JUDGMENT : B.D. AGRAWAL, J. 1. One Deo Narain was the bhumidhar of the land in dispute. On September 17, 1976, and April 24, 1980, there were registered deeds of sale executed purporting to be by Deo Narain aforesaid in favour of the Petitioners. The deed of sale dated September 17, 1976, pertains to land situate in village Atraila Shiv Gulam; the other deed of sale is in respect of certain plots situate in village Babura Bhairon Dayal. Deo Narain, along with his daughter, impleaded as Respondent No. 3, namely, Smt. Bhagwanti instituted Original Suit No. 161 of 1981 in *he Court of Munsif, Mirzapur, for cancellation of these deeds of sale on various grounds. Deo Narain died during the pendency of the suit on June 30, 1981. He died leaving his brother Jag Deo, but without the wife or a male issue. The question arose whether upon his death the suit had abated and it was also pleaded for the Petitioners (Defendants) that the civil Court did not have jurisdiction to try the suit. Preliminary issues were framed by the trial Court on this point. Both these issues were decided by the trial Court against the Petitioners on July 20, 1982, the revision filed by the Petitioners was dismissed on March 16, 1983. Aggrieved the Petitioners (Defendants) have approached this Court 2. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners raised two fold contentions in support of the petition. It was submitted in the first place that on the death of Deo Narain, his brother being the preferential heir u/s 171(f) of the UP ZA and LR Act (Act No. 1 of 1951) in comparison to married daughter, who is placed under Clause (g) and there being no application for the brother of the deceased seeking his substitution as a legal representative of the deceased, the suit could not be maintained by the surviving Plaintiff, namely Smt. Bhagwanti. The other contention is that there being averment in paragraph 7 of the plaint to the effect that the deed of sale dated April 24, 1980, may have been obtained from some imposter by the Petitioners, the jurisdiction lies in revenue Court since on that account the transaction could be void and not voidable. Both these contentions have been countered from the other side. 3. Both these contentions have been countered from the other side. 3. Taking up the issue of jurisdiction first, there can be no dispute that for adjudication thereof the averments contained in the plaint have to be taken in their entirety. The effort of the Court has to be to gather the pith and substance of what is alleged in the plaint. Considered in the light thereof it would be observed that in paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the plaint there is allegation in substance to the effect that Deo Narain was old and infirm; that his wife had predeceased; that he had no male issue; that he reposed confidence in the Petitioners and that the transaction impugned was secured taking advantage of his physical and mental infirmity. No doubt, in paragraph 7, it has been added that it is rumoured that some imposter was set up to execute the deed of sale dated April 24, 1980. But it would not be reasonable to divorce the averment contained in paragraph 7 from the rest of the plaint and to hold on the basis thereof alone that the jurisdiction rests in the revenue Court. Learned Counsel Sri S.P. Srivastava has cited in support of his contention my decision in Khamani Ram v. District Judge, Badaun (sic) Allahabad Civil Journal 617. That decision may have attracted in the instant case provided on the pith and substance of the plaint it could be said that the transaction impugned is claimed to be void. It is not difficult to discern that in the present state of pleading the predominent theme is that the transaction is vitiated on account of fraud or undue influence exercised against the executant. It is not only that para 7 of the plaint is confined to one out of the two impugned deeds of sale, the rest of the averments too suggest that the Plaintiffs' case has been that the transaction is voidable. The jurisdiction consequently lies in such a case, according to Khamani Ram's case (supra) as well, in the civil Court. 4. As regards the other submission of Sri Srivastava for the Petitioners Order XXII Rule 3 CPC runs as under: 3. The jurisdiction consequently lies in such a case, according to Khamani Ram's case (supra) as well, in the civil Court. 4. As regards the other submission of Sri Srivastava for the Petitioners Order XXII Rule 3 CPC runs as under: 3. Procedure in case of death of one of several Plaintiffs or of sole Plaintiff: (1) Where one of two or more Plaintiffs dies and the right to sue does not survive to the surviving Plaintiff or Plaintiffs alone, or a sole Plaintiff or sole surviving Plaintiff dies and the right to sue survives, the Court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased Plaintiff to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit. (2) Where within the time limited by law no application is made under Sub-rule (I), the suit shall abate so far as the deceased Plaintiff is concerned, and on the application of the Defendant, the Court may award to him the costs which he may have incurred in defending the suit, to be recovered from the estate of the deceased Plaintiff. 5. Of the two Plaintiff to the suit Deo Narain is dead. The right to sue subsequent to his death cannot be claimed to survive to the Respondent No. 3 alone. In so far as the land other than that covered under the deed of gift dated 13th October, 1980, is concerned, the legal heir in view of Section 171(f) of the U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951 is Jagdeo the brother of Deo Narain deceased and not the Respondent No. 3 (who is a married daughter of Deo Narain) and is placed in Clause (g) of Section 171. The deed of gift is in respect only of part of certain plots in village Babura Bhairon Dayal annexure 3 to the writ petition. This does not at all pertain to the land in the other village. In para 1 of the plaint this is only deed of gift referred to. There is no one else alleged in any part of the pleadings for that matter. It follows that upon the death of Deo Narain, the right to sue for cancellation of deed of sale dated 17th September. 1976 in respect of the land in village Atraila Shiv Gulam devolves upon his brother being a lawful heir and not the Respondent No. 3. It follows that upon the death of Deo Narain, the right to sue for cancellation of deed of sale dated 17th September. 1976 in respect of the land in village Atraila Shiv Gulam devolves upon his brother being a lawful heir and not the Respondent No. 3. There is no application by or on behalf of the brother to pursue the matter. In accordance with Order XXII Rule 3(2), therefore, the suit abates so far as the deceased Plaintiff is concerned in regard to the cancellation claimed of the deed of sale dated September 17, 1976. The right of the Respondent No. 3 the co-Plaintiff to sue is confined to her share in the gifted land to the extent the same has been transferred by sale under the deed executed on April 24, 1980. 6. For Respondent No. 3, learned Counsel urged that she is legal representative of the deceased within the meaning of Section 2(11) CPC being an intermeddler. In this capacity, however, she cannot have preference over the lawful heir who is the person in whom the right to sue in respect of the non gifted land survives. Deo Narain asserted his right to sue in capacity as bhumidbar of that land. Upon his death the bhumidhar would be his brother as per Section 171(f) of the U.P. Act 1 of 1951 and not the Respondent No. 3. The definition given to the expression legal representative' in Section 2(11) merely means that a person who intermeddles with the estate may also be treated as the legal representative. It does not mean that a person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased is to placed in preference to a person who is found to be the true legal representative of the deceased’s property. The law is settled that the inclusion of a person who intermeddles with the property of a deceased person into the definition cannot effect substantive right of the lawful heirs. The law is settled that the inclusion of a person who intermeddles with the property of a deceased person into the definition cannot effect substantive right of the lawful heirs. In Lalsa Rai v. Udit Rai AIR 1924 All 717 it was held: It is quite true that when a person intermeddles with the property of the deceased he is a legal representative of the deceased for the purposes of procedure to the extent of the property with which he has intermeddled, but I do not see any principle of law which makes him the representative of the deceased so far as succession to the property of the deceased is concerned. The definition of legal representative in the CPC is only for the purposes of procedure in instituting and defending suits. Any definition for the purposes of adjective law cannot alter the rule of substantive law and it is not easy to understand how the mere fact that an intermeddler is joined as a party to the suit for recovery of possession can make a decree in that suit in any way binding on the real heir who is not a party to that suit and who later on gets a decree against the intermeddler declaring his superior right. The same view has been taken in Suraj Prasad Vs. Mt. Lukher Kuer and Others, AIR 1939 Patna 117; Jai Kishan Dass v. Karimuddin AIR 1939 Lah 321. In the last mentioned case it is observed also that a person who intermeddles with the property of the deceased person has been probably included in the definition of the legal representative in the CPC merely to enable persons who wish to obtain relief against the property to proceed against it in the hands of such a person. As would presently appear, this finds support from the observations of the Supreme Court in The Andhra Bank Ltd. Vs. R. Srinivasan and Others, AIR 1962 SC 232 cited for the Respondents. The right to sue for the purposes of Order XXII Rule 3(2) cannot in my opinion be claimed to adhere in an intermeddler in preference to the lawful heir of the deceased under the relevant rule of succession and viewed in the light thereof it may not be doubted that the suit in the present abates so far as the deceased Plaintiff is concerned. 7. 7. Sri Sankatha Rai learned Counsel for the Respondents relying on The Andhra Bank Ltd. Vs. R. Srinivasan and Others, AIR 1962 SC 232 strenuously argued that a person who represents only a part of the estate of the deceased is also a legal representative within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the CPC This provision is undoubted. The contention in the aforementioned case was that the Respondents who were in possession of different pieces of property belonging to the deceased Raja Bahadur the judgment debtor, under the will executed by him could not be his legal representatives. The Supreme Court repelled this observing that the object of widening the scope of the expression 'legal representative' which Section 2(11) is intended to achieve would be frustrated if this interpretation were accepted. This moreover is not consistent with the position that persons who intermeddle with a part of the estate are legal representatives. In the words of the Supreme Court: Besides, if such a construction is accepted it would be so easy for the estate if a deceased to escape its legitimate liability to pay the debts of a deceased debtor only if the debtor takes the precaution making several legacies to different persons by his will. 8. This decision also is a clear pointer in the direction that the width of the dictionary meaning assigned to the expression "legal representative" in Section 2(11) is aimed to rope in those also intermeddle with different parcels of the estate of the deceased in order that no part thereof escapes being brought within the clutches of a decree. This, however, is not the question before us in the present. The issue is not as to whether the Respondent No. 3 is a legal representative of Deo Narain deceased-Plaintiff No. 1. Assuming that she is, the question is whether right to sue survives to her within the meaning of Order 22 Rule 3(2) CPC in respect of land other than her share in the land gifted to her and her sister by the father on 13th October, 1980. If as is manifest the right to sue in respect thereof inheres in the brother of the deceased who does not chose to pursue the suit, it is plain that, as against him, the Respondent No. 3, cannot assert her claim as a legal representative. If as is manifest the right to sue in respect thereof inheres in the brother of the deceased who does not chose to pursue the suit, it is plain that, as against him, the Respondent No. 3, cannot assert her claim as a legal representative. The Respondents therefore do not derive assistance from the decision in Andhra Bank Limited (supra). 9. The submission for the Respondents that cause of action for purposes of Order XXII Rule 3(2) CPC be construed as merely the relief sought for cancellation of the two deeds of sale is also devoid of merit. The "right to sue" which Deo Narain made the basis in the suit was the assertion that he is bhumidhar of the land in dispute part of which he gifted to his two daughters. That indeed constitutes the soul of the cause of action set up by him. Therefore, on his death the right to sue would devolve upon one who can claim to have become bhumidhar of the said land and in view of the rule of succession it would be the brother and not the married daughter vide Section 171 Act I of 1951 referred to above. This is not deciding the dispute upon merit as the Respondents' counsel apprehends but determining whether the suit has within the meaning of Order XXII Rule 3(2) abated in so far as the deceased Plaintiff is concerned. 10. Learned Counsel urged also that a person who is impleaded as a legal representative of deceased party can raise only such objection as could have been taken by the deceased party himself. He is confined to the pleadings and the case of the Plaintiff whose representative he is and cannot agitate in that suit his own claim against the other Plaintiff in the case though he may do so in any other proceeding This proposition is equally well settled and not disputed from the other side though the counsel cited authorities also in aid thereof vide 19 Indian Cases 255, Ismail Jolaha v. Jagannath (Allahabad), V.T. Elaya Pillai v. R.J. Goundan AIR 1947 Mad 165 , Kameshwar Singh and Others Vs. Chaudhury Rajbansi Singh @ Raja Singh, AIR 1943 Patna 433; Qulli v. Sawan AIR 1924 Lah 45, Mohd. Naina Maracavi v. Ammal AIR 1930 Mad 593 . The proposition is hardly of relevance of any avail to the Respondents. Chaudhury Rajbansi Singh @ Raja Singh, AIR 1943 Patna 433; Qulli v. Sawan AIR 1924 Lah 45, Mohd. Naina Maracavi v. Ammal AIR 1930 Mad 593 . The proposition is hardly of relevance of any avail to the Respondents. The attack against the right claimed by the surviving Plaintiff-Respondent No. 3 to pursue the suit in respect of land other than her gifted share is founded entirely upon what is pleaded in the instant case at the instance of the deceased Plaintiff. 11. For the discussion in the above, I find that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit. The suit has abated under Order XXII Rule 3(2) Civil Procedure Code, so far as the deceased Plaintiff is concerned. The surviving Plaintiff-Respondent No. 3 can pursue it in respect only of her share in the land claimed to have been gifted to her by the deceased father on 13th October, 1980 and to the extent it forms the subject matter of the impugned deed of sale dated April 24, 1980 The petition succeeds therefore in part and is allowed accordingly. In the circumstances there shall be no order as to costs.