JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE judgment delivered in this appeal will dispose of criminal Reference No. 4 of 1985 made by the Third Additional Sessions Judge, Damoh for confirmation of death sentence awarded to the appellant in Sessions Trial No. 64 of 1984 decided on 3rd October, 1985 as well as the Criminal Appeal No. 1170 of 1985 (Khilan vs. State of M. P. ). ( 2. ) IN Criminal Appeal No. 1169 of 1985, the appellant Khilan has challenged his conviction under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for which he has been awarded death sentence in Sessions Trial No. 64 of 1984 by the Third Additional Sessions Judge, damon. In Criminal Appeal No. 1170/85, the appellant Khilan has challenged his conviction under section 107 of the Indian Penal Code for attempt to murder Jagatsingh, for which he has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10 years. ( 3. ) THE incident in question in which appellant Khilan is said to have murdered his 3 minor daughters and his wife and attempted to murder Jagatsingh (P. W. 8) relates to the month of April, 1964 after harvesting period was over. The appellants crop after harvesting was also stored by him in his Khaliyan. The harvested crop of Ramsingh (P. W. 3) and bhaguntsingh was also stored in the Khaliyan of the appellant. The appellant had hired the thrasher and starter of Komalsingh (P. W. 9) for thrashing of his crop. The starter had burnt and, therefore, the appellants mother went to Komalsingh to ask for another starter. Komalsingh (P. W. 9) stated that he would give the starter in the night. The appellant, therefore, asked Komalsingh to take away his thrasher and motor next day, that is, on 154-1984 whereafter Jagatsingh (P. W. 8) installed the thrasher and motor in his Khaliyan. Bhaguntsingh and Ramsingh (P. W. 3) also took away their crop from the Khaliyan of the appellant to the Khaliyan of Jagatsingh. It was alleged that due to this incident, the appellant got annoyed. In the forenoon of 15-4-1984, he went to his house with an axe, where he killed his wife Mst. Jeerabai alias Badi Bahu and 3 minor daughters, namely, laxmibai aged about 3 years, Chainabai aged about 5 years and Leelabai aged about 7 years. Thereafter it was alleged that the appellant proceeded towards the Khaliyan of jagatsingh. In the forenoon of 15-4-1984, he went to his house with an axe, where he killed his wife Mst. Jeerabai alias Badi Bahu and 3 minor daughters, namely, laxmibai aged about 3 years, Chainabai aged about 5 years and Leelabai aged about 7 years. Thereafter it was alleged that the appellant proceeded towards the Khaliyan of jagatsingh. The appellant met Jagatsingh (P. W. 8) on the way to his Khaliyan who was returning back after bath. The appellant attacked Jagatsingh with an axe and gave a blow on his neck. It is also alleged that when the appellant assaulted Jagatsingh, he said that he has killed his wife and children due to Jagatsingh and he would kill Jagatsingh also. But in the meanwhile the witnesses arrived and intervened. The appellant was caught hold by the witnesses and taken to the house of Sarpanch Koshaisingh, village Kotwar Babulal (P. W. 4)was called. It is said that in the presence of Kotwar Babulal (P. W. 4), the appellant made an extra-judicial confession that he had killed his wife and daughters because of Jagatsingh and somehow Jagatsingh escaped. Kotwar Babulal (P. W. 4) went to the police station Patharia 7 kilometers away from the village Kindraha where he lodged the report (Ex. P-1) at 4. 00 p. m. On 15-4-1984 itself. The injured Jagatsingh (P. W. 8) had also proceeded on a bullock cart to the police station. He had taken with him the axe with which he was assaulted and which was snatched from the appellant. At the same police-station Jagatsingh (P. W. 8)lodged the report (Ex. P-4) at about 4. 10 p. m. on 15-4-1984. The axe was also seized from jagatsingh by A. S. I. Shahjad Khan (P. W. 23) in the presence of Kotwar Babulal (P. W. 4)by seizure memo Ex. P-2. ( 4. ) THE police arrived in the village in the afternoon on 154-1984. The A. S. I. Shahjad Khan (P. W. 23) prepared Inquest reports of the dead bodies of the 3 daughters and the wife of the appellant in the presence of the witnesses. Ex. P-8, Ex. P-9, Ex. P-10 and ex. P-11 are the inquest reports. ( 5. ) AFTER arrival of the police in village in the afternoon of 154-1984, appellant Khilan was also arrested On the memorandum (Ex. Ex. P-8, Ex. P-9, Ex. P-10 and ex. P-11 are the inquest reports. ( 5. ) AFTER arrival of the police in village in the afternoon of 154-1984, appellant Khilan was also arrested On the memorandum (Ex. P-13) made by the appellant soon after his arrest his Kurta was seized by A. S. I. Shahjad Khan (P. W. 23) from the house of the appellant as per seizure memo. Ex. P-14. The nails of the appellant were also cut and seized by A. S. I. Khan (P W. 23) in the presence of witnesses and seized as per seizure memo. (Ex. P-15 ). ( 6. ) DR. Sahu (P. W. 16) Assistant Surgeon District Hospital. Damoh performed an autopsy over the dead bodies of 3 daughters and the wife of the appellant. Dr. Sahu as per his post mortem report (Ex. P-21), found incised wound over left side of. face and neck extending from cheek 6 x 1 " bone deep. The wound was ante mortem caused by sharp cutting and heavy object. The cause of death was shock as a result of haemorrhage. Ex. P-21 is the report in respect of Cheemabai. Ex. P-22 is the post mortem report of deceased girl laxmibai. Dr. Sahu (P. W. 16) found incised wound over her neck separating the head and upper H. T neck from rest of the trunk. This injury was also ante mortem in nature caused by heavy sharp cutting weapon and cause of death was shock as a result of haemorrhage. Ex. P-23 is the post mortem report of deceased girl Leelabai who also had the incased wound over front of the neck separating the head from the trunk. This injury to Leelabai was ante mortem and caused by heavy sharp cutting weapon. Cause of death was shock as a result of haemorrhage. Ex. P-24 is the post mortem of Jeerabai wife of the appellant who had several injuries on her person including incised wound over right frontal region 6" x 1" bone deep; one incised would 3 " x 1 " bone deep over back of neck left side; one incised wound 2" x 1" bone deep over right side of back of neck and one incised wound 3 3/4 x 1 " over left side of chest. These injuries were ante mortem in nature caused by heavy sharp cutting weapon. These injuries were ante mortem in nature caused by heavy sharp cutting weapon. The cause of death was shock as a result of haemorrhage. ( 7. ) DR. Ashok Jain (P. W. 24) examined the injured Jagatsingh (P. W. 8) on 154-1984 and as per his report (Ex. P-23) filed in Sessions Trial No. 63 of 1984, (Copy of the same Ex. P-34 filed in Sessions Trial No. 64 of 1984), he found one incised wound 7 cm x 3 cm on the back side of the neck which was bleeding, an abrasion 3cm x 2cm over left leg and one abrasion 3cm x 3cm over right knee. In the opinion of Dr. Jain (P. W. 24) injury No. 1 was caused by sharp cutting weapon which was dangerous to life and sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Injuries Nos. 2 and 3 were caused by Hunt rough object which were simple in nature. ( 8. ) THE Assistant Chemical Examiner Sagar found Mood on the Kurta and nails of the appellant Khilan. The Chemical Examiner Calcutta, as per his report Ex. P-33 confirmed the Hood on the axe seized from injured Jagatsingh by A. S. I. Shahjad Khan (P. W. 23 ). Ex. P-37 is the report of the Serologist who found human Hood on the Kurta of the accused but the Hood group could not be determined. ( 9. ) AT the trial, the appellant abjured his guilt and pleaded false implication by jagatsingh (P. W. 8) and his relatives due to party-faction. The appellant also pleaded that at about noon time he was returning home from well after taking bath. On reaching near his house he heard the weeping cries of his mother and he saw that his wife and daughters were lying dead. He also stated that his mother told him that Jagatsingh (P. W. 8) had killed 3 daughters and wife of the appellant. The appellant got infuriated. He picked up his axe and gave an axe How to Jagatsingh and grappled with him. But in the meanwhile people arrived and intervened. The appellant also adduced 3 witnesses in his defence. He also stated that his mother told him that Jagatsingh (P. W. 8) had killed 3 daughters and wife of the appellant. The appellant got infuriated. He picked up his axe and gave an axe How to Jagatsingh and grappled with him. But in the meanwhile people arrived and intervened. The appellant also adduced 3 witnesses in his defence. On scrutiny of the record and entire evidence, learned Additional Sessions Judge negatived the defence and came to the conclusion that the appellant had killed his 3 daughters and wife and, therefore, held him guilty of the offence under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and awarded him death sentence for the same. Learned Additional Sessions Judge also found the appellant guilty under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code for attempting to murder jagatsingh (P. W. 8) and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10 years, against which these two appeals have been preferred by the appellant and the learned additional Sessions Judge has also made a refe ence to this Court for confirmation of death sentence on four counts awarded to the appellant. ( 10. ) AS pointed out earlier the prosecution case against the appellant was based on extra judicial confession said to have been made on 3 occasions - firstly after killing his wife and 3 children, the appellant was going in search of Jagatsingh (P. W. 8) to kill him also; secondly when the appellant met Jagatsingh and assaulted him in his neck by an axe and thirdly when he was caught hold by the witnesses and taken to the house of Sarpanch kaushal Singh (P. W. 14) where the appellant was confined in a kotha and he made extra judicial confession in the presence of village Kotwar Babulal (P. W. 4 ). The first confession is said to have been made in the presence of Ramsewak (P. W. 2), Ramsingh (P. W. 3 ). Rakhe Singh (P. W. 5) and Palu (P. W. 6 ). On scrutiny of the evidence of these witnesses we find that their evidence is not free from doubt as their police statement was recorded on 25th April, 1984 after about 10 days from the date of the incident. The police statement (Ex. Rakhe Singh (P. W. 5) and Palu (P. W. 6 ). On scrutiny of the evidence of these witnesses we find that their evidence is not free from doubt as their police statement was recorded on 25th April, 1984 after about 10 days from the date of the incident. The police statement (Ex. D6) of Palu (P. W. 6) was recorded on 16-4-1984, that is, next day of the incident but the fact that the appellant made extra judicial confession about the murder of his children and wife is missing in his case diary statement. Similar is the position with the evidence of dhansu (P. W. 1 ). The second extra judicial confession is also not free from doubt which is said to have been made at the hotel of one Mulayam Singh (P. W. 11) in the presence of bhagirath (P. W. 7) and injured Jagatsingh (P. W. 8 ). Mulayamsingh (P. W. 11) was declared hostile as he did not depose in the Court that the appellant had made any extra judicial confession about the killing of his children and wife. As regards the evidence of Jagatsingh (P. W. 8) he did not state in his report (Ex. P-4) about the alleged extra judicial confession. Thus there remains only the extra judicial confession which is said to have been made at the house of Kaushalsingh (P. W. 14) and his father Prahlad Singh (D. W. 1) in the presence of village Kotwar Babulal (P. W. 4 ). ( 11. ) THE village Kotwar Babulal (P. W. 4) deposed that Dhansu (P. W. 1) came to his house and told him that he was called by Patel Prahlad Singh (D. W. 1) as the appellant had killed his 3 daughters and wife and has assaulted Jagatsingh (P. W. 8) also by an axe. He further deposed that he went to the house of Patel Prahlad Singh who asked him to go and see the place of incident and make a report. He, therefore, went to the house of the appellant along with Chandansingh (P. W. 10), Mulayam Singh (P. W. 11), Santosh Kumar (P. W. 12), Patel Babulal (P. W. 4), Dhansu (P. W. 1) and one M. P. E B. Employee Kashiram (P. W. 13) and found that 3 daughters and wife of the appellant dead having injuries in their neck. He proceeded to state that thereafter he returned back to the house of Patel Prahlad and asked the appellant as to what had he done. Thereupon the appellant is said to have replied that he had killed his 3 daughters and wife and had also assaulted Jagatsingh (P. W. 8) by his axe. Babulal (P. W. 4) then went to the police station Patharia where he lodged the first information report (Ex. P-1 ). Nothing could be brought out from this witness even after the lengthy cross-examination on the point of extra judicial confession. ( 12. ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant contended that the last extra judicial confession discussed above is said to have been made at the house of Sarpanch Kaushal singh (P. W. 14) and his father Pralhad Singh (D. W. 1) but both of them have denied the fact of extra judicial confession alleged to have been made by the appellant. He submitted that the presence of Prahladsingh (D. W. 1) has not been disputed and the evidence of kaushalsingh (P. W. 14) and his father Prahladsingh (D. W. 1) negatives the evidence of babulal (P. W. 4) and, therefore, no connection of the appellant can be based on the extra judicial confession about the murder of his children and wife. In our opinion, there is no force in this contention as Kaushalsingh (P. W. 14) and his father Prahladsingh (D. W. 1) are not truthful witnesses. Both these witnesses made a false statement in the Court in order to save the appellant because they are closely related to the appellant. Kaushalsingh (P. W. 14)in paragraph 8 of his deposition clearly admitted that father of the appellant and his father prahlad Singh (D. W. 1) are real brothers. Thus the appellant is first cousin brother of kaushalsingh (P. W. 14) and nephew of Prahlad Singh (D. W. 1 ). The falsehood of the witness Kaushalsingh (P. W. 14) is further revealed from his case diary statement (Ex. P. 19)which shows that at the time of the incident he was not present in the village and had gone to Damoh for some work and had returned to the village some time in the evening. But still in Court he stated that he was at home and sleeping when the incident took place. His presence in the evening is established from the inquest reports (Ex. P-8 to Ex. But still in Court he stated that he was at home and sleeping when the incident took place. His presence in the evening is established from the inquest reports (Ex. P-8 to Ex. P-1) which were written by this witness Kaushal till about 730 or 8. 00 p. m. Thus the evidence of these two witnesses Kaushal Singh and Prahlad Singh cannot be relied on in the face of evidence of an independent witness Babulal (P. W. 4) who is responsible person of the village having no grudge or any animus against the appellant. ( 13. ) IT is no doubt true that evidence about the extra judicial confession in the very nature of things is a weak piece of evidence. But in a case where the evidence of extra judicial confession on scrutiny is found to be free from legal infirmity and the Court believes the witness before whom the confession is made and is satisfied that the confession was voluntary, then in such a case a conviction can be based on such evidence. See -Darshanlal vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir (AIR 1975 SC 858) and Maghar Singh vs. State of Punjab ( AIR 1975 SC 1320 ). ( 14. ) IT may further be pointed out that the law does not require that the evidence of extra judicial confession should in all cases be corroborated It is settled law that where the extra judicial confession was proved by an independent witness who was a responsible person and who had no animus against the accused then there would be hardly any justification to disbelieve the evidence of such witness particularly in the present case where the witness Babulal (P. W. 4) on the point of extra judicial confession is corroborated by the first imformation report (Ex. P-1) lodged by him in the police station soon after the incident. ( 15. ) IN the case of State of U. P. vs. M. K. Anthony ( AIR 1985 SC 48 ) their Lordships of the Supreme Court made the following observations : "there is neither any rule of law nor of prudence that evidence furnished by extra judicial confession cannot be relied upon unless corroborated by some other credible evidence. The Courts have considered the evidence of extra judicial confession a weak piece of evidence. The Courts have considered the evidence of extra judicial confession a weak piece of evidence. If the evidence about extra judicial confession comes from the mouth of witness/witnesses who apperar to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused, and in respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive for attributing an untruthful statement to the accused; the words spoken to by the witness are dear, unambiguous and unmistakably convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime and nothing is omitted by the witness which may militate against it, then after subjecting the evidence of the witness to a rigorous test on the touchstone of credibility, if it passes the test, the extra judicial confession can be accepted and can be the basis of a conviction. In such a situation to go in search of corroboration itself tends to cast a shadow of doubt over the evidence. If the evidence of extra judicial confession is reliable, trustworthy and beyond reproach the same can be relied upon and a conviction can be founded thereon. " The Kotwar Babulal (P. W. 4) is an independent witness and a responsible person of the village. He had neither any animus against the appellant, nor any bias. On scrutiny of his evidence, we find that his testimony on the point of extra judicial confession by the appellant is fully reliable as nothing could be brought out in the examination which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive for attributing an untruthful statement to the appellant. His evidence is dearly unambiguous which unmistakably conveys that the appellant is the killer of his 3 children and wife. In these circumstances, we find that the learned Additional Sessions Judge committed no error in convicting the appellant under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for murder of his wife and 3 children. ( 16. ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant next contended that the village Kotwar enjoys all the powers of the police constable, he is, therefore, a police officer, within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act and, therefore, the alleged extra judicial confession said to have been made by the appellant to Kotwar Babulal (P. W. 4) is inadmissible in evidence under section 25 of the Evidence Act. hi support of this contention, reliance was placed on the decisions in the case of Deokinandan vs. Emperor (AIR 1936 All. 753 F. B.) and Punia goalin vs. Emperor (AIR 1947 Pat. 146 D. B. ). We do not find ourselves in agreement with the aforesaid contention as, in our view, the village Kotwar though invested with some of the powers of police constable, is not a police officer within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act. The decisions relied on and referred to above also proceed on distinguishable facts and, therefore, the same do not advance the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant. ( 17. ) IN the case of Deokinandan vs. Emperor (supra) decided by Full Bench of allahabad High Court there was North Western Province Village and Road Police Act No. 16 of 1873 which was in force at that time under which village Chowkidar was appointed and, therefore, the Chowkidar was held to be police officer within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act. Not only this Act No. 5 of 1861 was also in force which defined the word police" as including all persons who were enrolled under that Act. Added to these provisions, there was yet another provision in the police Regulations Part in, paragraph 371 which laid down that the police force consists of : (a) (i) Provincial Police (ii) Government Railway Police appointed and enrolled under Act No. 5 of 1861 (b) village chowkidars appointed under Act No. 16 of 1873 and not so enrolled. These Acts and the police Regulations referred to above dearly brought the appointment of a Chowkidar within the meaning of Police Officer and, therefore, under those facts and circumstances a village Qiowkidar was held to be police officer by the Full Bench of Allahabad High court. As regards the D. B. decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Punia Goalin vs. Emperor (supra) it does not contain full discussion in paragrah 13 of that judgment as to for what reasons the view was taken that the Chowkidar is a Police officer for the purposes of section 26 of the Evidence Act. This decision is, therefore, not of much assistance. This apart aforesaid D. B. decision of the Patna High Court is contrary to the D. B. decision of this Court. This decision is, therefore, not of much assistance. This apart aforesaid D. B. decision of the Patna High Court is contrary to the D. B. decision of this Court. We would, therefore, respectfully prefer the view taken by this Court as compared to the view taken by the Division Bench of any other High Court. ( 18. ) ON perusal of a catena of cases on the subject, we find that there has been long controversy and difference of opinion amongst the various High Courts in India with regard to the meaning of the word "police officer" used in section 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. One view has been that the words "police-officer" occurring in section 25 and 26 of the evidence Act must be construed in broad way and all officers whether they are police officers within the strict meaning of the words or not would be police officers within the meaning of this word, if they have all the powers of a police officer with respect to the investigation of an offence with which they are concerned. Nanoo Sheikh Ahmed vs. Emperor (AIR 1927 Bom. 4 F. B.), is the leading case in support o this view. The other view is that the word "police-officer" in section 25 of the Evidence Act means a police officer within the strict meaning of the words and do not include officers of other departments of the Government, who may be charged with the duty of investigation under any special Act and the leading case in support of this view is Radhakishan Marwari vs. Emperor (AIR 1932 pat. 293 ). The other High Courts of India have followed one view or the other. ( 19. ) IN case of Bhagwatdin vs. Emperor (AIR 1920 Nag. 167) it was held that a Kotwar or village watchman in the Central Provinces is not a police officer within the meaning of section 25 and as such a confession of guilt made to him by an accused person is admissible in evidence. ( 19. ) IN case of Bhagwatdin vs. Emperor (AIR 1920 Nag. 167) it was held that a Kotwar or village watchman in the Central Provinces is not a police officer within the meaning of section 25 and as such a confession of guilt made to him by an accused person is admissible in evidence. It was observed that widest and most comprehensive extension of the term "police officer" cannot make it include a Kotwar in the Central Provinces because under the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1917, then in force, the Kotwar had to do what any private person was authorised to do, by section 59 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and section 97 of the Indian Penal Code. This view was followed by a Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Sukhwaria vs. Emperor (AIR 1924 Nag, 29 ). The same view was again reiterated by Nagpur High Court in the case of Emperor vs. Akia (AIR 1927 Nag. 222 ). ( 20. ) THE decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Badku Joti syant vs. State of Mysore (AIR 1956 SC 1746) can be referred to with advantage to resolve the controversy in question. In the Supreme Court case Badku Joti vs. State of Mysore (supra) the accused was arrested under the Sea Customs Act and Land Customs Act and interrogated by Deputy Superintendent of Customs and Excise before whom the accused made a confession of guilt during the interrogation. The question, therefore, arose, was whether the Deputy Superintendent of Customs and Excise was a Police officer so that the confession made before him is hit by provisions of section 25 of the Evidence Act. Under the Sea Customs Act and the Land Customs Act, Central Excise Officer is empowered by the Central Government to arrest any person in accordance with the provisions of the code of Criminal Procedure, whom he has reason to believe to be liable to punishment under the Act. They are also empowered to make searches under the provisions of the code of Criminal Procedure and to forward the arrested persons to Magistrate or to the officer-in-charge of the nearest police station. They are also empowered to make searches under the provisions of the code of Criminal Procedure and to forward the arrested persons to Magistrate or to the officer-in-charge of the nearest police station. But the Central Excise Officer under those acts has no power to submit a charge sheet under section 173 of the Code of Criminal procedure but to file a complaint to the competent Magistrate who can take cognizance under section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On these facts their Lordships of the supreme Court observed that though the Central Excise Officers have power of a. officer in charge of a police station when investigating a cognizable case but it appears that these powers do not include the power to submit a charge sheet under section 173 of the Code of criminal Procedure. 20-A. Their Lordships further observed that mere conferment of powers of investigation into a criminal offence does not make the Central Excise Officer a Police officer even in the broader view mentioned above and if that be so any person entrusted with investigation under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, would become a police officer. In view of these facts and circumstances it was held that even though the central Excise Officers may have powers which are exercised by an officer in charge of a police station when investigating a cognizable offence, he does not thereby become a police officer and, therefore, confessional statement made before such officer is not hit by the provisions of section 25 of the Evidence Act. If a Deputy Superintendent of Customs and Excise who has almost all the powers of investigation as are excercised by an officer in charge of a police station, then how in the present case, a Chowkidar who is appointed under section 230 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 and who has limited duties to perform under the said Code, may become a police officer within the meaning of section 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. The view that we are taking also find support from two D. B. decisions of this Court in the case of Mahto Chandu Union vs. The State of M. P. (1978 mplt 599) and Devraj Jhalla vs. The State of M. P. ( 1978 MPLJ 802 ). ( 21. The view that we are taking also find support from two D. B. decisions of this Court in the case of Mahto Chandu Union vs. The State of M. P. (1978 mplt 599) and Devraj Jhalla vs. The State of M. P. ( 1978 MPLJ 802 ). ( 21. ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant lastly contended that a report of the first information report (Ex. P-1) was not sent to the Magistrate concerned forthwith as required by section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He submitted that the incident had taken place in the noon of 15th April, 1964 but the report was sent to the Magistrate on 17th april, 1984. He, therefore, submitted that the report (Ex. P-l) itself was not made on 15th april, 1984 but it was made later on after deliberation. It is true that the report was sent on 17th April, 1984 but it is not correct to say that the report was not lodged on the 15th April, 1984 or that it was lodged after deliberations. A report was despatched to the Magistrate, damon on 164-1984 and it was delivered on 17-4-1984 which in the facts and circumstances of the present case cannot be said to have been delivered with much delay especially when no prejudice is shown to have been caused to the appellant. The evidence of Kaushalsingh (P. W. 14) and Investigating Officer Shahjad Khan (P. W. 23) will go to show that till late in the evening on 15-4-1984, the police party and investigating officer remained busy at the place of incident in connection with the investigation and preparation of panchnama etc. The fact that the appellant had made extra judicial confession find place even in one of the panchnama (Ex. F-11) which was prepared on the place of the incident on 15-4-1984 and, therefore, the allegation that the report was lodged after deliberations by the investigating agency is without any foundation. ( 22. ) IN Palasingh vs. State of Punjab (AIR 1972 SC 2879) it was observed that in the absence of any prejudice to the accused, however improper or objectionable the delayed receipt of the report by the Magistrate concerned may be, it cannot by itself conclude that the investigation was tainted and the prosecution insupportable. ( 22. ) IN Palasingh vs. State of Punjab (AIR 1972 SC 2879) it was observed that in the absence of any prejudice to the accused, however improper or objectionable the delayed receipt of the report by the Magistrate concerned may be, it cannot by itself conclude that the investigation was tainted and the prosecution insupportable. See also Sarwansingh vs. State of Punjab ( AIR 1976 SC 2304 ), In the case of State of U. P. vs. Gokaran and others ( AIR 1985 SC 131 ) it has been observed that it is not that as if every delay in sending a delayed special report to the District Magistrate under section 157 Criminal Procedure code would necessarily lead to the inference that the first information report has not been lodged at the time stated or has been ante-timed or ante-dated or that the investigation is not fair and forthright. It has been further observed that where the steps in investigation by way of drawing inquest report and other Panchnamas started soon which could only follow the handing over of the first information report, the delayed receipt of special report by district Magistrate would not enable the Court to dub the investigation as tainted one nor could first information report be regarded as ante timed and ante dated Almost similar is the position in the case before us. We thus find no force in the contention. ( 23. ) AS regards the Criminal Appeal No. 1170 of 1985 preferred by the appellant against his conviction under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code far assaulting Jagajtsingh (P. W. 8), besides the overwhelming evidence in support of the finding, there is admission of the appellant himself in his statement under section 113 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. His conviction under section of the interferance. ( 24. ) THIS brings us to the question of sentence to the appellant under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for murder of his wife and 3 children. In the case of Earabhadrappa vs. State of Karnataka ( AIR 1983 SC 446 ) their Lordships observed that death sentence should not be passed except in rarest of the rare cases. The trend of decisions of the Apex court continued to hold the same view even now, on the compassionate sentiments of human feelings. In the case of Earabhadrappa vs. State of Karnataka ( AIR 1983 SC 446 ) their Lordships observed that death sentence should not be passed except in rarest of the rare cases. The trend of decisions of the Apex court continued to hold the same view even now, on the compassionate sentiments of human feelings. In case of Nathusingh and others vs. Union of India ( AIR 1980 SC 898 ) it was observed that it cannot be over emphasised that scope of concept of mitigating factors in the area of death penalty must receive a liberal and expansive construction by the Courts with regard to the sentencing policy writ large in section 354 (3) of the Code of Criminal procedure and that the Judges should never be blood thirsty. Hanging of murderers has never been too good for them. The same view has been reiterated in the case of State of U. P. vs. M. K. Anthony ( AIR 1985 SC 48 ) in which case, the accused had killed his ailing wife, and two children. In the case before us, it is no doubt true that the appellant committed a heinous crime. But end of a human life by violent means is always heinous whether it is murder of one person or more. In the present case no evidence is forthcoming as to the real motive of the appellant and the facts and circumstances under which he was compelled to kill his wife and 3 children. However, under the facts and circumstances of the present case, we do not find that it is rarest of the rare cases in which the death penalty should be inflicted to the appellant. In our opinion sentence of imprisonment for life will meet the ends of justice. ( 25. ) IN the result reference made by the learned trial Judge is answered in negative and it is rejected. Criminal Appeal No. 1169 of 1985 preferred by the appellant partly succeeds and is hereby allowed The conviction of the appellant under section 302 of the indian Penal Code is maintained but the punishment of death sentence on four counts is set aside. Instead the appellant is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life on" four counts. It is directed that substantive sentences shall run concurrently. As regards Criminal Appeal no. 1170 of 1985 it fails and is hereby dismissed. Order accordingly.