Research › Browse › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

1985 DIGILAW 462 (ALL)

State of U. P. v. Bharat Kumar

1985-04-22

A.P.MISRA, K.C.AGRAWAL

body1985
JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - This first appeal has been preferred by the State of U.P. against the judgment of the First Additional District Judge, Bijnor, dated 27-10-1978, partly allowing the Land Acquisition Case No. 73 of 1972 and enhancing the rate of compensation from Rs. 2509/- to Rs. 4000/- per acre. 2. It appears that by means of a notification issued on 9-10-1971, the land involved in the present case as well as some others was notified for acquisition by the State of U.P. This notification was followed by another notification under Section 6 of the said Act. Ultimately, the land was taken possession of by the State and thereafter proceedings for determination of compensation were started before the Special Land Acquisition Officer. On 30-3-1972, the Special Land Acquisition Officer determined compensation @ Rs 2509/- per acre. Aggrieved, the respondents preferred an application for reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. In the reference, the respondents claimed that compensation awarded was less than the market value of the land and the same should have been determined @ Rs. 5000/- per acre. The learned Additional District Judge, to whom the reference application had been transferred, found the compensation to be payable @ Rs. 4000/- per acre. In arriving at this finding, the Additional District Judge relied on the sale deeds dated 14-2-1968 filed by the respondents. By one of these sale deeds Gurmail Singh transferred 1 Bigha 13 Biswas land to Sardar Amreek Singh for Rs. 5000/-. Another sale deed was executed by Sardar Gurmail Singh in favour of Gur Dayal Singh for Rs. 3500/- of the land measuring 1 Bigha 7 Biswas. These sale deeds were found trustworthy and in respect of the land situated in the vicinity of the land acquired. The learned Additional District Judge placed reliance on these sale deeds. 3. On behalf of the State of U.P. the sale deed which was produced was dated 15-1-1969, by which Chhajju Singh sold the land to his son Lal Singh. The sale deed had been discarded by the court below on the finding that the same was a fictitious document executed by the father is favour of his son with a view to save his land from creditors. 4. Apart from the sale deeds, the learned Additional District Judge. The sale deed had been discarded by the court below on the finding that the same was a fictitious document executed by the father is favour of his son with a view to save his land from creditors. 4. Apart from the sale deeds, the learned Additional District Judge. who decided the application for reference, also made a local inspection of the acquired land and found that a good sugarcane crop was standing over the same. It was not found to be of low level, as was alleged by the State, and no rain water was accumulated therein. 5. After having considered the evidence and the local inspection, the learned Additional District Judge determined the compensation @ Rs. 4000/- per acre. The respondents were also paid solatium @ 15 per cent on the amount awarded by the Additional District Judge. 6. In the appeal before us, learned Standing Counsel contended that the learned Additional District Judge ought to have believed the sale deed executed by Chhajju Singh on 15-1-1969 in favour of his son Lal Singh. We are unable to accept the argument. A fictitious document cannot be a guide for the purpose of determining compensation. It has come in evidence that Chhajju Singh had executed the sale deed fictitiously in favour of his son to save his land from the creditors. As such, the said sale deed could not be considered as an exemplar for determining the value of the land in dispute. 7. So far as the sale deeds filed by the respondents are concerned, the suggestion made by the State Counsel was that they were executed with a view to inflate the claim of compensation of the land which were going to be acquired by the present acquisition. There is nothing on record to indicate that the persons of the village had come to know of the intending acquisition of the land in question. Moreover, there being no relationship or other circumstance to find that the considerations paid under the sale deeds, were fake, we do not agree with the counsel for the appellant to discard them. In our opinion, the learned Additional District Judge rightly considered these sale deeds and correctly found them to be reliable. 8. Moreover, there being no relationship or other circumstance to find that the considerations paid under the sale deeds, were fake, we do not agree with the counsel for the appellant to discard them. In our opinion, the learned Additional District Judge rightly considered these sale deeds and correctly found them to be reliable. 8. Learned counsel for the respondents, however filed an application for payment of solatium at 30 per cent on the basis of amendment made by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (Act No. 68 of 1984). By this Amending Act, a number of amendments have been made. For our purposes, the amendment relevant is in Section 23(2) which enhances the rate of solatium from 15 per cent to 30 per cent. This was done by Section 15(b) of the Amending Act, which reads as follows : "in sub-section (2), for the words "fifteen per centum", the words "thirty per centum" shall be substituted." 9. Another claim made by the applicant was for interest @ 9 per centum, which has been brought in by Section 18 of the Amending Act. Section 18(a) of the Amending Act provides : "In Section 28 of the Principal Act- (a) for the words "six per centum" the words "nine per centum" shall be substituted." 10. For answering the points raised, reference may be made to sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the Amending Act. which is being quoted below : "The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Section 28 of the principal Act as amended by clause (b) of Section 15, and Section 18 of this Act respectively, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to. and in relation to, any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the principal Act after the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982), in the House of the People and before the commencement of this Act." 11. The argument of the counsel for the respondents was that these provisions enhancing rate of solatium and rate of interest are retrospective and, therefore, to all cases which are pending, solatium would be payable @30 per centum and interest @9 per centum. For the proposition relied upon. The argument of the counsel for the respondents was that these provisions enhancing rate of solatium and rate of interest are retrospective and, therefore, to all cases which are pending, solatium would be payable @30 per centum and interest @9 per centum. For the proposition relied upon. learned counsel for the respondents relied on a decision of the Delhi High Court in Raghbir Singh v. Union of India, R.F.A. Nos. 113 and 114 of 1968, decided on 6-12-1984 : (reported in AIR 1985 Delhi 228). 12. It is no doubt true that this judgment of the Delhi High Court supports the contention of the respondents. However, on interpretation of the language of sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the Amending Act we respectfully find ourselves unable to agree with the view of the Delhi High Court. The intention of the Parliament is clearly expressed in the language employed in sub-section (2) of Section 30. The language leaves no room for doubt that the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Section 28 of the principal Act, as amended by the Amending Act, shall apply only to limited class of cases in which awards are given after 30th April, 1982. Counsel for the respondents urged that the intention of the Parliament could not be to confine the benefit of the Amending Act to cases where awards are given after 30th April, 1982. This submission is not tenable. 13. In Civil Appeals Nos. 2196 of 1970 and 2713 and 2714 of 1972, (decided on February 14,1985) : (reported in AIR 1985 SC 576 ), the Supreme Court had an occasion to decide precisely the same controversy which is involved in the present appeal. The Supreme Court has found that the amendments made in Section 23(2) and Section 28 of the principal Act would be applicable to cases in which awards are given after 30th April, 1982, and only to this limited extent retrospectivity has been given by the Parliament. Relevant portion of the judgment of the Supreme Court is quoted below (at p. 577) : "The Bill which ultimately became the Amendment Act was introduced into Parliament on April 30, 1982. Parliament obviously desired to give effect to the amended S. 23(2) from the date of introduction of the Bill. Relevant portion of the judgment of the Supreme Court is quoted below (at p. 577) : "The Bill which ultimately became the Amendment Act was introduced into Parliament on April 30, 1982. Parliament obviously desired to give effect to the amended S. 23(2) from the date of introduction of the Bill. So, the amended provision was expressly made applicable by S. 30(2) to awards made by the Collector or Court between April 30, 1982, and September 24, 1984 also. A natural corollary was that the new provision should apply to orders made by the High Court or by the Supreme Court in appeals against such awards, that is, awards made between April 30, 1982. and September 24, 1984. Parliament did not intend and could not have intended that whatever be the date of the award, however ancient it may be, solatium would stand enhanced to 'thirty per centum' if an appeal happened by chance or accident to be pending on April 30, 1982. Surely it was not the intention of Parliament to reward those who kept alive the litigation even after several years. If it was the intention of Parliament to make the amended S. 23(2) applicable to all proceedings relating to compensation wherever be pending, the words "after the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition Amendment Bill, 1982, in the House of the People) and before the commencement of this Act" in S. 30(2) would become meaningless. It is clear that Parliament wanted the amended S. 23(2) to have very limited retrospectivity. It made the provision applicable to awards made after April 30, 1982 and before September 24, 1984 also and further to appeals to the High Court and the Supreme Court arising from such awards. In this view, we see no force in the submission of Shri Bhat. All the appeals are dismissed. No costs.". 14. In our view, the question of retrospectivity of Section 30(2) has been settled by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision. 15. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. The application made by the respondents for payment of solatium @30 per centum and interest @9 per centum is also rejected. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs.