Hansaria. J. :- These two appeals are on behalf of one and the same appellant, namely, Diplal Singh, who has been found guilty u/s 302 of the Indian Penal Code by the learned Sessions Judge, Dibrugarh. These two appeals came to be filed by two different advocates. Shri A. Roy, learned Counsel for appellant in Crimi­nal Appeal No. 79/82 states that he had done so under the in­structions of the appellant not having known earlier that Crimi­nal Appeal No. 70/82 had already been filed. Bath the learned Counsel for the appellant are present in the Court and we have heard them as well as the learned Public Prosecutor, Assam. 2. The case for the prosecution is that the accused appe­llant had caused the death of Birdhichand Chowdhury on the night of 10..78. After having committed this crime, of the acc­used came to the house of PW-2 Machi Das at about 2 AM, and woke him up by calling "brother, brother''. Coming out, this witness saw the accused with a in his hand and the whole body smeared with blood The accused asked for a glass of wa­ter which was supplied. Having seen body smeared with blood the witness, out of fear, went to call his brother Yakub Beck, (PW-1). On being so called, PW 1 came to the house of PW-2 and it is his evidence that when the accused was asked as to what had happened, having seen the body of the accused streamed with blood, the latter said that as dacoit had entered his house, he had cut the dacoit and the name of the person done to death was given as Bridhichand. PW I thereafter left for Nam-Tup Police Station and lodged an ejahar which was recorded at 12-30 PM of 11.7.78. A reference to the F. I. R. shows that acco­rding to the informant P.W. 1, the accused had confessed before him as well as "before the persons named" in the ejahar that he had cut to death with dao Shri Bridhichand Choudhury the persons named being (1) Shri Shankar Ram Singh (2; Shri Ram-nath and (3) Shri Mesidas Beck. 3. A reference to the F. I. R. shows that acco­rding to the informant P.W. 1, the accused had confessed before him as well as "before the persons named" in the ejahar that he had cut to death with dao Shri Bridhichand Choudhury the persons named being (1) Shri Shankar Ram Singh (2; Shri Ram-nath and (3) Shri Mesidas Beck. 3. A reference to the evidence of PW-1 shows that when the accused had confessed as aforesaid, the same had been heard by his younger brother PW-2 Machi Das also, though PW-2 has stated that if his elder brother had asked the accused anything he did not know. Of course, according to PW-2, the accused had con­fessed his guilt on being asked by the Police at about 2-30 PM of next day. This evidence is, however, inadmissible in view of section 25 of the Evidence Act. 4. The other person named in the FIR as witness is "Shankar Ram Singh", but the name of PW-3 has been recorded as "Ram Sankar Singh". Even if these two names be of one and the same person, a reference to his evidence shows that on the next day of the occurrence he had come to know that Bridhichand had been murdered, and on receipt of the information he went to see him and found him lying dead in the verandah of Diplal with injuries on his body. He clearly stated that he did not ask the accused anything; but his further evidence is that when police came, the accused had admitted his guilt. As already stated, this part of the evidence is inadmissible under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. 5. Apart from the evidence of PW-1 regarding the making, of extra-judicial confession before him, there is really nothing in the evidence of any other witness to implicate the accused. Before we examine the legal aspect relating to the extra-judicial confession being the sole basis for conviction, it may be stated that though witnesses have said something about recovery of a dao from the house of PW-2, this piece of evidence is absolutely innocuous in so far as the appellant is concerned, inasmuch as even if it is believed that it was the accused who had handed over the dao, it would appear from Exhibit-3, the seizure-list, that the dao seized was not found even blood-stained. Further, as per this Exhibit, name of one Jitendra was found engraved in the dao, which as per PW-1, in the name of the blacksmith who had made the dao Jitendra being the person from whom peo­ple of the village used to purchase dao. May be; but then how can we say that the seized dao belonged to the accused - it mi­ght have been even of PW2. Then there is discrepancy as to wherefrom the accused had brought out the dao and produced before the police. As per PW-1, the police had recovered the dao from the back-side wall of the house of PW-2, whereas PW-5 Shri Pulin Kr Dutta, the Police Officer concerned, stated that he had seized the dao from the roof of the house of PW-2 as shown by the accused. Further, PW-1 deposed that the dao which was seized and exhibited in the Court as material Exhibit 2 was not the dao seen by him in the hand of the accused. Because of all these, the recovery of the dao has no relevance for the case at hand inasmuch as the same does not in any way implicate the accused. 6. Coming to the extra-judicial confession about which PW-1 deposed, it may first be stated that his evidence that the con­fession had been made by the accused in the presence of his you­nger brother (PW-2) is totally belied by what has been deposed by PW-2. The statements of PW-1 in cross-examination that the wit­nesses named by him in the FIR were met by him on the way, and these witnesses had also said that the accused had told to them (about his having committed the crime) are not at all borne out by the evidence of any of the concerned PWs. 7. Under these circumstances, we have to see whether the present is a case where law will permit us to sustain the con­viction on the solitary evidence of PW-1 regarding the extra-judicial confession of the accused. Shri Barua for the appe­llant has placed before us certain decisions of the Apex Court where it has been stated that extra-judicial confession cannot be the sole basis of conviction. Shri Barua for the appe­llant has placed before us certain decisions of the Apex Court where it has been stated that extra-judicial confession cannot be the sole basis of conviction. This is what was stated in Sahoo-v- State of UP, AIR 1966 SC 40 As per this decision, there is a clear distinction between the admissibility of an evidence and the weight to be attached to it, as observed in para 6. After pointing out certain infirmities relating to the evidence of confession, it was held in the above para that even if the evidence regarding confession inspired confidence, prudence and justice demanded that such evidence cannot be made the ground of conviction - the same could be used only as a corro­borative piece of evidence. Shri Barua will like us also to re­member that the evidence of extra-judicial confession in the very nature of things is a weak piece of evidence as observed in State of Punjab vs. Bhajan Singh, AIR 1975 SC 258 . It is lastly contended by Shri Barua that for conviction to be based on extra-judicial confession, the exact words used by the accu­sed must be deposed by the witness in question, as stated in. Heramba Brahma vs. State of Assam, AIR 1975 SC 1595, wherein it was also added that apart from there being reliable eviden­ce about the exact words used, the reason or motive for con­fession, and the person selected in whom confidence is reposed, must also be looked into. 8. As against this, the learned Public Prosecutor has invi­ted our attention to a very recent decision of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. vs. U.K. Anthony, AIR 1985 SC-48 wherein it was held that though the courts have considered the evi­dence of 'extra-judicial confession as weak piece of evidence but. if the evidence of extra-judicial confession is reliable, trustwor­thy and beyond reproach, the same can be relied upon and conviction can be founded thereon. if the evidence of extra-judicial confession is reliable, trustwor­thy and beyond reproach, the same can be relied upon and conviction can be founded thereon. A perusal of this judgment however, shows that this can be done if the evidence about extra-judicial confession comes from the mouth of witnesses who appear to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accu­sed, and in respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive for attribution an untruthful statement to the accused; the words spo­ken to by the witness are clear, unambiguous and unmistakab­ly convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime and nothing is omitted by the witness which may militate against it. Then after subjecting the evidence of the witness to rigorous test on the touchstone of credibility, if it passes that test, atone extra judicial confession can be accepted and can be the basis of a conviction. 9. Our attention has also been invited by the learned Public Prosecutor to Thimma vs. The State of Mysore, AIR 1971 SCC 1871, which has held that if a Court is satisfied that the prejudicial confession is voluntary, and does not appear to be the result of inducement, threat or promise and there is a ring of truth, the confession would be admissible in evidence and would deserve to be acted upon. For this purpose, the court must scrutinise all the relevant factors, such as the person to whom the confession has made, the time and place of making it, the circumstances in which it was made and finally the actual words used. State of Punjab, AIR 1975 SC 1320 , which is also pressed into service by the lear­ned Public Prosecutor, has stated that if the Court believes the witnesses before whom the extra-judicial confession is made and it is satisfied that the confession was voluntary, then in such a case conviction can be founded on such evidence alone as the same cannot be termed as tainted evidence; and if corroboration is required, it is only by way of abundant caution. A reference to that decision shows that the central evidence in that case consisted of the testimony of the approver as would appear from para 3. Then there was evidence regarding extra-judicial confession, which apart, there were some circumstances conn­ecting the accused with the murder of the deceased. A reference to that decision shows that the central evidence in that case consisted of the testimony of the approver as would appear from para 3. Then there was evidence regarding extra-judicial confession, which apart, there were some circumstances conn­ecting the accused with the murder of the deceased. In Piara Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 2274 also it was stated that the law does not require that the evidence regarding extra-judicial confession should in all cases be corroborated. It was further observed in this case that where the extra-judici­al confession was proved by an independent witness who was a responsible officer who bore no animus against the appella­nts, there was hardly any justification to disbelieve the evidence of such a witness particularly when the extra-judicial confession was corroborated by the recovery of an empty cartridge from the place of occurrence. 10. Let us apply the aforesaid tests to the present case to see if relying only on the evidence of PW-1 regarding extra-judic­ial confession made by the accused, we can bold the latter guilty for having murdered Bridhichand. We may first say that the evidence of PW 1 that the extra-judicial confession was made by the appellant in presence of PW-2, is belied by the evide­nce of this witness. We cannot also forget that though in the FIR it was stated that there were three other persons before whom the confession had been made by the time ejahar was lodged, two of them (PWs 1 and 3) have given a different story. We have also to remember that PW-1 is a person who had some liaisons with the police inasmuch as he is connected with the Village Defence Party and, as admitted by PW-5, police do have correspondence with the personnel of Village Defence Party. We do not find any particular reason as to why of all parsons, the accused would have selected PW-1 to tell about his guilt, when this witness is not related to the accused, who even resided in a different village, but had a shop in the village of PW-1 for about one year before the occurrence. The confession was said to have been made just on the query of the witness as to what had happened. The confession was said to have been made just on the query of the witness as to what had happened. On top of all, if it is noted that though as per PW 1's evidence he bad gone to the house of PW-2 on the very night of the occurrence when the accused had made the alleged confession, whereas his statement before the police was that he had known about the occurrence itself in the morning (naturally of the next day)4 the unreliability of PW-l gets exposed. 11. It must also be noted that according to the evidence of PW-1 what the accused had stated to him was that a dacoit had entered his shop house, and he bad cut the dacoit. There can be no dispute that if the deceased was genuinely taken as a dacoit, the accused would have been within his rights even to cause death of the concerned person in view of what has been stated in Section 103 of the Penal Code, when it is noted that the deceased had only one cut wound on his neck as found by PW-4. Though the wound was "deep", the force of the blow can not be measured in such cases in golden scale and the blow has to be severe to deter person from committing the crime. This defence of the accused has however been disbelieved by the learned trial Court. We may state that though inculcators portion alone of a confessional statement may be accepted, but then the exculpatory portion must appear as inherently improbable or must be contradicted by other evidence, as observed in Nishi Kanta vs. State. AIR 1969 SC 422 . In the case at hand it is difficult for us to say that the exculpatory portion was inherently improbable because (1) the occurrence had taken place in the shop of the accused where a dacoit is likely to go; (2) the incident was in night which is an apparatus time for committing dacoity : and (3) no other motive of killing Bridhichand is on record. The learned trial Court seems to have taken the plea as false, because according to it, the deceased could not have been taken as a dacoit being a nearby shopkeeper, more particularly when a lamp was burning in the verandah of the shop of the accused. The learned trial Court seems to have taken the plea as false, because according to it, the deceased could not have been taken as a dacoit being a nearby shopkeeper, more particularly when a lamp was burning in the verandah of the shop of the accused. In so far as the burning of the lamp is concerned, we are not sure if it was in a light­ed condition when the occurrence had taken place; as, PW-1 would not have perhaps found the lamp in a burning condition, when he had gone there next day afternoon in the company of police. What is more destructive of this evidence is that as per the seizure list (Ext-4) the lamp taken care of by the police had belonged to the deceased. 12. This being the state of affairs regarding the evidence given by PW-1 abut the -judicial confession of the app­ellant, we cannot base the conviction solely on the alleged confessional statement testified by PW-1. We may also say that the defence of the accused that he had killed Birdhichand taking him as a dacoit cannot also be rejected outright. 13. Because of all the above, we are not satisfied if the appellant can really be found guilty of a serious charge like Section 302 of the Pena) Code to incarcerate him for his life­time behind the iron bars. The appeals are therefore allowed and the conviction and sentence are set aside. The accused-appellant shall be set at liberty forthwith.