JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - Out of these connected four appeals filed under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, two of them have been preferred by the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) whereas two others have been preferred by the claimants of claim petition Nos. 229 and 230 of 1971. Claim petition No. 229 of 1971 has been filed by Vivek Saran Srivastava whereas his mother Smt. Dr. L. Srivastava preferred claim petition No. 230 of 1971. Both of these claim petitions were in respect of the same incident, which took place on 16th June, 1971. Vivek Saran Srivastava had made a claim of Rs. 25000/- for his injuries whereas the claim made by his mother, Dr. Smt. L. Srivastava, was for the amount of Rs. 1,10,600/-. The details of the amounts is as follows : - (i) For damage to the gun Rs. 100.00 (ii) For damage to the car Rs. 10,000.00 (iii) For loss suffered on account of leave period Rs. 4,500.00 (iv) For pain and suffering Rs. 24,000.00 (v) For loss of earnings Rs. 72,000.00 ______________ Total Rs. 1,10,600.00 ______________ 2. Vivek Saran Srivastava claimed a consolidated sum of Rs, 25,000/-on account of his future earning capacity and damages for pain, mental agony and suffering and also damage to his limbs. 3. In support of the claim petitions, which were tried together by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal), Vivek Saran Srivastava appeared as P.W. 9 and Dr. Smt. L. Srivastava as P.W. 12. Both of them deposed in support of their cases. Their case was that on the 16th June, 1971, the two were returning from Mussoorie in their Ambassador Car No. U.P.L. 5641, which was being driven by Vivek Saran Srivastava. In the after-noon, when the Car reached near the Kale Temple on Dehradun-Rishikesh Road, the car driver saw a bus No. 9229 coming from the opposite direction at a fast speed. To save the accident, Vivek Saran Srivastava went towards his left side and also gave signals to the bus driver. The driver, however, was running the bus at a fast speed which was beyond his control and despite the fact that the car was visible to him from a long distance, the driver dashed the bus with the car as an impact of which, he and his mother, Dr. The driver, however, was running the bus at a fast speed which was beyond his control and despite the fact that the car was visible to him from a long distance, the driver dashed the bus with the car as an impact of which, he and his mother, Dr. Smt. L. Srivastava, received serious injuries. 4. A joint written statement was filed by the respondents in both the cases. The respondent's contention was that the bus was moving at a slow speed on its left side while the car itself coming at a vehement speed dashed against the bus. 5. On the pleadings of the parties in each one of the two cases, the Tribunal framed four issues. Issues 1 and 2 were common in the two cases. These issues are as under : - 1. Whether the accident giving rise to this claim petition took place as a result of rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the respondent ? 2. Whether the accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving of the petitioner ? 6. As to who was negligent for the accident, the claimants produced themselves and for proving injuries and suffering on account of the same, the doctor, who was examined, entered into the witness box. Amongst the doctors, mention of the names of Dr. P.N. Sharma (P.W.), Dr. B.B. Khanna (P.W. 2) and Dr. A.K. Gupta (P.W. 3) may be made. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 10000/- to Vivek Saran Srivastava whereas it found Smt. Dr. L. Srivastava to be entitled to receive Rs. 37,600/- as compensation. As a result of part failure and success of the petitions, both sides felt aggrieved. On that account, four appeals have been preferred. 7. Before us in the appeals, the first thing to be considered is whether the accident took place as a result of rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the Corporation. For proving negligence of the driver, the two witnesses of the claimants were Vivek Saran Srivastava (P.W. 9) and Dr. Smt. L. Srivastava (P.W. 12). Both of them gave the version of the accident and stated that the left wheel of the car was on the patri. For proving negligence of the driver, the two witnesses of the claimants were Vivek Saran Srivastava (P.W. 9) and Dr. Smt. L. Srivastava (P.W. 12). Both of them gave the version of the accident and stated that the left wheel of the car was on the patri. On seeing the bus coming from the opposite direction, the speed of the car was slowed down, but the driver of the bus did not do so as a result of which the accident occurred. 8. This is a case of accident at an uninhabited place and, therefore, they could not produce independent witnesses. Their statements, however, were carefully considered by the Tribunal and accepted to be trustworthy Their statements were corroborated by the circumstances. We also have examined the evidence of these two witnesses namely, Vivek Saran Srivastava (P.W. 9) and Dr. Smt. L. Srivastava (P.W. 12). Finding both of them to be tallying with each other and consistent throughout, Vivek Saran Sfffltetava appears to have taken all the precautions after having seen the bus which could be expected of a reasonable man. His car was running at a slow speed but because solely on the rashness of the bus driver, the accident took place. from the statements of these two witnesses, as well as those of the witnesses produced from the side of the Corporation, which consisted of Ved Prakash Mamgai (D.W. 2), Rameshwar Prasad conductor (D.W. 3), Kalam Singh (D.W. 4) and Kedar Singh (D.W. 5), the learned counsel for the Corporation urged that the car was running at a speed which was beyond the control of its driver and, therefore, if the accident could not be said to have happened solely on account of the mistake of the car driver, there was no doubt in the state of affairs of evidence of the present case that the car driver had contributed equally to the same. We find ourselves unable to agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the Corporation. 9. D.W. 2 Ved Prakash Mamgai admittedly stated in his cross-examination that he saw the car only after collision had taken place and he had come down. According to his statement, he was sitting in the middle of the bus and could case little of value. No reliance could be placed on his testimony. 9. D.W. 2 Ved Prakash Mamgai admittedly stated in his cross-examination that he saw the car only after collision had taken place and he had come down. According to his statement, he was sitting in the middle of the bus and could case little of value. No reliance could be placed on his testimony. Rameshwar Prasad conductor (D.W. 3 no doubt supported the version of the respondents but it has inherent signs of falsehood. He stated that there was a curve 20 paces from the place of accident. On local inspection, the Tribunal, who had inspected the site himself, found the same to be incorrect. He further stated that the bus was going up the slope at the place of the occurrence. This again was believed by the local inspection. Initially, he stated that he was sitting in the front of the bus but subsequently in the cross-examination, he had to admit that he was in the back portion of it. 10. Kalam Singh (D.W. 4)'s statement was also to the effect that the conductor Rameshwar Prasad (D.W. 3) was sitting behind. Kalam Singh (D.W.4) could not say about the speed of the car or the bus and gave the statement about the accident which was wholly unreliable. He stated that the right mudguard of the car hit the left wheel of the bus. This is factually incorrect. The Tribunal had remarked about this witness : "that the witness was given repeated opportunities to underset and the question and answer intelligently but he could not clear his own confusion." This witness was also unreliable. 11. Statement of D.W. 5 Kedar Singh is liable to be thrown out as he incorrectly stated that there was a slope at the piace of accident. It was also incorrect on his part that the collision took place after the kale temple curve. On local inspection, the description of the place of accident given by this witness was not found to be correct. The learned Tribunal had, therefor, remarked this this witness was speaking on imagination rather than the actual fact. 12. From the photos (Exs. 24 and 25), it would be seen that the front right part of the car was smashed. As a result of the impact on the front right side, the car moved towards the back and stopped with its front towards the road. 12. From the photos (Exs. 24 and 25), it would be seen that the front right part of the car was smashed. As a result of the impact on the front right side, the car moved towards the back and stopped with its front towards the road. These photographs also support the testimony of P.W. 9 Vivek Saran Srivastava and P.W. 12 Dr. Smt. L. Srivastava. After a careful scrutiny of the evidence, the Tribunal found that the accident took place because of the rashness and negligence of the bus driver. With this finding, we are in complete agreement. 13. So far as the plea of contributory negligence of Vivek Saran Srivastava (P.W. 9) is concerned, it may be pointed out that the suggestion of the learned counsel was that Vivek Saran Srivastava was an young man coming from Mussoorie. He must have been driving rashly and as such, he should be held equally negligent. True it is that he was an young man but there was no such presumption, particularly when he had his mother who was an experienced medical officer by his side. In order to establish the defence of contributory negligence, the defendant must prove, first, that the plaintiff failed to take "ordinary care for himself" or, in other words, such care as a reasonable man would take for his safety, and, secondly, that his failure to take care was a contributory cause of the accident. 14. In the instant case, the defendants had failed to prove that the petitioner Vivek Saran Srivastava was guilty of contributory negligence. 15. Next comes the question of compensation. Principles of measure of damages have been dealt with in Bingham's Motor Claims Cases, page 340, the same is quoted below : "The damages which are to be awarded for a tort are those which so far as money can compensate, will give the injured party reparation for the wrongful act and for all the natural and direct consequences of the wrongful act" (Admiralty Comrs. v. Susquehanna (Owners), The Susquehanna), the words so far as money can compensate point to the impossibility of equating money with human suffering or personal deprivations. A money award can be calculated so as to make good a financial loss. Money may be awarded so that something tangible may be procured to replace something else of like nature which has been destroyed or lost. A money award can be calculated so as to make good a financial loss. Money may be awarded so that something tangible may be procured to replace something else of like nature which has been destroyed or lost. But money cannot renew a physical frame that has been battered and shattered. All that judges and courts can do is to award sums which must be regarded as giving reasonable compensation. In the process there must be the endeavour to secure some uniformity in the general method of approach. By common assent awards must be reasonable and must be assessed with moderation. Furthermore, it is eminently desirable that so far as possible comparable injuries should be compensated by comparable awards." 16. In C.K. Subramonia Iyer and others v. T. Kunhikuttan Nair and others, 1970 A.C J. 110 (S.C.), the following observations has been made : "There can be no exact uniform rule for measuring the value of the human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations but the amount recoverable depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. The life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiaries which ever is shorter is an important factor. Since the elements which go to make up the value of the life of the deceased to the designated beneficiaries are necessarily personal to each case, in the very nature of things, there can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of human life." 17. In our view, whatever compensation is determined, it is only a rough calculation and it is not possible to determine exactly as there is no yardstick by which the court can measure the amount to be paid for pain and suffering of ensuing disability. Although there is no fixed and unalterable standard of damages, the courts have been making these assessments over many years, and we think that they do form some guide to the kind of figure which is appropriate to the facts of any particular case. In the instant case, the Tribunal held Vivek Saran Srivastava to be entitled to Rs. 10,000/- as damages He stated in his evidence that his brain and eyes were adversely effected and he was having constant pain in his hand. In the instant case, the Tribunal held Vivek Saran Srivastava to be entitled to Rs. 10,000/- as damages He stated in his evidence that his brain and eyes were adversely effected and he was having constant pain in his hand. The Tribunal found that inspite of the fact that so many medical experts were examined by the claimant, no one had deposed in his favour on these points. To show the weakness of his brain, the petitioner filed the marks sheet of his High School, Intermediate and B.A. Part II. The first two examinations were passed by him before the accident and the last one after that. On the basis of these certificates, arguments were made before us as well as before the Tribunal that his brain was so much effected that he could not repeat his performance in B.A. Part II. This submission was not accepted by the Tribunal and for right reasons. Inasmuch as only at the High School Examination he got first division but could not obtain the same in the Intermediate examination. Accordingly, it is difficult to accept that his brain was adversely effected in the accident. 18. From the evidence, however, it was disclosed and established that he was in severe pain for two months and was seriously handicapped for a year because of the insertion of the nail. There is also a permanent handicap inasmuch as his one let was slightly shortened and he could not run fast or walk a long distance. On account of severe pain for two months, the Tribunal awarded Rs. 2000/- as compensation and Rs. 8000/- on account of physical handicap. Before us, the counsel for the Corporation urged that the amount of Rs. 10000/- to Vivek Saran Srivastava was unjustified and the same should have been less than awarded whereas Vivek Saran Srivastava urged in his appeal that the entire amount of Rs. 25,000/- should have been found to be award able to him. 19. After hearing counsel for the parties, we are of opinion that the appeals of both the sides are liable to be dismissed. 20. In an appeal under Section 110-D of the Act, the appellant Court should not interfere unless the Tribunal had applied wrong principles of law or misdirected itself or the amount awarded is very huge or low. 19. After hearing counsel for the parties, we are of opinion that the appeals of both the sides are liable to be dismissed. 20. In an appeal under Section 110-D of the Act, the appellant Court should not interfere unless the Tribunal had applied wrong principles of law or misdirected itself or the amount awarded is very huge or low. Reference in this connection may be made to R. Selvarai v. Jagannatha, 1969 ACJ page 1.; Champalal v. B P. Venkataraman, 1966 ACJ 224 ; and State of U P. v. Davali, 1971 ACJ 425 . The Court while dealing with an appeal may be entitled to consider the evidence of the parties but would not be inclined to reverse the finding of a Tribunal as to the amount of damages merely because it thinks that if it had tried the case first instance it would have given a lesser or higher sum. In order to justify reversing the Tribunal on the question of amount of damages it will generally be necessary that the Court should be convinced that the Tribunal acted upon some wrong principle of law, or that the amount awarded was so extremely high or very small as to make it, in the judgment, of this Court, an entirely erroneous estimate of the damages to which the plaintiff is entitled. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision reported in Greenfield v. London of North Eastern Rly., (1944) 2 All E.F. 438, which lays down the principles on which the Court of Appeal reviews the assessment of damages, whether too high or too low, is not because the Court of Appeal might have given rather more or rather less, but only (a) if the Tribunal has omitted some relevant consideration or admitted some irrelevant consideration, or (b) if the amount is so excessive or insufficient, as to be plainly unreasonable. 21. In the instant case on a review of the evidence of the parties, we find that the compensation awarded to Vivek Saran Srivastava is, in the circumstances, the proper amount which neither errs either on the side of excessiveness nor smallness. In fact, the Tribunal could not be shown by the counsel for either of the two sides to have committed any error which requires our interference. 22. Coming to Dr. In fact, the Tribunal could not be shown by the counsel for either of the two sides to have committed any error which requires our interference. 22. Coming to Dr. Smt. L. Srivastava, it may be noted at the beginning that we have given the details of the amount of compensation in the earlier part of this judgment. Out of this amount the Tribunal found that she was entitled to have Rs. 37,600/-. The argument advanced before us by the learned counsel for the respondent was in respect of items 2, 4 and 5. He urged that in respect of car amount of Rs. 5000/- was inadequate and being divorced from the facts should be set aside by increasing the same to the amount claimed. We do not agree with this submission. The car was purchased before the accident. It must have depreciated in value. After the accident, it was sold for Rs. 5000/-. The respondent could not prove the nature of damages caused to the car. The photos only showed that its front right side was damaged and there was very little damage to the other parts of the car. Even the report of the examination of the car (vide Ex. 18) does not indicate that damage to the car was up to the tune of Rs. 10,000/-. It shows that the hand brakes, tie rod and king pins and driving pins were all right. Only the steering had bent and there was damage to foot brakes, electric horn, gear system and right head light. From the defects stated above, the Tribunal could not be said to have committed any error requiring us to interfere in this appeal when he estimated the damages of the car at Rs. 2000/-. Merely because the car was sold away by Dr. Smt. L. Srivastava for Rs. 5000/-, we would not be justified in raising the compensation. The claim was for damage to the car. The damage could not be estimated at a figure higher than Rs. 2000/-. 23. The main argument of the learned counsel was about item No. 5 which was for loss of earnings. It claimed Rs. 72,000/- and was awarded Rs. 24,000/- out of which Rs. 8000/- was deducted on account of lump sum payment. 24. Counsel urged that the amount of Rs. 24,000/- was unjustified. We do not agree with this submission. 2000/-. 23. The main argument of the learned counsel was about item No. 5 which was for loss of earnings. It claimed Rs. 72,000/- and was awarded Rs. 24,000/- out of which Rs. 8000/- was deducted on account of lump sum payment. 24. Counsel urged that the amount of Rs. 24,000/- was unjustified. We do not agree with this submission. The respondent was a Government servant and had resumed service after the accident, she had even been promoted to a post carrying Rs. 2200/-. She admitted that she had been promoted to a post of Joint Director. But she claimed that she had to refuse her promotion as she could not properly discharge the duties of the said post which required touring. On this point, there was nothing but the uncorroborated testimony of Dr. Smt. L. Srivastava herself. The Tribunal found it difficult to believe that she gave up the job of Rs. 2200/- per month merely because she felt that she could not efficiently perform the duties of the office. There is nothing to show that she had been asked by the State Government to seek premature retirement due to the injury received by her in the accident. Seeking of retirement was her own choice. She could not hold the Corporation responsible for payment of damages for the same. The Tribunal in this connection observed and to us it appears to be correct that the Medical Officers choose to stay at a place where they have built up private practice. Thus, on account of choosing premature retirement, the Tribunal rightly held that the respondent was not entitled to any compensation. 25. Next comes the question of reduction of income from the fee as also from her private practice. There was evidence on record to prove that she could not undertake serious operations because of stiffness in the hip and the legs. She could not stand for a long stretch and also was unable to bend according to the requirements of the operations. From the assessments it appears that during the assessment year 1970-71 her income from profession was Rs. 15,806/-. In 1971-72 it was Rs. 17,360/-. These are the year before the accident. After the accident for the years 1972-73, she earned Rs. 9,702/-. This was a year during which for about four months she was confined to bed. From the assessments it appears that during the assessment year 1970-71 her income from profession was Rs. 15,806/-. In 1971-72 it was Rs. 17,360/-. These are the year before the accident. After the accident for the years 1972-73, she earned Rs. 9,702/-. This was a year during which for about four months she was confined to bed. If she would have worked for the whole year, it could reasonably be established that her income could be Rs. 13,000/-; nearly Rs. 3000/- less than the previous year. Finding that her private practice suffered on account of the injuries received, the Tribunal calculated the loss of earning capacity at Rs. 2000/- per year, calculating the life span of 65 years, the Tribunal found Rs. 24,000/- to be payable to her on this count. Out of Rs. 24000/-, 8000/- was deducted on account of lump sum payment. The balance payable was to the sum of Rs. 16,000/-. Counsel urged that loss of earning capacity should have been determined at a higher figure than Rs. 2000/- per year. We have gone through the evidence and find ourselves unable to hold that the loss from earning was wrongly calculated at Rs. 2000/- per year. She admitted in her statement that she was making 2 or 3 visits per day and had consultation practice as well. On average, she was earning Rs. 75/- per day on visits, she could reasonably be presumed to have been earning from consultation and examination of patients at home. Her average income, therefore, must have been near about Rs. 3000/- per month It may be true that in the accident she received some injuries which prevented her from doing serious operations but loss of earning capacity could not be estimated at a figure more than Rs. 2000/- per year. In doing so, no breach of any principle or any such error was committed which requires us to interfere. 26. Great stress was laid by the learned counsel for respondent, Dr. Smt. L. Srivastava, about the un justifying deduction of Rs. 8000/- out of the total loss of Rs. 24,000/-. In this connection counsel urged that life span should have been found at 80 years. On the evidence led by the parties, we do not find justification in taking a different view than what had been found. She could continue her private practice at a certain age. 8000/- out of the total loss of Rs. 24,000/-. In this connection counsel urged that life span should have been found at 80 years. On the evidence led by the parties, we do not find justification in taking a different view than what had been found. She could continue her private practice at a certain age. For that purpose, estimation of 65 years is justified. So far as deduction of Rs. 8000/- on account of lump sum payment is concerned, on the facts we have no contrary view to take. She got Rs. 24,000/- immediately which she would have earned up to the age of 65 years. Consequently, deduction of Rs. 8000/-which came to 33?% was justified and was not wrong. 27. For pain and agony and permanent disability, she had claimed Rs. 24,000/-. She was given Rs. 15,000/- by the Tribunal. No error could be pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent Dr. Smt. L. Srivastava for awarding the aforesaid amount. Amount awarded is justified in the circumstances and is not required to be enhanced or reduced. 28. Learned counsel for the respondent claimant last contended that she was entitled to get interest with effect from the date of making of the application and not from the date of giving of the award. Hence, the Tribunal erred in awarding interest with effect from that date. In that connection, counsel also urged that the rate of interest should have been 9% and not 6%. We do not find any merit in this submission. The Tribunal while awarding interest found that the claimant herself was responsible for the disposal of the case. It was her evidence which caused most of the delay. Hence, the discretion exercised by the Tribunal in awarding the interest with effect from the date of award and not from the date of making of the application could not be said to be erroneous being based on irrelevant considerations. Section 110-C of the Motor Vehicles Act is discretionary and if discretion has been exercised on relevant considerations, this Court in appeal would not be justified in interfering with the same. In view of the findings of the Tribunal, that most of the delay was caused on account of the respondent herself, we cannot accept the submission made to the contrary. 29. In view of the findings of the Tribunal, that most of the delay was caused on account of the respondent herself, we cannot accept the submission made to the contrary. 29. The last argument was that the Tribunal committed an error in directing the parties to bear their respective costs. Awarding to costs was discretionary with the Tribunal. While exercising discretion many considerations come in. As discretion exercised was not illegal, improper or irregular in this case, we decline to interfere. 30. In the result, all the four appeals fail and are dismissed. But in the circumstances, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.