JUDGMENT P.D. Mulye, I.- 1. The appellant has filed this appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against an order dated 19-4-85 passed in M. P. No.98 of 1981, by a Single Judge of this Court. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal, may he stated, in brief, thus: The appellant is a statutory Government company registered and incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, which is a subsidiary of respondent No.2, which is also a Government Company registered and incorporated under the Companies Act. The respondent No. 1 manages seven sick textile undertakings; (1) Indore Malwa United Mills, Indore (2) Swadeshi Cotton and Flour Mills, Indore, (3) Kalyan Mal Mills, Indore, (4) Burhanpur Tapti Mills, Burhanpur, (5) Rira Mills, Ujjain, (6) New Bhopal Textile Mills, Bhopal, (7) Dengal Nagpur Cotton Mills, Rajnandgaon. The said textile undertaking before nationalisation were owned by a number of Companies, the management of which was taken over by the Central Government under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 or as the case may be vested in the Central Government under the Sick Textiles Undertakings (Taking over the Management) Act. 1972 and were under the management either by the Authorised Controller appointed by the Government of India under S. 18 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 or the Custodian appointed under the Sick Textiles undertakings (Taking over of Management) Act, 1972. 3. The Sick Textile Undertakings Act came into force on 1st April, 1974. The respondent No.1 was appointed as a Sales Manager on a consolidated salary of Rs. 1500/- per month from the date of joining his duties and was posted in the New Bhopal Textile Mills, Bhopal by the appellant No.1, vide order dated 21st September, 1976. According to the terms and conditions of this order initially he was kept on probation for six months during which period his services could be terminated without any notice and without assigning any reasons. Thereafter his services were liable to be terminated on one month's notice or payment of one month's salary in lieu of notice on either side without assigning any reasons. Besides, during his employment, with the appellant, the employment of respondent No.1 was to be governed by the Rules, Regulations of Service, Conduct and Discipline Rules and Sanding Orders of the Mills, which may be in force or duly amended or altered from time to time. 4. Besides, during his employment, with the appellant, the employment of respondent No.1 was to be governed by the Rules, Regulations of Service, Conduct and Discipline Rules and Sanding Orders of the Mills, which may be in force or duly amended or altered from time to time. 4. Though the respondent No.1 by this order was posted to the New Bhopal Textile Mills, Bhopal by a subsquent order dated 28th October, 1976 he was directed to join first at the Corporate Office, Indore where he reported for duty on or about 8th November, 1976 and was then directed to proceed to Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills, Rajnandgaon, to take over his assignment as Sales Manager, by an order dated 8th November, 1976. Thereafter respondent No.1 was transferred from Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills, Rajnandgaon to the Head Office in the same capacity and thereafter vide order dated 4-5-1978 from the Corporate Office to Hira Mills, Ujjain. 5. That by an order dated 15th Nov., 1979 the respondent No.1 was granted an adhoc increment of Rs. 180/-with effect from 1-9-1979 so as to raise his salary to Rs. 1680/-. On the same day in order to bring uniformity in service conditions respondent No. 1 was absorbed in the pay scale of Rs. 1300-50-1700 and was paid a salary of Rs. 1720/-, inclusive of dearness allowance. Thereafter the respondent No.1 was transferred from Hira Mills, Ujjain to Kalyanmal Mills, Indore by an order dated 17-11-79. Thereafter the respondent No.1 was granted annual increment in January, 1980 and his salary was raised to Rs. 1810/-per month. Thereafter the respondent No.1 was approved for promotion and placed in the higher grade of Rs. 1500-60-1800-100 2000 and was also sanctioned an increment of Rs. 150/- which entitled the respondent No.1 to draw a salary of Rs. 1960/-per month. According to respondent No.1 this was in recognition of his meritorious performance. Thereafter a memo was issued to respondent No.1 dated 13th June, 1980 of which be gave reply on 30th July, 1980. Subsequently by an order dated 2-8-80/19th August, 1980 the services of respondent No. 1 were terminated with effect from 24th July, 1980 and that as per appointment terms he was entitled to one month's pay in lieu of one month notice. 6. Subsequently by an order dated 2-8-80/19th August, 1980 the services of respondent No. 1 were terminated with effect from 24th July, 1980 and that as per appointment terms he was entitled to one month's pay in lieu of one month notice. 6. It is in these circumstances that the respondent No.1 filed the writ petition challenging the order of termination of his services mainly on the ground that the same was punitive and mala fide, that though he was confirmed and promoted employee, the apprellant could not invoke the contractual clause contained in the letter of appointment. 7. The appellant in their returns contended that giving a higher grade to respondent No. 1 was not because of promotion as his designation continued to be the same he was merely given the higher grade of pay which cannot construed to be a promotion and moreover giving of higher scale of pay does not alter the other terms of the contract, including the term as regards termination with one month's notice or payment of one month's salary in lieu of notice. Further according to the appellant, the letter dated 15-11-79 was only relating to revision of pay scales and did not affect the original service conditions. 8. The learned Single Judge after considering the facts and circumstances and relying on the decisions reported in Yograj Sachdeva v. National Textile Corporation, 1983 MPLJ 789 ; Bhagwant v. National Textile Corporation, Ltd., 1984 JLJ 717 found that the order of termination is liable to be quashed and accordingly the petition was allowed with costs. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Sick Textile Undertakings Nationalisation Act came into force on 1-4-1974 as per S. 2 of the said Act, he also referred to Ss. 3, 6, 11 and 14 (2) of the said Act and submitted that as respondent No. 1 was appointed on 21-9•76 when the Corporation came into existence, he could not take advantage of the provisions which apply to those employees who were already in employment of the various Mills when the said Act came into force on the appointed date i.e. 1-4-1974. He further submitted that on 1-4-1976 the Corporation framed Employees Conduct and Disciplinary and Appeal Rules and as respondent No. I was a temporary employee his service conditions continued to be as a temporary employee in absence of any Rules framed by the Corporation and in support of his submission he placed reliance on the decisions reported in AIR 1962 SC 1711 , S. Sukhbans Singh v. The State of Punjab, 1978 MPLJ SN 75 and 1978 MPLJ, note 75. Further, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned Single Judge has misconstrued and amendment made in the returns in view of the amendment made by respondent No.1 in his petition and has thus drawn adverse inference against the appellant. The learned counsel tried to distinguish the authorities reported in Yograj Sachdera's case (supra) on the ground that in both these cases the employees were already appointed prior to 1-4-1974 and obviously services of such employees could not be terminated. 10. The learned counsel also referred to the two decisions reported in The Managing Director U. P. Warehousing Corporation & others v. Vijay Narayan Vajpayee, AIR 1980 SC 840 and A. L. Kalra v. The project and Equipment Corporation of India, Ltd., AIR 1984 SC 1361 and submitted that even though the respondent No.1 was given an option regarding the revision of pay scales which option he had exercised, that wag restricted only to the question of pay only and did not in any way affect or alter the original service condition1; and, therefore, even though prior to the termination of his services a show cause notice was given which was replied to by respondent No.1, it was not necessary for the appellant to assign any reason for terminating the services or for making any enquiry. He, therefore, submitted that S. 14 of the said Nationalisation Act has no application in the case of employees who are appointed by the Corporation for the first time after the appointed date as such employees from the very beginning of their appointment are governed by the Rules and Regulations of the Corporation as in force from time to time. He, therefore, submitted that S. 14 of the said Nationalisation Act has no application in the case of employees who are appointed by the Corporation for the first time after the appointed date as such employees from the very beginning of their appointment are governed by the Rules and Regulations of the Corporation as in force from time to time. He further submitted that the expression "Rules, Regulations of Service, Conduct and Discipline Rules and Standing Orders of the Mills, which are in force or as may be amended from time to time" used in clause 3 of the order of appointment of respondent No. 1 dated 21-9-76 are different from the Rules and Regulations and other service Conditions' contemplated in the option are those which pertain to pay scales and other pecuniary benefits and have nothing to do with service conditions in respect of the other matters. He, therefore, contended that in respect of the employees who were appointed by the Corporation itself after the appointed date they are governed by the Rules, Regulations and Service Conditions of the Corporation from the beginning of their service and would continue to be go~erl1ed by the same Rules, Regulations and Conditions of Service even after the exercise of option. He, therefore, urged that there is no condition of service in the Corporation which says that the employees of the Corporation would continue to serve up to a particular period or that their services would not be liable to termination on notice. It was therefore, submitted that the learned Single Judge has committed an error in allowing the writ petition filed by respondent No.1. 11. As regards the scope of Letters Patent Appeal, the learned Counsel placed reliance on the decisions reported in D. N. Sethi v. Dr. Miss. J. D. Sharma, 1960 JLJ 376= 1960 MPLJ 682 ; Kalicharan Shukla v. State of M. P., 1979 MPLJ-Note 25 and 7976 (1) M. P. Weekly Notes, Note 153, 1977 (1) MPWN 562. 12. On the point whether Letters Patent Appeal lies in a case decided in writ petition, the learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions reported in 1961 MPLJ 1403, 1976 (1) MPWN 153, Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D Kania, 1961 MPLJ 1403, Patel Kashiram Lavjibhai v. Narottamdas Bechardas, AIR 1981 SC 1786 and Kamalnarain Sharma v. Pt. Dwarka Prasad Mishra, AIR 1979 Gujrat 1 (FB). 13. Dwarka Prasad Mishra, AIR 1979 Gujrat 1 (FB). 13. So far as the merits of the case are concerned, the learned Single Judge has considered all the relevant facts and circumstances as well as the relevant provisions of law including the case law cited and we are of opinion that the view taken in the decisions reported in 1983 MPLJ 789 and (supra) could not be restricted to the case of the persons who were already employed prior to 1-4-74 as the principle enunciated in both these cases would also apply to the case of respondent No.1, Therefore, we are not persuaded to agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the effect of the option given by respondent No. 1 only related to the revision of pay but did not affect in any way the other terms and conditions of service of the original appointment order though the learned counsel did not dispute that the services of respondent No. 1 throughout were quite satisfactory right from the beginning till his service were terminated. It is not the case of the appellant that the services of respondent No. 1 were terminated for loss of confidence, but in fact no reason is assigned even though prior to the issuance of the order of termination a show cause notice was given which was replied to by respondent No.1, which cannot be said to be just a matter of routine enquiry as was contended. 14. It cannot be disputed that the appellant which is a Corporation controlled by the Union of India is an instrumentality of the State and having been controlled by the Government is an Authority under the Act for which provisions of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India are attracted. In our' opinion, in such a situation, the appellant cannot be allowed to urge that just as a person employed by a private individual c0uld be asked to leave the job at any point of time, the same would apply even in the case of the appellant and even on the principle of natural justice the services of respondent No.1 could not be terminated in the manner in which they have been terminated. 15. 15. In the decision reported in Ramana Dayaram Shifty v. The International Airport Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628 the Supreme Court has held that it is a well settled rule of law that an Executive must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its actions to be judged and it must scrupulously observe those standards on pain of invalidation of an act in violation of them. This rule was enunciated by Mr. Frankfurter in Vitarelli v. Seaton, (1959) 359 US 535 where the learned Judge said ;- "An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged. Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed. This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with the sword." this decision has been followed in the subsequent Supreme Court decision reported in Sukhdeo v. Bhagatrcm, 3 SCR 82; Therefore, the appellant Corporation being an instrumentality of the State, the services of its employees, like that of respondent could not be dispensed with and terminated at the whim or caprice of the appellant, as has been held in the Supreme Court decision reported in AIR 1984 SC, 1361 (supra) on which the learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance. Therefore, we see no valid ground to upset the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge. 16. The learned counsel for the appellant, on the point whether Letters Patent Appeal lies in a case decided under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India while placing reliance in the decisions referred to above on this point contended that in view of those decisions, the Letters Patent Appeal lies to a Division Bench against an order passed by the learned Single Judge. 17. The learned counsel for respondent No.1 while supporting the order of the learned Single Judge submitted that the work of the petitioner has been appreciated from time to time for which he has been given certificates. 17. The learned counsel for respondent No.1 while supporting the order of the learned Single Judge submitted that the work of the petitioner has been appreciated from time to time for which he has been given certificates. was also granted promotion; that the appellant was appointed substantively in a permanent and sanctioned post in clear vacancy on account of which Rules, Regulations of Services, Conduct and Disciplinary Rules and Standing Orders of the Mills are applicable as would be clear from clause 2 and clause 8 of the order of appointment though the did not dispute that provisions of Standing Orders would not apply to the case of respondent No.1. He further submitted that the annexures placed on record by respondent No. I would indicate that the General Manager, Kalyanmal Mills gave adverse reports against the respondent behind his back which were not communicated to him; that the respondent was forced to tender resignation under protest under compelling circumstances; that admittedly the age of super annuationis 58 years, which has been made applicable to the case of the employees of the National Textile Corporation (MP) Ltd, as is apparent from the two decisions of this Court referred to above. He also submitted that respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 5 have not filed any affidavit to controvert the averments made by respondent No.1 in the main petition which is supported by various affidavits filed by respondent No.1 himself from time to time; that respondent No.1 was a permanent employee and his services could not be dispensed with on hire and fire basis as has been, held in the decisions reported in West Bengal State Electricity Board v Desh Bandhu Ghose AIR 1985 SC 722 , 1979 SC 429, AIR 1975 SC 133, 1983 (1) Labour Law Journal 344, 1984 (2) Labour Law Journal 339, AIR 1983 Supreme Court 494, Union of India v. Jagdish Prasad, AIR 1982 SC 773 and 1982 (2) Labour Law Journal 57. 18. Therefore, on merits, we are of opinion, as pointed out above, that the appellant is not entitled to succeed. 19. The learned counsel for respondent No.1 challenged the maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal mainly on the ground that Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal does not apply to cases of writ petitions. 18. Therefore, on merits, we are of opinion, as pointed out above, that the appellant is not entitled to succeed. 19. The learned counsel for respondent No.1 challenged the maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal mainly on the ground that Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal does not apply to cases of writ petitions. He submitted that initially, according to S. 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915 it applied only to Chartered High Courts of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Rangoon and did not apply to the Nagpur High Court of which M.P. High Court is successor; that no Rules have been framed by the Nagpur High Court or M. P. High Court regarding filing of Letters Patent Appeal in a case decided under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India; that Cl. 26 of the Letters Patent only deal with powers of Single Judges and Division Courts, but does not speak regarding filing of appeal in such a case and in accordance with Article 225 of the Constitution of India which deals with the jurisdiction of existing High Courts, no Rules have been framed by this Court relating to filing of appeals against an order passed by a Single Judge in exercise of writ jurisdiction. He further submitted that this aspect has not been considered in the earlier decisions of this Court on which the learned counsel for the appellant bas placed reliance. He also submitted that the decision reported in James Chandwick & Bros. Ltd v. The National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd., AIR 1951 Born. He further submitted that this aspect has not been considered in the earlier decisions of this Court on which the learned counsel for the appellant bas placed reliance. He also submitted that the decision reported in James Chandwick & Bros. Ltd v. The National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd., AIR 1951 Born. 147 which went up before the Supreme Court in its decision reported in A.I.R. 1953 SC 357 is distinguisbable in view of the fact that in the decision reported in Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania, AIR 1981 SC 1786 which has considered the case law relating o the provisions of Letters Patent Appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, has observed as under :- "Before closing this judgment we may indicate that we have refrained from expressing any opinion on the nature of any order passed by a trial Judge in any proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution which are not governed by the Letters Patent but by rules framed under the Code of Civil Procedure under which in some High Courts writ petitions are heard by a Division Bench in other High Courts writ petitions are heard by a Single Judge and a right of appeal is given from the order of the Single Judge to the Division Bench after preliminary hearing." The learned counsel for the appellant did not bring to our notice any such Rule framed by this Court even in the Rules framed under the. Code of Civil Procedure. 20. This High Court has framed Rules for proceeding under Art. 226 of the Counstitution of India which have been published at page 164 in the Book "High Court Rules and Orders in M.P. "by Advocates Ashok Garg and Ramesh Garg". But they are silent regarding filing of appeal against an order passed by Single Judge. 21. The High Court Rules and Orders in M. P. Chapter I deals with jurisdiction of a Single Judge and of Benches of the High Court. Rule 6 is as follows ;- "Appeals under clause 10 of the letters Patent shall be heard by a Bench consisting of two Judges other than the Judge from whose Judgment the appeal is preferred." Chapter-II deals with the power of the Additional Registrar and Deputy Registrar. Rule 6 is as follows ;- "Appeals under clause 10 of the letters Patent shall be heard by a Bench consisting of two Judges other than the Judge from whose Judgment the appeal is preferred." Chapter-II deals with the power of the Additional Registrar and Deputy Registrar. Rule 1 (iii) provides: "To admit an appeal under clause 10 of letters Patent where leave is granted by Single Judge and to order issue of notices to the respondents." and Chapter V, Rule 3 provides that: "First Appeals, appeals under clause 10 of the Letters Patent, and reference under sub-section (I) of section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act if found in order, shall be submitted to the Additional Registrar for an order for the issue of notice for hearing parties." By amendment in the said Rules Single Benches are new empowered to hear and decide writ petitions relating to service matters, but there is no co responding Rule for filing a Letters Patent Appeal in such cases, as the case in question arises out of a service matter, the same has to be placed first before the Division Bench for admission including stay applications and it is only after admission when such cases are ripe for final hearing that they are listed before the Single Bench for final hearing. Therefore, in our opinion, even on this count a Letters Patent Appeal is not tenable by a Division Bench against the final order passed by the Single Bench on merits. 22. The authorities cited by the learned counsel for the appellant have not taken this aspect into consideration and the observations made by (he Supreme Court in the case referred to above do not support the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant on this point. We are, therefore, of opinion that clause 10 of the Letters Patent, as strictly construed, does not provide for an appeal against an order passed by a Single Judge in a writ petition and consequently the present appeal filed by the appellant is not maintainable. 23. In the result this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 350/-. Shrivastava, J.- 24. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of my learned brother Mulye, J. I agree that the appeal is Hot maintainable and even otherwise has no merit and must be dismissed. 23. In the result this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 350/-. Shrivastava, J.- 24. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of my learned brother Mulye, J. I agree that the appeal is Hot maintainable and even otherwise has no merit and must be dismissed. I, however, propose to state, in brief, my own reasons. 25. The relevant facts and circumstances have been ably set out in the judgment of my learned brother and I need not repeat them. 26. First, as to the question of tenability of the Letters patent Appeal against the judgment of the Single Judge rendered in exercise of the writ jurisdication under Article 226 of the Constitution. 27. It is well settled that a litigent has no inherent right to prefer appeal against any order and that right of appeal is a creature of statute. Therefore, the question whether or not an appeal lies has to be determined with reference to the relevant provision. 28. There is no express provision in the Civil Procedure Code for appeal to the High Court against the judgment of Single Judge of the High Court. Article 10 of the letters Patent of 1936 issued for the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur provides for internal appeal to the High Court from judgments of the Judges of the Court with and without certificate. The impugned order not being in exercise of appellate powers in second appeal, there is no question of any certificate and relevant portion of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent with which we are concerned in this appeal is follows:- PART 1- We do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Nagpur from the judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court pursuant to section one hundred and eight of the Government of India Act. Section 108 (1) of Government of India Act, 1915 reads as under:- Each High Court may by its own rules provide, as it thinks fit, for the exercise, by one or more Judges, or by division Courts constituted by two or more judges of the High Court, of the original and appellate jurisdiction vested in the Court. Section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down that High Courts may make rules regulating their own procedure. 29. Section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down that High Courts may make rules regulating their own procedure. 29. Section 117 of the Code of Civil Procedure expressly applies the provisions of the Code to the High Courts with due advertence also to order 49 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It may also be pointed out that a right of appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is in no way affected by Section 104 Civil Procedure Code read with Order 43 Rule 1 ibid. They are two separate provisions. The section expressly saves appeals provided by any law and Section 100-A Civil Procedure Code merely provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court third appeals before a fourth Court shall stand abolished. In this connection the decision in Shah Babulal Khimji's case, AIR 1981 SC 1786 may usefully be perused. 30. The decision in Mangol Prasad's case, 1973 JLJ 774 relates to a decision of a Single Judge of the High Court in appeal and tenability of appeal, therefrom. The Full Bench in P.K. Lavjibhai v. Narottamdas Bechardas and others, 1979 Guj. 1 (FB) in paragraph 17 negatived the argument that Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Bombay akin to Section 10 of the Letters Patent Nagpur is only confined to classical civil cases and does not refer to the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. It was pointed out that the order made in exercise of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution is neither a revisional nor an appellate order but is an order made in exercise of its extraordinary orginal jurisdiction and since there is no provision in the Constitution, the decision of the High Court is subject to the ordinary incidents of the procedure of the High Court for example appealability under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. 31. Article 24 and 25 of the Letters Patent respectively provide for High Court's Testamentary and Intestate Jurisdiction and Matrimonial Jurisdiction. Article 26 ibid deals with powers of Single Judge and Division Courts in performing the function of the High Court. Clause 9 ibid providing for extraordinary civil jurisdiction lay down that the High Court shall have power to remove and try and determine as a Court of extraordinary civil jurisdiction any suit. Article 26 ibid deals with powers of Single Judge and Division Courts in performing the function of the High Court. Clause 9 ibid providing for extraordinary civil jurisdiction lay down that the High Court shall have power to remove and try and determine as a Court of extraordinary civil jurisdiction any suit. It may be noted that the expression extraordinary jurisdiction has been used in the limited sense of removing suits for such trial and determination. 32. Clause 10 of the letters Patent apparently makes no reference to ordinary or extraordinary jurisdiction. However, from a combined reading of the observations made by the Privy Council in Mst. Sabitri's case, AIR 1921 PC 80 extracted in paragraph 30 of the decision in Shah Babulal's case (supra) and by the Supreme Court in paragraph 125 of its decision, it follows that Article 15 of the Letters Patent (Bombay) in addition to appeals from judgments of Single Judge of the High Court in exercise of his first appellate Jurisdiction has been interpreted as providing for first appeal as of right without any certificate to the High Court's appellate jurisdiction only from its judgment in its original ordinary jurisdiction and that proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution is governed not by the said article but by the rules framed under the (ode of Civil Procedure which are also applicable to the jurisdiction exercisable under the Letters Patent except that they do not restrict the expressed letters Patent Appeals. These observations cannot be cbaracterised as casual. They are so definite and appear to have been made after due consideration. Therefore, the observations are not only entitled to respect but also have a binding effect. From the aforesaid two decisions it follows that the question whether a judgment by a Single judge of the High Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution is appealable or not, has to be determined with reference to the rules framed by the High Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. Under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, appeal is provided only from the decisions which amount to 'judgment'. Under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, appeal is provided only from the decisions which amount to 'judgment'. The fact• that in the decision in Shah Babulal Khlmiji's case (supra) it has been expressly stated that Their Lordships have refrained from expressing any opinion on the nature of the order pissed by a trial Judge in proceeding under Article 226 of Constitution does not militate against the aforesaid view as to the right of appeal. It may be stated that from any orginal decision, normally a revision or appeal to a superior Court is provided by the statute concerned. But where the decision under the special jurisdiction under Article 226 is by a Judge of the High Court, internal appeal from it to a larger bench of the High Court, is properly left to be governed by its own rules. 33. From the foregoing discussion it follows that the applicability of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent stands excluded in relation to a decision by a Single Judge in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution and as the rules framed by the High Court do not expressly provide for an appeal against the decision of Single Judge in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, it has to be held that the present appeal is not tenable. 34 Now as to the merits of the appeal. As pointed out in the decision in Government Branch Press v. D. B. Billappa, AIR 1979 SC 429 the old doctrine as to the relationship of master and servant stands eroded in its application to persons in public employment to whom the constitutional protection of Articles 14, 15, 16 in Part III (Fundamental Rights, and 311 in Part XIV of the Constitution is available. As held in Basheshwar Nath v, Commissioner of Income-tax, AIR 1959 SC 149 fundamental rights cannot be bartered away. 35. Any State as defined in Article 12 of the Constitution is accountable to the obligations of fundamental rights under Chapter III of the Constitution. Article 14 is a general guarantee of equality. Article 16 ibid deals with the specific guarantee of equality of opportunity to all the citizens in all matters relating to public employment or appointment. 36. 35. Any State as defined in Article 12 of the Constitution is accountable to the obligations of fundamental rights under Chapter III of the Constitution. Article 14 is a general guarantee of equality. Article 16 ibid deals with the specific guarantee of equality of opportunity to all the citizens in all matters relating to public employment or appointment. 36. In State of Maharshtra v. Chandra Bhanu, AIR 1983 SC 803 it bas been held that public employment is the property of the nation to be shared equally subject, of course, to qualifications. 37. It has not been disputed that the appellant Corporation is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. In this connection, the decision in Bhagwant v. National Textile Corporation, 1984 JLJ 717 is pertinent. 38. The Corporation being a State is subject to the constitutional obligations under Article 14 and 16 occurring in Chapter III of the Constitution and its servants though not entitled to take shelter under the protective shield of guarantee under Article 311 of the Constitution available to persons employed in Civil capacities under the Union or a State are certainly entitled to the guarantee of fundamental right of equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 ibid. 39. In the instant case, as already stated, the respondent No. 1 admittedly entered the services of the appellant-Corporation under the terms and conditions embodied in the letter of appointment dated 21-9-1976. 40. The Sick Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 1974 had already come into force on 1-4-1974. It is on 1-4-1976 that the appellant-Corporation framed Employees Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules. There are no other rules. In the circumstances, notwithstanding the fact that the respondent No.1 had entered toe services of the Corporation subsequent to the said Act of 1974, his services did stand governed also by the express terms and conditions contained in the letter of appointment. In this context looking to the contents of the option form in their entirity the conclusion is irresistible that the terms and conditions of service as embodied in the letter aforesaid did stand altered and the services of the respondent No. 1 were to be governed exclusively by such rules as to the service conditions as may be framed by the Corporation. 41. 41. In the view aforesaid, the applicability of the ratio of the decision in Bhagwant's case (supra) is attracted with full force and the termination of the services of respondent No. 1 could only be under the rules of the Corporation and not under the initial terms of the contract of employment as embodied in the letter of appointment which previous to the option also governed the same. 42. It cannot be gainsaid that efficient and honest servants constitute the backbone of the administration run by the State. That the said servants have job security is as much in public interest as the power of the State to weed out corrupt and inefficient servants. However as held in the decision in Rayappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555 any arbitrary action affecting the rights to public employment would be hit by Article 14 and 16 the Constitution and would be justiciable. 43. As pointed out in D. B. Belliappa's case (supra) the State cannot terminate the services of even its temporary employee on the analogy of the power of a private employer to terminate the services of his employee. In a Government of Jaws there is nothing like unfettered discretion immune from judicial review-ability. No doubt that a permanent Government Servant acquires a right to the post and has a status and his services cannot be terminated without following the procedure laid down in the disciplinary rules. However, it is not that a temporary employee is left subject to the whims of his superiors. The decision in Billiappa's case (supra) points out that the Government's .right to terminate the services of its temporary employee under the contract of employment is no doubt there but this power is not absolute. Where a charge of unfair discrimination is levelled, reasons or motive for the impugned action have to be disclosed. As rightly pointed out therein, fairness founded on reasons is the essence of the guarantee epitomised in Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the constitution. Therefore, even the termination of the services of a temporary employee cannot be arbitrary. As arbitrariness is negation of equality, reasons for termination of the services of such an employee may be furnished in the needs of the State or in the inadequacy or fault of the employee which puts him in a class part from his juniors in• the same services. 44. As arbitrariness is negation of equality, reasons for termination of the services of such an employee may be furnished in the needs of the State or in the inadequacy or fault of the employee which puts him in a class part from his juniors in• the same services. 44. The ratio of the decision in D. B. Billiappa's case is also applicable to the respondent who is an employee under the appellant-Corporation which is a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. 45 In paragraphs 23 and 27 of the decision of D. P. Sheshachalam v. Administrative Staff College of India, 1985 (1) SCC 311 with reference to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution it has been pointed out that a pre-terminal notice of hearing however, summary, forms part of our Constitution and notice in terms of the contract of employment is not a substitute for it but only an additional safeguard. The decision in Subba Reddy v. Andhra University, AIR 1976 SC 2049 has been distinguished on the ground that the only question therein considered was whether the termination of services was ultra vires of the terms of contract of employment and the questions of job security under Articles 16 & 21 of the Constitution were neither raised nor considered. 46. Correctness of the contention that order of termination of services can be passed by the State as of right in accordance with the terms of contract of employment, at any time, on any day, for any reason or for no reason has to be negatived as existence of such unfettered right to terminate the services is antithetical to the Constitutional obligations under Articles 14, 16 & 21 of the Constitution. In Paragrarh 27 of the decision in D, P. Sheshachalam's case (supra) it has been pointed out that such rules and contract of employment if considered as independent and substantive sources of State's authority to terminate the services of its employee are liable to be struck down on the ground of their incompatability with the said Articles. They can only serve as additional safeguards to those provided by the constitutional mandates. At any rate, in a given case where such unfettered power is exercised arbitrarily the impugned action has necessarily to be struck down. They can only serve as additional safeguards to those provided by the constitutional mandates. At any rate, in a given case where such unfettered power is exercised arbitrarily the impugned action has necessarily to be struck down. In the decision in W. B. S. E. Board's case, AIR 1985 SC 722 dealing with the Board's regulation 34 which enabled the Board to terminate the services of any permanent employee by giving three month's notice or salary in lieu thereof it was observed thus in paragraph 4:- We are not impressed with the submission of the learned counsel for the Board. On the face of it, the regulation is totally arbitrary and confers on the Board a power which is capable of vicious discrimination. It is a naked 'hire and fire' rule, the time for banishing which altogether from employer-employee relationship is fast approaching. Its only parallel is to be found in the Henry VIII class so familiar to administrative lawyers ................ Since then Art. 14 has been interpreted in serveral decisions of this Court and confirment and exercise of arbitrary power on and by the State or its instrumentalities have been frowned upon and struck down by this Court as offending Article 14 ............ In Workment Hindustan Steel Limited v. Hindustan Steel. Limited, this Court had occasion, to hold that a Standing Order which conferred such arbitrary, uncanalised and drastic power to enable the employer to dispense with an enquiry and to dismiss an employee, without assigning any reason, by merely stating that it was expedient and against the interest of the security to continue to employ the workman was violative of the basic requirement of natural justice. 46. As result of the foregoing discussion, the conclusion is irresistible that the termination of services of respondent No.1 was rightly quashed by the impugned order. 47. The question whether the termination of services of the respondent No I was punitive or does not fall for consideration as the order of the learned single Judge does not cover this aspect of the matter. 48. In the result, the appeal is liable to be dismissed with costs as stated by my learned brother Mulye, J.