Judgment :- 1. In this Original Petition the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs: (i) issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction calling for the papers leading to Ext. P6 and quash the same; (ii) issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the respondents to allow the petitioners to continue in their respective posts to which they were appointed if Ext. P6 order were not issued at all; (iii) and grant such other reliefs as this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case including the costs of this Original Petition. The Original Petition was subsequently amended and the following additional prayer was also added: "Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction calling for the papers leading to Ext. P9 and all proceedings pending before the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Malappuram in A.R.C.24/1984 and quash the same". 2. Facts lie in a very narrow compass. Petitioners 1 and 2 were appointed as Junior Clerks; the 3rd petitioner as Junior Typist and the 4th petitioner as Salesman, in the Thenhipalam Service Co-operative Bank, the 3rd respondent. By Ext. P6 proceedings of the Part-time Administrator of R3 Co-operative Bank, the services of the petitioners were terminated with effect from 16-10-1984, the date on which the said order was passed. The reason for the termination of the services of the petitioners, as shown in Ext. P6, is extracted hereunder: "As per the orders of the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies read 1st above the interview for selection to the posts of Junior Clerk, Typist and Salesman in the Bank proposed to be held on 11-10-84 at 11 a.m. was stayed. But ignoring the above stay order the interview was conducted by two sub committee members on 11-10-84 and the appointments of the following persons was also ordered. 1. Sri. Bahavudeen T. P. Junior Clerk 2. Sri. Sankaranarayanan P. 3. Smt. Rahameth M. Jr. Typist 4. Sri. Krishnan V. T. Salesman. All the above persons have also joined duty in the respective posts on 11-10-84. The above appointments were ordered violating the lawful order of the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Malappuram and therefore the appointments are irregular. Under the circumstances the services of the above 4 candidates are hereby terminated with immediate effect." 3. Sri. Krishnan V. T. Salesman. All the above persons have also joined duty in the respective posts on 11-10-84. The above appointments were ordered violating the lawful order of the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Malappuram and therefore the appointments are irregular. Under the circumstances the services of the above 4 candidates are hereby terminated with immediate effect." 3. It is this order, Ext. P6, that is under challenge in this Original Petition. 4. As already stated, after amending the Original Petition the petitioner has also prayed for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash Ext. P9, the Arbitration Case pending before the 1st respondent. This Arbitration Case was filed by the additional 4th respondent in the Original Petition and the order of interim stay made mention of in Ext. P6 was the one passed by the Arbitrator at the instance of the additional 4th respondent. 5. In the decision in U. P. S.W. Corpn., Lucknow v. C. K. Tyagi, AIR. 1970 SC. 1244, the Supreme Court has held thus: "23. From the two decisions of this Court referred to above, the position in law is that no declaration to enforce a contract of personal service will be normally granted. But there are certain well-recognised exceptions to this rule and they are: To grant such a declaration in appropriate cases regarding (1) a public servant, who has been dismissed from service in contravention of Art.311. (2) Reinstatement of a dismissed worker under Industrial Law by Labour or Industrial Tribunals. (3) A statutory body when it has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation, imposed by statute." 6. It can thus be seen that the only instances where a declaration to enforce a contract of personal service can be granted are: (1) a public servant, who has been dismissed from service in contravention of Art.311. (2) Reinstatement of a dismissed worker under Industrial Law by Labour or Industrial Tribunals. (3) A statutory body when it has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation, imposed by statute. 7. It is not the case of the petitioners that the termination of services would fall in any one of these exempted categories. For that matter there is nothing discernible from the pleadings that the petitioners have any such case. (3) A statutory body when it has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation, imposed by statute. 7. It is not the case of the petitioners that the termination of services would fall in any one of these exempted categories. For that matter there is nothing discernible from the pleadings that the petitioners have any such case. The learned counsel for the petitioners however, submitted that the services of the petitioners are governed by the Industrial Disputes Act because they are workmen within the meaning of S.2 (s) of the said Act. I am not inclined to take cognisance of this argument because such a plea has not been taken in the Original Petition. Assuming that such a plea has been taken, even then this Court cannot entertain the same because it pertains to matters which fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of forums established under the Industrial Law. It cannot also be said that Ext. P6 order was passed by a statutory body in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed on it by a statute. Similarly the petitioners are also not entitled to the protection of Art.311 of the Constitution because they are not holding "civil posts" within the meaning of that Article. 8. The above position notwithstanding, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that Ext. P6 is liable to be declared null and void as the same was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. Even if that be the position, I am of the view, that the petitioners are not entitled to the reliefs prayed for in the Original Petition because the remedy of such a dismissed employee who does not come under any of the three exempted categories, is only to sue for damages for wrongful dismissal or breach of a contract. It has been so held in C. K. Tyagi's case 9. It has been so held in C. K. Tyagi's case 9. It has also been held in the said decision that when a statutory status is given to an employee and there has been a violation of the provisions of the statute while terminating the services of such an employee", the said employee is entitled to get "the relief of a declaration that the order is null and void and that he continues to be in service, as it will not then be a mere case of a master terminating the services of a servant." The petitioners are not eligible even for such a declaration because they have no case that they have been given a statutory status and that the termination of their services is in violation of the provisions of the statute. I, therefore, reject the prayer of the petitioners that Ext. P6 may be declared null and void as it is an order passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. 10. In this Original Petition, the petitioners have also prayed for the issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash Ext. P9 proceedings, pending before the 1st respondent. Admittedly the petitioners are not parties to Ext. P9, the Arbitration Case filed by the additional 4th respondent before the 1st respondent. According to the petitioners, the 1st respondent has no jurisdiction to entertain the case because the question arising for consideration in the sard case, cannot be said to be a dispute within the meaning of S.69 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act. May be that this is a valid contention. But, in as much as the petitioners are not parties to Ext. P9 proceedings, prima facie they have not the locus standi to challenge the same in this proceedings. It is all the more so, because as held by this Court in 1974 KLT.196, the Arbitrator has the jurisdiction to decide whether the dispute is one coming under the definition of "dispute". Even otherwise, in view of my findings relating to the main relief prayed for in this petition (namely the issuance of certiorari to quash Ext. P6), it is unnecessary for me to go into this question at all. For the reasons stated above, the Original Petition is liable to be dismissed. I accordingly dismiss the Original Petition. No costs.