JUDGMENT B.D. Agarwal, J. - These petitions give rise to common questions. The petitioners were employees of the U.P. State Handloom Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as the corporation) a Government Company. They were temporary some of them were placed on probation. On receipt to certain complaints, preliminary enquiry was held. This was followed by orders of termination of their services simpliciter. Certain other details may be considered relevant: - I. Namwar Singh Yadav (the petitioner in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 2822 of 83) was appointed Assistant Project Officer in the Corporation by order, dated October 16, 1980, and placed on probation of six months in the first instance. The terms and conditions of employment provided that his services were liable to terminal ion without notice if his work was not found satisfactory. An administrative enquiry held into the working of the Production Centre, Mahoba, brought to light serious irregularities and mismanagement on his part. By order dated January 25, 1983, supplemented by order dated January 25, 1983, supplemented by order dated March 11, 1983, the petitioners' services were terminated on three months pay in lieu of notice. The preliminary enquiry was conducted by the Senior Divisional Manager (Project) (U. S. Tewari), Siya Ram Misra (petitioner in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 2984 of 1983) was appointed production Assistant Grade II on temporary basis with effect from May 1, 1979. At the relevant time he was posted as in charge production Centre, Mahoba. Preliminary enquiry conductedby the Senior Divisional Manager (Project) (U.S. Tewari), a for mentioned, revealed that along with Rajendra Singh Chauhan this petitioner used to purchase sub-standard tricot clothes and controlled dhotis from weavers and misappropriate good quality of yarn issued to them for being given to weavers for the manufacture of cloths and dhotis respectively. The services were terminated by order dated February 10, 1983. On one months' pay in lieu of notice. The same is the story relating to Rajendra Singh Chauhan, who is the petitioner in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 3033 of 83. Appointed on May 22, 1979, as production Assistant II, he was production centre In charge, Rath, district Hamirpur. The Preliminary enquiry aforementioned was followed by the order dated January 25, 1983 terminating his services on one month's pay in lieu of notice. Appointed on May 22, 1979, as production Assistant II, he was production centre In charge, Rath, district Hamirpur. The Preliminary enquiry aforementioned was followed by the order dated January 25, 1983 terminating his services on one month's pay in lieu of notice. Siddiqu Ahmad (petitioner in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 3032 of 83) appointed as production Assistant Grade 11 on March 26, 1981. was terminated on January 25, 1983 in consequence of enquiry held by U. S. Tewari aforesaid, which was submitted on December 16, 1982, and at the relevant time this petitioner was posted at the Production Centre, Ranipur. It was revealed during the course of this enquiry that he maintained three parallel cash books and had dabbled in accounts during the period he was in charge. II. Ram Pher Pandey (petitioner in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 3421 of 83) joined as Production Assistant Grade II with effect from December 1, 1980. He was posted at the Production Centre, Kunda, district Pratapgaih. On complaints received preliminary enquiry was conducted by a Committee, which included P. N. Dixit, Officer on Special Duty (Production), who has also filed his affidavit in reply. The enquiry revealed misappropriation on a large scale on the part of this official in collusion with R. K. Misra, as a result whereof the services of the petitioner were terminated by order dated January 10, 1983, on one month's pay in lieu of notice in terms of the conditions of his appointment. Ravindra Kumar Misra (petitioner in Civil Miscellaneous Writ petition No. 7105 of 1983) was selected as Production Assistant on October 30, 1976. His services were temporary and liable to termination on one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof. On April 15, 1977, he was promoted as Production Superintendent and on April 1, 1981, he was made Deputy Production Manager, Kunda region. Upon the preliminary enquiry held by the Committee, referred to above, his services were terminated on February 10, 1983, on one month's pay in lieu of notice. Earlier he had been placed under suspension by order dated November 22, 1982, which however, was revoked on February 1, 1983. III. In Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 8300 of 1984 the petitioner Rajendra Kumar Chaube was appointed Depot Manager, Yarn Sales Depot, Ghazipur, by order dated October 3, 1980. Earlier he had been placed under suspension by order dated November 22, 1982, which however, was revoked on February 1, 1983. III. In Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 8300 of 1984 the petitioner Rajendra Kumar Chaube was appointed Depot Manager, Yarn Sales Depot, Ghazipur, by order dated October 3, 1980. He was on probation for one year and terms of appointment provided that if he was not found up to mark during probation, the same could be dispensed with without assigning any reason at any time without notice. Following news item dated March 20, 1984, certain charges were drawn against him on March 22, 1984, to which he submitted explanation dated March 26, 1984. Preliminary enquiry was conducted by S P. Misra, Marketing Manager, and as per report given by him dated April 21, 1984, it came to notice that the petitioner had been responsible for purchasing yarn on be hall of the Corporation from unauthorised dealers. The services were terminated by an order simpliciter dated May 1, 1984, on one month's pay in lieu of notice." 2. Aggrieved against the termination of their services the petitioners have approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. Learned counsel raised two-fold contentions in support of these petitions. It was urged in the first place, that the orders impugned are discriminatory and consequently hit by Article 16 of the Constitution. Secondly, it was argued that there was breach of the principle of natural justice. It is undisputed that there is no question of invoking Article 311 of the Constitution in these cases. 4. Assuming that the corporation is an agency or instrumentality of the State Government and as such an 'authority' within the meaning of Article 12 amenable as such to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the law is settled that Article 16 is not attracted where the termination of the services of the employee whether temporary or on probation is on ground of unsuitability. The performance or conduct of the petitioners as gathered on preliminary enquiry places them each into a class by himself. Even though persons junior to them in service with the Corporation are retained, the dispensation made of them is not bad in law proceeding as it does on account of their being unfit for the job entrusted to them. This suffices in law and constitutes ample justification to single them out. Even though persons junior to them in service with the Corporation are retained, the dispensation made of them is not bad in law proceeding as it does on account of their being unfit for the job entrusted to them. This suffices in law and constitutes ample justification to single them out. In Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 184., Wanchoo, J. speaking for the Constitution Bench repelled the argument based on alleged discrimination in relation to the termination of the services of a temporary Government servant observing : "The present however is a case where the appellants' services were terminated because his work was found to be unsatisfactory. (In such a case) there can, in our opinion, be no question of any discrimination. It would be assured to say that if the service of one temporary servant is terminated in the ground of unsatisfactory conduct the services of all similar employees must also be terminated along with him, irrespective of what their conduct is. Therefore, even the some of those mentioned in the plaint by the appellant were junior to him and did not have as good qualifications as he had and were retained in service, it does not follow that the action taken against the appellant terminating his services was discriminatory for that action was taken on the basis of his unsatisfactory conduct. A question of discrimination may arise in a case of retrenchment on account of abolition of one of several temporary posts of the same kind in one office but can in our opinion never arise in the case of dispensing with the services of a particular temporary employee on account of his conduct being unsatisfactory." Upon analysis the principle deduced is enunciated in Manager, Government Branch Press and another v. D.B. Belliappa, (1979) 1 SCC 477 . as under : "The principle that can be deduced from the above analysis is that if the services of a temporary Government servant are terminated in accordance with the conditions of his service on the ground of unsatisfactory conduct or his unsuitability for the job and/or for his work being unsatisfactory, or for a like reason which marks him off in a class apart from other temporary servants who have been retained in service, there is no question of the applicability of Article 16." 5. In Oil & Natural Gas Commission and others v. Dr. In Oil & Natural Gas Commission and others v. Dr. Mohd. S. Iskender Ali, (1980) 3 SCC 428. Fazl Ali. J. speaking for the court observed that the respondent having been a temporary employee on probation, it was open to the employer to terminate his services at any time before he was confirmed, if the employer was satisfied that he was not suitable for being retained ;n service. Where the respondent is merely a probationer the appointing authority need not consider it necessary to constitute enquiry but decide to terminate the services of the respondent on his being found unsuitable for the job. Such a termination in the case of a probationer or a temporary employee who has no right to the post, it was held, is valid and does not attract the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. 6. The principle has been reiterated in Commodore Commanding, Sourthern Naval Area Cochin v. V. N. Raj an, (1981) 2 SCC 636 .The Corporation in the instant case did not proceed on the basis merely of complaints or news items. Adequate care was taken before proceeding to terminate the services on the ground of unsuitability to ensure that the order proceeds on definable material objectively assessed and relevant to the ground on which termination is effected. Preliminary enquiry got made through the medium of senior officers in relation to each of these cases was aimed in this direction. The petitioners in Writ Petition Nos. 2822 of 1983 and 8300 of 1984 were placed on probation for specified period; the rest were temporary. It is not disputed that the probation was capable of being extended and there had been no confirmation. Being, therefore, placed on trial, it was open to the corporation to assess their performance during the period of employment and dispense with their services of the material which came to light during preliminary enquiry. There is no element of arbitrariness involved in this action nor are the orders shown to be vitiated by capriciousness. 7. Learned counsel relying upon U.P. Warehousing Corporation and another v. Vijay Narain Vajpayee, (1980) 3 SCC 459 . contended that since there is element of public employment or service, which is capable of protection, therefor, even though the relationship may be called that of master and servant, there is essential procedural requirement to be observed on grounds of natural justice. Learned counsel relying upon U.P. Warehousing Corporation and another v. Vijay Narain Vajpayee, (1980) 3 SCC 459 . contended that since there is element of public employment or service, which is capable of protection, therefor, even though the relationship may be called that of master and servant, there is essential procedural requirement to be observed on grounds of natural justice. In that case charges were framed following a preliminary enquiry and served upon the respondent asking him to submit his explanation and to indicate the evidence if any. Explanation was submitted. In this the respondent specifically demanded that he wanted to cross-examine certain witnesses the particular of which were mentioned by him and he also gave a list of his own witnesses. Nothing happened thereafter till the Managing Director passed an order 'dismissing' the respondent from service with effect from the date of his suspension. This evidently was a distinct case pertaining not to mere termination on ascertaining suitability through a preliminary enquiry. 8. The noteworthy feature in this group of cases is that there is no element of punishment inflicted upon the petitioners in any shape or form. None of them had a right to the post; the terms of appointment envisaged termination by order passed simpliciter, to guard themselves against being arbitrary or unreasonable the authorities satisfied themselves by enquiring into the complaint; the orders passed do not reflect stigma or charge of any sort against the petitioners. There is no deprivation of vested right nor evil consequences shown to flow from the impugned orders. The benefits earned always are not forfeited; the orders ex-facie do not preclude the petitioners from seeking employment else where and thus taking into account these considerations there is no merit in contending that the petitioners must have been associated with preliminary enquiry or that they should have been given opportunity to rebut the information assembled thereupon. 9. Even in relation to Government Servants where Article 311 (2) of the Constitution applies, the Court is advised to adopt a practical and reasonable approach. Ordinarily and generally the rule laid down in most of the cases by the Supreme Court is that you have to look to the order on the face of it and find whether it casts any stigma on the Government servant. Ordinarily and generally the rule laid down in most of the cases by the Supreme Court is that you have to look to the order on the face of it and find whether it casts any stigma on the Government servant. The Court will not normally interfere because ex-facie there is nothing to show that the order was intended as a punishment (See State of Maharashtra v. Veerappa R. Saboji and another, (1979) 4 SCC 466 . at p. 474 per Untwalia, J). The authority may choose to discharge the temporary servant on the basis of the preliminary enquiry instead of punishing him, vide State of U.P. v Bhoop Singh Verma, (1979) 2 SCC 111 . as has actually been done in these matters. 10. In Champaklal (supra) where the appellant, whose appointment being temporary was liable to be terminated on one month's notice on either side, was informed, without assigning any cause, after the expiry of about five years that his services would be terminated with effect from a specified date but before the termination, he was called upon to explain certain irregularities and was also asked to submit his explanation and to state who disciplinary action would not be taken against him and certain preliminary enquiries were also held against him in which he was not heard, but no regular departmental enquiry followed and the proceedings were dropped, it was held by the Supreme Court that such a regular departmental enquiry though contemplated was not held against the appellant and no punitive action was taken against him, there was no question of the case being governed by Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. It was further held in that case that it is only when the Government decides to hold a regular departmental enquiry for the purpose of inflicting one of the three major punishments that Government servants gets the protection of Article 311. In our opinion the petitioners in capacity as employees of the Corporation cannot on the general principles of natural justice claim to be placed on a higher pedestal n comparison to Government servants to whom the statutory protection of Article 311 extends. 11. In State of U.P. Ram Chandra Trivedi, (1976) 4 SCC 42 , which also is in point, the respondent was a temporary hand and had no right to the post. 11. In State of U.P. Ram Chandra Trivedi, (1976) 4 SCC 42 , which also is in point, the respondent was a temporary hand and had no right to the post. Both under the contract of service and the service rules governing the respondent, the State had a right to terminate his services by giving him one month's notice. The order impugned was ex-facie an order of termination of service simpliciter. It did not cast any stigma on the respondent nor did it visit him with evil consequences, nor was it founded misconduct. It was held that protection under Article 311 (2) did not avail and motive was of little consequence. The test propounded in Nepal Singh v. State of U.P. and others, (1980) 3 SCC 288 . by Pathak, J. speaking for the Division Bench as under also meets the factual situation hereof : "It is now settled law that an order terminating the services of a temporary Government servant and ex-facie innocuous in that it does not cast any stigma on the Government servant or visits him with penal consequences must be regarded as effecting a termination simpliciter, but if it is discovered on the basis of material adduced that although innocent in its terms the order was passed in fact with a view to punishing the Government servant, it is a punitive order which can be passed only after complying with Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. The scope of the enquiry called for in such a case has been outlined by one of us in State of Maharashtra v. Veerappa R. Fabaji. But the question which alias for determination in all such cases is whether the facts satisfy the criterion repeatedly laid down by this Court that an order is not passed by way of punishment, and is merely an order of termination simpliciter, if the material against the Government servant on which the superior authority has feted constitutes the notice and not the foundation for the order. The application of the testis not always easy. In each case it is necessary to examine the entire range of facts carefully and consider whether in the light of those facts the superior authority intended to punish the Government servant or, having regard to his character, conduct and suitability in relation to the post held by him. It was intended skimpily to terminate his services. In each case it is necessary to examine the entire range of facts carefully and consider whether in the light of those facts the superior authority intended to punish the Government servant or, having regard to his character, conduct and suitability in relation to the post held by him. It was intended skimpily to terminate his services. The function of the court is to discover the nature of the order by attempting to ascertain what was the motivating consideration in the mind of the authority which prompted the order." 12. For the petitioners, learned counsel relied on Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India and other, (1984) 2 SCC 369 . We have carefully looked into the facts thereof and find that they stand on distinct footing. The petitioner in that case who was a probationer was delayed on a particular date in reaching the field where the ceremonial drill practice to conduct P. T. unarmed combat practice meant for trainees in the Indian Police Service was to take place. This delay was considered as an incident which called for an enquiry. Explanation was called for and the petitioner was considered to be one of the ringleaders who was responsible for the delay. The Director without holding an enquiry into the alleged misconduct recommended to the Government of India that the appellant should be discharged from the service and he was so discharged. The Supreme Court took note of the fact that. "The cases of other probationers who were also considered to be ringleaders were not seriously taken note of" and that only the case of the appellant was dealt with severely in the end. Further, it was laid down that the recommendation of the Director which was the foundation for the order should be read along with the order to determine its true character and, "If on reading the two together the Court reaches the conclusion that the alleged act of misconduct was the cause of the order and that but for that incident it would not have been passed then it is inevitable that the order of discharge should fall to the ground as the appellant has not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself as provided in Article 311(2) of the Constitution" (Emphasis supplied). That was thus a case originating from a single act of misconduct and the order impugned was based thereon ; this cannot be applicable to a case where the overall assessment rests on performance and conduct spread over a length of period. In Nepal Singh v. State of U.P. and others, (1985) 1 SCC 56 . also the dominating factor which influenced the mind of the D.I.G. of Police was a solitary episode namely the allegation that the appellant had married a second wife against the Government Servants' conduct rules. It was held that with the dropping of enquiry allegations of misconduct remained unverified and it was not open to circumvent the constitutional provision of Article 311 (2). 13. In effect the position was not different in V.K. Singh v. Union of India, 1984 Lab IC 1559. decided by a Division Bench of this Court on which counsel for the petitioners relied. The discharge of the I.A.S. probationer therein also proceeded on a solitary episode during a trek and the dictum of the Supreme Court in Anoop Jaiwal (supra) vas followed. 14. In Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab and another, (1974) 2 SCC 831 . the Bench of 7 Hon'ble Judges affirmed that the fact of holding an enquiry is not always conclusive. A probationer whose terms of service provide that it could be terminated without any notice and without any cause being assigned could not claim the protection of Article 311 (2). A preliminary enquiry to satisfy that there was reason to dispense with the services of a temporary employees does not attract Article 311. When a preliminary enquiry is held, as in the case before us, by the employer to ascertain the correctness of the allegations made against its employee and if thereafter it decides to terminate the services by simple order of termination without taking any disciplinary proceeding to punish the employee, the order of termination cannot be said to be punitive in nature. The petitioners cannot have a grouse consequently that there is breach of principles of natural justice. A. K. Home Chaudhary v. National Textile Corporation U.P. Ltd. and others, 1984 UPLBEC 81 (Alld) (Division Bench). 15. Having regard to the discussion made in the above we find that these petitioners are devoid of merit. 16. The petitioners consequently dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. A. K. Home Chaudhary v. National Textile Corporation U.P. Ltd. and others, 1984 UPLBEC 81 (Alld) (Division Bench). 15. Having regard to the discussion made in the above we find that these petitioners are devoid of merit. 16. The petitioners consequently dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. The interim stay granted against the impugned orders of termination are discharged.