Judgment :- These writ petitions seek to challenge the instructions to candidates with regard to admission for three years B.L. degree regular and evening course for the academic year 1985-86 and to quash condition No.8. Why I say condition No.8 is that though the prayer in the writ petitions is wide enough, the argument concerns only with condition No.8. To appreciate the argument of the petitioners, I may straightway extract the said condition: "Candidates who have passed the Bachelor’s degree examination in any faculty of the Universities in Tamil Nadu or an examination of any other University recognised as equivalent thereto by the Madras/Madurai/Annamalai/Bharathiar/Barathidasan University shall alone be entitled for admission to the course. In the case of a candidate having also a post-graduate degree, only marks obtained in the Bachelor’s degree examination will be taken into account. But where a candidate has passed a post graduate degree only without a Bachelor’s degree his/her Post Graduate degree will be treated as his/her basic degree for purposes of admission to the Law course and the marks obtained in the Post-graduate degree examination will be taken into account. NOTE: Candidates should furnish the marks obtained by them in the qualifying examinations. Otherwise only the minimum of the marks of the grades will be taken as the basis for determining the marks.” What is argued before me is that when the academic performance in graduation course is reduced to 300, persons like the petitioners who had become graduates long ago were not awarded the actual marks obtained by them in the examination, but they were given grades. While taking grades into consideration the minimum alone is taken for the performance. While the new set of graduates are awarded the actual marks for the performances in the respective examinations for graduation they score a decided advantage. Therefore, if these two grades are clubbed together there is a treatment of unequals as equals. The second argument proceeds more or less on similar lines, in that the science graduates have a decided advantage over those who had Arts subjects for the graduation course, because the science graduates will get much more marks than the Arts graduates. Therefore, if these graduates, irrespective of the nature of graduation, are clubbed together, here again unequals are being treated alike. Therefore, there are pronounced inequalities violating Article 14. Therefore, if these graduates, irrespective of the nature of graduation, are clubbed together, here again unequals are being treated alike. Therefore, there are pronounced inequalities violating Article 14. This is what is being criticised by the Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. T.P.Roshana, (1979)2 S.C.R.974= (1979)1 S.C.C.572= A.I.R.1979 S.C.765. “We are not impressed much with the surmise which colours the reasoning of the Full Bench and the learned single Judge that there is such substantial difference in the pre-degree courses and evaluations between the sister universities within the same State that the breach of Article 14 equal treatment of the marks unequally secured by examinees in the two Universities may be spelt out. It is trite law that every inconsequential differentiation between two things does not constitute the vice of discrimination, if law clubs them together ignoring venial variance. Article 14 is not a voodoo which visits with invalidation every executive or legislative fushion of things or categories where there are no pronounced inequalities. Mathematical equality is not the touchstone of constitutionality. This Court in State of J. & K. v. Trilokinath Ghosa, (1974) Lab.I.C.l= (1974)1 S.C.J. 366= (1974)1 S.C.C.19 at 42, A.I.R.1974 S.C.1 cautioned: “Mini classification based on Micro distinctions are false to our egalitarian faith and only substantial and straightforward classifications plainly promoting relevant goals can have constitutional validity. To overdo classification is to undo equality’. In the same, ruling there was a caveat entered by Chandra-chud, J. (as he then was) against a charter for making minute and micro-cosmic classifications. What is more, a large latitude is allowed in this area to the State to classify or declassify based on diverse considerations of relevant pragmatism, and the judiciary should not “rush in’ where the executive warily treads. The core question is whether there is such substantial differentiation between the two universities in regard to the ]pre-degree or degree courses and system of examinations as too glaring to imperil the equal protection clause. The presumption is in favour of the vires of legislative and executive action where Article 14 is the basis of challenge. The core question is whether there is such substantial differentiation between the two universities in regard to the ]pre-degree or degree courses and system of examinations as too glaring to imperil the equal protection clause. The presumption is in favour of the vires of legislative and executive action where Article 14 is the basis of challenge. We see no factual disparities disclosed in the Full Bench ruling’ to reach the result of substantial difference in the syllabi, in the pattern of examinations, in the marking system or in the choice of examiners so as to warrant invalidation on account of equal regard being accorded to the marks secured by the examiners from the two universities. We cannot forget that many colleges are run by the State or Institutional Managements where pre-degree or degree courses are undertaken. The teachers move from one University jurisdiction to the other, the teaching material is inevitably of a like nature, the subjects taught must ordinarily be alike. The examiners are usually drawn from within the State or neighbouring States. Even the composition of the academic bodies in the two Universities may have common members. The University Acts themselves are substantially similar. To surmise discrimination from possibilities is alien to the forensic-process in the absence of hard facts. We are aware that there are Universities and Universities that gross divergences among them exist affecting the quality of the teaching and the marking, the anomalies of grading and the absurdity or equating the end products on the blind assumption that the same marks mean the same excellence. But not glib surmises but solid facts supply the sinews of discriminatory inequality or equality. Going by vague reports, some backward universities and colleges have degenerated into degree dealers bringing rapid discredit to Indian academic status." 2. 1 have given my careful consideration to the above argument. I do not think that either of the grounds urged before me could be considered to be tenable. Condition No.8, which has already been extracted, clearly lays down that graduation is the basis for admission, in other words graduation is prescribed as eligibility for admission to the Law College. 1 have given my careful consideration to the above argument. I do not think that either of the grounds urged before me could be considered to be tenable. Condition No.8, which has already been extracted, clearly lays down that graduation is the basis for admission, in other words graduation is prescribed as eligibility for admission to the Law College. In so doing, if the persons like the petitioners when they passed, were given mark sheets with merely grades, certainly it is not possible for the Law College authorities to find out the actual marks gained by the petitioners in the examination, because supposing the grade is between 40 and 50, whether actually the petitioners obtained 41, 42 or 45, cannot be discerned from the mark list. However, if the pattern of the award of marks has been changed by the University itself and later on the University had chosen to enter in the mark sheets the actual marks obtained by each one of the graduates, certainly those marks will alone have to be taken into consideration. So long as all graduates of the petitioners’ type are treated as equals they cannot have any complaint on the score that the persons who passed later have their actual marks in the mark list and, therefore, they will have an advantage. It is not the proper way to look at it at all. On the contrary, as far as grades are concerned, the ruling is the minimum to be taken into consideration and as far as the actual marks are concerned, they alone shall be considered for the purpose of reducing them to 300. 3. As regards the argument that the Arts graduates cannot favourably compare themselves with Science graduates, here again the grievance seems to be rather imaginary. It does not matter for the purpose of admission into the Law College whether one is a Graduate in Humanities or Science subjects. If the petitioners have not been fortunate enough to score high marks in the graduation course, they cannot blame the system for that. There is nothing wrong with the system because, as I said above, all graduates, irrespective of the subjects, are treated alike. Equality does not mean arithmetical exactitude. If the petitioners have not been fortunate enough to score high marks in the graduation course, they cannot blame the system for that. There is nothing wrong with the system because, as I said above, all graduates, irrespective of the subjects, are treated alike. Equality does not mean arithmetical exactitude. Therefore, there is no discrimination at all, much less any pronounced inequality so as to invoke the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. T.P.Roshkana, (1979)1 S.C.C.572= (1979)2 S.C.R.974= A.I.R.1979 S.C.765. Consequently, I conclude that there are no merits in the writ petition . Hence this writ petition is dismissed.