JUDGMENT : KAMLESHWAR NATH, J. 1. This is an election petition u/s 80 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (For short, the Act) for a declaration that the election of Respondent 'Sri Rajiv Gandhi to the Lok Sabha (House of People) from 25 Amethi Parliamentary Constituency, District Sultanpur, is void. 2. The Petitioner, Bhagwati Prasad Dixit "Ghorewala" was one of the several candidates for the purpose. In the result declared on 29-12-84, after the poll, the Respondent was declared elected by a margin of more than three lakhs votes against his close rival Mrs. Maneka Gandhi. The Petitioner, amongst others, consequently lost the election. 3. The validity of the election has been challenged en the following grounds: 1. The Respondent married an Italian lady and acquired properties in his name as well as in the name of his wife Mrs. Sonia Gandhi in Italy, in consequence of which the Respondent would be deemed to have ceased to be an Indian citizen u/s y of the Citizenship Act, that according to the Petitioner constitutes a disqualification under Article 102(1)(d) of the Constitution of India. These allegations were set out in paras 7 to 13 of the petition. 2. At the time when the election was held, the Respondent continued to be a member of the Parliament which, till then, had not been dissolved and since he was drawing his salary, he held an office of profit within the meaning of Article 102(1)(a) of the Constitution and, therefore was disqualified from being chosen as a member of the Parliament. These facts are stated in paras 14 to 16 of the election petition. 3. The appointment of Sri R.K. Trivedi as Chief Election Commissioner of India was illegal because he did not possess the requisite qualifications as laid down in Article 324 of the Constitution. According to the Petitioner a person to be appointed as Chief Election Commissioner should be qualified to be a Judge of the Supreme Court of India, while Sri R.K. Trivedi belonged to the cadre of I.A.S. only. The notification of the election u/s 14 of the Act and all subsequent proceedings of the election, without dissolving the Parliament, thus was contrary to law and the entire election was vitiated. These facts are set out in the petition in Paras 17 to 29. The notification of the election u/s 14 of the Act and all subsequent proceedings of the election, without dissolving the Parliament, thus was contrary to law and the entire election was vitiated. These facts are set out in the petition in Paras 17 to 29. The first and second grounds fall u/s 109(1)(a) of the Act; the third ground falls under the provisions of Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act and for that reason it was prayed by the Petitioner's that the election of the Respondent be declared void. 4. The Respondent filed C.M. An. No. 16(E) of 1983 under Order 6 Rule 16 CPC with a prayer to strike out the above described paragraphs of the election petition and to dismiss the election petition as one not disclosing a cause of action. 5. The Petitioner filed C.M. An. No. 20(E) of 1985 in reply to the Respondent's said application. This order governs these two applications, and Petitioner's C.M. An. No. 37(E) of 1965 for serving interrogatories on the Respondent. 6. Sri N.L. Jaiswal has appeared on behalf of the Petitioner and Sri S.C. Maheshwari has appeared on behalf of the Respondent. They have been heard at length. 7. In respect of the first ground of attack, consisting of Paras 8 to 13 of the election petition, the contention of the learned Counsel for the Respondent is that the allegations made are reckless, irrelevant and untenable in facts and law, that the Respondent did not voluntarily acquire the citizenship of another country, that indeed the Respondent's wife has acquired Indian citizenship and was an Indian citizen at the time of elections, and that the Respondent had not suffered the alleged disqualifications. It is also urged on behalf of the Respondent that it is not for this Court to decide the question of citizenship of Respondent because u/s 9(2) of the Citizenship Act, 1955, it must be decided by the Central Government. 8. It appears to me that the competence of this Court to decide the question of citizenship of the Respondent clearly follows from the provisions of Section 100(1)(a) of the Act. The Representation of the People Act 1951 is a special Act which governs the determination of all disputes regarding the election of a person to the Parliament or a State Legislature and all the rights of the parties must be found within the four corners of that Act. The Representation of the People Act 1951 is a special Act which governs the determination of all disputes regarding the election of a person to the Parliament or a State Legislature and all the rights of the parties must be found within the four corners of that Act. This position would be clear from the cases of Surinder Singh Vs. Hardial Singh and Others, AIR 1985 SC 89 and Arun Kumar Bose Vs. Mohd. Furkan Ansari and Others, AIR 1983 SC 1311 , Section 100(1)(a) of the Act clearly says that subject to the provisions of Sub-section (2) of that section the High Court shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void if it is of the opinion "that on the date of his election a returned candidate was not qualified or was disqualified, to be chosen to fill the seat under the constitution of this Act." The question of qualification or disqualification of the returned candidate, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, is, therefore, a matter specifically within the purview of the High Court considering it in an election petition. The provisions of Section 9(2) of the Citizenship Act, 1955 are a creation of the powers of Parliament as envisaged under Articles 10 and 11 of the Constitution of India. The loss of Indian Citizenship, on voluntary acquisition of citizenship of a foreign State, is envisaged in Article 9 of the Constitution. That Constitutional provision, so to say, has only been elaborated by Section 9(1) of the Citizenship Act, 1955 which says, inter alia, that any citizen of India who by naturalisation, registration or otherwise voluntarily acquires the citizenship of another country, shall upon such acquisition cease to be a citizen of India. Since these matters shall have to be considered while determining the qualification of a candidate under Article 102(1)(d) of the Constitution, read with Section 1OO(1)(a) of the Act, the provision of Section 9(2) of the Citizenship Act 1955 must yield to the provisions of the Act and the Constitution. The objection on behalf of the Respondent, therefore, that the question could be decided only by the Central Government and not by this Court must fail. The objection on behalf of the Respondent, therefore, that the question could be decided only by the Central Government and not by this Court must fail. Reliance by the learned Counsel for the Respondent on the decision dated 24th July, 1984, in Civil Appeal No. 1339 (M) of 1971 State of U.P. v. Mohammad Din and Civil Appeal No. 2344 (M) of 1971 State of U.P. v. Abdul Rashid is misplaced because the question there related to the jurisdiction of the civil courts in a suit for declaration of rights of citizenship; it did not arise in a case before the court of special jurisdiction like the present case. In my opinion, the question of alleged loss of citizenship by the Respondent on the ground of alleged acquisition of citizenship of Italy is open for decision by this Court in this election petition. 9. However, learned Counsel for the Petitioner has not been able to show that merely because the Respondent married an Italian lady or had acquired, if at all, properties in Italy, be could be deemed to have voluntarily acquired the citizenship of Italy in consequence of which he might have lost his citizenship of India under Article 9 of the Constitution or Section 9(1) of the Citizenship Act 1955. The act of marrying or acquiring property in a foreign State does not constitute an act of "naturalization, registration or otherwise voluntary acquisition of citizenship of a foreign State." 10. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner urged that the question as to how the Respondent voluntarily acquired the citizenship of Italy is a matter which could be settled only on the evidence at the time of trial. It is urged that for this purpose it was incumbent upon the Respondent to file a written statement stating the relevant facts. In particular, learned Counsel for the Petitioner filed C.M. An. No. 37(E) of 1985 in this Court in the course of his arguments on 30-4-1985 for leave to serve interrogatories upon the Respondent to answer certain questions. In substance, the questions seek the Respondent's statement about when and where he married Mrs. Sonia Gandhi, whether at the time of marriage the citizenship of the Respondent and his wife was one and the same, under what provision of law or custom of the country the marriage was performed and on what date Mrs. Sonia Gandhi obtained Indian citizenship. In substance, the questions seek the Respondent's statement about when and where he married Mrs. Sonia Gandhi, whether at the time of marriage the citizenship of the Respondent and his wife was one and the same, under what provision of law or custom of the country the marriage was performed and on what date Mrs. Sonia Gandhi obtained Indian citizenship. The Respondent was further desired to indicate whether he bad acquired any property in his wife's name in Italy and whether in the documents executed for acquisition of those properties the Respondent had specified his citizenship as India. The prayer to serve interrogatories has been opposed by the learned Counsel for the Respondent who, on the contrary, contends that on the own showing of the Petitioner he did not know material facts regarding the question of acquisition of the citizenship of Italy by the Respondent for which purpose the interrogatories are roving and fishing enquiry. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner says that the facts, In respect of which interrogatories are sought to be served, are within the special knowledge of the Respondent and, therefore, the Petitioner was in no position to state about them. It appears to me that the necessity of setting forth material fact u/s 83(1)(a) of the Act by the Petitioner is not relieved by the fact that some of the facts may be within the special knowledge of the Respondent. In the first place, there is no specific pleading by the Petitioner that the Respondent lost his Indian citizenship in any manner other than by marrying a lady of Italian nationality and acquiring some properties in Italy. The pleading has been put up in Para 9 of the petition in the following words: That on account of his marriage with a lady of Italian Nationality his citizenship of India shall be deemed to have been ceased under the provisions of Section 9 of the Citizenship Act. (Emphasis supplied). The reason of loss of Indian citizenship thus is specified to be only the Respondent's marriage. In para 11 of the election petition it was, however, said that the Respondent's marriage "shall be deemed to have been performed under the prevailing law of Italy and hence without losing the Indian citizenship, the said marriage could not be performed." (Emphasis supplied). The reason of loss of Indian citizenship thus is specified to be only the Respondent's marriage. In para 11 of the election petition it was, however, said that the Respondent's marriage "shall be deemed to have been performed under the prevailing law of Italy and hence without losing the Indian citizenship, the said marriage could not be performed." (Emphasis supplied). Judicial notice could be taken of any law prevailing in Italy to the effect alleged and it was the duty of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner to produce the law at the time of hearing. In the verification clause of the election petition this paragraph is stated to be believed to be true on legal advice received from the counsel. In the absence of an elucidation of the so called "prevailing law of Italy", the pleading is vague. It is in this context that the Petitioner went on to say in Para 12 of the election petition that the citizenship of the Respondent "therefore stood terminated". Learned Counsel for the Respondent correctly contends that it was necessary for the Petitioner to set out when and how the Respondent "voluntarily acquired" the citizenship of Italy as the statement of a material fact u/s 83(1)(a) of the Act. The allegation, therefore, of the Respondents voluntarily acquiring the citizenship of a foreign State and thereby losing the citizenship of India is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible and, therefore, embarrassing within the meaning of Order 6 Rule 16(b) CPC According to Webster, HI New International Dictionary, 1971 Edition, Volume I at page 739, the expression 'embarrass' means "to place in doubt, perplexity or difficulty." It appears to me that a pleading which is ambiguous or unintelligible or which contains vague, unnecessary or irrelevant allegations, is said to be embarrassing. In the case of Davy v. Carret (1978) 7 Ch. D. 473 the following observations at page 483 are significant: Now nothing is more embarrassing to a Defendant than a number of statements which may be irrelevant and which he, therefore, does not know what to do. In the case of Davy v. Carret (1978) 7 Ch. D. 473 the following observations at page 483 are significant: Now nothing is more embarrassing to a Defendant than a number of statements which may be irrelevant and which he, therefore, does not know what to do. Almost every statement in this claim appears calculated to embarrass the Defendant in ascertaining what is the case which he has to meet." It appears to me that in the present case, the allegation in the petition that the Respondent had voluntarily acquired the citizenship of Italy, for the purposes of his marriage, is extremely vague, ambiguous and unintelligible, it is clearly embarrassing and cannot be permitted to stand. The other reason of loss of Indian Citizenship, apart from the fact of marriage with a lady of Italian nationality or acquiring some properties in Italy, has no foundation in law and is clearly frivolous within the meaning of Clause (a) of Order 6 Rule 16 Code of Civil Procedure. The expression 'frivolous' has been described to mean "of little weight or important; having no basis in law or facts" Webster III New international Dictionary, 1971 Edition Volume I, at page 913. In the ultimate analysis, therefore, the Petitioner's pleading of the Respondent's disqualification is embarrassing and frivolous and having regard to the provisions of Order 6 Rule 16 CPC cannot be permitted to stand. 12. In respect of the Petitioner's plea of the Respondent's disqualification for the reason of his holding an office of profit under the government, being a member of the Parliament at the time of election, as set out in Paras 14 and 15 of the election petition, the contention of learned Counsel for the Respondent is that the allegations are wholly untenable, misconceived and reckless. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner says that a member of the Parliament draws salary from the government and, therefore, holds an office of profit under Article 102(1)(a) of the Constitution. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner says that a member of the Parliament draws salary from the government and, therefore, holds an office of profit under Article 102(1)(a) of the Constitution. According to Article 102(1)(a) of the Constitution a person is disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of either House of Parliament" if be holds any office of profit under the Government of India...other than an office declared by Parliament by law not to disqualify its holder." Learned Counsel for the Petitioner refers to Clause (2) of Article 102 which says that a person shall not be deemed to hold office of profit under the Government of India or the Government of any State by reason only that he is a Minister. In this very context be also refers to The Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1959, where Section 3 contains a declaration that the offices mentioned thereunder "in so far as it is an office of profit under the Government of India" or the Government of any State " shall not disqualify the holder thereof for being chosen as, or for being, a member of Parliament. The list subjoined to the section describes any office held by a Minister, Minister of State or Deputy Minister for the Union or for any State, whether ex officio or by name. "Several other clauses describe several other varieties of offices. The argument is that every Minister, Minister of State or Deputy Minister is a Member of Parliament and since Article 102(2) of the Constitution excludes a Minister from the category of a person holding an office of profit under the Government and similarly Section 3 of the Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1959 excludes any office, held by a Minister etc., to be an office of profit under the Government, but similar exemption has not been accorded to a member of the Parliament, it should follow that the law recognized a member of Parliament to be a person holding an office of profit under the Government. Learned Counsel for the Respondent says that a Minister of State or a Deputy Minister is the holder of an office and since that office is one under the Government, it would have been an office of profit under the Government but for the exemption accorded by the above-mentioned provisions of the Constitution of India, The Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1959. He contends that the office of a member of Parliament is not an office under the Government at all, much less an office of profit under the Government because he is only a member of the Central Legislature which is independent of the executive to which the Government belongs. The contention of learned Counsel for the Respondent, in my opinion, seems to be correct. Part V of the Constitution of India deals with the Executive in Chapter I and with the Parliament in Chapter II. The constitution of the executive as set forth in Chapter I incorporates the President of India, in whom the Executive power of the Union is vested (under Article 53) and a Council of Ministers to aid and advise him in exercise of his functions (vide Article 74). The Ministers are stated in Article 75(2) of the Constitution to hold office during the pleasure of the President; Clause (d) of Article 79 of the Constitution speaks about the salaries and allowances of the Ministers. It is clear from the provisions that Ministers are part of the Executive for the purposes of Government. Chapter I does not deal with the role of the Ministers as members of the Parliament only. It does not deal with the members of the Parliament at all, 13. The provisions regarding Parliament are set out in Chapter II and is stated under Article 70 of the Constitution to consist of the President and the two houses known as Council of States and House of people. Articles 80 and 81 of the Constitution specify the number of persons to be the members respectively of the Council of States and House of People. The only persons who are described in the constitution of the Parliament to be "Officers of the Parliament" are the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Council of States (vide Article 89) and the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the House of People (vide Article 93). The remuneration paid to these officers of the Parliament are described as salaries and allowances in Article 97. Apart from these officers, each House of the Parliament has a separate secretarial staff whose condition of service, including recruitment, is governed by law made by the Parliament or until the framing of such law, by rules made by the President vide Article 98. 14. Apart from these officers, each House of the Parliament has a separate secretarial staff whose condition of service, including recruitment, is governed by law made by the Parliament or until the framing of such law, by rules made by the President vide Article 98. 14. In this scheme of the officers and personnel of the Parliament, a member of the Parliament, as such, is not visualised to be a person appointed by any authority of the Government of India or drawing salary by virtue of any such appointment. Likewise, there is no concept of the removal of a member of parliament by any authority in the capacity of his appointing authority, apart from his disqualification under Article 102 of the Constitution or the vacation of his seat under Article 101 of the Constitution. The function of a member of the Parliament, as such, is to sit and take part in the proceedings of the respective Houses which has nothing to do with the functions of the executive. Indeed, the very disqualification of a person to be chosen and or being a member of either House of the Parliament, on account of holding of any office of profit under the Government, is contemplated under Article 102 of the Constitution, postulates that ex facie a member of the Parliament is not a person holding an office of profit under the Government, The mere fact that the members of the parliament receive salary and allowances will not establish the relationship of master and servant between him and the authority making the payment. The liability of the concerned authority to pay salaries and allowances of a member of parliament is a statutory liability, either under some Act of the Parliament or by the laws prevailing immediately before the commencement of the Constitution as set forth in Article 106 of the Constitution. The dominant test to determine whether a person holds an office of profit under the Government is to find out as to who is the appointing and removing authority of the officer concerned as pointed out in the case of Kona Prabhakara Rao Vs. M. Seshagiri Rao and Another, AIR 1981 SC 658 . It is not shown that the Government of India was the appointing or removing authority of any member o, parliament. The Respondent, therefore, did not suffer from any disqualification to be chosen as a member of the parliament. M. Seshagiri Rao and Another, AIR 1981 SC 658 . It is not shown that the Government of India was the appointing or removing authority of any member o, parliament. The Respondent, therefore, did not suffer from any disqualification to be chosen as a member of the parliament. Indeed the Petitioner's pleading in this respect is only frivolous and, therefore, cannot be permitted to stand. 15. In respect of the ground of illegal appointment of Sri R.N. Trivedi as Chief Election Commissioner and the alleged consequential illegality in the entire process of election, as set up in paras 17 to 20 of the election petition, the contention of the learned Counsel for the Respondent is that they are absolutely untenable, irrelevant and have no nexus to the validity of the Respondent's election. It is urged that the Petitioner has not been able to point out any provision of the Constitution of India or of the Act which might have been violated in appointing Sri R.K. Trivedi to be the Chief Election Commissioner. The ground, according to the learned Counsel for the Respondent should fall within the mischief of Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act where, inter alia, it is essential for the Petitioner to plead that the result of the election, insofar as it concerns the returned candidate, has been materially affected by the alleged illegality in the appointment of Sri R.K. Trivedi. It is pointed out on behalf of the Respondent that the Petitioner has lot set up any such plea. 16. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has not been able to refer to my direct provision in the Constitution or in the Act in support of his contention that a person to be appointed as Chief Election Commissioner must josses the qualification of a Judge of the Supreme Court. Only an inferential argument Is set up on the basis of Article 324(5) of the Constitution whose first proviso says that the Chief Election Commissioner shall not be removed from his office except in like manner and on the like grounds as a Judge of the Supreme Court. This proviso, while dealing with the removal, cannot be interpreted to signify a qualification for appointment. This proviso, while dealing with the removal, cannot be interpreted to signify a qualification for appointment. Learned Counsel for the Respondent has correctly pointed out that different provisions of the constitution relating to different dignitaries of the State, who may be removable in substantially similar manner or circumstances, are required to possess different qualifications for the purposes of appointment. It is pointed out that under Article 124(4) of the Constitution, a Judge of the Supreme Court is not removable from his office except by an order of the President passed after an address of each House of Parliament supported by a specified majority presented to the President In a particular session on specified grounds', and according to the proviso (b) to Article 217(1) of the Constitution a Judge of the High Court may be removed from his office in the manner provided In Clause (4) of Article 124 for removal of a Judge of the Supreme Court. Despite this identity of the procedure for removal, the qualification for appointment of a person as a Judge of the Supreme Court under Clause (3) of Article 124 is substantially different from those for appointment of a person as a Judge of the High Court under Clause (2) of Article 217 of the Constitution. There is thus substance in the contention of the learned Counsel for the Respondent that the mere provision of the necessity of applying the same procedure for removal of the Chief Election Commissioner from his office as that for a Judge of the Supreme Court, does not establish that the qualification for appointment of a person as Chief Election Commissioner should be the same as for that of a Judge of the Supreme Court. It is not shown, therefore, that there has been a violation of the provisions of the Constitution or of the Act in making the appointment of Sri R.K. Trivedi as the Chief Election Commissioner of India which could be a ground for vitiating the election of the Respondent u/s 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act. Further, as already pointed out, the Petitioner has not pleaded that the supposed illegality In the appointment in question has materially affected the result of the election insofar as it concerns the Respondent within the meaning of the said provision. The pleading on this point by the Petitioner has no basis in law or fact and is, therefore, frivolous. 17. Further, as already pointed out, the Petitioner has not pleaded that the supposed illegality In the appointment in question has materially affected the result of the election insofar as it concerns the Respondent within the meaning of the said provision. The pleading on this point by the Petitioner has no basis in law or fact and is, therefore, frivolous. 17. These are all the grounds on which the Petitioner has challenged the validity of the election of the Respondent. For reasons stated, the entire pleadings of the grounds, contained in paras 7 to 20 of the election petition, are hit by the mischief under Order 6 Rule 16 CPC and, therefore, must be struck out. 18. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, however, raised two points in this connection. In the first instance, it was urged that the Respondent's C.M. An. No. 16(E) of 1985, under consideration, is no application in the eyes of law because the affidavit in support thereof is contrary to the provisions of Order 19 Rule 9 CPC which would apply in view of Article 87 of the Act. It is pointed out that all the paragraphs of the application have been affirmed by the Respondent to be "true according to the legal advice received and believed to be true." Learned Counsel for the Petitioner says that this kind of animation is not recognised under Order 19 Rule 9 CPC (Allahabad) which says that except in interlocutory proceedings, affidavits shall strictly be confirmed to such facts as the declarant is able of his own knowledge to prove. The rule goes on to say that in interlocutory proceedings, when the particular fact is not within the declarant's own knowledge, but is stated from information obtained from others, the declarant must state the name and address of the person from whom he received such information. Legal advice received, it is contended, is information received and, therefore, it was necessary for the Respondent to disclose the name of the legal advisor concerned. 19. There are several objections to this contention. Firstly, legal advice is not information, information must relate to fact; advice cannot be a fact. Legal advice received, it is contended, is information received and, therefore, it was necessary for the Respondent to disclose the name of the legal advisor concerned. 19. There are several objections to this contention. Firstly, legal advice is not information, information must relate to fact; advice cannot be a fact. Secondly, between a lawyer and his client the communication is privileged and it cannot be forced to be brought on record in view of Section 129 of the Evidence Act, the relevant portion of which runs as follows: No one shall be compelled to disclose to the court any confidential communication which has taken place between him and his legal professional advisor... If a confidential communication between a person and his legal professional adviser cannot be required to be disclosed, the name of the legal adviser also would be exempt from such a disclosure. Thirdly, the Petitioner's own affidavit suffers from the same infirmity in respect of all the material fact, whatever their worth, set out in the petition. In the verification clause of the election petition, Paras 8 to 21 are described as "believed to be true on legal advice received" in the affirmation clause of the affidavit it is stated that the contents of paras 9 to 21, 23, 26 and 27 "are believed to be true on the legal advice received from the counsel." If the affidavit in support of the Respondent's C.M. An. No. 16(E) 1985 suffers from non-acceptability for the reason of manner of verification, the Petitioner's own petition and affidavit would suffer, from the same defect and would be no petition in the eyes of law. The Petitioner cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate. 20. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner urged that the Respondent was legally bound to file his written statement and was not entitled to make an application under Order 6 Rule 16 CPC instead and, therefore, the application under Order 6 Rule 16 CPC does not deserve to be considered. He says that since on 15-3-1985 this Court had ordered notice to be issued to the Respondent calling upon him, interalia, to file a written statement, the Respondent was bound to obey that order, and since he had not done that, he was not entitled to be heard on the application under Order 6 Rule 16 Code of Civil Procedure. This contention cannot be accepted for several reasons. 21. This contention cannot be accepted for several reasons. 21. In the first instance, a motion for striking out of the pleadings under Order 6 Rule 16 CPC is capable of being made "at any stage of the proceedings." In the second place, Rule 5 of Chapter XVA of the rules of Court visualizes a notice to the Respondent "to appear and answer the claim on a date to be specified." The Rule goes on to say that such notice shall "also direct that if he wishes to put a defence he shall file his written statement...." It seems that in view of this provision the direction to appear and answer the claim is not necessarily the one to file a written statement at once, the option to file a written statement left with the Respondent. That is the precise direction contained in this Court's order dated 15-3-1985. As such, having regard to the clear languages under Order 6 Rule 16 CPC the Respondent was at liberty to file an application for striking out the pleadings in the first instance rather than file a written statement. 22. The last point urged by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that, if, on account of the striking out of the Petitioner's pleadings, the petition may not be found to disclose a cause of action, the order of rejection of the petition under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC could be passed at the trial stage and not at any other stage. The contention is that when a petition is admitted, it cannot be rejected, and the petition itself has to proceed to the merits when it might entail dismissal. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has referred to a Allahabad decision in the case of Smt. Kalawati Devi Vs. Chandra Prakash and Others, AIR 1959 All 37 and Anr. case of Gujarat in Devnarayan Ramkumar Tewari v. State of Bombay now Gujarat 1963 Guj. 79. It would be enough to point out that in the case of Ruplal Sathi v. Nachchattar Singh (1982) 3 SCC 487 the Supreme Court has said that in view of Section 87(1) of the Act, the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC would apply, although the rule would not justify the rejection of a part of the election petition. In the case of Madan Lal v. Zargham Haider AIR 1938 All. In the case of Madan Lal v. Zargham Haider AIR 1938 All. 596 a Division Bench of this Court held that after striking out of the pleadings in the election petition, the petition itself is liable to be dismissed on the ground that it did not disclose any cause of action and the dismissal would be one on merits u/s 98 of the Act. In the case of Hardwari Lal Vs. Kanwal Singh, AIR 1972 SC 515 Para 23 It has been pointed out that since an election petition has to be tried as nearly as may be in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure, in view of Section 87 of the Act, it is liable to be dismissed like a suit which does not furnish a cause of action. It is not necessary in view of this legal position to direct that the election petition be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, the proper direction is to dismiss the election petition u/s 98 of the Act. 23. In view of what has been stated above, C.M. An. No. 16(E) of 1985 is allowed, the Petitioner's objection thereto, contained in CM. An. No. 20(E) of 1985, and C.M. An. No. 37(E) of 1985 for service of interrogatories upon the Respondent are dismissed, paras 7 to 20 of the election petition are struck out. 24. The election petition is dismissed for failure to disclose a cause of action. 25. The Petitioner shall pay the costs of the Respondent.