PUTTASWAMY, J. ( 1 ) ON a reference made by one of us (KSP. J), these cases have been posted before a Division bench for disposal. ( 2 ) AS the questions that arise for determination are either common or inter connected, we propose to dispose of them by a common order. ( 3 ) THE petitioners who are either registered owners or persons in possession of motor vehicles detailed in their respective writ petitions are exigible to taxes under the Karnataka Motor vehicles Taxation Act, 1957 (Karnataka Act No. 35 of 1957) ('the Act' ). ( 4 ) ALL the petitioners have paid taxes due by them on their vehicles or the instalments permitted by this Court. But in making those payments, there were delays which naturally varies and differs from case to case which fact is not also disputed by the petitioners. ( 5 ) ON the basis of those delays, the Regional Transport Officers of the areas ('rtos') either on their own in most cases and in a few cases with the prior approval of the Commissioner for transport in Karnataka, Bangalore ('commissioner'), have called upon each of the petitioners by separate notices/demands/orders to be hereafter referred to as 'orders' to pay composition fees in lieu of penalties or penalties of the amounts specified in the respective orders, the validity of which are challenged by them in these petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. In some cases, the petitioners have also challenged the validity of Rule 29 of the Karnataka Motor vehicles Taxation Rules, 1957 ('the Rules') as ultra-vires of the Act and as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. ( 6 ) THE petitioners have urged that the orders made by the Commissioner and RTOs were really without application of mind to the relevant factors and fact situations like (i) admitted payment of taxes (ii) period of delays and (iii) that the amounts demanded were out of all proportion to the taxes due and paid, were unconscionable and would completely ruin their trade and business. ( 7 ) THE respondents have resisted these writ petitions. ( 8 ) SRI R. N. Narasimha Murthy, Learned Senior Advocate, who appeared for the petitioners in W. P. No. 15250 of 1982 addressed the leading arguments. ( 7 ) THE respondents have resisted these writ petitions. ( 8 ) SRI R. N. Narasimha Murthy, Learned Senior Advocate, who appeared for the petitioners in W. P. No. 15250 of 1982 addressed the leading arguments. Sriyuths M. R. V. Achar, C. S. Shanthamallappa, B. R. S. Gupta, A. S. Vishwanath, C. N. Achar, N. S. Rajanna, B. R. Srirangaiah, S. V. Krishnaswamy, H. Rangavittalachar, M. Gopalakrishna Shetty and C. J. Sundardas who appeared for other petitioners, adopting the arguments of Sri Narasimha Murthy supplemented them. ( 9 ) SRI S. Rajendra Babu, Learned Government Advocate, has appeared for the respondents. ( 10 ) SRI Narasimha Murthy contends that Rule 29 of the Rules on the construction suggested for the respondents, if accepted by us, was ultra-vires of the Act and was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. ( 11 ) SRI Rajendra Babu contends that Rule 29 was intra-vires of the Act and was not violative of article 14 of the Constitution, ( 12 ) ON the view we propose to take on the impugned orders which are clearly unsustainable, we consider it unnecessary to examine and pronounce on the rival constructions of Rule 29 and its validity. We, therefore, leave open them. ( 13 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioners contend that the impugned orders made by either both the Commissioner and the RTOs or either of them only, without application of their minds to all the relevant factors and fact situations, were arbitrary and illegal. ( 14 ) SRI Rajendra Babu sought to support the impugned orders. ( 15 ) IN order to properly appreciate this contention, we consider it useful to notice the facts in w. P. Nos. 5777 of 1979, 15250 of 1982 and 7025 of 1983 as illustrative only. ( 16 ) W. P. No. 5777/79 : The petitioner who is the registered owner of motor vehicle No. MYS 5803 classified as a stage carriage paid the taxes due on the said vehicle for the quarter commencing from 1-5-1978 and ending on 31-7-1978 on 9-8-1978. For that delayed payment, the RTO, Shimoga, on an application made by the petitioner, by his order dated 18-11-1978 called upon him to pay a sum of Rs. 2,500/- as 'smaller penalty' which he did not pay within the time specified in that order. For that delayed payment, the RTO, Shimoga, on an application made by the petitioner, by his order dated 18-11-1978 called upon him to pay a sum of Rs. 2,500/- as 'smaller penalty' which he did not pay within the time specified in that order. In that view, the RTO by his order dated 17-1-1979 (Exhibit-A) called upon the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs. 9,900/- as 'nominal penalty' which was challenged by him before the Commissioner in a Revision under Section 15a of the Act. On 9-5-1979 (Exhibit-B) the Commissioner has rejected the same on the ground that it was appealable and that he should avail that remedy in the first instance. ( 17 ) W. P. No. 15250/82 : The petitioner who is the registered owner of motor vehicle bearing registration No. MYT 5665 classified as a stage carriage paid the taxes due on the said vehicle for the quarters ending 30-4-1977, 31-10-1977 and 31-7-1978 amounting to Rs. 18,200/- on 19-3-1982 apparently in pursuance of or before the order dated 11-3-1982 (Annexure-A) was received by him, which directed him to pay the taxes for the said periods and compound the offence also. On 22-3-1982, the petitioner made an application (Annexure B) before the RTO, tumkur, requesting him to recommend to the Commissioner to levy smaller penalty under Rule 29 for the delay in payment of taxes for those periods. But, the RTO without forwarding that application to the Commissioner as he was bound to, by his order dated 29-3-1982 (Annexure-C) called upon the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs. 9,95,500/- as penalty within 7 days from the date of receipt of the same by him. ( 18 ) 18-1. W. P. No. 7025 of 1983 : Among others, the petitioner is the registered owner of 25 public carrier vehicles detailed in Annexure-A to the Writ Petition which were exigible to taxes under the Act. 18-2. The Karnataka Motor Vehicle Taxation (Second Amendment) Act, 1979 (Karnataka Act 24 of 1979) ('amending Act') which received the assent of the Governor on 26-4-1979 and was first published in the Karnataka Gazette Extra-ordinary dated 28-4-1979, enhanced rates of taxes on public carrier vehicles retrospectively from 27-3-1979, the validity of which had been challenged by the petitioner and others before this Court. While dismissing the said Writ petition, this Court granted time or instalments for payment of difference of taxes payable under the amending Act. But, in making those payments that works out to Rs. 4,260/- on all the 25 vehicles, there was some delay, for which the RTO, Bellary, by his order dated 4-3-1983 (Annexure-J) has called upon the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs. 2,90,880/- as penalty for such delayed payment. ( 19 ) WHAT immediately strikes us, which is very clear from the orders in the three cases which has repeated itself in all other cases, is that they are totally unrelated to the taxes payable and paid by the petitioners. Another striking feature is that they are all made allmost mechanically, casually and arbitrarily without reference to all the relevant factors and circumstances. We are clearly of the view that non-application of mind and arbitrariness are writ large on all the impugned orders. ( 20 ) SRI Rajendra Babu is undoubtedly right in contending that on the very terms of Rule 29, the orders are in the nature of proposals only and that it is open to the petitioners to signify their acceptance or rejection and then face prosecutions before the Criminal Courts. But, from this, it does not necessarily follow that they can make orders without application of mind, without reference to all relevant factors and circumstances and arbitrarily. Every order under the Act and rules, including an order or a proposal under Rule 29 of the Rules, must be only on the application of mind to all relevant factors and circumstances, reasonable and just and cannot be arbitrary. We are of the view that this requirement is all the greater when what is demanded is penalty or composition fee in lieu of penalty. The proposals or orders to be made by the commissioner and the RTO cannot result in possible ruination of the tax payers as that will be clear in Writ Petition No. 15250 of 1982 and W. P. No. 7025 of 1983, the details of which we have set out earlier. ( 21 ) THE proviso to Sub-rule (1) of Rule 29 of the Rules has invested the Commissioner to determine 'smaller or nominal penalties' with due regard to all the facts and circumstances. ( 21 ) THE proviso to Sub-rule (1) of Rule 29 of the Rules has invested the Commissioner to determine 'smaller or nominal penalties' with due regard to all the facts and circumstances. The very object of this provision conferring power on the Commissioner, who is the head of the department, is not make a fetish of delays, relieve hardship and do justice to tax-payers. We are of the veiw that this provision far from supporting the arbitrary exercise of power as has been done in all these cases, supports our earlier conclusion. ( 22 ) WE have earlier noticed that the applicantion made by the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 15250/82 for determination or levy of 'smaller' penalty was disposed of by the RTO finally. ( 23 ) THE Rules do not empower the RTOs to dispose of the applications made before them for levy of 'smaller' penalties and expressly confer that power only on the Commissioner. When the rule expressly and exclusively confers the power to determine or levy 'smaller penalty' on, the commissioner, that power had to be exercised by him only and no other. Apart from this, the rule also directs the RTOs to refer such applications to the Commissioner. From this, it follows that the RTO, Tumkur, committed an error of jurisdiction and illegality in disposing of the application made by the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 15250 of 1982. ( 24 ) IN some other case, the petitioners had made applications, some of which had been referred to the Commissioner who had made his orders almost mechanically. We need hardly say that those orders for the very reasons stated by us earlier cannot be upheld. ( 25 ) IN many of these cases, the petitioners had not made applications before the RTOs for determination or levy of smaller penalties. In most of the cases, the orders made by the RTOs were not couched as proposals in terms of Rule 29, but were made as final and irrevocable orders with legal consequences ensuring on their failure to comply with them, which compelled those petitioners to approach this Court without making, such applications under that Rule. Apart from this, the authorities and parties were not clear as to how the matters should be regulated under that Rule. Apart from this, the authorities and parties were not clear as to how the matters should be regulated under that Rule. In these circumstances, we are of the view that all those who had not made applications should be enabled to make fresh applications and supplement their earlier applications also with additional applications if they so desire- Learned Counsel for the petitioners seek for one month's time from this day to make such applications which is fair and reasonable. ( 26 ) WHEN the petitioners make fresh or additional applications before the RTOs, it is hardly necessary to point out that they are bound to forward them to the Commissioner with their recommendations, if any, who is under a legal obligation to examine and pass appropriate orders on them, under the proviso to Rule 29 (1) of the Rules. In deciding such applications, the commissioner is not bound to afford an opportunity of oral hearing such to applicants or taxpayers. But, by affording an opportunity of oral hearing, the Commissioner does not commit an illegality at all as that would undoubtedly help him in deciding the matters more satisfactorily. We have every hope that the Commissioner would follow the latter course and give greater credibility to his orders. ( 27 ) ON the above discussion, it follows that all the impugned orders require to be quashed and appropriate directions issued to the Commissioner and the RTOs to re-determine the matters. But, till then, it is necessary to direct such of those petitioners that have furnished bank guarantees or securities in pursuance of the interim orders of this Court to be kept in force. ( 28 ) WE need hardly say that any of the payments made by any of the petitioners in pursuance of any of the interim orders made by this Court or otherwise will have to be modulated on the basis of the fresh orders to be made by the Commissioner and the RTOs as the case may be either by making refunds or recoveries as the case may be. ( 29 ) IN the light of our above discussion, we make the following orders and directions : (i) We leave open the construction of Rule 29 of the Rules as also its validity. ( 29 ) IN the light of our above discussion, we make the following orders and directions : (i) We leave open the construction of Rule 29 of the Rules as also its validity. (ii) We quash the orders impugned in all these cases and direct the Commissioner and the RTOs to restore the proceedings to their original files receiving all such fresh or additional applications to be made before them by any of the petitioners within 30 days from this day and then re-determine them in accordance with law and the observations made in this order. Whenever applications are made by any of the petitioners before the RTOs, they shall forward them with their recommendations to the Commissioner within one month from the date of their receipt who on receipt of the same shall dispose of them in accordance with law and the observations made in this order. (iii) We direct those petitioners that had furnished bank guarantees or securities to keep them in force till the matters are decided afresh and on such determination, the RTOs are free to regulate the recoveries, if any, in accordance with such orders from such bank guarantees or securities and otherwise in accordance with law. (iv) All payments so far made by any of the petitioners, either cases of recoveries from or refunds to them shall be regulated on the basis of fresh orders to be made by the Commissioner and the RTOs as the case may be. 30. Writ Petitions are disposed of in the above terms. But, in the circumstances of the cases, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.