JUDGMENT A. N. Verma J. - These two connected appeals can be disposed of by common judgment as the issues raised therein are identical. The appeals are directed against an ad interim injunction issued by the court below restraining the appellants from using the trade-mark of the plaintiff respondent in respect of manufacture and sale of biries. The plaintiff respondent filed a suit against each of the two sets of defendants - appellants on these assertion. The plaintiff manufacturers and sells biris with the trade-mark "222" and is the registered proprietor of a trade-mark no. 88522 in class 94 consisting of label and Jhilli (wrappers) and the numeral "222" and copyright also in respect of the same certificate were issued by competent authorities in favour of the plaintiff in this behalf under the Trade mark Merchandise Act and the Copyright Act some more than 40 years ago. The registration of the said trade-mark and copy-right is still in force and the plaintiff has the exclusive right to the use thereof. The defendants have however, who are neither registered under the Trade Marks Merchandise Act, nor under the Copyright Act, started manufacturing and selling biris under a trade mark consisting of the numeral "222" special professional which is so deceptively similar to the registered trade mark of the plaintiff that the purchasers of this commodity who are mainly illiterate persons are bound to be misled. The plaintiff asked the defendants to refrain from using the plaintiff's trade mark but without any effect. The loss which the plaintiff is suffering as a result of the unlawful act of the defendants, cannot be calculated in terms of money and hence the suit for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from infringing the plaintiff's registered trade mark No. 88522 and any other trade mark/label of jhilli which is identical with or deceptively similar to the plaintiff's registered trade mark. In the suit the plaintiff also filed applications for ad interim injunction restraining the defendants from using the trade mark of the plaintiff - respondent and from passing of their goods under the trade mark and label and Jhilli of the plaintiff - contentions. The application was contested by the appellants who disputed in the first place that their biries were being sold under a trade mark or label and wrapper which may bear any similarity to those being used by the plaintiff - respondent. The application was contested by the appellants who disputed in the first place that their biries were being sold under a trade mark or label and wrapper which may bear any similarity to those being used by the plaintiff - respondent. In the second place, it was contended that no ground for issuing ad interim injunction had been made out. The court below has on a consideration of the relevant facts and circumstances, granted the plaintiff - respondent ad interim injunction whereby the defendants - appellants have been restrained from selling or offering for sale under the offending trade mark "222" and the plaintiff's label and wrapper either themselves or through their stockists or dealer till further orders. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders, the defendants have filed these appeals. It may be mentioned here that the plaintiff - respondent has filed a suit against each of the two sets of appellants in these two appeals on similar grounds and in both these suits the plaintiff's application for an ad interim injunction has been granted. The place taken by the plaintiff on the hand and the defendants of the two suit on the other are substantially identical. L. N. Pandey, learned counsel for appellants challenged the correctness of the orders passed by the court below and submitted that the suits filed by the plaintiff - respondents were not maintainable being barred under section 27 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act. It was urged that as the trade mark claimed by the plaintiff - respondent was not registered under the aforesaid Act the suit was clearly barred under sub-section (1) of section 27 of the Act which provides that no person shall be entitled to institute any proceeding to prevent or to recover damages for infringement of an unregistered trade mark. The second submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants was that the suit was incompetent as the person, who signed the plaint on behalf of the plaintiff, was not authorised to sign the plaint, he being only a manager and not a partner of the firm. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am clearly of the opinion that the court below has rightly issued ad interim injunction and there is no substance in either of the two contentions. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am clearly of the opinion that the court below has rightly issued ad interim injunction and there is no substance in either of the two contentions. So far as the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is concerned, reliance was placed on a document which has been annexed as R.A. 5 to the rejoinder affidavit filed in this court in the stay matter. It is stated that the original of this document is on the record. It was urged that this paper indicates that the application of the plaintiff respondent for registration of its trade mark was still pending and has not been registered yet. Having perused the record of the suit and having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I find no merit in this contention. It is true that in annexure R.A. 5, which purports to be a certificate granted by the Trade Marks Register in regard to registered trade mark "No. 222", the remark is that the application is pending. It is possible that the document refer to the application of the plaintiff for a change in the design. This document, however, is not conclusive of the controversy as I find on the record original certificates granted to the plaintiff - respondent by the Registrar of Trade Marks from time to time right from 1940 (paper no. 8 C) showing that plaintiff's trade mark has been duly registered and that the same is still in operation. A perusal of the representation of the trade mark which was registered by the Registrar of Trade Marks clearly indicates that the trade mark of the applicant who were then trading under the names of Bengal Biri Factory and K.M. Sinha and Brothers, Ganeshganj, Mirzapur (U.P.) was registered under the Trade Mark Act, 1940. Prima facie, therefore, the court below rightly concluded that the plaintiff's trade mark was duly registered. Indeed, from the perusal of the order passed by the court below it does not seem to have been disputed on behalf of the defendants - appellants that the trade mark of plaintiff - respondent was duly registered. There is, therefore, no merit in the first point. Indeed, from the perusal of the order passed by the court below it does not seem to have been disputed on behalf of the defendants - appellants that the trade mark of plaintiff - respondent was duly registered. There is, therefore, no merit in the first point. Turning to the second point, I find that the plaint has been signed on behalf of the plaintiff by one Ram Nath Gupta purporting to be the Manager of the plaintiff concern. In para 1 of the plaint, it has been asserted that R. N. Gupta has been duly authorised and is competent to sign and verify the pleading and to institute the suit on behalf of the plaintiff, An affidavit to this effect was also filed before the court below. Consequently, for the matter of injunction it may be assumed that the plaint has been verified by a person who was competent to do so. However, if the defendant - appellants still raise this question an issue on the point can be framed at the trial of the suit. For the time being, however, injunction cannot be reduced to the plaintiff on the mere ipsi dixit that the person who has signed the plaint on behalf of the plaintiff, is not authorised to do so. The court below in granting ad interim injunction in favour of the plaintiff addressed himself to the relevant questions, namely, existence of prima facie case as well as the balance of convenience and has concluded that the plaintiff has a prima facie case and that he would suffer irreparable loss if the ad interim injunction is not issued. It has examined the merchandise of both the plaintiff as well as the defendant and has concluded that prima-facie there is a striking resemblance between the merchandise being manufactured and sold by the two, and that the resemblance is such that there is a strong possibility of confusion in the market resulting in irreparable injury to the plaintiff respondent. I have myself examined the packages of the Biris being sold by the two, namely, the plaintiff and the defendants, and prima facie the conclusion reached by the court below there is likelihood of confusion among the buyers, cannot be said to be unsustainable or such as may persuade this court to take a contrary view. I have myself examined the packages of the Biris being sold by the two, namely, the plaintiff and the defendants, and prima facie the conclusion reached by the court below there is likelihood of confusion among the buyers, cannot be said to be unsustainable or such as may persuade this court to take a contrary view. An unnecessary customer may quite likely be misled and he may purchase the defendant's Biris under the impression that he is buying the stuff being manufactured by the plaintiff for the past so many decades. The mark of distinction is illusory. The injunction was hence rightly granted. Another significant fact is that the defendant appellant's trade mark is admittedly not registered, and they have entered the market much later. The plaintiff - respondent's trade mark was registered for the first time more than 40 years ago and they have been continuously trading in the merchandise since. The court below was, therefore, right in concluding that the plaintiff - respondent is likely to suffer much greater loss than the defendant. In these circumstances the court below was justified in granting ad interim injunction. I may, however, make it absolutely clear that the observations which have been made in this judgment are tentative and shall not be treated an expression of any final opinion on the issue arising in the suit for final determination. Consequently, the court below should not feel bound or inhibited by any tentative observations which this court has made while disposing of the matter of temporary injunction. The court below shall decide the issues arising in the suit entirely uninfluenced by the observations made thereon by this court in these proceedings. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. The court below shall, however, try and dispose of the two suits expeditiously giving the same high priority. The record of the cases shall be sent down to the court below forthwith. (Appeal dismissed).