JUDGMENT : B.D. Agarwal, J. This is a Defendant's appeal arising out of the decision of the Additional Civil Judge, Basti, dated April 5, 1966. 2. According to the case of the Plaintiff, there was loan advanced by him of a sum of Rs. 4,000/- to the Defendant on February 25, 1958. The Defendant executed a promissory note the same day agreeing to repay the amount on demand with interest at the rate of 12% per annum. A sum of Rs. 1,400/-was paid on February 23, 1961: there was also payment of Rs. 900/- earlier on 15th November, 1958. Both these payments were endorsed under the signature of the Defendant at the back of the promissory note. The Plaintiff laid claim to a sum of Rs. 3,700/- including interest in Original Suit No. 59 of 1964 instituted by him in the court of Munsif, Basti. In defence it was pleaded, inter alia, that the Defendant had paid in all Rs. 3,700/- leaving a balance of Rs. 300/- only. The trial court decreed the suit on 1st February, 1965, for a sum of Rs. 1,345/76 only. Against that part of the decree disallowing portion of the claim of the Plaintiff he preferred an appeal; cross-objection was filed for the Defendant. Both these were decided by the Additional Civil Judge on April 5, 1966. Cross-objection was dismissed. The appeal was allowed in part and as a result the suit was decreed for Rs. 3,556/- only. 3. Aggrieved, the Defendant preferred this second appeal. 4. Upon the matter coming up earlier before a learned Single Judge on July 29, 1981, there was reference made to the lower appellate court for recording a finding on the following issues: whether the Plaintiff was a money lender within the meaning of the Act for the purposes of the protection envisaged by Sections 18 and 26(4)? 5. The finding recorded by the Civil Judge, Basti, dated October 7, 1982, on the issue referred is in the affirmative. It has been held that the Plaintiff was a money-lender within the meaning of Sections 18/26(4) of the U.P. Regulation of Money Lending Act, 1976. 6. Learned Counsel for the Appellants contends that the non-compliance of the provisions of Sections 18/26(4) of the U.P. Regulation of Money Lending Act, 1976, as a complete bar to the maintainability of the suit giving rise to this second appeal. 6. Learned Counsel for the Appellants contends that the non-compliance of the provisions of Sections 18/26(4) of the U.P. Regulation of Money Lending Act, 1976, as a complete bar to the maintainability of the suit giving rise to this second appeal. For the Respondents it was submitted that the bar may not be claimed to be attracted in the present since the suit was instituted prior to the enforcement of the Act. I am unable to agree with the submission for the Respondents in this behalf. 7. The proviso to Section 18 of the Act lays down that a suit for the enforcement of any loan, agreement or security made or taken before the commencement of the Act may be instituted or continued if the money lender applied for registration u/s 7 within a period of three months from the date of such commencement, and a certificate of registration is issued to him. There is no dispute that the Plaintiff in the instant case did not apply for registration u/s 7 nor was a certificate of registration issued in his favour. The expression 'continued' appearing in this proviso is suggestive of the application of the bar laid therein in respect also suit brought prior to the commencement of the Act. As K.N. Goyal, J. served in Ram Jiwan Vs. Sri Niwas, (1978) AWC 835, it is true that the language of Section 18 is not very happy, but we have to construe the prohibition contained in the main section in the light of its proviso as well and also in the light of Section 26(4). In so far as Section 26(4) is concerned, this in my opinion leaves no room to doubt that the bar is operative including in respect of a suit instituted prior to the commencement of the Act. Sub-section (4) of Section 26 reads as under: Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract, decree or order or any other law for the time being in force, no money-lender shall be entitled to claim any amount from a debtor in respect of any loan advanced before the commencement of this Act, unless the name of such debtor and the amount due from him has been specified in the statement referred to in Sub-section (1). 8. 8. The non-obstante clause in this sub-section makes it abundantly clear that the provision thereof overrides not merely a contract to the contrary but also a decree or order and for that matter any other law to the contrary. Despite, therefore, there being a decree passed by the trial court or the lower appellate court, before the commencement of this Act, the claim thereunder is not open to be pursued at the instance of the decree-holder without a compliance being made to the requirement of Sub-section (1). The expression "entitled to claim" governs, to my mind, also a claim in capacity as a Respondent in second appeal based upon a contract, decree or order or other law in force as in the present. For purposes of application of Sub-section (4) it is not required that the case be one where the claim is laid for the first time after the commencement of the Act. This has also been the view taken in Ram Jiwan (supra) and also by brother A.N. Varma, J. in Babban Mani Tewari Vs. Rani Barans, (1979) AWC 451. Reliance for Respondents was placed on the observations of Deokt Nandan J. in Ram Dayal Vs. Ganga Prasad, (1982) AWC 280 wherein it was stated that the claim for the amount in question for such a suit which is in respect of a loan advanced before the commencement of the Act and having already been made long before the commencement thereof and the claim also having been decreed, there was no bar arising due to Sub-section (4). It was submitted for the Respondent that on account of the conflict thus arising there is a reference made on the issue to a larger Bench. The decisions in 1978 AWC 833 and 1979 AWC 451 are not cited and do not appear to have been brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge deciding the case of Ram Dayal on March 3, 1982. The consensus is clearly in favour of the bar of Section 26(4) being applicable to such a case and, as I explained above, this also is borne out from the language employed and the context in which subsection (4) is placed. Even if there be a doubt entertained as to the application of the proviso to Section 18, it is rendered of little consequence because Section 26(4) is adequate in itself to non-suit the Plaintiff-Respondent. 9. Even if there be a doubt entertained as to the application of the proviso to Section 18, it is rendered of little consequence because Section 26(4) is adequate in itself to non-suit the Plaintiff-Respondent. 9. Learned Counsel for the Respondents argued then that there is no finding recorded by the lower appellate court to the effect that the Plaintiff had been a money-lender at the commencement of the Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 26 refers to every money-lender carrying on the business of money lending from before the commencement of the Act. Sub-section (4) is in relation to any money lender. The expression 'money-lender' in Section 3(6) is meaning a person who carries on the business of money lending. Satgur, the Plaintiff, admitted while giving his statement before the trial court on July 27, 1965 that he had money transactions with several persons. On being re-examined subsequent to remand on 17th September, 1982, he tried to deviate from this admission by saying that he was an employee in the Collectorate and he used to lend money to various persons from the village. He also stated that he maintained a register in connection with the lending of money. Register was, however, not produced nor accounted for. The statement made by him itself suggests that the money-lending was carried on by him in the ordinary course of business and that it is not a case of isolated transaction of advance of loan. In the absence of anything to the contrary the Court may well assume in favour of continuity rather than otherwise. The lower appellate court may not consequently be said to have erred in its finding that Satgur was a money-lender within the meaning of this Act. 10. Consideration being bad to the above, the appeal succeeds and is allowed accordingly. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court dated 5-4-1966 are set aside. The suit shall stand dismissed. Costs shall be borne by the parties throughout.