JUDGMENT T.N. Singaravelu, J. 1. The defendant in the suit is the appellant herein. 2. The respondent/plaintiff viz., Sri Kamakshi Amman Devasthanam (hereinafter referred to as the temple) filed the suit against the appellant/defendant for recovery of possession of a small plot of land adjoining the temple with the following averments: The defendant took the suit plot on lease from the temple on 1.7.1968 agreeing to pay a rent of Rs. 3/-per month and he put a superstructure with mud walls and thatched roofing for the purpose of using it as a cattle shed. He committed wilful default in the payment of rent and the temple issued a notice on 18.3.1974 calling upon the defendant to pay the arrears of rent and also vacate the premises. The defendant sent a reply disputing the correctness of the amount and sought protection under the Madras City Tenants Protection Act. The defendant is not entitled to any protection. Thereupon, the plaintiff sent a rejoinder on 1.5.1974 terminating the tenancy by 30.5.1975 and demanded vacant possession. The defendant did not comply with the same. Therefore the suit was filed for possession and for damages at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month. 3. The defendant/appellant contended in his written statement that there is no wilful default in payment of rent and that in any event, he is entitled to the benefits of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, The defendant then filed an additional written statement wherein he contended that the plaintiff has no locus standi to file this suit since the office of Managing Trustee is in dispute. 4. The trial Court framed various issues and found that the defendant had not committed wilful default in payment of rent, that the premises are not required for any bona fide purpose and that the Managing Trustee of the temple has no locus standi to file the suit. Of course, the trial Court further held that the defendant is not entitled to the benefits of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act. In the end, the trial Court dismissed the suit. 5. The plaintiff preferred an appeal in A.S.No. 377 of 1978 and the learned Subordinate Judge found that the Managing Trustee of the temple is competent to file the suit, that the defendant is not entitled to the benefits of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act and that the tenancy had been validly terminated. 5. The plaintiff preferred an appeal in A.S.No. 377 of 1978 and the learned Subordinate Judge found that the Managing Trustee of the temple is competent to file the suit, that the defendant is not entitled to the benefits of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act and that the tenancy had been validly terminated. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the suit was decreed for recovery of possession with damages. The defendant has now come forward with the second Appeal. 6. The vital point raised in the Second Appeal is whether the notice to quit under Ex.A-3 dated 1.5.1974 is valid in law. The notice Ex.A-3 recites that the tenancy will be terminated by 30.5.1974 and not by the expiry of the end of the month and therefore, according to the learned Counsel for the appellant/defendant, the notice is not in conformity with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. A preliminary objection was. raised on behalf of the respondent/plaintiff that this plea of want of proper notice should not be allowed to be taken in the Second Appeal. Of course, both in the written statement and in the additional written statement there is no plea by the defendant that the notice to quit was defective or bad in law. It was not even an issue before the trial Court. However, in the lower Appellate Court, this point appears to have been taken and the lower Appellate Court considered the same and found that the notice to quit was proper. Therefore the position is that this point was taken in the lower Appellate Court itself and it is not taken up for the first time in the Second Appeal. 7. Learned Counsel for the appellant/ defendant placed before me a ruling reported in J.C. Chatterjee v. Shri Sri Kishan Tandon for the proposition that the point as to termination of tenancy is essentially one of law and therefore it can be raised in Second Appeal and decided by the High Court. in fact, the substantial question of law that is framed in this Second Appeal is with reference to the validity of the notice Ex.A-3. Therefore the appellant can raise this legal point at the Second Appeal stage, since it goes to the root of the matter. Further, as already stated, this point was taken even in the lower Appellate Court and considered. Therefore the appellant can raise this legal point at the Second Appeal stage, since it goes to the root of the matter. Further, as already stated, this point was taken even in the lower Appellate Court and considered. Therefore the preliminary objection raised by the respondent for considering this question is rejected. 8. Learned Counsel for the appellant/ defendant strenuously contended that the notice Ex.A-3 recites that the tenancy was terminated on 30.5.1974, and since the month of May has 31 days, the notice should have recited that the termination was on 31.5.1974. Placing reliance on this, it was argued that the lease has been terminated at an earlier point of time before the end of the month and therefore it is bad in law. Learned Counsel for the appellant also relied upon a ruling reported in Bhagabandas Agarwalla v. Bhagwandas Kanu, and argued that under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, the notice to quit must expire with the end of the month and therefore the present notice terminating the lease from 30.5.1974 is invalid. I have carefully perused this decision and 1 find that the Supreme Court has also observed in the very same decision that a notice to quit must be construed not with a desire to find faults with it, which would render it defective, but it must he construed ut res magis valeat quam pereat. The Supreme Court extracted the observations of Lord Justice Lindley, L.J., in Sidebotham v. Holland (1895) 1 Q.B. 378 and quoted with approval that "the validity of a notice to quit ought not to turn on the splitting of a straw." The Supreme Court further went on to say that it must not be read in a hyper critical manner nor must its interpretation be affected by pedagogic pendantisrn or over-refined subtlety, but it must be construed in a common sense way. The Supreme Court followed the earlier decision in Harihar Banerji v. Ramsashi Roy L.R. (1918) 45 LA. 222 : 35 M.L.J. 707 : A.I.R. 1918 P.C. 102, and reiterated that the notice to quit must be judged for its validity in the light of the well recognised principle of interpretation. In fact, in the cited case, the relevant words in the notice were that the tenancy is terminated "within the month of October, 1962". 222 : 35 M.L.J. 707 : A.I.R. 1918 P.C. 102, and reiterated that the notice to quit must be judged for its validity in the light of the well recognised principle of interpretation. In fact, in the cited case, the relevant words in the notice were that the tenancy is terminated "within the month of October, 1962". an argument was raised before the Supreme Court that the tenancy of the respondent was sought to be terminated on a date earlier than the expiration of the month in October, 1962 but the same was repelled by the Supreme Court with the aforesaid observations. 9. With these principles in mind, let us turn to the facts of our case. Ex.A-3 recites that the tenancy stands terminated by 30.5.1974. The tenancy was from month to month and admittedly it commenced on 1.7.1968. It is very likely that the mention of the date of termination as 30.5.1974 was a mistake due to inadvertence ignoring the fact that the month of May contains 31 days. Firstly, it must be remembered that there was more than 15 days clear notice given by the landlord to the tenant. Secondly, no prejudice whatsoever is caused to the defendant by the mention of the date as 30.5.1974 instead of 31.5.1974. No doubt, the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act are rigid, but as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Bhagabandas Agarwalla v. Bhagwandas Karat, it should not be read in a hyper-critical manner nor should the question be approached with a view to find fault with the notice. In this connection it may be remembered that the defendant has not made a grievance out of it either in the written statement or during the trial of the suit. Thirdly, on the facts of the case, it is possible to infer that the defendant/tenant has waived the notice and therefore the error in the date mentioned in the notice Ex.A-3 is cured by waiver. As already stated, though the defendant had filed two written statements in the trial Court, there is not even a whisper therein that the notice Ex.A-3 was bad or improper or that he was prejudiced. No issue was framed on that point for want of pleadings, It is only in the lower Appellate Court a faint attempt was made that the notice Ex.A-3 was not proper. No issue was framed on that point for want of pleadings, It is only in the lower Appellate Court a faint attempt was made that the notice Ex.A-3 was not proper. Therefore, the conduct of the defendant shows that his main defence was that he is not a wilful defaulter in payment of rent, that he is entitled to the benefits of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act and that the present Managing Trustee was not competent to file the suit on behalf of the temple. The idea of want of proper notice was not in the mind of the defendant during the trial of the suit which lasted for four years. Considering the conduct of the defendant, I am of opinion that the defendant has waived this plea at an earlier stage, though he is now reviving it as a last straw. 10. The result is this: The mention of the date as 30.5.1974 in Ex.A-3 appears to be an error due to inadvertence; secondly, no prejudice whatsoever is caused to the defendant by such wrong mentioning of date; and thirdly, the defendant by his conduct has waived the notice-For all these reasons I hold that the notice to quit under Ex.A-3 is substantial compliance of the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and the plaintiff cannot be non-suited for an obvious error by oversight in the mentioning of the date of termination, since some months have 30 days and some months have 31 days. Consequently the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court are confirmed and the Second Appeal is dismissed with costs. Time for vacating the premises four months from to-day.