute 24.03 shall lie to the Regional Deputy Director of Education." 20. Under Statute 24.02 the appointing authority only takes disciplinary action and awards punishment as a result of the disciplinary action. No punishment can be awarded in a disciplinary proceeding for any defect in the order of punishment. The record of the disciplinary proceedings and the proposed punishment are the subject-matter for examination by the District Inspector of Schools and, in appeal, by the Regional Deputy Director of Education. There is nothing in the Statute to show that any of the three authorities mentioned in Statute 24.02 to 24.03 can go into the question of validity of appointment of an employee of an institution. 21. Sri S.P. Gupta has further urged that the Regional Deputy Director of Education was wrong in exonerating the petitioner on all but one charges framed against him. It is unnecessary to go in this aspect of the matter. 22. Sri S.P. Gupta then urged that the conduct of the petitioner has been such as to justify this Court in not interfering with the order impugned under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is not for this Court to look into the correctness of the allegations made against the petitioner but for the appropriate authority. Since the Regional Deputy Director of Education has decided the appeal without notice to the petitioner, it is proper that he should examine the entire record of the case again after notice to the petitioner and give him an opportunity of having his say. 23. In the result, the writ petition is allowed in part, the impugned order of the Regional Deputy Director of Education dated 7-6-1983 (Annexure-18 to the Writ Petition) is quashed and the Regional Deputy Director of Education is directed to decide the appeal of the Committee of Management afresh after notice to the petitioner. Since the matter is old, the Regional Deputy Director of Education should try and decide the appeal within six weeks of the date of presentation of a copy of this order before him. The petitioner will be entitled to his full emoluments as a Head Clerk from the date of this judgment till the appeal is decided by the Regional Deputy Director of Education and further payment will depend upon his decision. The petitioner will be entitled to his full emoluments as a Head Clerk from the date of this judgment till the appeal is decided by the Regional Deputy Director of Education and further payment will depend upon his decision. This order regarding payment of emoluments to the petitioner does not fetter the discretion of the Regional Deputy Director of Education to make such orders regarding payment of emoluments to the petitioner for the past and in future. There will be no order as to costs.