ORDER Dr. T. N. Singh, J. 1. This case has a chequered history which must be set out at the out-set to appreciate legal contentions advanced by counsel although the challenge to the impugned order is made on only two short but substantial grounds, entitled to be sustained without much ado. The back ground of the facts of the lis are important because there was a judicial deter-mination of a part of the question which later formed part of the disciplinary proceedings in the course of which petitioner was dismissed from service. 2. In a suit field in the Court of Second Additional District Judge, Gwalior being Civil suit No-2-B/70, the petitioner made a claim against the respondent University for non-payment of his salary and allowances for the period, from 22-9-67 to 2-7-70. The judgment of the trial Court is Annexure P-3 and the relevant issue is decided at para 8 of the judgment. It was held that the plaintiff, the instant petitioner, who was an employee of the University, did not take any job any, where during the said period and he was entitled to be paid his salary and allowances by the University for the said period. On this finding, which was recorded after the parties adduced evidence in the case, the suit was decreed on 30-11-1972 and petitioner's claim was accordingly allowed. The plaint and written statement, Annexures P-3l and P-32, respectively, in this case, manifest clearly stand of the respective parties taken in the suit. At para 4 of its written statement the University took upon itself the burden to show that the plaintiff did not remain unemployed during the said period and that he earned remuneration and, therefore, he was not entitled to claim salary and allowances from the University. I have made this observation even at this stage as it has been strongly urged by Shri J. P. Gupta, respondents counsel, that no proper decision could be rendered on the issue as the evidence on the issue to support defendant's claim came into defendant's possession only later, and much later, so late that the respondent, the University, had, under a mistaken belief, withdrawn the appeal which if had filed in this Court assailing the decree passed against it. As I am dictating this judgment I reminding Shri Gupta, time and again, to point out if any fact relating to his case is left out and I have checked with him to ensure that the sheet anchor of his argument is reflected in bold relief in this judgment. 3. At this stage, petitioner's counsel, Shri Arun Mishra, has on the other hand, reminded me that I should also look at Annexures P-19 and P-21 on which are projected some important scenes of the first act of the drama. Indeed, so. At Annexures P-19 is an application by the defendant, University, wherein at Para 2 "Smith kline and French (India) Ltd." is named boldly as the plaintiff's employer during the relevant period. This application was filed under O. 16 R. 1 and S. 151 CPC praying a chance to be given to the defendant to summon some officer of the said company to give evidence in support of defendant's specific case but strangely on 27-11-1972 the defendant backed out and submitted to the Court that it had no evidence to produce. This is reflected in Annexure P-20 which is an order passed on that date by the trial Court. At this stage, Shri Gupta stands up again to say that I should put something more from Annexure P-20 but in my view what I have already said is sufficient to do justice to both sides as it is not necessary to enlarge corpus of the judgment by setting out the fringed facts or by reproducing the order in extenseo as the order hardly turns the case of the University. I may as well refer to few facts of the closing scene of the first act of the drama which is projected in Annexures P-16, P-17 and P-18. The appeal filed in the High Court against the judgment passed by the trial Court was withdrawn on 16-10-1973 but this was evidently done on the basis of resolurions of the Executive Council of the University passed on 27-4-1973 and 27-6-1973. 4. The next act of the drama is unfolded on Annexure P-30 dated 29-7-1974 which is a petition filed by the respondent in the Court of the Additional District Judge under section 476 Cr. P. C. (old) read with section 340 Cr. 4. The next act of the drama is unfolded on Annexure P-30 dated 29-7-1974 which is a petition filed by the respondent in the Court of the Additional District Judge under section 476 Cr. P. C. (old) read with section 340 Cr. P. C. (New), for initiating prosecution against the plaintiff by lodging a com plaint in the Court of appropriate jurisdiction under S. 193 I.P.C. because of alleged false statements made by him in his evidence in the suit. Because this petition was dismissed for default and then restored to file by the learned Additional District Judge, his decision was challenged unsuccessfully in this Court by the present petitioner. Being aggrieved by this Court’s judgment, the petitioner moved the Hon'ble Supreme Court and there he succeeded in having both orders quashed. Annexure P 6 is the order passed by their Lordships on 2-9-1980 wherein it was observed that "University itself had ample opportunity to contest the statement of the appellant" in allowing the appeal and rejecting the contention advanced by the University that the appellant had obtained a decree against the University for a large amount by making a false statement on oath and, therefore, in the interest of justice a complaint should be lodged against him. Counsel for the University also contended before their Lordships that unless a complaint was lodged the University would not be able to get back the money from the appellant but this was also repelled holding that it may be open to the University to file a suit though it was also observed that no opinion need be expressed on the maintainability or advisability of the suit. 5. However, the crux of the matter in the instant case lies not in the lodgment of the application in the Court of Additional District Judge for proceeding against the petitioner for having committed the offence of perjury but in the fact that few months thereafter a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner, which is manifested in Annexure P-7. This time on two charges and these have to be set out briefly but carefully: (1) Because of toe statements (cited therein above) made by the petitioner on oath in the trial of the Civil suit he managed to secure a decree against the University suppressing the fact that between 1-12-1968 and 6-9-1970 he was in service of "Smith Kline and French (India) Ltd". His conduct, therefore, was unbecoming of an employee of the University and be had violated the provisions of paragraphs 62 (c) of Statute No. 31 of the University and (ii) The University bad received on 30-4-1974 an article (hand-written) written by the petitioner in which several defamatory allegations were made against the officers of the University and the petitioner, while in the service of the University, having done so was guilty of "misconduct" within the meaning of Clauses (b) and (c) of paragraph 62 of Statute No. 31. 6. At this stage, I may refer to para 3 of the return of the respondent on which much stress is laid by Shri Gupta. A reference may also be made to the statements which appear at page 13 of the return, which have also been stressed by Shri Gupta to submit that it was difficult to proceed departmentally against the petitioner smoothly because he was playing taunt. These facts are mentioned because Shri Arun Mishra made a legal submission contesting the bona fides of the enquiry and also submitting that the same was conducted in a manner violative of the provisions of Rule 14 of M. P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966, which are made applicable in the case of employees of the University in virtue of clause 3 of para 57 of statute 31. In this connection he has also drawn my attention to pages 18 and 19 and 20 of the return wherein is produced a dialogue between the delinquent (petitioner) and the inquiry officer to submit that such dialogue was not contemplated and that it was prejudicial to the petitioner's in1erest and violative of the aforesaid rule. Because, it was on 16-11-1974, on which date the several questions, which were put to the delinquent, that the charge-sheet against him was delivered to him for the first time and this was done after the question and answer session was over. Indeed, this fact is reflected at page 21 of the return wherein it is stated that after the petitioner "willingly and voluntarily" replied to all questions put to him by the Enquiry Officer, only when he "asked for a copy of the charge-sheet and suspension memo" it was "given to him immediately on 16-12-1974 itself". Indeed, this fact is reflected at page 21 of the return wherein it is stated that after the petitioner "willingly and voluntarily" replied to all questions put to him by the Enquiry Officer, only when he "asked for a copy of the charge-sheet and suspension memo" it was "given to him immediately on 16-12-1974 itself". Whatever that may be, in the course of the enquiry parties examined witnesses and eventuality the Enquiry Officer submitted his report vide Annexure P-28 recording his findings on both the charges whereupon the final order, which is impugned in the instant petition, was passed on 10th August 1975 by the Executive Council of the University removing the petitioner from the services of the University w. e. f. 9th August 1975. Although the petitioner filed an appeal against this order to the Kuladhipati of the University as per Annexure P-13 on 13-8-1975, the Executive Council of the University, only on 13-12-1975, decided to forward the appeal along with comments of the legal Advisor, submitted on the appeal, to comply with the requirement of sub-para (4) of the aforesaid para 58 of the statute No. 31. However, as manifested in Annexure P-24, petitioner was intimated only 6 years later that he could represent his case in person to the Kuladhipati at Raj Bhawan, Bhopal, on 5th December 1981 This chapter came to a close with Annexure P-15 which is the order passed on 21-6-1982 by Kuladhipati rejecting petitioner's appeal. 7. I may now turn to legal contentions agitated by the counsel which indeed, as alluded, are few but clinching. I need not dwell at length on the grievance that the belated disposal of the appeal was itself against the principles of natural justice and indeed also of the provisions of sub-paragraphs (4) and (5) of paragraph 58 of the Statute aforesaid though there is much substance in the contention advanced by Shri Arun Mishra in as much as the delay had been inordinately extensive though in the return an effort is made to explain the delay. Instead, I propose to deal with the other two contentions which are weighty and the petitioner, in my opinion is entitled to relief on their basis itself. Instead, I propose to deal with the other two contentions which are weighty and the petitioner, in my opinion is entitled to relief on their basis itself. On the facts, which I have carefully laid out earlier in the judgment with the assistance of counsel for both sides, I have no hesitation to uphold the first contention of Shri Arun Mishra that there was jurisdictional incompetence on the part of the disciplinary authority to hold any enquiry into the first charge. Because the subject matter of the charge was also the subject matter of the civil suit filed by the petitioner and there were judicial findings which must be held binding on the parties and any disciplinary enquiry in the same matter was excluded by the principles of resjudicata. Shri Arun Mishra has pressed in service two decisions of the Apex Court to which I may immediately refer. The decision in Bombay Gas Co. (1975) 4 SCC 690 , has a pointed relevance in as much as in that case also the question involved was applicability of the principles in a domestic enquiry. The Court hold that the doctrine of resjudicata governed not only the matter covered by the provisions of Civil Procedure Code but to all litigations because it was based on the principles that there should be no unnecessary litigation and whatever claims and defences are open to the parties should all be put forward at the same time and in holding so their Lordships merely restated the established legal proposition earlier settled by the Court in Devilal Modi AIR 1965 SC 1150 and Daryao AIR 1961 SC 1457 . In the last mentioned decision, from which a passage was extracted in Bombay Gas. Company (supra ), it was held that the doctrine is founded on public policy that parties must not be made to face the same kind of litigation twice over, because such a progress would be contrary to consideration of fair play and justice. To the same effect is the decision in Lalchand AIR 1977 SC 789 wherein there was a contest between the findings in two proceedings under two different enactments, namely, the Delhi Rent Control Act and the Slum Clearance Act. To the same effect is the decision in Lalchand AIR 1977 SC 789 wherein there was a contest between the findings in two proceedings under two different enactments, namely, the Delhi Rent Control Act and the Slum Clearance Act. The Court took the view that the proceedings undertaken by the respondents under the slum clearance Act having decided the issues on which relief was claimed and having been denied the same to him, subsequent suit claiming the same relief was barred by principles of resjudicata although, in terms, Section 11 C. P. C. did not apply. It was held that the issues involved in two proceedings being identical and arising between the same parties, because those were decided finally by a competent quasi-judicial Tribunal, the same issue could not be litigated once again. This principle, it was held, was founded on equity, Justice and good conscience which require that a party which has once succeeded on an issue should not be permitted to be harassed by a multiplicity of proceedings involving determination of the same issue. A decision of Division Bench of this Court is also cited by Shri Arun Mishra where the question was not of resjudicata but of double jeopardy and, in my opinion, it has little relevance to the facts of the instant case. Indeed, the petitioner's contention is supported by Apex Court's decisions to which I have just adverted. 8. Before I finally impress the stamp to affirm the view I had taken to uphold petitioner's contention, I must to do justice to Shri Gupta's submissions, who laboured hard and expended legal scholarship of infinite variety and depth to refute the contention which, unfortunately, have not appealed to me. I would merely say that the hair-splitting arguments of Shri Gupta do not make any dent on the ratio of the decisions just discussed in as much as his main contention is that the scope of two proceedings being separate the decision in Civil suit should not be held binding in a disciplinary proceeding. At this stage, Shri Gupta, rises to add further that this contention has to be considered in the particular facts and circumstances of the case because evidence was not available to the respondents earlier when the parties were litigating their rights In civil proceedings. At this stage, Shri Gupta, rises to add further that this contention has to be considered in the particular facts and circumstances of the case because evidence was not available to the respondents earlier when the parties were litigating their rights In civil proceedings. That is, however, begging the question first because there is a clear finding, against the respondents, of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, that they did have ample opportunity to contest the appellant's case to which I have also referred to Annexures P-19 and P 20 which further demolishes Shri Gupta's submission that the doctrine of resjudicate must be diluted in this case to accommodate the respondents. Reverting to Shri Gupta's main contention. I would further like to add that he has misconceived the ratio of the decision of Apex Court which. in my opinion, clearly lay that test for application of the principle of resjudicata is not the scope of the two proceedings but issues of facts so that the findings of facts arrived in the earlier proceedings, where the relevant issue was raised and finally litigited, must be held to be binding on the same parties in a subsequent proceedings. The rationals of the dictum is short and simple-needless and avoidable harassment to litigants must be eschewed to accord primacy to finally in any litigation and make dispensation of justice speedy and inexpensive. 9. I propose now to consider the other equally meritorious contentions of the petitioner to which an equally meritless reply, indeed halting and hesitant, has came from Shri Gupta. The three documents• the charge (Annexure P-7), Enquiry officer's finding (Annexure P-.8 and Penalty order (Annexure P.12), I have compared. There can be no valid ground to reject the forceful contention of the petitioner that he has been punished for which he has not at all charged ( in charge No.2) and on that score, the penalty order concerning that charge, being without jurisdiction, it is liable to be quashed. Indeed, the charge, as earlier alluded, clearly and categorically imputed merely writing of an article to the petitioner while the finding of the Enquiry officer is that the petitioner had merely translated the concerned "leaflet" from Urdu, and also indeed that he was not the author thereof. On the other hand, in the penalty order the punishment was for "circulation" of the concerned "leaflet” by the petitioner. On the other hand, in the penalty order the punishment was for "circulation" of the concerned "leaflet” by the petitioner. Not only there was no enquiry for the charge of circulation, there was no finding also by the Enquiry officer that it was the petitioner who had circulated the concerned "leaflet". On these facts there can hardly be any other option to this Court except to declare unequivocally that the punishment for the second charge was not merely perverse but it was wholly devoid of jurisdiction. In a recent decision of this Court in Omprakash (M. P. No. 218/80), decided on 5-12-1985, I have taken the view that the act of disciplinary authority in rendering the final judgment against the delinquent must not smack of autocration because the power envisaged under the statutory rules which authorised punishment of the delinquent for a misconduct, duly proved, cannot be abused and bonafide exercise of the power must be manifest on the face of the order. I had quoted Prof. Wade and I feel tempted to quote him again to say that Parliament must be presumed to have intended that statutory power conferred for public purposes is conferred as it were upon trust, not absolutely (see Administration law, 5th Edition, page 355). 10. Another point which has just appealed to me is the valid objection that can be taken by the petitioner about non-compliance by the Disciplinary authority with the statutory rules in quantifying the punishment inasmuch as the requirement contemplated under Rule 15 (4) (b) does not appear to have been satisfied in the instant case. I do not, however, propose to record any categorical finding on this aspect of the case upholding Shri Gupta's objection that this point was not raised in the petition. Indeed, Shri Arun Mishra has fairly conceded that notice against the proposed penalty had been given to him but the fact remains that the penalty order (Annexure p-12) does not on its face manifest consideration of petitioner's representation submitted against the notice contemplated under the aforesaid clause (b) of rule 15(4) and, therefore, on that count itself it must be said that the impugned order is without jurisdiction. On the face of order is writ large infraction of sub rule (4) (ii) (b) which requires proper and adequate 'consideration' of the representation and indeed in Omprakash (supra) itself I held that the statutory right of 'consideration' of the representation was not an empty formality. This question does not necessitate investigation of facts in as much as I have to consider carefully Annexure P-12 only to record the finding that there was no 'consideration' in other words, no proper adequate consideration of the representation and indeed in this case there was total non-consideration of the representation and this fact is writ on the face of the Annexure. The ratio of the decision in Omprakash (supra), therefore, squarely applied in this case but I have not to adjust the punishment in this case because, for reasons earlier alluded, it is a case of no punishment owing to the failure of the respondents to bring home to the delinquent any of the charges levelled against him. 11. For the forgoing reason the petition succeeds and it is allowed. The impugned orders, Annexures P-12 and P-15 are quashed, and I direct the petitioner be reinstated in service. However, I refuse to make any order in this case as regards petitioner's grievance for non-payment of subsistence allowances during the enquiry period and also for salary for the said period. I merely say this much that it shall be open to the petitioner to seek his remedy at the appropriate forum, if so advised. Shri Gupta has relied on Vijay Narain ( AIR 1980 SC 840 ). I have no doubt at all that this decision supports his contention on the view taken by me in the instant case, is not of any infringement of and fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case I have no hesitation to hold that the petitioner is entitled to his costs in this Court as the beck ground history narrated above is so chequered and hauting, keeping the petitioner away from justice for the last 10 years, that it will be doing injustice if he is not compensated for that. I quantify the costs, which must be paid to the petitioner by the respondents, at Rs.2,000/-. 12. Outstanding amount of security be refunded to the petitioner.