JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE applicants-plaintiffs have invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under section U5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, aggrieved by an order passed by the First Additional Judge to,the Court of district Judge, Bhind, in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 9/1982, dated 18-8-1982. ( 2. ) IN short, the facts are that the applicants filed a civil suit before shri S. L. Bansai, Civil Judge Class II, Bhind. This was a suit for injunc-tion against Nagarpalika, Bbind. According to the applicants, they in the year J954-1955 obtained a temporary lease of a piece of land 8 x 8 in the market area Ater Darwaza, Bhind and since then they are carrying on their business in this land by placing a gumti upon it. They were served with a notice of eviction by the Municipal Council and, hence, they filed the suit and also prayed for temporary injunction. The prayer for temporary injunc-tion was refused by the trial Court, aggrieved by which they preferred an appeal before the First Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge. By the impugned order the appellate Court on 18-8-1982 dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved by that order, the applicants have preferred this revision. ( 3. ) SHRI R. D. Jain, learned counsel for the applicants, has contended that the applicants were dispossessed on 198-1982 at 4. 30 p. m. while the matter regarding grant of temporary injunction was being considered by the trial Court. The stand of the non-applicant before the trial Court as well as before the appellate Court was that they are widening the roads due to dis-proportionate increase in the population, and the gumti in question falls in the foot-path and is nothing but an encroachment. Thus, the plaintiffs were trespassers. Widening of the roads is for the smooth passage of traffic and is being done in the public interest. The finding of both the Courts below is concurrent. Prima facie case, balance of convenience and the fact of irreparable loss were not found by these Courts in favour of the applicants. According to the impugned order, the march of progress of the society and improvements for its well being cannot be stayed for the convenience of an individual, who is encroaching upon the land. According to the concurrent finding of fact, both the Courts below have held that the applicants are trespassers. According to the impugned order, the march of progress of the society and improvements for its well being cannot be stayed for the convenience of an individual, who is encroaching upon the land. According to the concurrent finding of fact, both the Courts below have held that the applicants are trespassers. Shri R. D. Jain, learned counsel for the applicants, has cited before me the case of Rama, 1973 MPLJ 973 = 1973 JLJ 914 . and also the case of Municipal Council v. Rameshwar, 1985 CCLJ 28 and plays that on the strength of these two decisions, this court exercising its revisional powers should pass a mandatory injunction and bring back the status quo ante. ( 4. ) I entirely agree with the propositions laid down in these two cases cited by Shri Jain, but while exercising the revisional jurisdiction, the provisions of section 115, Civil Procedure Code stay my hands. The revisional jurisdiction has been vested in the High Court with superintending and visitorial powers over subordinate Courts, and this revisional jurisdiction has been conferred on this court under section 115 Civil Pro-cedure Code. The powers given are clearly limited to the keeping of subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. The scope of revisional jurisdiction under section 115 Civil Procedure Code is severely restricted and it is only where there is a jurisdictional error or illegality or material irregularity in exercise of the jurisdiction that the High Court can interfere. Three conditions are necessary: (a) the subordinate judiciary exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by law, or (c) acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. The section applies to jurisdiction alone, the irregular exercise or non-exercise of it or illegal assumption of it. Merely because the High Court would have felt inclined, like in this case, had it dealt with the matter initially, to come to a different conclusion, would hardly justify interference in revision under section 115, when no illegality or material irregularity was committed by the subordinate Court. The position is firmly established that while exer-cising the jurisdiction under section 115, it is not competent to the High court to correct errors of fact however gross, or even errors of law unless the said errors have relation to jurisdiction of the Court. The position is firmly established that while exer-cising the jurisdiction under section 115, it is not competent to the High court to correct errors of fact however gross, or even errors of law unless the said errors have relation to jurisdiction of the Court. My hands are further tied by the pronouncement of the Honble Supreme Court in municipal Corporation, Delhi v. Sureshchandra Jaipuria, AIR 1976 S C 2621. in which it was held that interference by the High Court with the concurrent finding of fact was unjustified, as the Court had overlooked the principles governing interference under section 115. The same view was taken earlier to this judgment (i. e. in Sureshchandra Jaipurias case, AIR 1970 SC 406 ,) and A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 2324. ( 5. ) THE plight of the applicants may be genuine; this Court may feel sympathy for them while they are being uprooted by the public authorities, but this Court refuses to transgress its limits of jurisdiction which are controlled solely by the provisions of section 115, Civil Procedure Code. With these observations, the revision is dismissed. However, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. Revision dismissed.