JUDGMENT : K.S. VERMA, J. 1. One Kailash Chandra is the landlord of an accommodation known as building No. 10, Nehru Road, Sadar Bazar, Police Station Cantonment, Lucknow. The dispute relates to the upper storey of the building which was previously let out to one Jitendra Singh. Kailash Chandra Vaish filed a suit for the ejectment of Jitendra Singh. The said suit for ejectment was decreed but time had been allowed to Jitendra Singh to vacate the accommodation within four months. Kailash Chandra, the landlord, moved an application for the release of the accommodation which was going to be vacated by Jitendra Singh in execution of the decree. The release application was made on 1-1-1978. The main ground for the release of the accommodation is that the landlord needs the accommodation for his own use. The application for release and the application of G.K. Pillai for allotment were beard together by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and by order dated 11-6-1979 the release application was dismissed and the accommodation in dispute was allotted to G.K. Pillai. Aggrieved by the said order dated 11-6-1979, Kailash Chandra Vaish filed two revision applications, one against the rejection of title release application and the other against the allotment of the accommodation to G.K. Pillai. The Additional District Judge by his order dated 27-11-1979 dismissed both the revision applications. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Additional District Judge, Kailash Chandra Vaish filed a writ petition in this Court impleading G.K. Pillai as one of the Respondents. The writ petition was numbered as writ petition No. 358 of 1980. The prayer in this writ petition was that the orders of the Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies) dated 11-6-1979 and the order passed by the Additional District Judge, Lucknow dated 27-11-1979 be quashed by the issue of a writ of certiorari. The writ petition came up for hearing before K.N. Goyal, J. who set aside the order of the Additional District Judge and directed the District Magistrate to consider the application of the Petitioner for release of the accommodation afresh in accordance with the directions given in the judgment of this Court dated 23-10-1981. The writ petition came up for hearing before K.N. Goyal, J. who set aside the order of the Additional District Judge and directed the District Magistrate to consider the application of the Petitioner for release of the accommodation afresh in accordance with the directions given in the judgment of this Court dated 23-10-1981. While dealing with the merits of the case K.N. Goyal, J. observed as follows: It is well settled that while in cases u/s 21 where a sitting tenant has to be displaced the question of relative hardship is also required to be considered. No such consideration arises in a case u/s 16. So far as cases u/s 16 are concerned, if a landlord genuinely needs the additional accommodation that is sufficient to entitle him to release. This has not been considered by the two authorities. Accordingly, their orders cannot be sustained. 2. When the case came up before the trial court after the remand, an application was moved by G.K. Pillai on 18-4-1983 that the court may be pleased to afford an opportunity to him to contest the case cm merit for which be has not been given any notice to appear before the court. The court on 18-4-1983 dismissed the application of G.K. Pillai on the ground that he has no locus standi to intervene in the case till the release application is disposed of. The trial court on the same date, namely, 18-4-1983 held that the needs of the landlord for the accommodation in question were genuine and bona fide; hence the accommodation was released in favour of the landlord. In regard to the impleadment of G.K. Pillai the court observed as follows; The opposite party Sri G.K. Pillai sought an opportunity to contest the case but the prayer was disallowed in view of the observations made by the Hon'ble High Court in their order dated 23-10-81. 3. Aggrieved by the order of release G.K. Pillai filed a revision application before the Additional District Judge which was dismissed on 10-11-1983. This order passed by the Additional District Judge, Lucknow is challenged in writ petition No. 6077 of 1983. 4. 3. Aggrieved by the order of release G.K. Pillai filed a revision application before the Additional District Judge which was dismissed on 10-11-1983. This order passed by the Additional District Judge, Lucknow is challenged in writ petition No. 6077 of 1983. 4. Another aspect of the case is that in 1979 G.K. Pillai filed a suit against Kailash Chandra Vaish for a declaration that the Plaintiff could not be evicted from the premises 10, Nehru Road, Police Station Cantonment, Sadar Bazar, Lucknow on the basis of the decree dated 13-12-1976 in Suit No. 558 of 1973 Kailash Chand v. Jitendra Singh. The case of G.K. Pillai was that the accommodation in dispute was allotted to him on 11-7-1979 after rejecting the release application of the landlord. The premises were vacated by previous tenant Jitendra Singh on 14-7-1979. It is maintained by the Plaintiff in that suit that be sent proper intimation to the District Magistrate (Civil Supplies) about the vacation of the premises and be got possession of the allotted premises on 14-7-1979 and is in peaceful possession of the same. The case of G.K. Pillai is that the Defendant is executing his decree for ejectment and in execution of the said decree is attempting to evict him although be is holding possession on the basis of an order of allotment. On these facts G.K. Pillai contends that he cannot be evicted in pursuance of the decree passed in favour of the landlord against Jitendra Singh. The suit was contested by Kailash Chandra Vaish who pleaded that the accommodation in question was illegally allotted to the Plaintiff. He had applied for the release of the accommodation and the question of allotment in favour of G.K. Pillai could arise only if the release application was dismissed. It is further contended that the allotment order was cancelled in writ petition No. 358 of 1980 and the Plaintiff is in wrongful possession. The case of the Defendant is that the Plaintiff wrongly and illegally occupied the premises on 14-11-1979. The case of the Defendant is that the release application moved by him has been allowed, the order of allotment in favour of G.K. Pillai has been cancelled and, therefore, he is not entitled to resist the decree for eviction obtained by him. The case of the Defendant is that the Plaintiff wrongly and illegally occupied the premises on 14-11-1979. The case of the Defendant is that the release application moved by him has been allowed, the order of allotment in favour of G.K. Pillai has been cancelled and, therefore, he is not entitled to resist the decree for eviction obtained by him. The trial court dismissed the suit and the appellate court by judgment and decree dated 10-11-1979 maintained the decree passed by the trial court. Aggrieved by the appellate decree G.K. Pillai has filed Second Appeal No. 817 of 1983 and by an order of this Court this appeal has been directed to be listed for hearing alongwith writ petition No. 6077 of 1983. 5. In both the cases, I have heard Mr. A.B. Mathur, counsel for G.K. Pillai and Mr. P.N. Mathur counsel for Kailash Chandra Vaish. Mr. A.B. Mathur while arguing writ petition No. 6077 of 1983 contended that the Rent Control authorities illegally rejected the application moved by G.K. Pillai for being heard in opposition to the release application moved by the landlord. In this respect he drew the attention of the court that he applied to the Rent Control authorities to contest the release application. The order passed by the trial court that G.K. Pillai has no locus standi till the release application is disposed of was challenged before the Additional District Judge also, Ho contended that having regard to the facts that are on record it would be eminently desirable and appropriate to permit G.K. Pillai to oppose the application for release. Before an appropriate answer to the question posed in this case is given it would be appropriate to analyse the case law bearing on this point. The earliest case relating to the question in issue came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Dr. Gopi Mohan Saxena Vs. State of U.P. and Others, (1979) AWC 255. A perusal of the facts of that case would indicate that the Petitioner Dr. Gopi Mohan Saxena challenged the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer declaring the premises vacant u/s 12 of U.P. Act XIII of 1972. The contention of the Petitioner was that the accommodation which has been declared vacant was not a building u/s 12 of the Act. Gopi Mohan Saxena challenged the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer declaring the premises vacant u/s 12 of U.P. Act XIII of 1972. The contention of the Petitioner was that the accommodation which has been declared vacant was not a building u/s 12 of the Act. The contention of the Petitioner in that case was that the upper storey which has been declared vacant was in the occupation of the Petitioner through the members of his family and was also necessary for the utilization of the lower storey of the building which was being utilised for non-residential and commercial purposes. The grievance of the Petitioner was that the order of the Kent Control and Eviction Officer had not decided the question raised by him about the building being a residential building and that the finding about the members of the family not residing in the accommodation in question is perverse. The Division Bench observed that the Petitioner has no locus standi to intervene at this stage. It was observed that the Petitioner could raise this matter when the application for release of he accommodation is considered by the Kent Control authorities. The Division Bench observed as follows: We see no bar in the Petitioner getting an opportunity to contest the application for release before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 13 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting. Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 which provided that the question of release was a matter between the District Magistrate and the landlord and the outgoing tenant and the prospective allottee had no right to file any objection, has since been deleted and there is no bar now to the outgoing tenant having a right to object to the release of the accommodation in favour of the landlord. After these observations the Division Bench dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the petition was premature as he could raise the objections at the time when the release application was considered. A perusal of the judgment further indicates that the observation made by the Division Bench that the outgoing tenant has a right to object to the release of the accommodation in favour of the landlord appears to be an obiter dicta as the question whether such a right existed or not was not in issue before the Division Bench. A perusal of the judgment further indicates that the observation made by the Division Bench that the outgoing tenant has a right to object to the release of the accommodation in favour of the landlord appears to be an obiter dicta as the question whether such a right existed or not was not in issue before the Division Bench. As a matter of fact, the Division Bench observed that the approach made by the Petitioner to the High Court was premature as he could raise his objections at the time of consideration of the release application. The point whether the outgoing tenant or the prospective allottee of an accommodation could contest the release application moved by the landlord directly came up for consideration before this Court in A.K. Sharma v. Smt. Shyam Rani 1979 LLJ 199 and perusal of the said report would indicate that the accommodation in question was let out to one A.K. Sharma and an application for release of the accommodation in question was also moved by the landlord. The question directly raised in that case was whether the prospective allottee was entitled to a hearing before the application for release in favour of the landlord was allowed. According to A.K. Sharma failure on the part of the District Judge to afford an opportunity to him vitiated the order passed by him as the same was in violation of the principles of natural justice. This Court dismissed the petition of A.K. Sharma with the observation that be had no locus standi to challenge the application for release moved by the landlady. The Division Bench decision in Dr. Gopi Mohan Saxena's case (Supra) was distinguished. The point of distinction has already been pointed by me in earlier part of the judgment. The correctness of the decision given In A.K. Sharma's case (Supra) was challenged before a Division Bench of this Court in writ petition No. 2136 of 1975. The Division Bench agreed with the line of reasoning taken by this Court in A.K. Sharma's case (Supra) and also expressed their agreement with another rendered by S.D. Agarwala, J. in Raghunandan Lal and Another Vs. District Judge and Others, (1978) AWC 506. The Division Bench case is reported in Sri Kant Divedi v. IIIrd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Hardoi 1981 ARC 49. 6. District Judge and Others, (1978) AWC 506. The Division Bench case is reported in Sri Kant Divedi v. IIIrd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Hardoi 1981 ARC 49. 6. During the course of arguments, the attention of this Court was drawn to an order passed by A. Banerji, J. in writ petition No. 7782 of 1982 whereby he has referred the question of right of prospective allottee to file objection to contest the release application to a larger Bench. This has been done on the ground that in Sri Kant Dwivedi v. IIIrd Add. District and Sessions Judge, Hardoi 1981 ARC 49 attention of the Division Bench was not drawn to another decision rendered in Dr. Gopi Mohan Saxena's case (supra). I have already indicated above that in Dr. Gopi Mohan Saxena's case the question in issue in this case did not arise for consideration of the Court. There was just an observation which was in the nature of an obiter dicta which seems to suggest that the Division Bench was of the view that the prospective allottee had a right to object to the release application. On the basis of the observations made by A. Banerji, J. in writ petition No. 7782 it was strenuously contended by Mr. A.B. Mathur that the question whether a prospective allottee has a right to object to the release application be referred to a larger Bench. 7. In my opinion there is no conflict between Sri Kant Dwivedi's case (Supra) and Sri Gopi Mohan Saxena's case (Supra). In the latter case the point whether the prospective allottee has a right to challenge the release application did not come up for consideration at all. Only an observation was made by the Division Bench in Dr. Gopi Mohan Saxena's case (Supra) that prospective allottee has a right to challenge the release application Since the question was not in issue any observation made by the Division Bench will not be a decision on the point. In support of this view a reference may be made to Quinn and Leathern 1901 AC 495. Gopi Mohan Saxena's case (Supra) that prospective allottee has a right to challenge the release application Since the question was not in issue any observation made by the Division Bench will not be a decision on the point. In support of this view a reference may be made to Quinn and Leathern 1901 AC 495. The observations made by Earl of Hals bury L.C. at p. 506 are relevant: That every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all. In Dr. Gopi Mohan Saxena's case the writ petition was dismissed as being premature on the ground that the Petitioner had only challenged the order declaring the accommodation to be vacant. Incidentally, the court observed that it will be open to Dr. Gopi Mohan Saxena to challenge the application for release. There was no decision by the Division Bench in Dr. Gopi Mohan Saxena's case (supra) as to the locus standi of a prospective allottee as this point was not in issue in that case and any observation made on this aspect of the matter would not have a force of a decision by a court of law as the point did not actually arise in the case. On the basis of the principles enunciated by House of Lords in the case referred to above I am of the view that there is no conflict between the view taken in Sri Kant Dwivedi's case and the view taken in Dr. Gopi Mohan Saxena's case. On the basis of the principles enunciated by House of Lords in the case referred to above I am of the view that there is no conflict between the view taken in Sri Kant Dwivedi's case and the view taken in Dr. Gopi Mohan Saxena's case. The point in issue in this case directly came up for consideration in Sri Kant Dwivedi's case (Supra) and since the point directly arose in the case and a specific decision was given on that point, the decision rendered in that case will be applicable to the facts of the case and it cannot be said that the point decided in Sri Kant Dwivedi's case (Supra) was in conflict with the decision given in Dr. Gopi Mohan Saxena's case. As a matter of fact, the point which is now in issue did not actually arise for decision In Dr. Gopi Mohan Saxena's case (Supra) except that there was an observation in the judgment that the prospective allottee could challenge the release application. Since the view taken in A.K. Shurma's case (Supra) has been upheld by a Division Bench of this Court in Sri Kant Dwivedi's case (Supra), there is no necessity to refer the matter to a larger Bench as the decision rendered by the Division Bench is binding upon this Court. On the grounds stated above, I am of the view that the Petitioner has no locus standi to challenge the release application in view of the principles enunciated in Sri Kant Dwivedi's case (Supra). 8. In Second Appeal No. 817 of 1983 it was contended on behalf of the Appellant that Kailash Chandra Vaisb had obtained a decree for ejectment against Jitendra Singh but in execution of the said decree G K Pillai could not be evicted as he has an Independent title in the sense that the accommodation in dispute was allotted to him. The suit filed by G.K. Pillai for a permanent injunction restraining Kailash Chandra Vaish form executing his decree was dismissed by the trial court as also by the appellate court. While deciding writ petition No. 6077 of 1983, I have already held above that the prospective allottee has no right to challenge the release application moved by the landlord. It is also clear from the record that the allotment order in favour of G.K. Pillai was cancelled and the release application of Kailash Chandra was allowed. While deciding writ petition No. 6077 of 1983, I have already held above that the prospective allottee has no right to challenge the release application moved by the landlord. It is also clear from the record that the allotment order in favour of G.K. Pillai was cancelled and the release application of Kailash Chandra was allowed. In view of the findings recorded by me above, the Plaintiff G.K. Pillai has no locus standi to challenge the release application moved by Kailash Chandra. In this way, it is clear that after the cancellation of the allotment order in favour of G.K. Pillai, he will have no rights in the accommodation in dispute and in pursuance of the decree for ejectment obtained by Kailash Chandra Vaish, he could evict any person who has taken possession of the accommodation in dispute otherwise than in accordance with law. In view of the fact that G.K. Pillai had no locus standi to challenge the release application and the accommodation in dispute was released in favour of Kailash Chandra Vaish, the suit filed by G.K. Pillai has rightly been dismissed by the two courts below. In view of the findings recorded above the second appeal also deserves to be dismissed. 9. For the reasons stated above, writ petition No. 6077 of 1983 and Second Appeal No. 817 of 1983 fail and are dismissed. Costs of this Court shall be borne by the parties. In view of the scarcity of accommodation in the city of Lucknow, G.K. Pillai will be allowed to retain the accommodation for two months so that he may find another accommodation for himself.