ORDER Dr. T.N. Singh, J.- l. I have brushed aside objections of the counsel against bearing the matter today as gross in justice has been caused in this case by letting the matter lie burried for the last 12 years in the heaps of forgotten, if not discarded, records of this Court. 2. Counsel are heard on merits and I proceed to render my decision to dispose of the case finally on merits. Lamentably I have to observe that on 7-9-1983 there was an order passed in this case by this Court adjourning the case "sine die" by which the records were consigned to the deep abyss of inviolable oblivion from which it was difficult to resurrect the matter unless I had reacted to the situation when it came to my notice on perusing the statement of pending cases, on the same being called for, that it was the lone case of 1973, farthest in point of time. However, nothing more need be said on that aspect and at this late stage, I do not like to lay blame at the door of any counsel for the mishap and would cop-elude merely saying that it is my duty as dearly as possible to undo the harm that has ensued to the course of Justice by the long lapse of time. 3. Shri H.D. Gupta, counsel appearing for Non-petitioner No.2, has strongly urged, in support of the order aforesaid passed in this matter on' 7-9-1983, to allow status quo to continue and to await decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court as directed in that order. However, Deputy Government Advocate, Shri Roman, appearing for the State (Non-petitioner No.1), though made to sail in the same boat with Shri H.D. Gupta, has accepted my counsel and agreed to argue the case on merits and I have heard counsel for all parties at length. I did so because I had no doubt at all that this matter need not await decision of their Lordships in an appeal said to have been taken against an order passed by this Court on 1-9-1976, in Civil Revision No. 235/72, which was between the State of Madbya Pradesh and Nandram Naraindas who figured as non-petitioner No.2 in this matter. The instant petitioners were Dot parties to those proceedings and the point agitated by their counsel, Shri Dubey, assailing the impugned decision did not at all figure in the earlier matter, and no decision thereon was rendered either, by this Court, while disposing of the matter by the order passed on 1-9-1976. True, my attention is drawn to para 16 of the judgment in that case. But the innocuous observations therein which merely hint at the possibility of the State's right to claim priority in the matter of rateable distribution of the decretal amount lying deposit in the executing Court, do net at all touch the question of right of the State to lay such a claim which point is vigorously and forcefully urged before me with great vehemence by Shri Dubey. 4. The short facts of this case are that there was a decree passed in favour of Firm Gopaldas Laxminarain for a sum of Rs. 1,28,776-03 against the State of M. P. The decretal amount was duly deposited by the judgment debtor in the Executing Court and on such deposit having been made half the amount was withdrawn by a partner of the firm (Bhagwandas Sethi) and when the remaining amount was lying deposited in the Court claim thereto was laid by several applications made by several other creditors of the Firm and, indeed, the question arose as to whether the remaining amount ought to be paid to the other partner of the decree-holder firm, namely Hari-Kishandas Bhuta. whose legal representatives are petitioners before in this case, or the amount had to be distributed rateably among the aforesaid claimants. I earned District Judge, in whose Court execution was levied, dealt with the question in paragraphs 15, 16 and 17 of the judgment. However, before me the only point which is canvassed by Shri Dubey is that the Executing Court expressed erroneous view of law in holding that the State's right to lay claim to the amount as one of creditors was valid and could be entertained in virtue of the provisions of Section 155 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code (for short. the Code) The admitted position on facts is that of the three claimants. the Code) The admitted position on facts is that of the three claimants. Firm Nandram Naraindas and Bhind Co-operative Bank, Bhind, based their claims on decrees passed in their favour against Firm Gopaldas Laxminarain by Civil , Courts while in the case of State of M.P. there were no such decree and the claim was based on a revenue recovery certificate. Shri Dubey has rightly contended, according to me, that what was decided by the learned District Judge was a tangential question by-passing the core of the matter in as much as no decision was rendered by him on the question of State's right to claim attachment of any part of the decretal amount on the basis of the revenue recovery certificate without following the relevant provisions of law, the decision being confind to the question as to whether State could have priority over the claim of other creditors in the matter of disbursement of the amount lying in deposit in the Executing Court. 5. Shri Roman has drawn my attention to para 11 of the judgment of this Court in Civil Revision No. 235 of 1972, above referred. What this Court decided, according to me, is the clear decision only on the question of State's entitlement to priority under the Code and that position is reflected in para 16 of tile judgment to which I have already referred above. Nothing more is said on the question which is agitated in this petition. Indeed, it did not come up for decision of this Court in that matter. He has also relied on a Full Bench decision of this Court rendered on 9-9-1977, in Civil Revision No. 191/77 (State of M. P. v. Awantilal) wherein also, in my opinion, the only question of priority was decided and, therefore, it does not advance the matter any further. However, on the other side also Shri Dubey has placed reliance on certain decision of this Court to which I propose to refer in due course. 6 I propose to refer first to Section 155 of the Cede to consider the grievance made by Shri Dubey that the provision was wrongly construed by the Executing Court and the impugned order is, therefore, liable to be quashed. 6 I propose to refer first to Section 155 of the Cede to consider the grievance made by Shri Dubey that the provision was wrongly construed by the Executing Court and the impugned order is, therefore, liable to be quashed. In several clauses, namely, Clauses (a) to (g) of Section 155 are enumerated the various classes of dues payable to the State which may be recoverable as an arrears of land revenue but to test the validity of Shri Dubey's submission that the provision must be strictly construed I have to consider if there is a duty on the concerned authority, authorised to make recovery of the classified dues, "in the same manner as an arrears of land revenue" to first determine whether the dues claimed are such as may be recoverable in that manner and therefore fell in any of the categories of dues mentioned in clauses (a) to (g). He has drawn my attention to the relevant rules framed under section 258 (3) of the Code, which are printed at page 508 in the 9th Edition of the Commentary on the Code by Dr. Harihar Niwas Dwivedi under note (K) of the annotation, dealing with section 155, The Rule related to recovery of dues classified in Clame (c) of section 155 and it is provided in Rule 1 that where any person or local authority desires that any sum due to him or it be recovered in same manner as prescribed in the case of arrears of land revenue, an application in that behalf shall be made in writing to the Tahsildar or such other Revenue Officer as may be empowered under the Code to recover the arrears It is contemplated in Rule 3 that on receipt of the application, the Revenue Officer shall dispose of the application in accordance with the provisions of the Code and the rules made thereunder. In this connection my notice is also drawn to schedule I of the Code which deals with "procedure of Revenue Officers and Revenue Court,". While Shri Roman submits that whether any sum due to the Government was recoverable as an arrears of land revenue was a question that was, and could be, determined before a revenue certificate was issued. In this connection my notice is also drawn to schedule I of the Code which deals with "procedure of Revenue Officers and Revenue Court,". While Shri Roman submits that whether any sum due to the Government was recoverable as an arrears of land revenue was a question that was, and could be, determined before a revenue certificate was issued. This position is strongly contested by Shri Dubey who submits that the affected person has a right under the Code to challenge validity of the certificate itself in the proceedings initiated before the Revenue Officer in the course of execution of the certificate but importantly, Shri Dubey further submits, attachment of any property of the judgment debtor under the certificate can be validly made in the course of the same proceeding only and by the Revenue Officer himself. It is. therefore, contended that without there being an order by the competent authority rendered in the manner prescribed in a duly instituted proceeding by merely flaunting the certificate in the Civil Court the State cannot lay claim in a Civil Court to have satisfaction of the certificate made out of any proceeds deposited to the credit of the judgment debtor in the Civil Court and indeed even from attachment of such an amount by the Civil Court the certificate would not avail the State. 7. At this stage of dictation Shri Roman after shuffling the records of the Executing Court, made a laboured effort to dig out the certificate issued by the Assistant Director of Industrial, Madhya Pradesh, Bhind, to Tahsildar. Bhind, and also the application of the State in the Executing Court to which the said certificate was attached. However, before proceeding further to deal with the legal contentions 1 must at once say at this stage that there is nothing in the papers relied on by Shri Roman, though produced from the records of the case itself, which will show that there was any order by the Tahsildar or any request was made by him to Executing Court to attach the amount due under the certificate. The only thing which has been placed before me is the certificate and its 'enclosures' which are all signed by Assistant Director of Industries. The only thing which has been placed before me is the certificate and its 'enclosures' which are all signed by Assistant Director of Industries. If this shows anything, it clearly supports petitioner's contention that the dues claimed are classified by clause (c) of Section 155 and as such the rules prescribed in that behalf, above referred, must be complied with. Indeed, on its very face it is manifested that it was not a mere 'certificate' but the application contemplated under the said Rule 3, though beaded "Certificate of Recovery". That there is no order by the Tahsildar on the said 'certificate' is very clear from the plain fact that the original certificate came to be filed in the Civil Court which 'certificate' ought to be in the Court of the Tahsildar on which requisite order had to be passed by the Tahsildar. 8. What counsel could not, and have not, submitted so far is the important provision of section 147 of the Code to which I find reference in the Full Bench decision in Manoharlal v. Board of Revenue 1964 RN 1=1964 MPLJ 32. and which deals explicitely with the "process of recovery of arrears of land revenue payable to the Government". It is explinitely contemplated thereunder that such recovery can be made by the Tahsildar and in anyone or more of the various modes prescribed thereunder, inter alia by attachment and sale of any moveable property of the judgment debtor. The importance of Manoharlal (supra) so far it concerns the instant lis, is only that much. The Division Bench decision in Surajdin Laxman 1960 MPLJ 39 . is also relied on and its importance is also limited inasmuch as it is relevant only to the extent that any sum due payable to the State cannot be recovered as arrears of land revenue for mere asking and, therefore, it supports Shri Dubey's contention that the jurisdictional point could still be agitated in the proceedings before the Tahsildar. What has been held is that in the absence of express condition in the, contract that the amount due thereunder could be recovered as arrears of land revenue in view of section 143 of the Code, such an amount could not be recovered in that manner. Two other short-noted decisions are also cited to which I may briefly refer. What has been held is that in the absence of express condition in the, contract that the amount due thereunder could be recovered as arrears of land revenue in view of section 143 of the Code, such an amount could not be recovered in that manner. Two other short-noted decisions are also cited to which I may briefly refer. In Ramgopal v. Collector Tikamgarh 1963 JLJ-SN 26 a Division Bench of this Court held, upon construing indeed section 155 of the Code itself, that when there was no statutary enactment or rule making the loan recoverable as arrears of land revenue and there was also no term in the contract that it was so recoverable, the recovery proceeding were illegal. To the said effect is the decision in G.D. Goenka V. State of M. P. 1966 JLJ-SN 10 which also dealt with the ambit of section 155 and held certain State dues to be not recoverable as arrears of land revenue. 9. However, according to me, reference to the provisions of Schedule I of the Code would be must apposite because in virtue of Clause 22 thereof provisions of Order 21, Rules 46 to 53 C.P.C. are made applicable to the proceedings before a Revenue Officer, who in terms of section 147 of the Code as also indeed also of Rule 3 of Rules framed under section 155 (C) thereof is the only competent authority to execute any revenue recovery certificate. In the instant case, evidently, the Executing Court ignored and over-looked the provisions of Clause 22 of Schedule I of the Code as also of Order 21, Rule 52 C.P.C. and in that view of the matter also the impugned order is liable to be quashed. Jurisdictional infirmity in the impugned order is so patent and vicious that it is wholly unsustainable in law. The Executing Court over stepped the limits of its jurisdiction acting in a casual and cavalier manner and on accepting the revenue recovery certificate filed in its Court by the State as executable in its Court like a decree of a Civil Court over looking the relevant provisions of law to which I have just referred. The Executing Court over stepped the limits of its jurisdiction acting in a casual and cavalier manner and on accepting the revenue recovery certificate filed in its Court by the State as executable in its Court like a decree of a Civil Court over looking the relevant provisions of law to which I have just referred. It had jurisdiction in the matter if and only when a request is made to it in terms of Order 21, Rule 52 C.P.C read with Clause 22 of Schedule I of the Code by the Revenue Officer in the course of execution by him of the revenue recovery certificate issued by the Assistant Director of the Industrial. 10. For the foregoing reasons I have no doubt at all reading the provisions of section 147 and 155 and Clause (22) of Schedule 1 of the Code as also the rules framed under section 155 (C) and indeed of Order XXII Rule 52 C.P.C. as well that the claim made by the State could not have been entertained without an appropriate proceedings being initiated be ore the Revenue Officer for recovery of the amount due under the certificate in question and without there being an order passed by the Revenue Officer in that behalf as prescribed in the Code. That being the position the impugned order which has upheld the claim made by the State for payment to it of a sum of Rs. 34,167.92 out of the decretal amount lying deposit in Execution Case No. l-A/62 x 68 to the credit of Harkishandas Bhuta was illegal and without jurisdiction and the impugned order in so far as that direction is concerned is liable to be quashed. 11. In the result, the petition succeeds to the extent indicated and the impugned order stands quashed to the extent indicated. There shall be no order as to costs in these proceedings of detailed reasons aforesaid, to which I need not refer again.