STATE OF KARNATAKA v. A. P. ABDUL LATHIEEF — 1985 DIGILAW 483 (KAR)

N. D. VENKATESH, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision is by the State. It is directed against the order dt. 5-2-1985 of the Special Court, Mysore, in Crl. Misc. No. 15 of 1985. By that order, the Special Court purporting to exercise its power under the provisions contained in Chap. XXXIV of the Cr. P. C. , 1973 (the Code) has released the truck in question in favour of the respondents. The order apparently appears to be one under S. 457 of the Code. He could not have invoked the other allied provisions for the reason that there was neither an enquiry nor a trial pending with him for any offence involving the vehicle in question. ( 2 ) THE vehicle had been seized by the Tahsildar, Mysore, suspecting that it had been used to carry some essential commodity in contravention of the provisions of the Karnataka Rice and Paddy Procurement (Levy) Order, 1983 (the order ). He had handed over the seized vehicle with the essential commodity contained in it to the Yelwala Police of Mysore for further action. The Police registered a case, sent the F. I. R. to the Court and placed the essential commodity before the Deputy Commissioner. Along with the F. I. R. sent to the Court, the original seizure mahazar was also forwarded to the Court. At that stage, the respondent herein appeared before the Court and applied for interim entrustment of the truck stating that he was innocent of the matter and also that the vehicle had not been used to commit any offence. The Public Prosecutor representing the State opposed that application contending, inter alia, that the Court had absolutely no powers in the matter and, that, if at all, it was only the Deputy Commissioner of the District who had such powers as provided under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Stating that "the powers of this Court as a Court of jurisdiction to try the offence under S. 451 or under S. 457 Cr. P. C. are not taken away by any of the provisions of S. 6 or Ss. 6a to 6e of the Act the Special Court repelling the contention of the Public Prosecutor entrusted the truck to the respondent stipulating certain conditions to the said order. P. C. are not taken away by any of the provisions of S. 6 or Ss. 6a to 6e of the Act the Special Court repelling the contention of the Public Prosecutor entrusted the truck to the respondent stipulating certain conditions to the said order. ( 3 ) CHALLENGING the order of the Special Court the Government Pleader drew my attention to two decisions, both of this Court, and submitted that the Special Court had taken a wrong view of the law and, therefore, its order should be quashed. On the other hand, on behalf of the respondent, his learned counsel drew my attention to a decision of the Calcutta High Court and also to S. 6e of the Act and submitted that the order impugned herein does not call for any interference. ( 4 ) SECTION 6a of the Act confers powers of confiscation in appropriate cases of not merely the essential commodity but also the vehicle, etc. , used in transporting the said essential commodity only on the Collector or the Deputy Commissioner of the District. No doubt, sub-sec. (3) thereof says that if in a prosecution instituted for the alleged contravention before any Court, the Court acquits the accused the essential commodity or the vehicle seized by the Deputy Commissioner shall be returned to the accused or to the owner of the said commodity or its value. But, as observed by this Court in State v. Abdul Rasheed, AIR 1967 Mys 231, sub-sec. (3) of S. 6a of the Act comes into operation only when the prosecution launched is finally terminated after enquiry or trial as the case may be. Not merely this, the observations in Abdul Rasheed's case also clearly show that neither S. 457 nor any other allied provisions contained in Ch. XXXIV of the Code apply to the Special Court in the circumstances of the case to make any interim entrustment of the truck to the respondent. In this connection, I may usefully extract the following observations contained in that case at Para 13 :"this means that the Court should be satisfied that an Order has been contravened only after the enquiry or trial of the case against the accused is over. This power cannot be exercised before the institution of the prosecution against the accused. In this connection, I may usefully extract the following observations contained in that case at Para 13 :"this means that the Court should be satisfied that an Order has been contravened only after the enquiry or trial of the case against the accused is over. This power cannot be exercised before the institution of the prosecution against the accused. The only provision made by the Legislature in the Act is the provision relating to the amended S. 6a which empowers the Collector or the Deputy Commissioner to confiscate the foodgrains etc. , if he is satisfied after an enquiry that any provisions of the Act or the Orders are contravened by the accused. Where a statute specifies a particular mode of enforcing a new obligation created by it, such obligation can as a general rule be enforced in no other manner than that provided by the statute. The wider power of confiscation conferred by S. 517 Cr. P. C. must be regarded as impliedly limited by the specific provision in the statute, see the decision in Emperor v. Purshottam Devji Patel, 46 Bom LR 449 : AIR 1944 Bom 247. Therefore, the contention of Sri Shetty that once the foodgrains etc. , are produced before the Magistrate having jurisdiction, the power of disposal of the property is vested in the Court under S. 523 Cr. P. C. has no merit in it. In my opinion, the amended provisions of S. 6a of the Act impliedly limit the powers of the Criminal Court in the matter of disposal of foodgrains etc. , which are seized in contravention of the Act and Orders whether or not prosecution is instituted against the accused. Even after the prosecution is instituted, the criminal courts get power of disposal of foodgrains only after the enquiry or trial is over as provided under various clauses of the Orders made under S. 3 or 5 of the Act. "again this court has observed in P. Mohd. Kunhi v. Deputy Commr. , South Kanara, Mangalore Writ Petns. Nos. 4420 and 4421 of 1974 disposed of on 29-8-1974 that:"when the statute confers power on the Deputy Commissioner to confiscate the carrier, it shall be assumed that the statute also impliedly confers on him all the incidental power to make an effective order of confiscation in the adjudication proceedings under S. 6a of the Act. Nos. 4420 and 4421 of 1974 disposed of on 29-8-1974 that:"when the statute confers power on the Deputy Commissioner to confiscate the carrier, it shall be assumed that the statute also impliedly confers on him all the incidental power to make an effective order of confiscation in the adjudication proceedings under S. 6a of the Act. " ( 5 ) IT is the Act of 1981 that has created the Special Court. S. 12ac which has been incorporated into the Act of 1955 by S. 11 of the Act of 1981 makes applicable the provisions of the Code to the proceedings before a Special Court. There was no proceeding as such pending with the Special Court when the Special Court made the order. Neither any enquiry nor any trial was pending. Only a seizure report with an F. I. R. had been sent to Court. Besides this, we have to place a harmonious construction on all the relevant provisions of the Acts of 1955 and 1981. So read, it would be clear that, as observed by this Court in the case of Mohd. Kunhi, it is only the Deputy Commissioner who has been conferred with exclusive powers to pass final as well as interim orders relating to essential commodities and the vehicles, etc. , if any. It is true that as provided in S. 6a (3) (c) of the Act of 1955 the final order of confiscation made by the Collector is subject to the Judgment of acquittal, if any, of the Court in a prosecution instituted therein for the very contravention. But it may be noted that the investigating authority may not institute any prosecution at all and may only choose to go before the Collector which discretion that authority undoubtedly has. ( 6 ) AS stated above, the learned counsel for the respondent supporting the order of the Special Court drew my attention to a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in (1979) 2 Cal LJ 254 (257) (DB) and referred to A. I. R. Manual, 4th Edn. Vol. 16, at page 664 in the Foot-note below S. 6e of the Act at Item No. 5. Vol. 16, at page 664 in the Foot-note below S. 6e of the Act at Item No. 5. It is stated therein that S. 6e of the Act only excludes the jurisdiction of a Court or a Tribunal or other authorities in the case of essential commodities seized, but not in respect of the articles which are not "essential commodities" within the meaning of the Act. But, as already stated by me above, we have to construe harmoniously all the relevant provisions of the Act and should not choose to construe a particular provision in isolation and doing so will result in startling consequences as in this case and that would also result in final orders being made by one authority and interim orders in respect of that very property by some other authority. Therefore, I am unable to agree with the ruling of the Calcutta High Court referred to above. ( 7 ) ACCORDINGLY, for the reasons stated above, this revision is allowed and the order impugned herein is quashed. The Special Court will have to take steps to obtain the vehicle in terms of the bond and will direct the local police to place the same before the authority empowered to hold the enquiry under S. 6a of the Act. That authority, if the respondent herein applies for interim entrustment of the vehicle, will hear all the concerned and pass appropriate orders expeditiously. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Court below in three weeks' time. Petition allowed. --- *** --- .