JUDGMENT O.P. Saxena, J. - By these petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioners have challenged the process of selection of candidates for appointment in the Ministerial Establishment of Allahabad Judgeship and have also prayed for a writ of mandamus directing the District Judge, Allahabad to appoint them. 2. Appointments to the Ministerial Establishment of Subordinate Civil Courts are made by the District Judge under the Subordinate Civil Court Ministerial Establishment Rules, 1947. Rule 9 provides that the District Judge shall recruit as many candidates for his Judgeship as are required for the vacancies likely to occur in the course of the year. Rule 10 provides that applications shall be invited by the District Judge in Form A in Appendix I by advertising in papers. Rule 11 provides that recruitment shall be based on the result of competitive examination and interview by the District Judge. Rule 14(1) provides for maintenance of the approved list. Rule 14(3) provides for appointment from the list in strict order of seniority. It further provides that the name of a candidate who has not been offered an appointment within a year of recruitment shall stand automatically removed. Rule 15 provides for appointment by the District Judge. 3. On 29th June 1981, the District Judge, Allahabad prepared an approved list of 150 candidates. On 1-12-82, his successor ordered that the name of candidates who were not offered appointment within a year in accordance with R. 14(3) stood automatically removed. First 45 candidates had been duly appointed. He treated the remaining approved list as cancelled. On 5th and 18th Aug, 1983, he made ad hoc appointments. On 11th Aug. 1983, he invited applications for preparing a fresh list. 4. The petitioners' case is that as they were appointed for short terms within a year of recruitment, the District Judge cannot treat the approved list as cancelled or prepare a fresh list and should fill up vacancies from the list. Annexure `A' gives the serial number of the petitioners in the approved list and the period for which they got appointment. 5. The case of respondents 2 and 3 is that as the petitioners were not given short term appointment in accordance with seniority, there was no compliance of R. 14(3) and the approved list stood cancelled and a fresh list has to be prepared. 6. 5. The case of respondents 2 and 3 is that as the petitioners were not given short term appointment in accordance with seniority, there was no compliance of R. 14(3) and the approved list stood cancelled and a fresh list has to be prepared. 6. The learned counsel placed reliance on the Annexures filed in Writ Petition No. 9967 of 1983. 7. The controversy in these petitions depends on the interpretation of R. 14(3) of the Subordinate Civil Court Ministerial Establishment Rules, 1947 which provides : "If any such candidate has not been given an appointment offered in strict order of seniority according to the list in the bound register prescribed under sub-rule (1) within 1 one year from the date of his recruitment, his name shall be automatically removed from the register of recruited candidates and he must then take his chance with others for recruitment again in a subsequent year". 8. Sri V.B. Upadhyay, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that all the petitioners got short term appointments in the Judgeship within a year from recruitment and as such their names shall be deemed to continue in the list. In view of this, the District Judge is bound to make appointments from the list and the order dated 1st Dec. 1982 and orders dated 5th and 18th Aug, 1983 making ad hoc appointments are illegal and void. 9. Sri P.K. Misra, learned Standing Counsel submitted that for the application of R. 14(3), it is necessary that appointments should have been made strictly in the order of seniority. It was said that short term appointments were made arbitrarily and hot according to seniority and such appointments could not enure to the benefit of the candidates. 10. C.A. 6 shows that 33 candidates at serial numbers 46, 47, 62, 63, 65, 69, 70, 73, 76, 77, 81, 87, 88, 91, 94, 95, 98, 103, 114, 119, 121, 128, 129, 133, 134, 136, 139, 143, 144, 147,148, 149 and 150 were not given short term appointments during one year from the date of recruitment. 11. 10. C.A. 6 shows that 33 candidates at serial numbers 46, 47, 62, 63, 65, 69, 70, 73, 76, 77, 81, 87, 88, 91, 94, 95, 98, 103, 114, 119, 121, 128, 129, 133, 134, 136, 139, 143, 144, 147,148, 149 and 150 were not given short term appointments during one year from the date of recruitment. 11. C.A. 7 shows that first 45 candidates were given regular appointment and 72 candidates at serial numbers 48 to 61,64,66 to 68, 71, 72,74,75,78 to 80,82 to 86,89,90.93, 96, 97, 99 to 102, 104 to 113, 115, 116 to 118, 120, 122 to 127, 130 to 132, 135, 137, 138, 140 to 142,145 and 146 got short term appointments during one year from the date of recruitment. 12. Paras 19 and 20 of the counter-affidavit show that the names of selected candidates were not duly entered in the bound register according to the rules. The bound register contains several interpolations. The entries have neither been initialled nor dated by the District Judge. In para 21 it was said that appointments were not made in the strict order of seniority. In para 30 it was said that the selection of 150 candidates was out of proportion to the number of vacancies. In para 3 of the supplementary counter-affidavit it was said that there were only 28 vacancies at the time of selection. Under R. 9, the District Judge could recruit as many candidates for the posts which were likely to occur during the year. In para 33 of the counter-affidavit it was said that the District Judge did not offer the appointment in order of merit as required under the provisions of R. 14(3). In para 34 it was said that no appointment was offered to the candidates at serial numbers 46 and 47 before giving appointment to candidates at serial numbers 48 to 61. District Judge did not offer appointment to other candidates referred to in C. A-6. In para 25(a) of the rejoinder affidavit it was not said that any offer of appointment was made to the candidates referred to in C. A. 6. A vague plea was raised that those who were not available to join the post were left out and the next candidate was appointed. In para 25(a) of the rejoinder affidavit it was not said that any offer of appointment was made to the candidates referred to in C. A. 6. A vague plea was raised that those who were not available to join the post were left out and the next candidate was appointed. It was urged that in these days of unemployment and acute economic crisis, it is more probable that selected candidates should have been running to the judgeship to find out when the vacancy would occur and it is not probable that as many as 33 candidates should not have been available. 13. On 20th Oct. 1983, a Division Bench of this court directed the then District Judge, Allahabad to enquire as to whether short term appointments were offered in accordance with . seniority. He was directed to file a counter-affidavit. 14. Sri P.N. Roy, the then District Judge, Allahabad filed a supplementary counter-affidavit and also filed a copy of the enquiry report. The report shows that no notices were ever given to candidates who were senior before giving short term appointment to candidates junior to them. He referred to the short term appointments given to the petitioners and pointed out the irregularities therein. 15. Having considered the submissions made before us and the material on the record, we are of the opinion that the petitioners did not get short term appointments in accordance with the provisions of R. 14(3) referred to above. Rule 14(3) could enure to the benefit of the petitioners only if the short term appointments had been given strictly in the order of seniority. The appointments offered to the petitioners without offering the same to candidates senior to them could not extend the longevity of the approved list, in so far as the petitioners are concerned. 16. Sri V.B. Upadhyay submitted that the petitioners cannot be blamed for the mistakes of the respondents. He placed reliance on Hari Krishna Tripathi v. State Government of U.P., 1984 UP LBEC 172 : AIR 1984 NOC 259. It was held in para 9 : - ".... Moreover, the petitioner had been selected and appointed by a duly constituted committee in accordance with Regulations. He had no control over the action of any of authorities committing error in performing their duties. It was held in para 9 : - ".... Moreover, the petitioner had been selected and appointed by a duly constituted committee in accordance with Regulations. He had no control over the action of any of authorities committing error in performing their duties. In that situation, the petitioner who was fully qualified and who had been selected for appointment could not be penalised for the errors committed by any other authority." 17. The case is obviously distinguishable. The petitioners were duly selected, but were not given short term appointment according to Rules. 18. Sri V.B. Upadhyay next submitted that the respondents cannot be allowed to assail the orders passed by them. He relied upon State of Assam v. Raghava Rajagopalachari, 1972 Serv LR 44 (SC). It was held that the respondent to a writ petition cannot be allowed to attack its own order as a respondent. A Government servant was being prosecuted for offences under Sections 161 and 467, I.P.C. He was due to retire on 30th June 1953. On July 23, 1953, Government issued a notification continuing his service till such time as prosecution against him was finalised. The Supreme Court rejected the attack on the validity of the order made on behalf of the Government with the observations made above. In the present case the petitioners want the benefit of R. 14(3) and they cannot take advantage of short term appointments unless the same were made strictly in the order of seniority. It is for them to show this. The order dated 23rd July, 1953 in the reported case was an order passed after consideration and deliberation. This can be inferred from the nature of the order. In the present case the short term appointments could be even manipulated from the office. There is evidence on the record to show that these orders were not passed according to rules and claim of seniors was ignored. In the circumstances the case relied upon is distinguishable. 19. Sri V.B. Upadhyay lastly submitted that R. 14(3) is a directory one. He relied upon Sharifuddin v. Abdul Gani, AIR 1980 SC 303 . In para 9, pages 305-306 it was held :- "The difference between a mandatory rule and a directory rule is that while the former must be strictly observed, in the case of the latter, substantial compliance may be sufficient to achieve the object regarding which the rule is enacted. In para 9, pages 305-306 it was held :- "The difference between a mandatory rule and a directory rule is that while the former must be strictly observed, in the case of the latter, substantial compliance may be sufficient to achieve the object regarding which the rule is enacted. Certain broad propositions which can be deduced from several decisions of courts regarding the rules of constructions that should be followed in determining whether a provision of law is directory or mandatory may be summarised thus. The fact that the statute uses the word shall' while laying down a duty is not conclusive on the question whether it is a mandatory or directory provision. In order to find out the true character of the legislation the court has to ascertain the object which the provision of law in question is to subserve and its design and the context in which it is enacted. If the object of a law is to be defeated by non-compliance with it, it has to be regarded as mandatory. But when a provision of law relates to the performance of any public duty and the invalidation of any act done in disregard of that provision causes serious prejudice to those for whose benefit it is enacted and at the same time who have no control over the performance of the duty, such provision should be treated as a directory one. Where, however, a provision of law prescribes that a certain act has to be done in a particular manner by a person in order to acquire a right and it is coupled with another provision which confers an immunity on another when such act is not done by that manner, the former has to be regarded as a mandatory one. A procedural rule ordinarily should not be construed as mandatory if the defect in the act done in pursuance of it can be cured by permitting appropriate rectification to be carried out at a subsequent stage unless by according such permission to rectify the error later on, another rule would be contravened. Whenever a statute prescribes that a particular act is to be done in a particular manner and also lays down that a failure to comply with the said requirement leads to a specific consequence, it would be difficult to hold that the requirement is not mandatory and the specified consequence should not follow." 20. Whenever a statute prescribes that a particular act is to be done in a particular manner and also lays down that a failure to comply with the said requirement leads to a specific consequence, it would be difficult to hold that the requirement is not mandatory and the specified consequence should not follow." 20. Rule 9 provides for recruitment of as many candidates as are required for the vacancies likely to occur in the course of the year. The object of the rule appears to be that recruitment should be held every year. It is for the purpose of carrying out this object that R. 14(3) has been framed. 21. Rule 14(3) does not only provide for appointments in strict order of seniority, it also provides that if any candidate has not been given an appointment in strict order of seniority according to the list within one year from the date of his recruitment, his name shall be automatically removed from the register of recruited candidates and he must take his chance with others for recruitment in a subsequent year. In view of the consequential provision in unambiguous terms we are unable to accept that the R. 14(3) is a directory one and hold that it is mandatory. 22. As the petitioners have failed to prove that they obtained short term appointments in strict order of seniority the appointments obtained by them cannot save them from the rigour of the consequential provision in the rule. Their names stood automatically removed from the list on 28th June, 1982. They have no right to claim appointment. 23. The result is that the petitions are dismissed. We make no orders as to costs.