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1985 DIGILAW 459 (RAJ)

Hiralal v. Parmanand

1985-08-09

GOPAL KRISHNA SHARMA

body1985
G.K. SHARMA, J.—This revision petition is preferred against the judgement of Additional District Judge No. 2, Bharatpur, by which, he accepted the appeal of the non-petitioner and set aside the order of the Munsif, Bharatpur dated 29th Nov. 82,. 2. Hiralal filed a suit for rent and eviction, in the court of Munsif, Bharatpur. The learned Munsif, on 2nd July, 1980, determined the rent to be paid by the defendant, and directed the defendant to deposit the amount within 15 days. On 16th July,80, the defendant requested the court to extend the time for depositing the amount, and further time of 15 days was granted to him. Thereafter, on 17th July, 80, the defendant preferred an appeal against the order of the learned Munsif dated 2nd July, 80 and obtained a stay order from the appellate court. That appeal was dismissed on 7th Nov. 81. The defendant deposited the amount determined by the court as well as the arrears of monthly rent for the months November & December, 1981. He also submitted an application before the court to the effect that he came to know about the judgment of the appellate court on the 20th Jan. 82, and hence, the delay from 7th Nov. 81 to 21st Jan . 82, be condoned, for depositing the determined rent. 3. The plaintiff-petitioner filed reply to the application of the defendant-non-petitioner, and he also moved an application on 18th May, 82, for striking out the defence of the defendant as the latter had failed to deposit the determined rent and the monthly rent, in time, as directed by the court. On that application, the learned Munsif agreed with the plaintiff and, vide his judgment dated 29th Nov. 82, passed the order striking out the defence of the defendant, who also dismissed the application of the defendant for extension of time. The defendant then preferred an appeal against the said order before the Additional District Judge No. 2, Bharatpur, who, vide his order dated 28th, Aug. 84, accepted the appeal of the defendant and set aside the order of the learned Munsiff. Aggrieved by that order, the present revision petition has been filed. 4. It is not disputed that the Munsiff determined the rent on 2nd July, 80, and 15 days time was granted to the defendant for depositing the rent. It is also not disputed that the time was extended by 15 days. Aggrieved by that order, the present revision petition has been filed. 4. It is not disputed that the Munsiff determined the rent on 2nd July, 80, and 15 days time was granted to the defendant for depositing the rent. It is also not disputed that the time was extended by 15 days. But, during that period, an appeal was preferred by the defendant and a stay order was received by him from the appellate court, and he did not deposit the determined rent. When the appeal was disposed of on 7th Nov. 81, it was for the defendant to have deposited the determined rent, immediately, as directed by the learned Munsiff. 5. Mr. Garg, the learned counsel for the non-petitioner argued that the defendant came to know about the judgment of the appellate-court on 20th Jan. 82, and after that, immediately on 21st Jan., 82, he deposited the determined amount as well as the rent pertaining to months November & December, 81. So, according to him, there was no delay, and if there was any delay, that might be condoned, because the non-petitioner, Parmanand was not in the knowledge of the judgment. 6. Mr. Khejriwal, the learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the judgment of the appellate court was pronounced in presence of the counsel for defendant-non-petitioner Parmanand, on 7th Nov., 81. So, it cannot be said that defendant Parmanand had no knowledge of the judgment of the appellate court. 7. I agree with the argument of Mr. Khejriwal, the learned counsel for the petitioner. The appellant, while filing the appeal before the court of ADJ, was not unrepresented, but, he was represented by a counsel. His counsel argued the appeal and he was present when the appeal was disposed of. It was the duty of the defendant either to have been present on every date before the appellate court, or if he thought not to be present and relied on his counsel, then, it was his duty to have found out from his counsel about the fate of the appeal. This is no ground that after engaging a counsel, the defendant could be silent and would sleep at his house and his counsel would come to his house and inform him what had happened to his appeal. This is no ground that after engaging a counsel, the defendant could be silent and would sleep at his house and his counsel would come to his house and inform him what had happened to his appeal. The fact of engaging a counsel, does not relieve a party of his duty of knowing as to the happenings to his case. Therefore, the ground that the defendant did not know about the judgment of the appellate court on 7th Nov., 81, but he came to know about it only on 20th Jan. 81, is of no substance. In my opinion, this is no ground at all. Apart from this, it has not been shown as to how the defendant - non - petitioner came to know about the judgment of the appellate court on 20th Jan.82. After 7th Nov. 81, till 20th Jan., where the defendant - non - petitioner, Parmanand was? It is very easy to say that he did not come to know about the judgment of the appellate court earlier, but he came to know about it only on 20th Jan., 82. Hence, I do not feel that defendant - non-petitioner Parmanand was not in the knowledge of the judgment of the appellate court on 7th Nov., 81. 8. Apart from this, an application was filed by the defendant on 21st Jan., 82, requesting the court to extend the time for depositing the amount, which was only pertaining to the determined amount. In that application, the defendant prayed that time be extended for depositing the amount determined by the learned Munsiff, vide his order dated 2nd July. 80, In that application there was no mention that the amount for the months November & Dec. 81, was not deposited in time, and so, the period for those months be also extended. Even in the prayer there was no mention that time for depositing the rent relating to months November & December, 1981, be also extended. As such, there was no prayer by the defendant for extending the time for depositing the rent for the months of November & December, 81, which he was bound to deposit in time. 9. Mr. Even in the prayer there was no mention that time for depositing the rent relating to months November & December, 1981, be also extended. As such, there was no prayer by the defendant for extending the time for depositing the rent for the months of November & December, 81, which he was bound to deposit in time. 9. Mr. Garg, the learned counsel for the non-petitioner then argued that in the interest of justice, time should be extended now, and the defendant who has already deposited the amount on 21st Jan., 82 and thereafter, he has been continuing depositing monthly rent every month. 10. I do not agree with the contention of Mr. Garg. No doubt, the legislature is in favour of the tenants, and such a stringent view of striking out defence should not be taken ordinarily by the court but, this does not mean that without there being any valid reasonable ground for not depositing the amount in time, the Court should extend the period, only because, the legislation is in favour of tenants. The defendant in this case should have satisfied the court and should have given valid reasons for not depositing the amount in time. But, in the present case, no reason has been shown, and the ground for not having knowledge of the judgment of the appellate court, is such a vague ground which cannot be believed at all. So, in my view allowing the defendant and condoning the delay at this stage, would not be justified. 11. The delay is on the two grounds, firstly, regarding the determined rent; and secondly, regarding monthly rent for the months of November & December, 1981. The learned Munsiff on both the grounds struck out the defence, and the appellate court on both the grounds accepted the appeal of the defendant. 12. S.13(4) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short hereinafter, "the Act") reads as under: "S. 13 (4). (1) The tenant shall : (a) deposit in Court - or (b) pay to the landlord the amount determined by the court under Sub-Section (3); (i) within FlFTEEN DAYS from the date of such determination, OR (ii) within such further time, not exceeding THREE months, as may be extended by the Court. (1) The tenant shall : (a) deposit in Court - or (b) pay to the landlord the amount determined by the court under Sub-Section (3); (i) within FlFTEEN DAYS from the date of such determination, OR (ii) within such further time, not exceeding THREE months, as may be extended by the Court. (2) The tenant shall: (a) also continue(i) to deposit in the Court, OR (ii) pay to the landlord, (b) month by month the monthly rent subsequent to the period upto which determination has been made, (c) by the fifteenth of each succeeding month, OR (d) within such further time, not exceeding fifteen days, as may be extended by the Court, (e) at the monthly rate at which the rent was determined by the Court under sub-section (3)". According to this Section, the Court would determine the rent and the tenant shall deposit the determined rent within 15 days from the date of such determination, or within such further time not exceeding three months as may be extended by the Court. So, for depositing the determined rent, the maximum period as given in the Act is, three months, from the date of such determination. The period beyond three months, cannot be extended in any case. In the present case, the rent was determined on 2nd July, 80, and the defendant - non-petitioner preferred an appeal on 17th July, 80, when the appellate - court passed the stay order. The said appeal of the defendant was disposed of by the appellate court on 7th Nov., 81. So, the stay continued from 17th July, to 7th Nov.,81, During this period, the amount was not deposited for which, the defendant cannot be blamed also, nor this period should be counted while counting the three months period from the date of determination of rent. As such, not counting the period from 17th July,80, to 7th Nov.81, during which the stay order was in force and the appeal had been pending, the amount was deposited on 21st Jan.,82, i.e. within 89 days. So, it cannot be said that this period was beyond three months as envisaged in S. 13(4) of the Act. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was any default in making payment of the determined rent/amount, which was determined by the court on 2nd July, 80. In this regard, the judgment of the appellate court is correct. So, it cannot be said that this period was beyond three months as envisaged in S. 13(4) of the Act. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was any default in making payment of the determined rent/amount, which was determined by the court on 2nd July, 80. In this regard, the judgment of the appellate court is correct. The second point is with regard to default pertaining to months November and December, 1981 S. 13(4) of the Act says that the tenant shall continue to deposit in court, month by month, monthly rent, subsequent to the period upto which determination has been made. This monthly rent was to be deposited by the 15th of each succeeding month, or within such further time, not exceeding 15 days, as may be extended by the court, which means that the period for depositing monthly rent, can be extended by the court upto 15 days only, and beyond 15 days, the court has no power to extend the time. So, this is a mandatory provison, and the defendant non - petitioner was to deposit the monthly rent on 15th of each succeeding month, and if he failed to deposit it by that date, then, within next 15 days, which could be the maximum extended period, by the court. In the present case, it is not disputed that the defendant did not deposit the rent for the months November and Dec. 81. The rent for these two months, was deposited on 21st Jan.82. There was no application of the defendant for granting extension for depositing the monthly rent. The application which was filed by the defendant on 21st Jan, 82, was only pertaining to determined rent. There was no prayer therein for extending the period with regard to monthly rent for the months of November & December, 81. If the prayer of the defendant-non-petitioner is considered at this stage that the period be also extended, then, it would be against mandatory provisions of S. 13(4) of the Act, which says that period cannot be extended beyond 15 days. 13. Mr. Garg then contended that the rent for the month of December, 82, was to be deposited by Jan., 15, 82, and this period could be extended for 15 days more, and as the rent for this month was deposited on 21st Jan., 82, and if the period is extended, it would be within the time. 13. Mr. Garg then contended that the rent for the month of December, 82, was to be deposited by Jan., 15, 82, and this period could be extended for 15 days more, and as the rent for this month was deposited on 21st Jan., 82, and if the period is extended, it would be within the time. As there was no prayer in the appellate court, I do not think it proper to consider this prayer at this stage. There has been default for the month of Nov., 81 and for which the provision is mandatory, the defendant cannot get any benefit at this stage. 14. Under these circumstances and the observations made above, I am of the view that the learned Additional District Judge did not correctly appreciate the point of default pertaining to the months of November & December,81. As such his order on this point, cannot be maintained. 15. In the result, the revision petition is partly accepted. The order of the learned Additional District Judge pertaining to monthly rent for the month of Nov., 81, and that of the learned Munsiff dated 29th Nov.. 82 are maintained. The defence of the defendant-non-petitioner which was struck out, by the learned Munsiff, is hereby maintained. The parties are left to bear their own costs, in the circumstances of the case.