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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

1985 DIGILAW 472 (MP)

RAJKUMAR COLLEGE KARMACHARI UNION v. PRINCIPAL RAJKUMAR COLLEGE

1985-12-03

B.M.LAL

body1985
JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) BY this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of india, the petitioners Rajkumar College Karmachari Union seeks to quash the award dated 24-2-1983 (Annexure-21) passed by the respondent No. 2, the Labour Court raipur whereby the claim of 21 members of the Union, who are employees of the rajkumar College, presented by the petitioner under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the act) has been dismissed ( 2. ) THE short facts leading to this petition are as under :. The Rajkumar College, raipur was constituted and registered as society in the year 1894 with an object of establishing public school. The Society formed for the purpose laid down the foundation of the institution which is named as rajkumar College which is a residential. institution for schooling small children ranging from the age group of 6 to 18 years. ( 3. ) TO look after the welfare of the residential students, the. management of respondent No. 1 employed various employees to work in different capacities viz. , as cooks, Khawas, waiters, sweepers etc. and to regulate their service conditions, the respondent No. 1 has framed its own rules and regulations. ( 4. ) IT is not disputed that the 21 persons who figured in para 2 (i) of the petition and who are members of the petitioner-Union and the other employees of the Rajkumar college, have continuously served the management of respondent No. 1 for more than 240 days as required under Section 23 (b) of the Act, extending their services in hostel, mess, sports, recreation and as cooks, sweepers etc. , but the management of respondent no. 1, without any ryhme or reason, terminated the services of the aforesaid 21 persons by passing separate orders contained in Annexures 1 to 19. This has given the cause of action in favour of the petitioner to approach the respondent No. 2 under Section 10 (1)of the Act making grievance that the order contained in Annexures 1 to 19 results in illegal termination of the services of the 21 persons which amounts to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2 (oo) of the Act. ( 5. ( 5. ) THE petitioner submitted that the respondent No. 1 having not complied with the mandatory requirement of Section 25-F of the Act and the termination orders in question result in retrenchment, the aforesaid 21 persons are not only entitled for reinstatement but are also entitled for the back wages as well. ( 6. ) THE respondent while filing reply before the respondent No. 2 submitted that the management of respondent No. 1 is not an industry within the meaning of Section 2 (j) of the Act. It is further alleged that aforesaid 21 persons suddenly stopped their work and abstained from their duties and in this way paralysed the activities of the school. The petitioners aforesaid 21 members also continued to remain absent, therefore, the management of respondent No. 1 lost confidence on them, and on this account, according to the rules and regulations by which their services are governed, terminated their services. It is, however, submitted that one months salary was given to each of the aforesaid 21 persons in lieu of one months notice. The other allegations relating to victimisation, unfair labour practice as have been pleaded by the petitioner in the application, have been specifically denied by the respondent No. 1. The respondent No. I also submitted that Jogeshwar, Mansukhlal, Hardwarsingh and Vishnudatt have already attained the age of superannuation and, therefore, they have no right to continue in service as provided in the rules. ( 7. ) THE respondent No. 2 by its impugned award dated 24-2-1983, contained in annexure-21, dismissed the application of the petitioner holding that the management of respondent No. 1 is not an industry within the meaning of Section 2 (j) of the Act. It further held that the services of the aforesaid 21 persons have not been terminated illegally and, therefore, the question of retrenchment as envisaged under Section 2 (oo)of the Act, does not arise. On the other hand, it has been held that the services of the aforesaid 21 persons have been dispensed with in accordance with the College rules and regulations and as such the termination of their services has been held to be justified. ( 8. ) AGAINST the order of the respondent No. 2, the present petition has been filed by the petitioner-Union. ( 9. ( 8. ) AGAINST the order of the respondent No. 2, the present petition has been filed by the petitioner-Union. ( 9. ) SHRI H. N. Vyas, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the management of respondent No. 1 comes within the definition of Section 2 (j) of the act and further submitted that since the aforesaid 21 persons have worked for more than 240 days as required under Section 25-B of the Act, the non-observance of the mandatory requirements of Section 25-F of the Act, the termination orders result in retrenchment as defined under Section 2 (oo) of the Act and, therefore, the petitioners (aforesaid 21 members) are entitled to be reinstated in service with back wages. ( 10. ) SHRI G. M. Chaphekar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1, while supporting the award passed by the respondent No. 2 submitted that because of the activities of the aforesaid 21 persons abstaining from duty without any notice to the management of respondent No. 1, he lost confidence and, therefore, their services have been rightly terminated after giving one mouths salary in lieu of one months notice. It is also submitted that substantially the requirements of Section 25-F of the Act have been complied with by giving one months salary required under provisions of Section 25-F (a)of the Act. ( 11. ) AFTER hearing the, rival contentions of the parties and considering the decisions cited by them, I have reached the conclusion that this petition deserves to be allowed. ( 12. ) IN Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs. A. Raiappa and others, air 1978 S. C. 548, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that any management having activities of industry within the meaning of definition of Industrial disputes Act, is an industry and, therefore, the ratio laid down in the above cases leaves no room to doubt that management of respondent No. 1 does come within the meaning of Section 2 (j) of the Act and hence the argument as advanced by Shri Chaphekar for the respondent No. 1 that the management of respondent No. 1 is not an industry is of no consequence, as has been concluded by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court. ( 13. ( 13. ) SHRI Chaphekar next contended that the respondent No. 1, having substantially complied with the provisions of Section 25-F (a) of the Act, has substantially met with the requirements of the provisions of the aforesaid Section of the act. I am afraid if this contention is accepted, then for want of compliance of other provisions of Section 25-F, i. e. the remaining sub-sections (b) and (c), the intention of the legislature would become nugatory. The entire provision is contained in three limbs i. e, sub-section (a), (b) and (c) of Section 25-F of the Act and these subsections are conjunctive and are to be complied with simultaneously. Compliance of the requirement of one limb will not be sufficient to construe that the provisions of Section 25-F have been complied with. All the three limbs of Section 25-F of the Act, collectively issue mandate upon the management to comply with all the sub-sections at a time. Therefore, if only one sub-section of Section 25-F is complied with, it cannot be construed to be compliance of Section 25-F of the Act as a whole and, therefore, in my opinion, only by complying with sub-section (a) of Section 25-F of the Act, in paying one months salary in lieu of one months notice, cannot be held good, inasmuch as, the management of respondent No. 1 has not substantially complied with the entire provisions of Section 25-F-of the Act Due to the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the act as a whole, the termination of services of the aforesaid 21 persons, results in retrenchment, as denned under Section 2 (oo) of the Act. ( 14. ) SHRI Chaphekar next contended that the management of respondent No. 1 lost confidence on the terminated 21 persons because of their act of remaining absent continuously for days together and, therefore, the management has rightly terminated their services as per College management rules. This argument of Shri Chaphekar has no substance in view of the provisions of Section 25-F and Section 2 (oo) of the Act, as in such circumstances, if the services of the employees are terminated, question of loss of confidence in them, would not arise at all. This argument of Shri Chaphekar has no substance in view of the provisions of Section 25-F and Section 2 (oo) of the Act, as in such circumstances, if the services of the employees are terminated, question of loss of confidence in them, would not arise at all. In L. Robert Dsouza vs. The Executive engineer, Southern Railway and others (AIR 1982 S. C. 854), Their Lordships of the supreme Court have held that if termination of service of a workman is brought about for any reason whatsoever, it would be retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2 (oo) of the Act. Therefore, it must as a necessary corollary follow that if services of the aforesaid 21 persons are terminated by the management of respondent No. 1, without following the mandatory requirements of Section 25-F of the Act, that termination would amount to retrenchment and the defence as taken by the respondent No. 1 that the management of (of respondent No. 1) lost confidence over the terminated persons, is of no avail. The words used by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, i. e. , for any reason whatsoever signify that even if the management loses confidence, it has to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act, which issues mandate upon the employer (management ). ( 15. ) IN Management of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, Bangalore vs. M. Boraiah and another (AIR 1983 S. C. 1320) and Factory Manager Central India machinery Mfg. Co. Ltd. Gwalior and another vs. Naresh Chandra Saxena and others (1984 MPLJ 408) effect of retrenchment was considered and the ratio laid down is that the termination in violation of Section 25-F of the Act results in voidness ab initio. The observations made in para 5 of Factory Managers case (supra) which are reproduced herein below, signify the importance of non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Act: ". . . . When the pre-requisite for a valid retrenchment as laid down in Section 25-F was not complied with, the retrenchment bringing about termination of service of employee would be ab initio void. It may be mentioned here that in the last 4 cases the Supreme Court reiterated the view expressed in Santosh gupta vs. State Bank of Patiala (supra) and approved the distinguishment of the earlier decision in H. S. Shukla vs. A D. Divelkar (supra ). It may be mentioned here that in the last 4 cases the Supreme Court reiterated the view expressed in Santosh gupta vs. State Bank of Patiala (supra) and approved the distinguishment of the earlier decision in H. S. Shukla vs. A D. Divelkar (supra ). Therefore, law is not well settled by the Supreme Court that termination of service for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than punishment by Way of disciplinary action or voluntary retirement or reaching the age of superannuation or on medical ground, amounts to retrenchment" ( 16. ) FROM the discussion aforesaid, the true position that emerges is that fee management of respondent No. 1 has no right to terminate the services of its employees, in the circumstances of the case, under the College Rules and Regulations and, therefore, the termination order results in retrenchment as defined under Section 2 (6o)of the Act if Section 25-F has not been complied with fully by the employer. Therefore, the pleas as raised by the respondent No. 1 have no substance in the eye of law and hence they must be rejected. ( 17. ) AS discussed above, the termination of the aforesaid 21 persons, becomes void ab initio and, therefore, if the remaining sub-sections of Section 25-F of the Act are even now complied with, that will not help the respondent No. 1 in regularising the termination orders contained in Annexures 1 to 19. On the other hand, for non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Act, as a whole, as a necessary consequence the aforesaid 21 persons are deemed to have continued in employment and, therefore, they are entitled for full back wages as held by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M/s hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. vs. Employees of M/s Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. and others (AIR 1978 S. C. 75 ). ( 18. ) OF the 21 persons as aforesaid, so far as Jogeshwar Mansukhlal, Hardwarsingh and Vishnudatt are concerned, it has been argued that they have reached the age of superannuation. If that is so, this may be considered after giving due opportunity to them by the respondent No. 1. ( 19. ( 18. ) OF the 21 persons as aforesaid, so far as Jogeshwar Mansukhlal, Hardwarsingh and Vishnudatt are concerned, it has been argued that they have reached the age of superannuation. If that is so, this may be considered after giving due opportunity to them by the respondent No. 1. ( 19. ) AS a result of the aforesaid discussion, the termination orders contained in annexures 1 to 19 and the award contained in Annexure-21 dated 24-2-1983 are hereby quashed and Juria Reddy, Jiwrakhan, Vishanbar, Ramu Reddy, Gaindlal, Radheshyam, vishwanath, Sukhru Reddy, Gangasagar, Khema, Ramji Pal, Ram Gyani, Kejuram, tejram, Bhagirathi and Lal Bahadur and Shrimati Sonkunwarbai are directed to be reinstated with full back wages. As far as Jogeshwar, Mansukhlal, Hadwarsingh and vishnudatt are concerned, they shall be entitled to get their back wages only upto the date they attained age of superannuation. ( 20. ) IT is, however, further made clear that the back wages to the aforesaid 21 persons must be paid within three months from the date of this order. ( 21. ) AS a result of the aforesaid findings, this petition is allowed with costs. Counsel fee Rs. 500/-, if certified. The security amount, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition allowed.