JUDGMENT : N.D. OJHA, J. 1. The Petitioner appeared in the B.Ed. examination of the year 1980 conducted by the Rohilkhand University, Bareilly as a regular student of S.S. College, Shahjahanpur. His case is that he was declared to have passed the said B. Ed. examination and was issued a nark sheet declaring him to have passed in theory in IIIrd division and in practical in IInd division. A photostat copy of the mark sheet has been annexed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition. His further case is that in the newspaper 'Amar Ujhala' Bareilly dated 27th August, 1984 a news item was published stating that the Petitioner had wrongly been declared successful in the 1980 examination and requiring the Petitioner to deposit the mark sheet in the office of this University. It is this order of the University which is sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. 2. Counter and rejoinder affidavits have been filed. Keeping in view the nature of the controversy involved in the instant case we are of opinion that it is a fit case where the writ petition may be finally disposed of at this very stage as contemplated by the second proviso to Rule 2 of Chapter XXII of the Rules of Court. We have accordingly heard counsel for the parties on the merits of the writ petition. On the basis of the facts stated in the counter affidavit and Ordinance 5 of the Ordinances framed by the Rohilkhand University in regard to B.Ed. examination, it has been urged by Sri L.P. Naithani counsel for the University that in order to pass B.Ed. examination it was incumbent upon an examinee to secure atleast 30 percent marks in each paper and 36 percent marks in the aggregate in theory papers and atleast 40 percent marks at the practical examinations, it has been pointed out that the Petitioner had obtained only 22 marks out of 100 in paper three Modern India Education and that being less than 30 percent the minimum pass marks required by the relevant ordinance the Petitioner had failed and it was due to mistake that in the column showing the result it was stated that he has passed in theory in IIIrd division and in practical in IInd division. According to Sri Naithani when the mistake was detected by the University it was simply rectified by the impugned order. According to Sri Naithani when the mistake was detected by the University it was simply rectified by the impugned order. Emphasis also has been placed by him on the fact that 22 marks obtained by the Petitioner in paper No. three Modern Indian Education have been encircled which is out even from annexure 1 to the writ petition which was a clear indication that the Petitioner had failed in that subject. Relying on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Kedar Lal Verma Vs. The Secretary, Board of High School and Intermediate Education and Another, AIR 1980 All 32 it was urged by Sri Naithani that since the Petitioner had not obtained the minimum marks of 30 percent in one of the papers as mentioned above, it was not open to the University to declare the Petitioner as having passed in the said examination and no question of estoppel arose in such a case. 3. For the Petitioner it has been urged that the University having declared the Petitioner as having passed in the 1980 B.Ed. examination was not now entitled to pass the impugned order after more than four years particularly when the Petitioner had after being declared successful in the II. Ed. examination had taken jobs from time to time. Reliance in support of this submission was placed by him on the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Smt. Premwati Nautiyal v. Narendra Mahila Vidyalaya 1983 UP KB EC 226, In regard to this decision it was pointed out by Sri L.P. Naithani that it was a case where the matter came up for consideration before this Court in a second appeal and there was a finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate court in favour of the Plaintiff as is apparent from paragraph 19 of the report. It was further pointed out that the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Kedar Lal (Supra) was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge. 4. It was further pointed out that the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Kedar Lal (Supra) was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge. 4. On the facts of the instant case we are of opinion that it is not necessary to go into the question of estoppel inasmuch as the impugned order deserves to be quashed on the alternative submission made by counsel for the Petitioner namely, that even if the University was not estopped from passing the impugned order the said order was still liable to be quashed having been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice, inasmuch as the Petitioner was given no opportunity of showing cause before passing the said order. To this argument the reply of Sri Naithani was that since the Petitioner had obtained only 22 marks in one of the subjects as already pointed out above, in view of the law laid down by this Court in Kedar Lai's case, no useful purpose would have been served by giving a show cause notice to the Petitioner. According to him it was just a case of mistake which was rectified by the impugned order. We find it difficult to agree with this submission. It cannot be denied and has not indeed been denied by Sri Naithani, counsel for the University, that the impugned order amounts to a penalty in the sense that even though earlier the Petitioner had been declared successful the effect of the impugned order is to declare him to have been failed in the said examination. 5. In Anil Kumar Srivastava v. University of Allahabad AIR 1973 All. 443 the Petitioner of that case appeared at the M.Sc. previous (Maths) examination. On the strength of the mark sheet of M.Sc. previous he joined M.Se. final. Only a couple of days before the commencement of the final examination the Petitioner of that case was informed that he had been debarred from appearing at the examination because he had failed at the M.Sc. previous examination. A writ petition was instituted in this Court by Anil Kumar Srivastava. It was allowed by a learned Single Judge who held that the University, on the facts of that case, was estopped from restraining Anil Kumar Srivastava from appearing in M.Sc. final examination. previous examination. A writ petition was instituted in this Court by Anil Kumar Srivastava. It was allowed by a learned Single Judge who held that the University, on the facts of that case, was estopped from restraining Anil Kumar Srivastava from appearing in M.Sc. final examination. Against the judgment of the learned Single Judge a special appeal was preferred by the Allahabad University which came up before a Division Bench of this Court being Special Appeal No. 65 of 1973. The appeal was decided on 18th April, 1973 and the Division Bench deciding it maintained the judgment of the learned Single Judge by confining it only to the point of no opportunity being given to Anil Kumar Srivastava before passing the impugned order in that case. In other words the Division Bench took the view that giving of a notice to show cause was essential before passing the impugned order inasmuch as the order resulted in penalty. 6. In Divisional Superintendent, Eastern Railway, Dinapur and Others Vs. Shri L.N. Keshri and Others, AIR 1974 SC 1889 the pay of certain employees of the railway had by order dated 16th August, 1966 been fixed at Rs. 135/- per month, in the scale of Rs. 105-135. This order was challenged by the employees on the ground that their pay had earlier been fixed at the scale of Rs. 110-180 and the scale was arbitrarily and illegally reduced. The reduction in the scale was sought to be justified by the railway on the ground that it was because of mistake that the Respondents had been put in the grade of Rs. 110-180 and by the impugned order this mistake had been rectified. The Supreme Court took the view that even in such a case an opportunity of being heard was necessary to be given to the employees before passing the impugned order. 7. In The Board of High School and Inter-mediate Education, U.P. and Others Vs. Kumari Chitra Srivastava and Others, AIR 1970 SC 1039 the Board of High School and Intermediate Education had cancelled the examination of a candidate who had been allowed to appear at the examination on the ground that he had been admitted to the examination inspite of shortage in attendance at lectures without giving any show cause notice to the candidate. The order was sought to be quashed on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. The order was sought to be quashed on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. It was urged on behalf of the Board that no useful purpose could be served by giving a show cause notice to the candidate inasmuch as the decision of the Board was on the facts correct and the Beard had no power to condone the shortage of lectures. This plea was repelled by the Supreme Court and it was held that whether a duty arises in a particular case to issue a show cause notice before inflicting a penalty does not depend on the authority's satisfaction that the person to be penalised has no defence but on the nature of the order proposed to be passed. The Supreme Court (declined to go into the submission made by counsel for the Board to the effect that the Board had no power to condone the shortage of lectures. It was pointed out that the question as to whether the Board has the power to condone the shortage of the lectures is atleast at the first instance for the Board to decide. 8. In view of the foregoing discussion we are of opinion that the impugned order serves to be quashed on the ground that it has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as admittedly no opportunity was given to the Petitioner before passing the said order. 9. In the result the writ petition succeeds and is allowed and the impugned order communicated to the Petitioner by getting it published in 'Amar Ujala' Bareilly, dated 27th August, 1984, a copy whereof has been filed as Annexure 2 to the writ petition, is quashed insofar as the Petitioner is concerned. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.