K. P. MOHAPATRA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the order passed by the Special Judge (Vigilance), Sambalpur convicting the appellant under S. 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (referred to as the 'act') and under S. 409, I. P. C. and sentencing him to imprisonment of various terms and fines of different amounts with a further direction that the sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently. ( 2 ) THE brief facts of the prosecution case are that the appellant was serving as the Revenue Inspector of Tora within Bargarh Sub-division in the months of July and August, 1975. During those months there was a special drive for collection of land revenue and water tax from tenants. The appellant as the Revenue Inspector of the area was in charge of collection thereof. On 26-7-1975 he collected a sum of Rs. 50/- and again on 27-7-1975 he collected a further sum of Rs. 400/- from Ramesh Chandra Sahu (P. W. 5) towards land revenue and water tax. In July 1975 he collected a sum of Rs. 800/- from Gourishankar Sahu (P. W. 8) towards royalty of a Sairat. On 23-8-1975, he collected Rs. 500/- towards land revenue and water tax from Madanmohan Sahu (P. W. 9 ). The appellant also collected a sum of Rs. 300/- in two instalments from one Krushna Chandra Sahu towards land revenue and water tax. Despite receipt of the aforesaid amount of Rs. 2050/-, the appellant did not grant receipts to the payers. He did not reflect the receipts in the books of accounts. On the other hand, he misappropriated the entire sum of Rs. 2050/ -. Much later on 15-10-1976 he gave refund of Rs. 750/- through his successor Revenue Inspector, P. K. Sarangi (P. W. 6 ). Complaints were made against the appellant of misappropriation and F. I. R. was lodged by the Officer-in-charge, Vigliance Police Station, Sambalpur on 16-9-76. After close of investigation by the Vigilance organisation, charge-sheet was submitted against the appellant. ( 3 ) THE learned Special Judge framed charges against the appellant for offences under Ss. 5 (1) (c) and 5 (1) (d) punishable under S. 5 (2) of the Act and under S. 409, I. P. C. The appellant denied the charges. After close of investigation by the Vigilance organisation, charge-sheet was submitted against the appellant. ( 3 ) THE learned Special Judge framed charges against the appellant for offences under Ss. 5 (1) (c) and 5 (1) (d) punishable under S. 5 (2) of the Act and under S. 409, I. P. C. The appellant denied the charges. ( 4 ) DURING trial, the prosecution examined eleven witnesses including most of the persons who made payments to the appellant and also produced a large number of documentary evidence. After consideration thereof, the learned Special Judge found the charges established against the appellant and. Therefore, he convicted and sentenced the appellant as referred to above. ( 5 ) MR. P. K. Misra, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, strenuously urged that the prosecution evidence is full of discrepancies and improbabilities due to which it is unsafe to rely upon the same. Further, the sanctioning authority did not apply its mind before granting sanction of the prosecution according to law. Therefore, the conviction of the appellant is illegal and he is entitled to be acquitted. The learned Additional Standing Counsel, on the other hand, contended that the prosecution proved its case against the appellant to the hilt and the sanction order was not detective in law. Therefore, it is a fit case to uphold the conviction and sentence. ( 6 ) IN view of the contentions raised in appeal, the first point for consideration is whether the prosecution has been able to establish that the appellant being a public servant received various amounts in the months of July and August, 1975 towards land revenue and water tax and dishonestly and fraudulently misappropriated the same. First of all, I shall take up the question of misappropriation of Rs. 450/- alleged to have been collected from Ramesh Chandra Sahu (P. W. 5) on 26-7-75 and 27-7-75. P. W. 5 made a complaint in writing (Ext. 4) to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Bargarh stating therein that he made payment of Rs. 50/- and Rs. 400/- respectively to the appellant in the presence of Ramachandra Satpathy, Additional Tahasildar (P. W. 4) and B. C. Das, Nizarat Officer (P. W. 7 ). He stated in his evidence that in the last week of the month of July, 1975 he paid Rs. 50/- and Rs. 400/- respectively to the appellant in the presence of Ramachandra Satpathy, Additional Tahasildar (P. W. 4) and B. C. Das, Nizarat Officer (P. W. 7 ). He stated in his evidence that in the last week of the month of July, 1975 he paid Rs. 50/- to the Additional Tahasildar (P. W. 4) who in his turn made over the amount to the appellant. P. W. 7 was also present at that time. On the next day he took a loan of Rs. 400/- from one Babaji Sahu and paid the same to P. W. 7 who in turn gave the amount to the appellant. Despite demands, the appellant did not grant receipt to him. Therefore, he made the complaint in Ext. 4. On 16-10-1976 the successor Revenue Inspector, P. K. Sarangi (P. W. 6) gave him the receipts (Exts. 11 and 11/1) for Rs. 450/- and told him that the day, before, the appellant made over the sum of Rs. 450/- to him. After he got the receipts for the amount he had paid, he withdrew the complaint by the petition (Ext. 12 ). The witness was cross-examined at length and no material was brought out so as to discard his evidence. Ramachandra Satpathy, Additional Tahasildar, Bargarh (P. W. 4) was making the special drive for collection of land revenue and water tax. He stated that along with the Nazarat Officer, B. C. Das (P. W. 7), he had been to Tora on 26-7-1975 to persuade the tenants to make payment of land revenue and water tax. P. W. 4 paid a sum of Rs. 50/- on that day. The appellant told that on payment of the balance amount on the next day, he would grant the receipt to P. W. 5. On 27-7-1975, however he did not visit Tora. He identified Ext. 4 the complaint petition submitted by P. W. 5 to the Sub-Divisional Officer. On 15-10-1976 the appellant produced a sum of Rs. 750/- towards collection of land revenue from P. W. 4 and another named Krushna Chandra Sahu. He asked P. W. 6, the successor Revenue Inspector to prepare receipts in favour of P. W. 5 and Krushna Chandra Sahu and grant the same to them. In cross-examination he specifically stated that P. W. 5 paid a sum of Rs. 50/- to the appellant. No material was elicited so as to disbelieve him. He asked P. W. 6, the successor Revenue Inspector to prepare receipts in favour of P. W. 5 and Krushna Chandra Sahu and grant the same to them. In cross-examination he specifically stated that P. W. 5 paid a sum of Rs. 50/- to the appellant. No material was elicited so as to disbelieve him. P. W. 7 stated in his evidence that on 26-7-1975 he accompanied P. W. 4 to Tora to supervise collection of a land revenue and water tax. On that day P. W. 5 paid a sum of Rs. 50/- to the appellant towards land revenue. He went to Tora again on 27-7-1975 and saw that P. W. 5 paid a further sum of Rs. 400/- to the appellant towards land revenue. In the month of March, 1976 when he went to village Tora P. W. 5 complained that the appellant did not give any receipt to him in respect of the sum of Rs. 450/ -. Though he was cross-examined in detail there is nothing worthy of note to discredit his testimony. P. W. 6 succeeded the appellant as the Revenue Inspector of Tora. He stated that on 15-10-76 the appellant paid a sum of Rs. 750/- to him in the presence of P. W. 4 saying that out of the aforesaid amount. Rs. 450/- related to the payment made by Ramesh Chandra Sahu and the balance amount of Rs. 300/- related to the payment made earlier by Krushna Chandra Sahu. So on 16-10-76 he called P. W. 5 and gave him two receipts (Exts. 11 and 11/1 ). After receipt thereof P. W. 5 by the representation (Ext. 12) withdrew his complaint against the appellant. He also granted receipt (Ext. 13) to Krushna Chandra Sahu who by the representation (Ext. 14) withdrew his complaint against the appellant. This witness was also cross-examined in detail but nothing was elicited to disbelieve him. ( 7 ) THE next item of payment was in respect of Rs. 800/- made by Gourishankar Sahu (P. W. 8) to the appellant. P. W. 8 stated that he was the Secretary of Tora High School. On behalf of the High School, he had taken lease of a stone-quarry from the Revenue Department for a period of three years from 1975 to 1977. The appellant demanded a sum of Rs. 1300/- towards the second instalment, but he paid a sum of Rs. P. W. 8 stated that he was the Secretary of Tora High School. On behalf of the High School, he had taken lease of a stone-quarry from the Revenue Department for a period of three years from 1975 to 1977. The appellant demanded a sum of Rs. 1300/- towards the second instalment, but he paid a sum of Rs. 800/- to him in the month of July, 1975. The appellant promised to give the receipt subsequently but did not give the same. On demand he said that he spent the amount of Rs. 800/- and after receipt of provident fund advance he would make the necessary adjustment and issue the receipt. In cross-examination he admitted that in the School accounts the payment was noted. The accounts were, however, not produced. The managing committee did not accept the fact of payment and the amount has remained unadjusted. Okila Sahu (P. W. 3) stated that P. W. 9 paid a sum of Rs. 800/- to the appellant towards royally of the stone-quarry taken on lease on behalf of the High School. In cross-examination he stated that he went to the office of the Revenue Inspector to pay the land revenue but he did not take money with him. The evidence of these two witnesses do not inspire confidence for the simple reason that (i) P. W. 9 did not produce the best evidence, namely, the accounts of the School showing payment of Rs. 800/- to the appellant. (ii) he did not report this important fact in writing to the revenue authorities, and (iii) the supporting witness. P. W. 3 had no apparent reason to be present at the time of the alleged payment. Therefore, this part of the prosecution story has not found convincing support from the evidence of P. Ws. 9 and 3 the benefit of which must go to the appellant. ( 8 ) THE next item of payment was Rs. 500/-by Madanmohan Sahu (P. W. 9) to the appellant on 23-8-1975. P. W. 9 stated that in the months of July and August, 1975 the Tahasildar of Burgarh came to Tora for collection of land revenue. In order to pay the arrears he incurred a loan from Pabitra Pradhan, obtained Rs. 1100/- and paid Rs. 500/- to the appellant towards the arrear of land revenue. P. W. 9 stated that in the months of July and August, 1975 the Tahasildar of Burgarh came to Tora for collection of land revenue. In order to pay the arrears he incurred a loan from Pabitra Pradhan, obtained Rs. 1100/- and paid Rs. 500/- to the appellant towards the arrear of land revenue. The appellant did not give a receipt immediately and told that he would give the receipt later. He made a report regarding this fact to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Bargarh by Ext. 5. A deed of agreement (Ext. 1) executed by this witness on 23-8-1975 in evidence of the fact that he had incurred a loan from Pabitra Pradhan to the total extent of Rs. 4200/- was proved and admitted into evidence. Though he was cross-examined, his evidence was not shaken. Pitamber Sahu (P. W. 1) stated that he saw P. W. 9 making a payment of Rs. 500/- to the appellant in the presence of Pabitra Pradhan (P. W. 2 ). The appellant did not immediately give a receipt but stated that there will be a Faisala, whereafter he would give the receipt to the witness. Even though the witness was declared hostile, yet in his cross-examination he stuck to his version. Pabitra Pradhan (P. W. 2) stated that P. W. 9 took a loan of Rs. 1100/- from him and out of that amount, paid a sum of Rs. 500/- to the appellant towards land revenue and water tax. The appellant did not give a receipt immediately. He admitted that P. W. 9 executed the agreement (Ext. 1) in his favour. This witness was also critically cross-examined, but I do not find any material to discard his version. ( 9 ) THE next and last payment was in respect of Rs. 300/- made by Krushna Chandra Sahu to the appellant on 26-7-1975 and 27-7-1975. It is to be noted that Krushna Chandra Sahu had not been examined as a witness for the prosecution but, his representation (Ext. 3) made to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Bargarh was admitted into, evidence. In the said representation he stated that on 26-7-1975 he paid a sum of Rs. 80/- and on 27-7-1975 he paid a sum of Rs. 220/- to the appellant in the presence of P. Ws. 4 and 7. The appellant, however, did not give any receipt to him. 3) made to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Bargarh was admitted into, evidence. In the said representation he stated that on 26-7-1975 he paid a sum of Rs. 80/- and on 27-7-1975 he paid a sum of Rs. 220/- to the appellant in the presence of P. Ws. 4 and 7. The appellant, however, did not give any receipt to him. P. W. 4 stated in his evidence that in his presence Krushna Chandra Sahu paid a sum of Rs. 80/- to the appellant and promised to pay the balance amount on the next day. On 15-10-1976 the appellant paid Rs. 750/- to the successor Revenue Inspector (P. W. 6) for adjustment towards the payment of Rs. 300/-made by Krushna Chandra Sahu. He asked P. W. 6 to make the necessary adjustment and then grant the receipt. As already stated earlier nothing convincing was brought out in his cross-examination to disbelieve his version. On the other hand, he reaffirmed his earlier version that Krushna Chandra Sahu made payment of a sum of Rs. 80/- to the appellant. P. W. 7 stated that in his presence Krushna Chandra Sahu paid Rs. 80/- to the appellant on 26-7-1975. On 27-7-1975 he paid the balance amount of Rs. 220/ -. The appellant received the amount and noted the case in a list though the list has not been produced. He did not, however, state this important fact of payment by Krushna Chandra Sahu before the investigating officer (P. W. 11 ). P. W. 6 the successor Revenue Inspector stated that the accused gave a sum of Rs. 750/- to him on 15-10-1976 in the presence of P. W. 4 and said that out of the said amount, a sum of Rs. 300/- related to the payment made by Krushna Chandra Sahu. On 16-10-1976 he adjusted the payment and granted receipt (Ext. 13) in favour of Krushna Chandra Sahu. On receipt thereof Krushna Chandra Sahu wrote Ext. 14 so as not to press his earlier representation (Ext. 3 ). ( 10 ) THE collection registers which have been proved do not show receipt of the various amounts from P. Ws. 5, 9 and Krushna Chandra Sahu. There is clear evidence on record of the persons who made the payments to the appellant supported by documentary evidence and the evidence of public officers, such as, P. Ws. 3 ). ( 10 ) THE collection registers which have been proved do not show receipt of the various amounts from P. Ws. 5, 9 and Krushna Chandra Sahu. There is clear evidence on record of the persons who made the payments to the appellant supported by documentary evidence and the evidence of public officers, such as, P. Ws. 4, 6 and 7 to the effect that the appellant received Rs. 450/- from P. W. 5, Rs. 500/- from P. W. 9 and Rs. 300/- from Krushna Chandra Sahu but did not account for the same. It is unthinkable that all these presons formed an unholy combination to entrap the appellant for no apparent reason. The evidence of the prosecution as already discussed is convincing, save and except, very insignificant variations here and there which cannot be taken note of, because, whilst the occurrence was in the months of July and August, 1975 the witnesses were examined in 1979 and 1980. In such circumstances discrepancies were bound to occur. In consideration of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, I hold in agreement with the learned Special Judge that except the alleged payment of a sum of Rs. 800/- made by P. W. 8 the rest of the payment to the appellant according to the charges have been established beyond reasonable doubt. In this connection I cannot resist the temptation of quoting from the decision reported in AIR 1959 SC 1390 , Krishan Kumar v. Union of India. "it is not necessary or possible in every case to prove in what precise manner the accused person has dealt with or appropriated the goods of his master. The question is one of intention and not a matter of direct proof but giving a false account of what he has done with the goods received by him may be treated a strong circumstance against the accused person. In the case of a servant charged with misappropriating the goods of his master the elements of criminal offence of misappropriation will be established if the prosecution proves that the servant received the goods, that he was under a duty to account to his master and had not done so. If the failure to account was due to an accidental loss then the facts being within the servant's knowledge, it is for him to explain the loss. If the failure to account was due to an accidental loss then the facts being within the servant's knowledge, it is for him to explain the loss. It is not the law of this country that the prosecution has to eliminate all possible defences or circumstances which may exonerate him. If these facts are within the knowledge of the accused then he has to prove them. Of course the prosecution has to establish a prima facie case in the first instance. It is not enough to establish facts which give rise to a suspicion and then by reason of Sec. 106 of the Evidence Act to throw the onus on him to prove his innocence. "in a recent decision of this Court reported in (1983) 56 Cut LT 288, Md. Sabir Hussain v. State of Orissa, it was held that in a case where entrustment is proved or admitted, it would be for an accused person to account for the money entrusted with him and the prosecution may not be in a position to show as to how exactly the money has been misappropriated or converted by an accused person to his own use, but the evidence and the circumstances must lead one to a reasonable conclusion that an accused person in order to cause wrongful gain to himself or wrongful loss to another, has committed misappropriation. Since the appellant being a public servant received the amounts but did not account for the same though he was bound to do so, it cannot but be said that he was guilty of misappropriation. ( 11 ) EVEN though it has been found on the evidence adduced by the prosecution that the appellant received various amounts due to the Government from the prosecution witnesses, did not account for the same and misappropriated the amounts, it is yet necessary to consider the important aspect canvassed by Mr. P. K. Misra to the effect that in the absence of a valid sanction under S. 6 of the Act, the entire proceeding is null and void, as a consequence of which, the appellant is entitled to an acquittal. Indisputedly section 6 of the Act is of mandatory character [see (1981) 52 Cut LT 197 : (1982 Cri LJ 961), Republic of India v. Khagendranath Jha]. Indisputedly section 6 of the Act is of mandatory character [see (1981) 52 Cut LT 197 : (1982 Cri LJ 961), Republic of India v. Khagendranath Jha]. Trial of an offence under section 5 (2) of the Act is no trial at all due to want of valid sanction under section 6 of the Act. In 1971 S. C. D. 1126, Major Som Nath v. Union of India the Supreme Court held as follows :-"for a sanction to be valid it must be established that the sanction was given in respect of the facts constituting the offence with which the accused is proposed to be charged. Though it is desirable that the facts should be referred to in the sanction itself, nonetheless if they do not appear on the face of it the prosecution must establish aliunde by evidence that those facts were placed before the sanctioning authorities. "in AIR 1979 SC 677 , Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of Andhra Pradesh, the law with regard to sanction under S. 6 of the Act has been succinctly and lucidly laid down. It was held as follows :-"it is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that a valid sanction has been granted by the Sanctioning Authority after it was satisfied that a case for sanction has been made out constituting the offence. This should be done in two ways; either (1) by producing the original sanction which itself contains the facts constituting the offence and the grounds of satisfaction and (2) by adducing evidence aliunde to show that the facts placed before the Sanctioning Authority and the satisfaction arrived at by it. It is well settled that any case instituted without a proper sanction must fail because this being a manifest defect in the prosecution, the entire proceedings are rendered void ab initio. because what the Court has to see is whether or not the Sanctioning Authority at the time of giving sanction was aware of the facts constituting the offence and applied its mind for the same and any subsequent fact which may come into existence after the resolution granting sanction has been passed, is wholly irrelevant. because what the Court has to see is whether or not the Sanctioning Authority at the time of giving sanction was aware of the facts constituting the offence and applied its mind for the same and any subsequent fact which may come into existence after the resolution granting sanction has been passed, is wholly irrelevant. The grant of sanction is not an idle formality or an acrimonious exercise but a solemn and sacrosanct act which affords protection to government servants against frivolous prosecutions and must therefore be strictly complied with before any prosecution can be launched against the public servant concerned. " ( 12 ) THE relevant portion of the sanction order (Ext. 19) is quoted below not only for easy reference but also to see if the Sanctioning Authority, namely, the District Magistrate, Sambalpur had applied his mind to the facts and evidence of the case before according sanction for the prosecution under S. 6 of the Act. "whereas it is alleged that Sri Baikunthanath Mohanty while functioning as Revenue inspector, Tora Revenue Circle under Bargarh Tahsil Office during the period from 12-7-70 to 26-10-75 collected arrear of land revenue, water tax and Sairat dues amounting to Rs. 2050/- in village Tora from Sri Ramesh Chandra Sahu, Krishna Chandra Sahu, Madan Mohan Sahu and Gouri Shankar Sahu in July August 75 but did not issue receipts to them for the amounts collected. The said Baikunthanath Mohanty did not deposit the amount on Govt. account nor made entry in the concerned records regarding these collections and misappropriated the same. x x x x x x and whereas I, Sri Surendra Nath Khuntia, I. A. S. (Name and Designation of the sanctioning authority to be noted) being the authority competent to remove the said Sri Baikunthanath Mohanty from service, consider after carefully examining the material and evidence before me with regard to this report that the said Sri Baikunthanath Mohanty should be prosecuted in the court of law for the above mentioned offence. "according to the evidence collected by the prosecution, different prosecution witnesses paid different amounts to the appellant on different dates. Some of them made complaint before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Bargarh and the matter was enquired into. It is also on record that the appellant subsequently paid Rs. 750 and accordingly receipts were granted in favour of two persons who had paid amounts to the appellant. Some of them made complaint before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Bargarh and the matter was enquired into. It is also on record that the appellant subsequently paid Rs. 750 and accordingly receipts were granted in favour of two persons who had paid amounts to the appellant. A large number of documents were also seized to be used as evidence by the prosecution. In the sanction order no reference at all has been made in respect of the evidence both oral and documentary which the Sanctioning Authority considered before according sanction. All these evidence in the shape of statement and documents were in possession of the prosecution before sanction was accorded. Therefore, it was essential that all the evidence collected by the prosecution should have been placed before the sanctioning authority whose duty it was to peruse them and consider if it was a fit case for sanctioning prosecution under section 6 of the Act. But on perusal of the sanction order (Ext. 19) it would appear that bare facts were stated by the Sanctioning Authority and it did not even indicate that he had applied his mind to the facts of the case before according sanction. No other evidence was also adduced by the prosecution to prove that all the collected materials were placed before the sanctioning authority who after applying his mind and considering the facts of the case accorded sanction for the prosecution. This being the position, the conclusion is irresistible that the mandatory provision of S. 6 of the Act was violated and the order of sanction being invalid the prosecution and trial of the appellant under section 5 (2) of the Act is void ab initio. ( 13 ) THE next point for consideration is whether the charge framed against the appellant under S. 409, I. P. C. for the same cause of action can he sustained. Since the trial of the appellant for offence under S. 5 (2) of the Act is null and void, trial of the offence under section 409, I. P. C. is without jurisdiction. There are direct decisions in support of the aforesaid view. In AIR 1961 Patna 203. Ramautar Mahton v. The State, the appellant was charged for an offence under S. 5 (2) read with Ss. There are direct decisions in support of the aforesaid view. In AIR 1961 Patna 203. Ramautar Mahton v. The State, the appellant was charged for an offence under S. 5 (2) read with Ss. 2 (1) (a) and 2 (1) (c) of the Act and in respect of the same facts he was further charged for an offence under S. 409, I. P. C. The learned Special Judge acquitted the appellant of the charge under S. 5 (2) of the Act because of want of sanction under section 6 thereof. But he convicted the appellant under S. 409, I. P. C. , A Division Bench of the Patna High Court held as follows :-"the question which arises in the present case is whether the trial of the other offences can be held to have been without jurisdiction when the Special Judge convicts the accused for such an offence by the same judgment by which he holds that he was not competent to try the offence which he was trying under Sec. 7 (1) of the Act XLVI. In my judgment, the same result must follow. As the proceeding before the Special Judge in this case relating to the offence under Sec. 5 (2) of Act II was no trial at all due to the absence of a valid sanction, the Special Judge had no jurisdiction under Sec. 7 (3) of Act XLVI to try the offence under Sec. 409 of the Penal Code also. The trial for the offence, being without jurisdiction, is null and void. The appellant's conviction cannot, therefore, be upheld. Indeed, no order, either of acquittal or conviction, can be passed. The trial for the offence, being without jurisdiction, is null and void. The appellant's conviction cannot, therefore, be upheld. Indeed, no order, either of acquittal or conviction, can be passed. "on identical facts a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in 1963 (2) Cri LJ 556, Sahebkhan Umerkhan v. The State, relied upon the decision in Ramautar Mahton case (supra) and held as follows :-"it is clear from what we have discussed earlier that as there was no valid sanction to prosecute, the Special Judge, Rajkot District, did not get any jurisdiction to entertain the matter so far as the offence punishable under Section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is concerned, and that the learned Special Judge also had no jurisdiction to try the offence under Sec. 409 I. P. C. Since this is a question of want of jurisdiction, it is obvious that the entire trial before the Special Judge was vitiated and, therefore, the orders of conviction and sentence passed against the accused in both these cases must be set aside. We wish to make it clear that the accused it is being discharged and not acquitted as we have not gone into the facts or considered the merits of the evidence led before the trial Judge. "there are also three decisions of this Court reported in (1981) 52 Cut LT 197 Republic of India v. Khagendranath Jha, (1984) 58 Cut LT 1, Rajib Lochan Pradhan v. State and (1984) 58 Cut LT 53 B. K. Kutty v. State in which the decisions reported in AIR 1961 Patna 203 and 1963 (2) Cri LJ 556 (Guj.) (supra) were relied upon to hold that if the trial of an offence under section 5 (2) of the Act is void ab initio due to want of valid sanction, the Special Judge has no jurisdiction under section 7 (3) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 to try allied offences. In an identical case a different view, however, was taken in the case reported in (1983) 56 Cut LT 288, Md. Sabir Hussain v. State of Orissa. Although it was held that for want of valid sanction under S. 6 cognizance of offence punishable under Section 5 (2) of the Act could not be taken, yet it was further held that the prosecution under S. 409 I. P. C. could not be said to be invalid. Sabir Hussain v. State of Orissa. Although it was held that for want of valid sanction under S. 6 cognizance of offence punishable under Section 5 (2) of the Act could not be taken, yet it was further held that the prosecution under S. 409 I. P. C. could not be said to be invalid. While taking such a view, reference was not made to the earlier decision of this Court reported in (1981) 32 Cut LT 197, Republic of India v. Khagendranath Jha, as well as, the decisions reported in AIR 1961 Patna 203, Ramautar Mahton v. The State and 1963 (2) Cri LJ 556 (Guj), Sahebkhan Umerkhan v. The State. In the premises of the aforesaid settled position of law, since the trial of the appellant by the learned Special Judge for the offence under section 5 (2) of the Act is null and void, he lacked jurisdiction to try the offence under section 409 I. P. C. in respect of the same cause of action. ( 14 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, the order of conviction and sentence passed on the appellant cannot be sustained and are set aside. The appeal is accordingly allowed. Appeal allowed. .