ORDER Dr. T.N. Singh, J.--1. Hanuman Bhandar is an eating house which sells and serves edibles. It is situated within the campus of Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills at Birlanagar, Gwalior, and the workmen of the Bhandar say that they sell food to themselves and the co-workmen who are engaged in the textile industry which goes by the name of Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills, besides the Bhandar is a 'canteen' for the workers of the Mills. This is truly the crux of the controversy between the parties. For, this position is disputed by three petitioners who, respectively, are- (1) Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Ltd., (2) factory Manager of the Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Ltd., Textile Factory, Birlangar, Gwalior and (3) Manager, Hanuman Bhandar, J.C. Mills Ltd., Birlanagar, Gwalior. However, in the instant petition, the scope of the controversy does not extend to Bhandar's employees enforcing any right of workmen of J.C. Mills but it is limited to narrow confines, which I proceed immediately to indicate. 2. Before I refer to the diary of events leading to the instant petition. I propose to say at once that Shri S.K. Dubey, petitioner's counsel, rightly, indeed, realising the character of the lis, which concerns chiefly the interpretation of a couple of local statutes dealing with industrial relations, laid great stress on the word "a" which appear in Section 13 of M. P. Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1961 (for short 1961 Act'). Because the said provision also inheres the core of the controversy in the instant lis, I propose to extract the same in extenso-- "Disputes regarding application and interpretation of Standing Orders--If any question arises as to the application or interpretation of a Standing Order, an employer, an employee or a representative of employees may refer the question to the Labour Court having jurisdiction and the Court shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, decide the question and his decision shall be final and binding on the parties." However, in the same statute there are other provisions, which have signal relevance to the core issue and I propose, therefore, to extract relevant portions thereof;-- "2. Application of the Act--(1) This Act shall apply to— (a) every undertaking wherein the number of employees on any day during the twelve months preceding or on the day this Act comes into force or on any day thereafter was or is more than twenty; and (b) such other class or classes of undertakings as the State Government may, from to time, by notification, specify in this behalf: Provided that it shall not apply to an undertaking carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government or a railway administration or a mine or an oil field." "5. Power to exempt-where the State Government is of the opinion that it is necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do, it may, by notification and subject to such condition, if any, as it may specify in the notification-- (a) exempt any undertaking or class of undertakings from the operation of all or any of the provisions of this Act; and (b) as often as may be, cancel any such notification and again subject, by a like notification, the undertaking or class of undertakings to the operation of such provisions." "6. Application of standard standing orders to undertaking--(1) The State Government may, by notification, apply standard standing orders to such class of undertakings and from such date as may be specified therein. (2) Where immediately before the commencement of this Act standing order are in force in respect of any undertaking, such standing orders shall, until standard standing orders are applied to such undertaking under sub-section (1) continue in force as if they were made under this Act." Because in virtue of section 3 (d) of the same statute it is contemplated that words and expressions used in the Act but not defined in Act shall bear the same meaning assigned to them in the Madha Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960, (for short 1960 Act'), becomes necessary to refer, and indeed also extract, the provision of Section 2 (33) thereof, to install more comprehensively the statutory radar for proper comprehension of the forensic contour of the lis and the rival contentions advanced by counsel for both sides. "Section 2 (33)--undertaking means a concern in any Industry." 3. "Section 2 (33)--undertaking means a concern in any Industry." 3. On application (Annexure P-5) filed in Labour Court No.1 Gwalior, under Section 13 (aforequoted), by the first respondent, Mazdoor Congress, Gwalior, the impugned order (Annexure P-19) was rendered on 22-1-1982, which is challenged in the instant petition. The application refers to M. P. Gazette dated 5-9-1981 in which was published the "Notification" dated 6-8-1980 contemplated under Section 6 (extracted above) and it was prayed that a declaration be made that the Standard Standing Orders made under the provisions of 1961 Act shall be applicable to the employees of J.C. Mills' canteen, known as Hanuman Bhandar canteen, claiming the same to be a part of the textile industry owned by the non-applicants, namely the present petitioners. 4. Petitioners counsel Shri Dubey, has assailed the impugned order on two counts. Firstly, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the application as it did not raise any "dispute" contemplated under Section 13 of 1961 Act. Secondly, the provisions of 1961 Act were not applicable to the workmen or employees of Hanuman Bhandar, which was registered on 21-1-1977 under the provisions of M.P. Shops and Establishments Act, 1958 (for short 1958 Act'). He invited my attention to the Annexure P-6 (Written Statement) filed in the Labour Court as also to certain other Annexures, namely P-2, P-8, P-10 and P-13 to P-16 to lay the foundation of facts for the legal contentions. The gist of his contention on facts, based on the Annexures referred, is projected in Annexure P-12 itself which is an agreement executed on 1-4-1979 between the Manager of Hanuman Bhandar canteen and Secretary of Shops and Establishments workers' Union. It is his submission that the workmen of Hanuman Bhandar cannot approbate and reprobate, in other words, they were bound by the agreement and their service conditions are to be governed by the agreement and the provisions of the 1958 Act, and not by 1961 Act and be placed implicit reliance on appendices I and II of the agreement to support his contention. However, in my opinion, this contention bas to be rejected forthwith as for violation of the terms and conditions of the agreement by the workmen of the Bhandar there can and must necessarily, be a separate dispute and that question has nothing to do with the jurisdictional competence of the Labour Court to determine the "dispute" referred to it under Section 13 of 1961 Act. Indeed, Shri Upadhyaya, learned counsel for the respondents, rightly submitted that there can be no estoppel against the statute and by their unilateral act of securing registration of Hanuman Bhandar under 1958 Act the petitioners could not thereby render inapplicable the provisions of 1961 Act to the workmen of Hanuman Bhandar. Accordingly, Shri Upadhyaya, who relied on Associated Rubber Industries (1985) 4 SCC 141 case, to make the submission, submitted that this Court must tear the veil and demolish the device adopted by the petitioner, namely, the registration, which was devised for the purpose of avoiding an onerous future liability, eventually created by the 1961 Act, which was a welfare legislation. 5. I propose to examine first the contention that the application filed by the Mazdoor Congress, which espoused the case of workmen of the Hanuman Bhandar in the Labour Court, was not contemplated under Section 13 of 1961 Act. The threshold submission of Shri Dubey, as alluded, is founded on the use of the word "a" in the expression "application or interpretation of a Standing Order" and also on the fact that in the said expression the word "Order" was in singular number, which, counsel submits indicate clearly that only such "questions" as may relate to the application or interpretation" of anyone or more particular "Standing Order" can, be raised. A first blush the argument appealed to me but I regarded it a" my constitutional obligation to construe the provisions in a manner as may fulfill the object of the welfare legislation as enjoined by the Directive Principles to ensure that the cause of the weaker section of the society does not suffer through neglect, apathy, inadvertence or even lack of forensic skill. Therefore, the matter had to be deliberated and indeed counsel for both sides rendered valuable assistance to me in doing so. Therefore, the matter had to be deliberated and indeed counsel for both sides rendered valuable assistance to me in doing so. To me, it appears, however, that Shri Dubey's contention has a short answer provided by Section 5 (b) of M. P. General Causes Act, 1957, which contemplates that "unless a different intention appears, words in the singular shall include the plural, and words in the plural shall include the singular". Indeed, in the decision in Newspapers Ltd., AIR 1957 SC 532 , their Lordships, while examining the content of the term 'workmen' used in the definition of the term 'Industrial dispute' under the U.P. Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, took the view that the tenor of the Act and decisions of the Court having a bearing on the question would rather be decisive of the fact as to whether use of the word 'workmen' in the definition of an 'Industrial Dispute' would also embrace as individual' dispute. 6. However, according to established canons of construction, ambiguity in any statutory provision can be resolved with reference to the marginal note of Section, which can be used as an external to interpretation. For this, S.P. Gupta, AIR 1982 SC 149 , is a high and vocal authority. Because of Section 5 (b) of the G. C. Act an ambiguity is admittedly introduced in Section 13 of 1961 Act which is made more vocal and potent by the marginal note, wherein the expression is 'Standing Orders' using the term 'Orders' in plural, and as held in Newspapers Ltd. supra. I must, therefore, refer to the object and purport of the 1961 Act (as a whole) which exercise is also mandated by the supreme and progressive rule of interpretation labelled as the rule of 'purposive construction'. In two recent decisions of the Apex Court Glaxo Laboraories, AIR 1984 SC 505 and R.S. Nayak, AIR 1984 SC 684 . I find ample support for this view. I, therefore, propose merely to extract a portion from the judicial dicta in Glaxo Laboratories supra-- "No canon of construction of a statute is more firmly established than this that the purpose of interpretation is to give effect to the intention underlying the statute and therefore unless the grammatical construction leads to any absurdity, it is safe to give words their natural meaning because the framer is presumed to use the language which conveys the intention. If two constructions are possible, it is equally well established that the construction which advances the intention of the legislation, remedies the mischief to thwart which it is enacted should he accepted. The Act was enacted for ameliorating the conditions of the workers and therefore conditions of service prescribed thereunder must receive such interpretation as to advance the intendment underlying the Act and defeat the mischief." 7. Indeed, as an external aid to interpretation, reference may also be made to legislative history. The 1961 Act had a precursor in Madhya Pradesh Industrial workmen (Standing Orders) Act, 1959, but before I say anything a bout that I would like to refer to long title of the 1961 Act itself. It reads-"An Act to provide for rules defining with sufficient precision in certain matters the conditions of employment of employees in undertakings in the State of Madhya Pradesh". That it was a comprehensive enactment meant to improve on its precursor is expressed with sufficient clarity in the long title, just quoted, which leaves little doubt about its object and the mischief it sought to remedy. The prime reason for re-enactment in 1961 of the 1959 Act was to bring it in line with cognate enactments, later enacted in 1960 namely M.P. Industrial Relations Act as also Indian Trade Unions Act (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) Act. I may, therefore, refer to the source or the soul of both 1959 Act and 1961 Act which is to be traced in the statement of objects and reasons appended to the Madhya Pradesh Industrial workmen (Standing Orders) Bill, 1958. It was stated in the 'objects and reasons' that though the Bill was based generally on Industrial Employment (Standing) Act, 1964 its scope was "sufficiently widened to apply to all industrial establishments employing more than 20 workmen". Further, the desirability to have an "uniform law" on the subject in supersession of the diverse extant provisions was also stressed taking note of the fact that "Standing Orders from the basic rules regulating the conditions of service of workmen in industrial establishments." 8. Now, according to me the 'mischief', shortly put, was remedied in 1961 by enlarging the scope of its applicability inasmuch as expression 'industrial establishments' was replaced by the word 'undertaking'. Now, according to me the 'mischief', shortly put, was remedied in 1961 by enlarging the scope of its applicability inasmuch as expression 'industrial establishments' was replaced by the word 'undertaking'. This also follows from the provisions of Sections 5 and 6, which I have extracted, by which the State Government is empowered to issue 'notifications' for application or exemption of Standing Orders to any particular class of undertakings which, ex-hypothesis, postulates 'question' being raised as to interpretation also of such notifications before the Court by means of an application under S. 13. There would be an obvious necessity for Labour Court to decide such question also under Section 13 as the Act is silent on the mode or even the forum for agitating and deciding such questions. The three provisions, in my opinion, must be read together and the 'question' contemplated for decision of the Labour Court under Section 13 can nor, in my view, be limited merely to the application and interpretation of any one or more Order of the Standing Orders but also to a notification issued under Sections 5 and 6. Indeed, the very fact that power to exempt, as also to revoke the exemption, from time to time, given in Sections 5 indicates that the notifications made whether under Section 5 or 6 would be required to be interpreted very often. 9. That apart, there is a similar compulsion, indeed, more stronger, flowing from sub-section (2) of Section 6, which in clear terms contemplates a right to enforce "application" of a Standard Standing Order after the same is made, to replace the old or extant Standing Orders. Therefore, in any view of the matter the application made on behalf of the workmen of Hanuman Bhandar having referred categorically to the notification issued under Section 6, it was well within the jurisdiction, nay it was the duty, of the Labour Court to entertain, hear and dispose of the same to carry out the inexorable mandate of sub-section (2) thereof. I have, therefore, no hesitation to hold that the first contention raised by Shri Dubey has no force and it must be rejected without more ado because the right contemplated sub-section (2) of Section 6 was, in effect, being enforced by the application made under Section 13. Reliance was placed by Shri Dubey on the decisions reported in Tata Chemicals, AIR 1964 Guj. Reliance was placed by Shri Dubey on the decisions reported in Tata Chemicals, AIR 1964 Guj. 266, as also on Manager Straw Products, 1960 MPLJ SN 190, which deal with the interpretation of Section 13-A of the Central Standing Orders Act of 1946. Evidently, those decisions could not, and have not, dealt with the impact of a provision like Section 6 (2) on the scheme of things contemplated by the legislature. Those decisions, therefore, have no application to the facts of the instant case. So also is the case reported in AIR 1969 Bombay 274 which is in the same line. In the instant case the application under Section 13 made in clear terms a prayer only for a declaration that the Standard Standing Orders made under 1961 shall be applicable to the employees of Hanuman Bhandar as the Act has been brought into force by the State Government against all employers of textile industries. It has to be noted that the prayer was not for enforcing any right under any particular Order of the Standard Standing Orders, which evidently cannot be agitated under Section 13, and held in Gujrat and Bombay decisions. 10. I may now deal with the merits of the case on which is founded the second contention but the validity of the contention depends obviously on the construction to be placed on the term 'undertaking'. Indeed, the term used in 1961 Act is defined in Section 2 (33) of the 1960 Act and the definition I have already extracted above. But, it is also to be added that Section 2 of the 1961 Act which deals with 'application' of the Act clearly contemplate wider applicability by contemplating applicability generally to all 'undertakings' wherein 20 or more employees are engaged, which, according to me, impart to Clause (a) of Section 2 the character of a residuary clause. Because, the two clauses, evidently, ale mutually exclusive. Thus, even if an 'undertaking' is not notified undertaking within the meaning of section 6 read with section 2 (b) if it employ more than 20 persons it would be an 'undertaking' to which the provisions of the said Act will be applicable. Because, the two clauses, evidently, ale mutually exclusive. Thus, even if an 'undertaking' is not notified undertaking within the meaning of section 6 read with section 2 (b) if it employ more than 20 persons it would be an 'undertaking' to which the provisions of the said Act will be applicable. At this stage itself I must stress the primacy of two hallowed maxims Noscitur a sociis and ex visceribus actus to magnify the necessity of construing the term 'undertaking' with reference not only the context and setting of the provisions but also purport and object of the Act itself construed with the aid of legislative history of the enactment. The use of the word 'every' in clause (a) of Section 2 of 1961 Act is signally indicative of the wide amplitude which the legislature intended to impart to the term 'undertaking' and this position is also made clear by the object of the enactment which is projected in the long title by which case is taken to safeguard 'conditions' of employment of employees in undertakings in the State of Madhya Pradesh'. To the legislative history which projects the mischief, the Act sought, to remedy, I have already referred and now I merely reiterate its importance in this context. According to me, to all 'undertakings' or 'every' such 'undertaking' as is so defined in the Act, the applicability of the Act extends subject only to the reservation made under Section 5. What is to be found in section 2 (33), extracted above, is a manifestation of this position wherein different parts of an industry are regarded different undertakings with the clear object of ensuring that even by creating separate establishments or units in an industry it would not be possible to avoid the application of the Act. In Chambers Dictionary, the term 'concern' is said to mean also 'a business establishment' and according to me, therefore, a 'concern in any industry' means, any integral concern or part of an industry which can even be a separate business establishment. Indeed, judicial consensus accepts that an 'undertaking' to industrial parlance, is meant to cover parts of an industry. See Hindustan Steel Limited, (1973) 3 SCC 464, Straw Board Mfg. Co., (1974) 4 SCC 681 . Indeed, judicial consensus accepts that an 'undertaking' to industrial parlance, is meant to cover parts of an industry. See Hindustan Steel Limited, (1973) 3 SCC 464, Straw Board Mfg. Co., (1974) 4 SCC 681 . The word 'undertaking' came to be construed by the Apex Court in the case of Indian Standards Institution (1975) 2 SCC 847 , where the view was taken that in divining true meaning of these terms (undertaking' and 'industry') a liberal approach was warranted to advance the purpose of the legislative measure. Indeed, that 'undertaking' could be a part of an 'industry' is also projected in the same decision. In the scheme of things, envisaged under the Act, according to me, the true import of these three terms 'concern' 'undertaking' and 'industry' can be best understood by visualising three concentric circles of which the smallest and innermost circle would be 'concern' and the outermost or the largest circle would be 'industry'. Such a scheme is deliberately contemplated to effectively blunt the ingenuous device of the employers evolved to evade onerous statutory burdens. 11. In this connection I would refer to the provisions of Section 47 of the Factories Act which makes it obligatory for the occupier of a factory to make provision of canteen or canteens in a case in which more than 250 workers are ordinarily employed in the factory and it is not disputed that the provisions of the Factories Act do apply to 1st petitioner's textile mills. Indeed, respondents categorical case, is also that Hanuman Bhandar was a canteen maintained by the 1st petitioners' mill, albeit under separate management, to discharge their statutory obligation. Hence, if it be found that Hanuman Bhandar was a canteen so maintained it will be difficult to dispute then that it was an 'undertaking' within the meaning of Section 2 (33) and, therefore, to deny applicability of 1961 Act to the employees of Hanuman Bhandar, because it was a business establishment, and indeed a separate one, catering not only to the needs of the workers of the Textile Mills but also of outsiders as is the case of petitioners themselves. But, in my opinion, the single and solitary fact that it served as the 'canteen' of first petitioner's Textile Mills, would make it an 'undertaking' within the meaning of both clauses of (a) and (b) of section 21 of the 1961 Act read with Section 2 (33) of the 1960 Act, because, the canteen was admittedly run at the separate business establishment employing more than 20 persons. 12. Accordingly, in the instant case, in my opinion, the fact that the notification, Annexure P-4, which admittedly covered the textile industry as per Annexure P-3 made it patently clear that the respondent's case was covered by Section 2 (1) (b) of 1961 Act and the reference made to the Labour Court, I must hold, therefore, to be competent and covered under Section 13 of the Act. 13. Before the Labour Court as also before me reliance was placed on several provisions of the 1958 Act. Therefore, the contentions advanced by Shri Dubey on the basis thereof has also to be dealt with but I have no hesitation at all to hold that the Labour Court's finding reached on the appreciation of the evidence adduced in the case is unassailable. I accept without hesitation the conclusion reached by the Labour Court that Hanuman Bhandar was a 'factory canteen' attached to the textile factory owned by J.C. Mills, Ltd. It is true that Labour Court also found as a fact that the said canteen in which about 150 workmen were employed also served in the canteen for Gwalior Rayon, etc. but as observed earlier, the moot question is, whether Hanuman Bhandar is an 'undertaking' in virtue of the aforesaid S. 2 (33) and S. 2 (1) of 1960 and 1961 Acts, respectively read with Section 46 of the Factories Act. The question of ownership or management of the 'canteen' was immaterial and was not germane to the decision to be rendered on the application made under Section 13 of the 1961 Act. Accordingly, therefore, in my opinion, the Labour Court was justified in merely holding without deciding the question of ownership of Hanuman Bhandar, that the provisions of 1961 Act would be applicable to Hanuman Bhandar and the employees of the said undertaking would be governed by the Standard Standing Orders provided by the Act. 14. Accordingly, therefore, in my opinion, the Labour Court was justified in merely holding without deciding the question of ownership of Hanuman Bhandar, that the provisions of 1961 Act would be applicable to Hanuman Bhandar and the employees of the said undertaking would be governed by the Standard Standing Orders provided by the Act. 14. Shri Dubey raised, unnecessarily, in my opinion the question of implied repeal and cited case-law with which I do not consider necessary to deal as, according to me, the contention is misconceived. Because, it is nobody's case that the 1961 Act impliedly repealed 1958 Act. Indeed, as has been rightly submitted by Shri Dubey, the scope of the two enactments is not the same. However, it is necessary to refer to the provision of Section 2 (23) of 1998 Act on which Shri Dubey placed implicit reliance to support the contention that Hanuman Bhandar was a 'restaurant or eating house' within the meaning of said provision. Unfortunately, sub section 2 (23) itself, in terms, excludes from its operation cases covered by the Factories Act. Indeed, because of the express provisions of the second part of Section 2 (23) itself reliance, in my opinion, on Section 3 of the Act will also not avail the petitioners. For the same reason, reliance on sub-section (4) of section 6 is also futile. Shortly put, pointedly pithily the very provision of second part of Section 2 (23) demolishes all arguments of Shri Dubey and I propose, therefore, to quote the same 'but does not include a restaurant or a canteen attached to a factory if the persons employed thereunder are allowed the benefits provided for workers under the Factories Act, 1948." 15. I do not find also any merit in the submission that the Labour Court exceeded its jurisdiction in any manner and, therefore, according to me reliance on Perry and Co., AIR 1970 SC 1334 , is ill advised because what was held in that case was that the Tribunal deciding a matter under the Industrial Dispute Act shall confine itself to the pleadings and issues arising therefrom and must not travel beyond that. In the instant case, as alluded, the Labour Court guarded itself carefully against transgressing its limits and confined itself merely to the relief claimed by the respondents and allowing the relief upholding that the 1960 Act was applicable to the employees of the Hanuman Bhandar and they were entitled to invoke the provisions of Standard Standing Orders provided by the Act. In very clear and categorical terms, the Labour Court held that the question of ownership of Hanuman Bhandar or the question of liability of the non-applicant, J.C. Mills Ltd. (the first petitioner in the instant case), under the Standard Standing Orders, need not be determined as those questions were subjudice in a proceeding pending in the Industrial Tribunal. I have also to make it clear, therefore, that on these questions I have not expressed, and do not propose to express, any opinion. Indeed, I am informed that in the connected Misc. Petitions, which are part-heard and are pending disposal, the questions were agitated and, therefore, decision on these questions will be rendered in those matters. 16. For the foregoing reasons I hold that the impugned order suffers from no jurisdictional infirmity and there is no error of law apparent on the face of the record which could be pointed out in the impugned order so as to warrant my interference with the impugned order. 17. In the result, the petition fails and it is dismissed with costs, which I assess at Rs. 500/-.