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1985 DIGILAW 494 (MAD)

S. Rajendran v. The State of Tamil Nadu, rep. , by the Secretary to Government (Home Dept), Madras

1985-12-05

SETHURAMAN

body1985
Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is the owner of the building bearing Door No. 170 Dr. Nanjappa Road, Coimbatore. Unfortunately, the premises is under Government tenarcy on a monthly rental of Rs. 110. As the building was let cut for residential purposes and the rental is Rs. 110, naturally, the building is covered by the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. According to the petitioner, the building is required by the petitioner for immediate purposes of demolition and reconstruction. He therefore presented a petition to the Accommodation Controller (Sub-Collector of Coimbatore) under S. 12(1)(b) of the Act. But the said petition was rejected by the Accommodation Controller. The petitioner therefore preferred an appeal to the Government under S. 12(3-A) of the Act. But the Government also rejected the appeal by its order, dated 2nd November, 1983 in G.O.Ms. No. 2318 of 1983. It is this order that is challenged in this writ petition. The stand of the Government is that the petitioner is only a student, that he had not renewed the plan which had been originally sanctioned, that he had not produced any evidence to prove his means and that the building is in a very good condition. For this factual basis, the Government relied on the report of the Accommodation Controller himself. In view of the above circumstances the Government has dismissed the appeal. 2. It may be noticed that in the impugned order it is stated that as there is no provision in the Act to enable the petitioner to have a personal hearing, more so to be represented by counsel, such request was turned down. 3. It is useful even at the outset to refer to the particular provision which enables the petitioner to present a petition for release of the building. 3. It is useful even at the outset to refer to the particular provision which enables the petitioner to present a petition for release of the building. The relevant provision is S. 12 (1)(b), which is as follows:— “S. 12(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, on an application made by a landlord of a building is respect of which the Government shall be deemed to be the tenant, the authorised officer shall, if he is satisfied:— (a)………… (b) That the building is bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building on the site of the building sought to be demolished, pass an order directing the allottee to deliver possession of the building to the landlord before a specified date.” Though the order is liable to be set aside for the simple reason that the petitioner was not furnished with a copy of the P.W.D. Engineers report, it is relevant to point out that according to that report, the building is in a good and tenantable condition. 4. Further, the fact that the Government turned down the petitioners request to have a personal hearing is, in my opinion, also a ground on which the order is liable to be set aside. This is not a case where the party made an application for licence or any other privilege which has to be granted by the Government. On the other hand, here is a case where his proprietary right is affected by the disposal of the appeal by the Government. If that is so, I am of the strong view that the Government shall give a personal hearing to the petitioner; if he should require the assistance of a counsel, he shall also be allowed to have that facility. It is significant to note in this case that the Government was prepared to accept the findings made by the Accommodation Controller. The matter that was before the Government was an appeal and if so, the petitioner is entitled to point out to the Government the relevant materials which would, in turn establish that he had the means that the building is required for the immediate purpose of demolition and reconstruction and therefore, his requirement is nothing but bona fide . The matter that was before the Government was an appeal and if so, the petitioner is entitled to point out to the Government the relevant materials which would, in turn establish that he had the means that the building is required for the immediate purpose of demolition and reconstruction and therefore, his requirement is nothing but bona fide . Having refused such an opportunity it is against all canons of justice to say that the petitioner has not proved his case, particularly when the Government simply accepted the findings of the Accommodation Controller. A reading of the order will disclose that the Government itself did not apply its mind, but simply accepted the findings of the Accommodation Controller. This kind of disposal can never be countenanced by any Court. I therefore reiterate that on this ground also, the order is liable to be set aside. 5. The question is whether the matter has to be sent back and the petitioner driven from pillar to post. Already, the matter vas brought before this Court when the petitioners request for release of the building so as to enable him to demolish and reconstruct the same was turned down. This Court set aside the then order of the Government and directed that the Government should dispose of the petition in accordance with law, on the petitioner presenting an application in the prescribed form and adducing further evidence as he may think fit. In the above circumstances, 1 am constrained to dispose of the petition on merits even though the order is liable to be set aside on the two grounds aforesaid. I am to reiterate that it is not worthwhile to send back the matter to the Government and to direct them to reconsider the appeal on merits. That will only keep the petitioner at bay almost endlessly, and will cause him grave injustice. The Courts of justice are there to administer justice. Taking into consideration the circumstances in each case, in my view this is an extraordinary case where the petition should be disposed of on merits one way or the other. But, we are not to drive the petitioner again before the Government and place him on its mercy. 6. The Courts of justice are there to administer justice. Taking into consideration the circumstances in each case, in my view this is an extraordinary case where the petition should be disposed of on merits one way or the other. But, we are not to drive the petitioner again before the Government and place him on its mercy. 6. The Accommodation Controller rejected the application because the petitioner has not let in evidence and established that (a) the structural soundness of the building is in such a bad condition and that further continued occupation of the same would have lead to loss of life and property, etc., (b) that the building is declared as unsuitable for human occupation, etc., by the Local Board concerned, and (c) that the actual occupant of the said building has himself expressed that the building is unsafe for the lives of his family, etc. All the three grounds relied on by the Accommodation Controller are not valid grounds to turn down the petitioners request. On the other hand, they are all extraneous considerations which had prevailed upon the Accommodation Controller to have rejected the petitioners genuine request. All that the petitioner has to establish is that the petition building is rather old and that he has enough means to meet the cost of the new construction It is not necessary that the Municipality or the Corporation concerned should have issued a notice to the petitioner stating that the building is in such a dilapidated condition as to require demolition, nor is it necessary for the petitioner to establish that the building is in such a bad condition that it is unfit for human habitation. 7. 7. In this case, even the P.W.D. Engineers report shows that the building is forty to fifty years old, that the front side Madras Terraced portion over which the first floor is constructed is in a fair condition and that the Mangalore tiled portion on the rear side is though in living condition, it requires certain minor repairs to bring it to standard and that the northern side compound wall required replastering to bring it to standard Pursuant to the Accommodation Controllers letter dated 14th April, 1982, the petitioner had produced the following documents: (1) his original sale deed dated 21st April, 1925; (2) Letter written by the erstwhile allottee to the Government, dated 1st September, 1956; (1) Letter written by the erstwhile allottee to the Government, dated 8th November, 1956; (4) Certified copy of the judgment in R.C.A. No. 158/76 on the file of the Sub-Court, Coimbatore; and (5) Certified copy of the order in C.R.P. No. 800/77 passed by this Court. The last three documents related to the property owned by the petitioners grandfather which was also adjacent to the present petition building in respect of which release is sought for by the petitioner. These documents were produced to point out that even the petitioners grandfather had demolished his building which was as old as the petitioners building and also to establish that the Tribunal as also this Court were satisfied about genuine requirement of the petitioners grandfather in like circumstances. In spite of it, it is rather strange that the Accommodation Controller should take into consideration extraneous circumstances and at any rate, take a finding different from those rendered by the Tribunal which were confirmed by this Court. At least, the Accommodation Controller and the Government should have taken into consideration this particular important factor, namely, on similar circumstances, their Court has upheld the genuine requirement of the petitioners grandfather. This is a precedent which certainly binds the Accommodation Controller as also the Government. It may not be a decision inter-parts, but certainly it is a binding precedent. On this score alone, I am of the view that the impugned order is liable to be set aside and the petitioners application should be accepted. 8. As regards the age of the building, besides the opinion expressed by the P.W.D. Engineer employed by the first respondent, there it the original sale deed dated 21st April, 1925. On this score alone, I am of the view that the impugned order is liable to be set aside and the petitioners application should be accepted. 8. As regards the age of the building, besides the opinion expressed by the P.W.D. Engineer employed by the first respondent, there it the original sale deed dated 21st April, 1925. There is no evidence that after such purchase the property suffered no change in its structure. If that is so, there is ample evidence to prove that the building is as old as sixty years. After the building has lived for sixty yean, I can take judicial notice of the feat that if the owner has means, he shall be given the right to demolish and reconstruct it. In this particular case, there are tiled portions in the demised building. It is too unjust and inequitable to say that the tenant has the right to dictate to the landlord that the tiled building should be continued to be so for its life because it is in a sound condition. Here also, even according to the Engineers report, unless the building is repaired it would not be of the standard as pointed out by the Engineer. 9. The petitioner has stated that he has means and he has further stated that his father, who is an income-tax assessee, is pre pared to help him When the need for accommodation it ever growing and when the building is as old as sixty years, and some portions of it are tiled, it is open to the landlord to demolish the building and improve its income. This is what the petitioner has claimed in his petition. 10. If the landlord represents that the building is outmoded, that a portion of the building is tiled and that therefore he has decided to demolish and reconstruct it, not only is he benefited personally in that there will be an increase in his income, but also, there will be an additional accommodation provided for by the petitioner. The evidence of the petitioner is stated to have been recorded by a clerk in the office of the Accommodation Controller. The Government has not adduced any evidence contra. The evidence of the petitioner is stated to have been recorded by a clerk in the office of the Accommodation Controller. The Government has not adduced any evidence contra. Besides the oral testimony of the petitioner in his reply, dated 20th April, 1982 to the Accommodation Controllers letter dated 14th April, 1982, he had categorically stated that he owns agricultural lands, and his father will also provide with funds, if necessary and the petitioner himself had got Rs. 10000 in his Bank account. These circumstances particularly when they are not rebutted, are enough proof to show that the petitioner has got the sufficient means. As regards the plan, he did obtain one, but he had not renewed it because this matter has been dragging on. Further, when the petitioner wanted the original plan to be returned to him so as to enable him to apply for renewal, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Coimbatore, in his proceedings L.Dis. No. 7073 dated. 9th April, 1979, had informed the petitioner that as the plan formed part of the records it could not be returned. Thus, the petitioner is prevented from making application for renewal of the plan. Thus, the three material factors which the petitioner had to prove satisfactorily, namely, the age of the building, his means and having applied for and obtained the sanctioned plan, are fully established. After all these, it is not open to the State to say that the petitioner has not proved his requirement and further that his requirement is not genuine. I have already referred to the fact that the Government had simply acted upon the findings of the Accommodation Controller, but, by itself, it did not apply its mind to the materials and failed to reach a conclusion that the requirement of the petitioner is not genuine. 11. In the above circumstances, I cannot but hold that the order passed by the Government is not only illegal, but also suffers from errors apparent on the face of the record. The result is that the impugned order is set aside and the respondents are directed to release the building to the petitioner within three months from this date. The petition is ordered accordingly. There will, however, be no order as to costs.