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1985 DIGILAW 504 (MP)

COMMISSIONER NAGAR PALIKA NIGAM GWALIOR v. PATIRAM SHARMA

1985-12-24

RAMPAL SINGH

body1985
JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) APPELLANT-DEFENDANTS have challenged the judgment and decree passed by Fourth Additional District Judge, Gwalior, in Civil Suit No. 10-B of 1976 dated 21st August 1978 in this Court, by this appeal filed under section 96, Civil procedure Code. ( 2. ) RESPONDENT-PLAINTIFF filed a suit against appellant-defendants for the back salary and other benefits, amounting to Rs. 15,240. 00 on 10-12-1974 in the trial Court. According to the plaintiff, he entered the service of the appellants-defendants in 1948 as a Lower Division Clerk. In 1960 he was promoted as Upper Division Clerk, and he continued to work in the same post till 10-12-1971, when he was retired. Vide order and letter dated 21-10-1970, the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Gwalior, intimated the plaintiff that he would be retired from the service with effect from 10-12-1971 and, therefore, he should avail all the benefits of leave due to him. Consequent upon it, the plaintiff applied for earned leave and other leave benefits to be given to him from 3-11-1970 or 11-12-1971. The appellant-defendants sat over this application upto 23-6-1973, and it was only on 24-6-1973 that the Standing Committee by its resolution (Ext. P-11) granted leave to the respondent-plaintiff for 720 days, i. e. , from 11-12-1971 to 30-11-1973. The appellants had retired the respondent from 11-12-1971 on attaining the age of 55 years. ( 3. ) MEANWHILE, the State of M. P. raised the age of retirement from service from 55 to 58 years, and this was made effective from 30-5-1972 (Ext. P-3 ). Consequently, the appellant-defendants by resolution No. 544 dated 23-10-1972 also raised the age of retirement of its class III employees from 55 to 58 years. The State of M. P. issued an order dated 30-5-1972 that those employees, who were entitled to earned leave and other benefits before their retirement and their applied leave was not sanctioned, during such leave entitlement, shall be deemed to be in service and shall be deemed to have been retired only on attaining the age of 58. According to the respondent-plaintiff, he, much before his retirement, had applied for leave benefits but the appellant-defendants sat over that application, which amounts to refusal of leave benefits, and, thus, he shall be deemed to be in service and cannot be retired till he attains the age of superannuation, i. e. , 58 years. According to the respondent-plaintiff, he, much before his retirement, had applied for leave benefits but the appellant-defendants sat over that application, which amounts to refusal of leave benefits, and, thus, he shall be deemed to be in service and cannot be retired till he attains the age of superannuation, i. e. , 58 years. He is, therefore, entitled to receive his salary and other benefits from 11-12-1971 to 9-4-1972. The plaintiff further averred that the appellant-defendants have, under the same circumstances, extended all the benefits to one Ramchandra Sharma, another Class III employee and retired him at the age of 58 years. Thus, respondent-plaintiff is a victim of discrimination and is entitled, on the ground of equality, to similar treatment and benefits as were given to ramchandra Sharma by the appellant-defendants, because they have contravened the Constitutional safeguards enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of india. He, thus, prayed for the relief of a decree of Rs. 15,240/- against the appellant-defendants. ( 4. ) APPELLANT-DEFENDANTS contested the suit hotly and repelled the contentions of the plaintiff strongly. They denied in their pleading that the plaintiff was entitled to be retired at the age of 58 years. They also denied that the plaintiff was entitled to any relief, as prayed for in the plaint. They, inter alia, contended that the leave benefits, as prayed for by the respondent-plaintiff before his retirement, were neither refused nor accepted; hence he cannot get the benefit of the amendment with regard to the provision of uplift of age. In the end, they pleaded not guilty to the charge of contravention of the constitutional provisions contained in Articles 14 and 16. ( 5. ) THE trial Court after framing the issues and recording the evidence of the parties, answered the issues thus : (i) Appellant-defendants, by their resolution No. 544 dated 23-10-1972 raised the age of retirement of all its employees from 55 to 58 years, but they discriminated with the case of the plaintiff and contravened, thus, the constitutional guarantee contained in Articles 14 and 16. Their act is, therefore, illegal and unconstitutional. (ii) In spite of their clear resolution No. 317 dated 24-6-1972, the defendant-appellants did not pay the back salary to the plaintiff, due to him upto 30-11-1973. (iii) Plaintiff is entitled only to get a decree of Rs. Their act is, therefore, illegal and unconstitutional. (ii) In spite of their clear resolution No. 317 dated 24-6-1972, the defendant-appellants did not pay the back salary to the plaintiff, due to him upto 30-11-1973. (iii) Plaintiff is entitled only to get a decree of Rs. 14,941/- with costs because he claimed only this amount in his demand notice. Appellant-defendants aggrieved by this judgment and decree passed by the trial court, have invoked the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under section 96, Civil Procedure Code. ( 6. ) RESPONDENT-PLAINTIFF, to prove his cause, examined Devi Sahai Singhal (PW. 1); chiranjilal Jain (PW. 2); Devendra Kumar Sharma (PW. 3); Sripat Rao (PW. 4); ramchandra Sharma (PW. 5); Ramswaroop (PW. 6) and himself as P. W. 7. The plaintiff also produced and proved documents numbered from Ext. P-1 to Ext. P-24. The appellant-defendants did not examine any witness from their side during the trial. From the pleadings of the parties, it is apparent that appellant-defendants admitted the facts that - (i) the plaintiff entered its service in the year 1948; (ii) vide letter dated 21-10-1970 the plaintiff was asked to avail of the leave benefits before his retirement from service; (iii) order of Govt. of M. P. Memo No. 322/419/i/iii/72 dated 30-5-1972 was received and the appellants vide resolution No. 544 (Ext. P-1) dated 23-10-1972 raised the age of superannuation of their employees from 55 to 58 years; (iv) Ramchandra Sharma (PW. 5) was retired in 1971, but after the age of retirement was raised from 55 to 58 years, he was taken in service and he relired at the age of 58 and his case was reviewed, and (v) the appellant-defendants have neither denied the facts on oath and have also not denied Ext. P-22, the joining report of the plaintiff dated 25-4-1972. ( 7. ) SHRI M. G. Khedkar, learned counsel for the appellanfs, has contended that the amendment, made and came into effect from 21-4-1972, raising the age of retirement from 55 to 58 years, cannot he applied retrospectively, because the plaintiff retired prior to 23-10-1972, i. e. on 10-12-1971. He further contended that resolution no. 544 dated 23-10-1972, by which the age of the Municipal Corporation employees was raised from 55 to 58 years, was made applicable from 23-10-1972 and no employee, who had already retired before 23-10-1972, could get the benefit. He further contended that resolution no. 544 dated 23-10-1972, by which the age of the Municipal Corporation employees was raised from 55 to 58 years, was made applicable from 23-10-1972 and no employee, who had already retired before 23-10-1972, could get the benefit. Sri J. P. Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff repelled the arguments of Sri Khedkar and supported the reasonings given in the impugned judgment, in which these arguments were properly and effectively answered. ( 8. ) RAMCHANDRA Sharma (PW. 5) was retired from service on reaching the age of superannuation, i. e. 55 years, on 30-6-1971. He was given an e: \lension of 3 months; hence he, admittedly, retired on 30-9-1971. After he retired, he was given his leave benefits on full pay for 180 days and on half pay for 547 days with effect from 1-10-1971. Vide its resolution No. 544 dated 23-10-1972 (Ext. P1), when the age of superannuation of the defendants employees was raised from 55 to 58 years, ramchandra Sharma (PW. 5) filed a petition for the review of his case and the appellant-defendants allowed the review petition (Ext. P-6 ). It is, thus, clear that ramchandra Sharma (PW. 5) was retired from service on 30-9-1971, his leave expired on 27-9-1973, and he was taken back in service on 26-4-1974 by the appellant-defendants. When, on 30-6-1974 he reached the age of 58, vide Ext. P-8, he was retired again from service. The case of the respondent-plaintiff is exactly like that of ramchandra Sharma (PW. 5), but he was unfortunate not to have found favour with the appellant-defendants, as his colleague Ramchandra Sharma (PW. 5) had obtained. Like Ramchandra Sharma, the respondent-plaintiff was also on leave, during which resolution No. 544 dated 23-10-1972 (Ext. P-l) came into force, raising the age of retirement of Class III and Class IV employees from 55 to 58 years. Exhibit P-22 is the application of the plaintiff which he sent to the appellant-defendants for reviewing his case also like that of Ramchandra Sharma. In this application he prayed on 25-4-1972 that he also be permitted to join his duties because the rule is equally applicable in his case also. Respondent-plaintiff again reminded the appellant-defendants on 6-6-1974 (Ext. P-9) that he is being discriminated against and is not being treated on par with ramchandra Sharma and that his constant prayers fell only on the deaf ears of the appellant-defendants. Respondent-plaintiff again reminded the appellant-defendants on 6-6-1974 (Ext. P-9) that he is being discriminated against and is not being treated on par with ramchandra Sharma and that his constant prayers fell only on the deaf ears of the appellant-defendants. A vague allegation was made by the appellants in their pleading that the respondent-plaintiff, on the date of retirement, did not hand over his charge of the office to his successor. But Ext. P-16 and the statement on oath of the plaintiff clearly refute this allegation. In absence of a rebuttal on oath from the side of the appellants-defendants during the (rial of this fact, there is no reason as to why the plaintiff should not be relied upon, when he stands corroborated by Ext. P-l6. ( 9. ) APPELLANT-DEFENDANT is a Municipal Corpora! ion, it is a local authority and is, therefore, a state as provided in Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The duty to abide by the constitutional provision and to maintain the rule of law is cast not only upon all branches of the State, namely, legislature, executive and judiciary, but also upon the local authorities, who are state within the provisions of Article 12. state is the repository of State power. The prohibition against the State depriving any person of life, liberty or property or denying to any person equal protection of law, extends to all actions of the state, whether it is an action by the legislature, executive, judicial authorities or local authorities, who are all agents of the State. The inclusion of all. local authorities in the definition is for the purpose of ensuring that even those, who perform certain public function, do not contravene the fundamental rights of the citizens. ( 10. ) THE ideal of equality before the law is not only embodied in the preamble but also in Article 14 of the Constitution. This Article expresses the general rule as to equality before law, while the succeeding Articles enact the particular application of the rule. Article 14 commands state not to deny any person equality before the law or equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. The prohibition contained in article 14 is directed agtainst the State, as widely defined by Article 12, for the purposes of Part III, which provides for fundamental rights. Article 14 commands state not to deny any person equality before the law or equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. The prohibition contained in article 14 is directed agtainst the State, as widely defined by Article 12, for the purposes of Part III, which provides for fundamental rights. The prohibition of Article 14 is, thus, addressed not only to the legislature but also to the executive, and not only to the Government, but also to the local and other authorities. This doctrine of equality finds extension and expansion in Article 16 which guarantees equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the state. ( 11. ) AS stated hereinabove, the case of Ramchandra Sharma was identical with that of the plaintiff, and both should have been treated equally by the appellants-defendants. The appellants clearly discriminated against the plaintiff which is prohibited by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Respondent-plaintiff had a constitutional right to be treated equally in the matter of employment. As the case of the plaintiff was similar to that of Ramchandra Sharma, the plaintiff too, like ramchandra Sharma, should have been retired only when he attained the age of 58 years. The plaintiff should also have been treated by the appellant-defendants just as ramchandra Sharma was treated. (Rajasthan Electricity Board vs. Mohanlal and others, ( AIR 1967 SC 1857 ). Similar views were expressed by this Court in Mohan singh ( 1980 MPLJ 665 = 1980 JLJ 746 (DB) and in Ram Bihari Pandey (1966 MPLJ 425 (DB) ). Thus, if the appellant-defendants, according to its resolution, could employ and retire Ramchandra Sharma at the age of 58 years, why the respondent-plaintiff should also not be similarly treated in the matter of employment. Honble the Supreme Court in the case of Iron and Metal Traders Pvt. Ltd. ( AIR 1984 SC 629 ) upheld the award of the Industrial Tribunal, which ordered the reinstatement of ten workmen against the discriminatory treatment meted out to them by the management. ( 12. ) THE trial Court has rightly answered the issues after evaluating the entire evidence on record correctly. It has also correctly applied the legal provisions and has properly granted the relief to the respondent-plaintiff. Consequently, this appeal, which has no force, deserves to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed. ( 12. ) THE trial Court has rightly answered the issues after evaluating the entire evidence on record correctly. It has also correctly applied the legal provisions and has properly granted the relief to the respondent-plaintiff. Consequently, this appeal, which has no force, deserves to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed. The judgment and decree passed by the Court below is maintained. Appellants shall bear the costs of the litigation throughout. Counsels fee according to schedule, if certified. Appeal dismissed.