Judgment S.NATARAJAN, J. In order to challenge the validity of an order of detention, dated 15th April, 1985 passed by the second respondent against the petitioner’s husband Thiru Joseph and to secure his release from detention this petition has been filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution praying for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus. 2. The petitioner’s husband, detenu Joseph, was directed to be placed under preventive detention by the second respondent by an order dated 15th April, 1985 passed under Sec.3 of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bottleggers, Drug-offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum-grabbers Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982), hereinafter referred to as the Act. The grounds of detention set out that the detenu had come to adverse notice in four cases, viz., (1) Crime No.2038/84 of Prohibition Enforcement Wing, St. Thomas Mount, for an offence under Sec. 4(1)(i) of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act; (2) Crime No. 803/85 of Prohibition Enforcement Wing, St. Thomas Mount, for an offence under Sec.4(1)(i) of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act; (3) Crime No.914/85 of Prohibition Enforcement Wing, St. Thomas Mount, for an offence under Sec.4(1)(i) of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act; and (4) Crime No. 1242/85 of Prohibition Enforcement Wing, St. Thomas Mount, for an offence under Sec.4(1)(i) of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act. All these cases relate to the sale of arrack mixed with a poisonous and intoxicating substance, viz,, chloral hydrate. After the detenu was apprehended on 14th March, 1985 and the case in Crime No.914/85 of the Prohibition Enforcement Wing, St. Thomas Mount, was registered against him, the third respondent deemed it proper that the bottlegging activities of the detenu which were affecting the maintenance of public order should be brought to the notice of the second respondent so that an order of detention can be passed against the detenu for safeguarding the interests of the public Hence, relevant materials against the detenu were placed before the second respondent. On a consideration of the materials placed before him, the second respondent was subjectively satisfied that in order to ensure the maintenance of public order; it was necessary to pass an order of detention against the detenu under Sec.3 of the Act. On a consideration of the materials placed before him, the second respondent was subjectively satisfied that in order to ensure the maintenance of public order; it was necessary to pass an order of detention against the detenu under Sec.3 of the Act. Consequently, he passed an order of detention and thereupon the detenu who had been enlarged on bail in the criminal case referred against him was again taken into custody and placed in jail. The grounds of detention were served on him. 3. A representation was made by the petitioner on behalf of the detenu to assail the order of detention. The representation was sent to the second respondent for paragraph-war remarks and after the remarks were received, the first respondent considered the representation and the remarks of the second respondent and rejected the representation and confirmed the order of detention. In the meanwhile the Advisory Board constituted by the first respondent had also considered the case of the detenu on 9th May, 1985 and gave its opinion that there was sufficient cause for the detenu being kept under detention. Thereafter, the petitioner has filed this petition to seek the intervention of the Court to set aside the order of detention passed against her husband. 4. In the affidavit filed by her, the petitioner has raised various grounds of attack against the order of detention. But in the view we propose to take of the matter, it is not necessary to set out the various grounds of attack in detail It will therefore be sufficient if we only set out the broad features of the contentions put forward by the petitioner. The first criticism levelled is that there has been no application of mind by the second respondent to the relevant facts of the case before passing the order of detention. This ground is raised on the basis that if the materials gathered against the detenu are true and correct, then it would have been seen that the sample of arrack which was seized during the raid conducted on 6th March, 1985 was found to contain a high percentage of chlroal hydrate, but in spite of it the third respondent had not deemed it necessary to bring to the second respondent the adverse material against the detenu for the former to take action under the Act. That apart, no adverse report was sent against the detenu, when another raid was said to have been conducted on 14th March, 1985 and the police authorities had seized arrack mixed with chloral hydrate from the detenu An adverse report was sent only after the alleged raid on 5th April, 1985. The reason, according to the petitioner, for the report having been sent relating to the raid on 14th March, 1985 after conducting the raid on 5th April, 1985 is that the police officers had seized from the detenu a gold chain, ring and two wrist watches, but they had not produced those articles before the Court and that led to the detenu filing a petition before the Magistrate and enraged by the action of the detenu, the third respondent has sent an adverse report against the petitioner with reference to the seizure of arrack on 14th March, 1985 pursuant to the raid conducted on that day. Hence, the petitioner would say that the second respondent has failed to probe into the matter fully, via;, as to why a belated report was being sent about the raid conducted on 14th March, 1985, before passing the order of detention. The next ground of attack is that in any case there has been inordinate delay in considering the representation sent on behalf of the detenu and by reason of the delay. Art.22(5) of the Constitution is violated and hence the detention of the detenu has become illegal. The third ground put forward is that the first respondent is under an obligation to pass orders on the representation made by the detenu with utmost expedition, but in this case the first respondent had failed to act in that manner and it had deferred taking action till the opinion of the Advisory Board was received. By reason of this lapse, the detenu has been denied the two-fold opportunity given to him to agitate against his detention and seek release from custody. 5. Respondents 1 and 2 have filed separated counter-affidavits where in the grounds of attack contained in the petitioner’s affidavit have been traversed. 6. As we have already indicated, we do not think it necessary to set out the averments contained in the counter-affidavits, because we find that one ground of attack, viz., the second ground, is fully sustainable. 5. Respondents 1 and 2 have filed separated counter-affidavits where in the grounds of attack contained in the petitioner’s affidavit have been traversed. 6. As we have already indicated, we do not think it necessary to set out the averments contained in the counter-affidavits, because we find that one ground of attack, viz., the second ground, is fully sustainable. From the records and the counter-affidavits it is seen that the petitioner sent a representation to the first respondent on behalf of the detenu on 26th April, 1985. This has been received by the first respondent on 29th April, 1985. On the next day, i.e, on 30th April, 1985, the representation has been sent to the second respondent for submission of his paragraph-war remarks. Strangely enough the communication sent by the first respondent on 30th April, 1985 has reached the second respondent only on 14th May, 1985. The second respondent in turn called for paragraph-war remarks from the concerned police and they were made available to him on 18th May, 1985. After perusing the same, the second respondent sent the paragraph war remarks to the first respondent on 24th May, 1985 and the remarks had been "received by the first respondent on 27th May, 1985. Thereafter the papers passed through the hands of the Under Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Law Minister and finally reached the Chief Minister, and on 3rd June, 1985 the Chif Minister passed orders rejecting the representation. The rejection order was issued by the Government on 4th June, 1985 and it was communicated to the detenu a few days later. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner states that even though the representation had reached the Government on 29th April, 1985, it had failed to consider the same for about five weeks and the delay is therefore inordinate and on that ground the order of detention should be set aside. Another contention put forth is that the Government had not passed orders on the representation forthwith but had passed orders after the Advisory Board had given its opinion and by reason of this, the detenu has been denied the benefit of a consideration of his case by the Government at two stages, i.e., (1) before the Advisory Board gave its opinion, and (2) after the Advisory Board gave its opinion. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on three decisions of the Supreme Court, viz., JAYANARAYAN SUKUL v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 675: 1970 Crl.L.J. 678, OR. RAHMATULLAH V. STATE OF BIHAR AND ANOTHER, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 2069 and SHYAM SUNDER v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN. 1982 Cr.L.R. (S.C.) 57. 8. Ona consideration of the matter, we find the grievance of the petitioner to be justified. No doubt, we find that there has been no delay in the first respondent calling for paragraph-war remarks of the second respondent on the representation sent by the petitioner and also in the disposal of the representation after the paragraph-war remarks of the second respondent were received on 27th May, 1985, But there is not only a long delay, but unexplained delay during the period 30th April, 1985 to May 14th May, 1985, which is the time said to have been taken for the communication sent by the first respondent to reach the second respondent, Kan-cheepuram, where the office of the second respondent is situated is only about 50 miles from the Secretariat at Fort St George and therefore it is ununderstandable how the communication sent on 30th April, 1985 from the Secretariat would have taken two weeks time to reach Kancheepuram. The learned Public Prosecutor stated that the delay would have occurred in postal transit But it is hardly an acceptable explanation. Obviously, the delay would have occurred in the despatch of the communication of the first respondent to the second respondent in the despatch section at the Secretariat. It will, however, be no excuse for the first respondent to say that the delay had occurred in the despatch section For a detenu in custody on account of an order of detention passed against him, every day spent in prison is a day of deprivation of his liberty and therefore it is that the Courts have laid down that every day’s delay must be satisfactorily explained. In this case we find no explanation forthcoming for the delay of 14 days in the communication sent by the first respondent reaching the second respondent. On that shortground we feel constrained to allow the writ petition, even though the materials against him fully justify his being placed under detention under the Act. 9. In this case we find no explanation forthcoming for the delay of 14 days in the communication sent by the first respondent reaching the second respondent. On that shortground we feel constrained to allow the writ petition, even though the materials against him fully justify his being placed under detention under the Act. 9. In so far as the other grievance is concerned, we find that in spite of the Advisory Board having seven weeks’ time to offer its opinion, in this case it has met expeditiously and offered its opinion on 9th May, 1985, though it had time till the first week of June, 1985, after granting the detenu a personal hearing. It is because the Advisory Board meeting earlier, the first respondent was not able to pass orders on the representation before the Advisory Board had occasion to consider the matter. When a representation is sent by a detenu or by someone on his behalf, the Government has to necessarily call for paragraphwar remarks from the detaining authority and it will take some time for the paragraph-war remarks to be received. We are therefore of the opinion that it would be better for the Advisory Board to meet within the eleven weeks’ period after the Government has received the paragraph-war remarks and passed orders on the representation of the detenu. Otherwise, a situation as the one existing here would arise, viz., the Advisory Board giving its opinion even before the Government considers the representation and passes order in the first instance. 10. Wemay only point out that the Supreme Court has laid down in DR.RAHMATULLAH v. STATE OF BIHAR, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 2069, and other such cases that a detenu has a right to have his representation considered by the Government at two stages, viz., (1) before the Advisory Board meets, and (2) after the Advisory Board meets, and a deprivation of the two-fold right will amount to non-compliance of Art.22(5) of the Constitution. 11. In the light of our finding on the question of delay, the writ petition deserves to succeed and accordingly it will stand allowed. The order of detention dated 15th April, 1985 will stand quashed and the detenu is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith. 12. We place on record our appreciation of the assistance rendered by Thiru P.Venka-tasubramanian, Advocate of the High Court Legal Aid Centre, Madras.