JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS order shall also dispose of C. R. No. 94/1985. This revision petition has been preferred under section 23 (E) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, because the applicant was aggrieved by the order of the rent Controlling Authority, Sheopur Kalan, in case No. 4/a-90/84-85 dated 28-2-1985. ( 2. ) NON-APPLICANT/landlord filed an application under section 23-A of the M. P. Accommodation Control (Amendment) Act, 1983 (for short, hereinafter referred to act No. 27 of 1983) for eviction of the applicant from a non-residential accommodation on the ground of bona fide requirement. Upon this, a notice was issued by the authority to the applicant/tenant, who submitted an application for grant of leave to defend, and denied the averments contained in the application of the non-applicant/landlord. The applicant, inter alea also raised a plea that the non-applicant/landlord previously filed civil suit No. 746-A of 1983 in the Court of additional Civil Judge Class II, Sheopur Kalan, which was withdrawn in contravention of the provisions of 0. 23, R. 1, CPC. ( 3. ) WHILE these proceedings were pending before the Authority, the Act was amended by M. P. Accommodation Control (Amendment) Ordinance, 1985 (for short, hereafter called the Ordinance) which came into force on 15-1-1985. By section 23-J of the Ordinance, the jurisdiction of the Rent Controlling Authority was taken away with regard to proceedings filed by the landlord except the category enumerated in section 23-J of the Ordinance. For convenience, it is being reproduced below : " 23-J. Definition of "landlord" for the purposes of Chapter III-A. For the purposes of this Chapter "landlord" means a landlord who is, (i) a retired servant of any Government including a retired member of defence Services; or (ii) a retired servant of a company owned or controlled either by the Central or any State Government; or (iii) a widow or a divorced wife; or (iv) physically handicapped person; or (v) a servant of any Government including a member of defence services who, according to his service conditions, is not entitled to Government accommodation on his posting to a place where he owns a house or is entitled to such accommodation only on payment of a penal rent on his posting to such a place. " Admittedly, the non-applicant-landlord does not fall in the categories enumerated hereinabove. " Admittedly, the non-applicant-landlord does not fall in the categories enumerated hereinabove. Hence, as contended by Shri Aran Mishra, learned counsel for the applicant, that the landlord was excluded from the category of the landlords, the authority had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order on 28-2-1985, when the jurisdiction of the Authority was taken away on 15-1-1985 by virtue of section 10 of the Ordinance. ( 4. ) SHRI Mishra further contended that as provided in section 10 of the ordinance, this proceeding was pending before the Authority on the coming into force of this Ordinance on 15-1-1985 and, hence, it shall stand transferred to a civil court of competent jurisdiction. Shri K. S. Tomar, learned counsel appearing for the landlord-non-applicant contended that by virtue of section 6 of the General Clauses act, the right of a party, which accrued under the old Act, cannot be taken away by the subsequent Act. He further contended that as the application to defend was filed before the Authority on 9-1-1985, the Authority was seized of the matter and its jurisdiction shall not be ousted by coming into force of the Ordinance. ( 5. ) THOUGH the learned counsel for the parties have also addressed this Court on the merits and demerits of the case, yet I propose to deal with the first contention of shri Mishra, first in order. If by virtue of section 10 of the Ordinance the proceeding pending before the Authority shall, on such commencement of the Ordinance, stand transferred to the civil Court of competent jurisdiction, then the impugned order passed by the Authority will be, undoubtedly, without jurisdiction. It is a fundamental principle that a decree or order passed by a Court without jurisdiction, is a nullity and that its invalidity could be set up whenever or wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon in any forum or proceeding. A defect of jurisdiction whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject matter or the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree or order and, as such, a defect cannot be cured even by the consent of the parties, Kiran Singh ( AIR 1954 SC 349 ). ( 6. ( 6. ) FOR evaluating the rival arguments of the learned counsel, it would be pertinent to examine the provisions of section 10 of the Ordinance, which is being reproduced below : "10. Transfer of pending application to Civil Court - An application filed by the landlord, other than that defined in section 23-J to evict the tenant exclusively on the ground of "bona fide" requirement of accommodation under section 23-A of the Principal Act before the commencement of this ordinance and pending on the date of such commencement before the Rent controlling Authority shall on such commencement stand transferred to a civil Court of competent jurisdiction and such Court shall proceed to dispose of the same in accordance with the provisions of Chapter III as if it were a plaint. " As is apparent from the wordings of section 10 of the Ordinance, it commands that an application filed by the landlord other than that defined in section 23-J, to evict the tenant exclusively on the ground of bona fide requirement of the accommodation, under section 23a of the Amendment Act, before the commencement of the ordinance and pending on the date of such commencement, before Rent Controlling authority, shall on such commencement stand transferred to civil Court of competent jurisdiction and such Court shall proceed to dispose of the same, etc. etc. The portions emphasised contain the key to the interpretation of this section. It would be necessary first to understand the meaning of the word pending. Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 70 contains an exhaustive definition of the word pending. "pending - A term having different shades of meaning, susceptible of two interpretations, the legal and technical, or the popular and liberal. pending is defined as meaning in the process of settlement or adjustment; begun, but not yet completed; unsettled; undetermined; before the conclusion of; depending; not terminated; during; prior to the completion of; remaining undecided; undecided or undisposed of; also during the time intervening before; awaiting; until. Having recourse to the vernacular or to the derivation of the term, pending means hanging. pending has been held equivalent to or synonymous with, during, and hanging. An action is pending from the date of its commencement and is regarded as pending from such time until its final termination or until final judgment is rendered. Having recourse to the vernacular or to the derivation of the term, pending means hanging. pending has been held equivalent to or synonymous with, during, and hanging. An action is pending from the date of its commencement and is regarded as pending from such time until its final termination or until final judgment is rendered. " It is, thus, clear from the above-mentioned definition that the technical, legal, popular and liberal meaning is that a proceeding shall be deemed to be pending, which is in the process of settlement or adjustment, or which has begun but not yet completed or settled and determined finally. So if a proceeding is pending, then it means that it has not been finally determined, and if before the determination the venue of the proceeding is changed, while it is pending, then it shall simply and automatically stand transferred to that new venue. ( 7. ) ON a plain reading of section 10 of the Ordinance, it becomes apparent that it was not given the retrospective face. In the Amendment Act (No. 27 of 1983) when section 23-A was enacted, it did not create a right in favour of a landlord, but only changed the venue of the proceeding for eviction of tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement. The Amendment Act contained a somewhat similar provision in section 12, which dealt with the pending suits and proceedings in Civil Court. In section 12 of the Amendment Act, the word pending was also used. Section 10 of the Ordinance provided that the proceeding pending before the Authority shall on such commencement (15-1-1985) stand transferred to a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. Clearly this provision was prospective and not retrospective; unless a right to the landlord is created by the provisions of the previous Act, it cannot operate retrospectively, (AIR 1951 S. C. 199 and AIR 1966 S. C. 459 ). Similarly, in Md Idris and others (AIR 1966 S. C. 1499), Honble Supreme Court took the view that when the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act came into force, repealing the U. P. Agriculturist Relief Act, the application for redemption pending at the time of commencement of the Abolition Act was not affected, because the right to redeem already had accrued under section 12 of the Agriculturist Relief Act. ( 8. ( 8. ) SHRI K. S. Tomar, learned counsel for the landlord, contended that section 6 of the General Clauses Act deals with the repealing provisions. Let the relevant part be reproduced for convenience :- "6. Effect of repeal - Where this Act or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter be made, then, unless a different intention appears the repeal shall not:- (a) *** *** *** (b) *** *** *** (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. (d) to (s) **** **** ***" (Emphasis supplied ). This clause embodies trie general principle that the repeal or amendment of an Act does not affect a right already in existence, unless a contrary intention is made out, expressly or by implication. A distinction has, thus, to be drawn between a legal proceeding for enforcing a right acquired or accrued and a legal proceeding for acquisition of a right. The former is saved under this provision of section 6 while the latter is not. The right of a landlord to start eviction proceeding on the ground of bona fide requirement has not been taken away by section 10 of the Ordinance. The right to continue the proceeding of eviction is merely transferred from one forum to another. The provisions of section 6 (c) of the General Clauses Act are not in any way affected; rather the said provisions are protected by section 10 of the Ordinance. For example, a right to file an appeal accrued to a party before the amendment came into force. That right to appeal cannot be taken away by subsequent amendment by virtue or section 6 (c) of the General Clauses Act. The right, privilege or obligation in section 6 (c)appears to be related to particular individuals and is not a right in gross. ( 9. ) A Division Bench of this Court in Kumari Sushma Mehta (AIR 1964 M. P. 133) observed, when Claims Tribunals were created by an amendment in the Motor-Vehicles Act: "any enactment which has the effect of destroying an existing right cannot be given retrospective effect without express words and this rule also extends to the remedy which a litigant has for obtaining relief by a suit. " Furthermore, a statute should not be so construed as to create new disabilities or obligations or impose new duties in respect of transactions which were complete at the time the Amending Act came into force, and so was observed in Nani Gopal Mitra (AIR 1976 S. C. 1636 ). ( 10. ) TO conclude, the only meaning of section 10 of the Ordinance is that an application filed by landlord, other than the ones defined in section 23-J shall only stand automatically transferred on the date of commencement of the Ordinance. The reasonable construction, which can be placed upon section 10 of the Ordinance, is that before his application stands transferred, the landlord can show to the authority that he comes within the orbit of section 23-J, whose application is pending adjudication. In such a situation, a judicial order is contemplated and if it is not done, then of course, the positive mandate of section 10 of the Ordinance would be defeated. ( 11. ) CLEARLY, the Authority, the landlord and the tenant seem to be completely ignorant of the forceful existence of sections 10 and 23-J of the Ordinance on 15-1-1985. It was the duty of the Rent Controlling Authority to acquaint itself of any jurisdictional change occurring during the pendency of a proceeding. Unmindful of the loss of its jurisdiction on 15-1-1985, the Authority proceeded to pronounce the final judgment by the impugned judgment on 28-2-1985. ( 12. ) CONSEQUENTLY, the impugned judgment is illegal and does not deserve to be maintained. It is, accordingly, set aside and this revision of the tenant is allowed. The proceeding, therefore, pending before the Rent Controlling Authority on 15-1-1985 shall stand transferred to the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Revision allowed.