Judgment :- NATARAJAN J. 1. The State has preferred these two appeals against the order of V. Ramaswami, J. in W.P. 4040 and 4041 of 1978. The said writ petitions wore filed by the first respondent in the respective writ appeals for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the acquisition proceedings relating to his or her lands for which notice of enquiry under S. 9(1) of the Land Acquisition Act hereinafter referred to as the Act, had been issued by the first appellant on 22nd September, 1978. The first respondent in the respective writ petitions sought the quashing of the acquisition proceedings on two grounds. The first was that the acquisition proceedings had been undertaken by the State Government on be half of the Government of India for the establishment of a Steel Plant, township and ancillary industries. A large extent of area was notified for acquisition, but subsequently the Government of India, the second respondent, restricted its requirements and did not want acquisition of the remaining extent of land that had been notified. But instead of de-notifying the lands the appellant had initiated proceedings under S. 9(3) of the Act in order to acquire the lands not required by the second respondent, for its own public purpose, viz., formation of ancillary industries to the Salem Steel plant. The second ground urged was that there had been long delay between the notification under S. 4(1) and the declaration under S. 6 on the one hand and the issue of notice for enquiry being held under S. 9(3) on the other. V. Ramaswami, J. sustained the grievance of the writ petitioners and allowed the writ petitions, and issued a rule for quashing the acquisition proceedings pertaining to the lands of the first respondent in the respective writ appeals. As against that order, the State has preferred these two writ appeals. 2. The contentions of the appellants are that even though the Government of India had restricted its requirements of land for the establishment of a steel plant, township and ancillary industries the State Government is entitled to acquire the remaining area of the notified lands for formation of ancillary industries for the steel industry as it is one of the public purposes for which the Government of India too had sought the help of the State Government to initiate acquisition proceedings. In so far as the delay is concerned, it is stated that the declaration under S. 6 bad been done without undue delay and as such the first respondent cannot complain about any delay in the passing of the award after enquiry under S. 9. 3. Before examining the merit of the contentions of the appellants, it is necessary to set out certain facts. For the purposes of establishment of a steel industry, township and ancillary industries, the Government of India wanted to acquire several thousands of acres of lands Hence in exercise of the powers conferred by Cl. (1) of Art. 258 of the Constitution, the President issued a Notification (No. 20/1/55 Judl (I) dated 14th May, 1955) entrusting to the State the functions of the Central Government under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 for acquiring lands for the purpose of the Union in this State. In exercise of the powers given to it, the State Government passed an order on 16th January, 1964 and in pursuance thereof a Gazette Notification was made under S. 4(1) of the Act, on 22nd January, 1964. A declaration under S. 6 was made about five years later, i.e., 8th January, 1969. Thereafter the Government of India was satisfied with the acquisition of a much smaller extent than was notified and established a steel plant, housing colony and ancillary industries, The remaining extent of land was not denotified. On 22nd September, 1978 the State issued a notice under Ss. 9(3) and 10 of the Act, informing the first respondent in the respective writ appeals that the award enquiry will be held on 16th October, 1978. Thus, it may be seen that the award enquiry was proposed to be held after more than 14 years from the date of the notification under S. 4 (1). That apart, the acquisition proceeding was sought to be continued for requirements of the State, viz., the appellants and not the Government of India. 4. Two questions fall for consideration in the appeal, viz., (1) whether the State Government will be entitled to avail of the notification under S. 4(1) and the declaration made under S. 6 of the Act, pertaining to acquisition of lands for the Government of India, for acquiring certain extents of land which are not required by the original acquiring authority? Two questions fall for consideration in the appeal, viz., (1) whether the State Government will be entitled to avail of the notification under S. 4(1) and the declaration made under S. 6 of the Act, pertaining to acquisition of lands for the Government of India, for acquiring certain extents of land which are not required by the original acquiring authority? and (2) Whether the attempt to pass an award more than 14 years after the notification under S. 4(1) will be permissible under law. 5. On the first question, it is not in dispute that the appellants have not issued a fresh notification under S. 4(1) of the Act. Therefore it follows that the attempt of the appellant to acquire lands is referable to the initial notification made under S. 4 at the instance of the second respondent, viz., the Government of India. It has also to be noticed that the proposed acquisition of land is not for formation of ancillary industries contemplated in the original scheme of acquisition, because, if the l ands were so required, the Government of India itself would have acquired all the extent of land that was required and would not have restricted the acquisition to a portion of the area notified for acquisition. Therefore, even though the words ‘ancillary industries for the steel industry’ are used in the notification under S. 9(3) of the Act, it has to be held that these ancillary industries are not connected with the establishment of the steel plant; nor are the ancillary industries integrally connect ed with the steel industry. Once this position emerges, then it has necessarily to be held that the State Government cannot take advantage of the notification made under S. 4(1) on behalf of the Government of India, and seek to acquire lands which were not required by the Government of India Even though the acquisition by both the Governments is for a public purposes it goes without saying that the public purposes are not one and the same and likewise the Governments acquiring the lands are not also one and the same. It is true that a notification has been made under S. 4(1) and the lands of the respective land owners in these cases were also included in the said notification. It is true that a notification has been made under S. 4(1) and the lands of the respective land owners in these cases were also included in the said notification. But, it has to be pointed out that a notification under S. 4(1) cannot constitute a deep freezer in which the lands contained in the notification can be kept in cold storage and taken out for acquisition and use for various purposes as and when the notifying authority deems it fit. In this case, the position is worse still. The original notification was on behalf of the Government of India and with reference to a project started by it. The continuance of the acquisition is sought to be done by the State Government for a public work not connected with the original purpose for which the lands were notified for acquisition. On that one ground alone, the acquisition proceedings have to be struck down and therefore rightly, if we may say so with respect, the learned single Judge has allowed the writ petitions and quashed the proceedings. 6. Mr. Raj Kumar, learned Government Advocate, would however cite the decisions of the Supreme Court in Aflatoon and others v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and others, 1 and Gulam Mustafa and others v. The State of Mahrashtra and others 2 and Mangal Oram and others v. State of Orissa and another, 3 to contend that once a valid notification has been made under S. 4(1) and the notification is not challenged, then it will not be open to the owner of the land to complain about the acquisition proceedings merely on the ground that the acquired land had been utilised for some other purpose instead of the original purpose for which acquisition was sought to be made. The authorities cited by the learned Government Advocate cannot lend support to the Governments stand in this case. Those are cases where acquisition proceedings had been completed. Long thereafter, a portion of the acquired lands bad been handed over for collateral public purposes, and that was objected to by the landowners. The authorities cited by the learned Government Advocate cannot lend support to the Governments stand in this case. Those are cases where acquisition proceedings had been completed. Long thereafter, a portion of the acquired lands bad been handed over for collateral public purposes, and that was objected to by the landowners. The Court has held that since the acquisition proceedings had been completed, the owners will have no right to question the validity of the acquisition proceedings, several years later merely because a portion of the lands acquired had been given for utilisation of a public purpose not identical to the one contained in S. 4(1) notification. For example, in Aflatoon and others v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and others 1, an area of 34070 acres was acquired for a public purpose, viz., the planned development of Delhi. After the acquisition proceedings had been successfully completed, a certain extent of land wis given to co-operative housing societies for formation of housing colonies. In Gulam Mustafa and others v. State of Maharashtra and others 1, land had been compulsorily acquired on behalf of the Municipality for enabling it to run a country fair or market. After the acquisition proceedings were over, the unutilised portion of the land was sold by the Municipal Committee for formation of a housing colony In Mangal Oram and others v. State of Orissa and another 2 a certain extent of land was acquired for expansion of rail facilities to serve the steel plant at Rourkela Long thereafter some extent of land was handed over to the local authority for formation of link roads aod construction of bus stand, taxi stand and shops. It was on account of the fact that the acquisition proceedings were completed and the diversion of lands was for allied purposes, the Court refused to disturb the acquisition proceedings which had been completed long before. In the ins ant case, such is not the position. Except making a notification under S. 4(1) and the declaration under S. 6, nothing else has happened. Therefore, the appellants cannot legitimately contend that though the acquisition is for its own requirements and not for the requirements of the government of India, it is entitled invoke the original S. 4(1) notification and S. 6 declaration made earlier and proceed with the acquisition. 7. Therefore, the appellants cannot legitimately contend that though the acquisition is for its own requirements and not for the requirements of the government of India, it is entitled invoke the original S. 4(1) notification and S. 6 declaration made earlier and proceed with the acquisition. 7. As regards the second ground, we have already referred to the dates The award enquiry was sought to be held more than fourteen vears after the notification under S. 4 (1). The delay is inordinate and it will be wholly unjust to the first respondent in each appeal to receive compensation at rates pegged to the market conditions prevailing in 1964. In a similar situation, Mohan, J., in Sree Vigneeswarar Alagar-Perumal Devastanam by its hereditary trustee, etc. v. The State of Tamil Nadu by its Secretary, Housing Urban Development Dept., Fort St. George, Madras 9 and others , 3 sic , has held that to allow the Government to pass an award after an inordinate length of time (in that case it was 20 years) on the basis of S. 4(1) notification mace earlier would be making a mockery of the rights of citizens. We entirely agree with the view taken by Mohan, J., in that case. Therefore, on the ground of inordinate delay also, the appellants are not entitled to proceed with the acquisition. 8. For the aforesaid reasons, we affirm the order of V. Ramaswami, J., and dismiss the writ appeals with costs. Counsels fee Rs. 250 (Rs. Two hundred and fifty only) —one set.