JUDGMENT K.N. Goyal, J. - In this group of writ petitions the levy of additional market fee on rice under U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti Ordinance No. 40 of 1983 has been assailed on a number of grounds. 2. Some of the writ petitions were filed during the period this Ordinance was in force. The said Ordinance expired and was not replaced by an Act of Legislature. Thereafter some more writ petitions were filed. All of them are before us for consideration today. All the writ petitions are listed today except W.P. No. 2821 of 1984 whose record was also summoned from the office as agreed by parties counsel and the same is also being disposed of by this judgment. 3. The first point that was urged on behalf of the petitioners by learned counsel Sri U. K. Srivastava, whose arguments were adopted by other learned counsel appearing in some of the cases, was that after the expiry of the Ordinance it was no longer open to the authorities to realise the additional market fee. It was contended that S. 6 of the U.P. General Clauses Act applies only to repeal of an enactment and not to expiry of the Ordinance which was limited in point of time. A number of decisions were cited with respect to proposition, namely, that the expression "repeal of an enactment" under S. 6 does not cover expiry of an Act or Ordinance. However, these decisions would not be of any help in the instant case because so far as this State is concerned a new S. 6-B has been inserted by the Amending Act of 1975 which specifically provides that the provisions of S. 6 shall apply to expiry of a temporary Act in the same manner as they apply to repeal of an enactment. S. 30 of the Act lays down that the provisions of the Act shall apply to an Ordinance as they apply to an Act. 4. Reading these two sections together it follows that the provisions of S. 6 would apply to expiry of an Ordinance in the same manner as they apply to repeal of an enactment. Accordingly any unpaid fee due for a period the Ordinance was in force would remain outstanding as an enforceable responsibility even after expiry of the Ordinance. 5. 4. Reading these two sections together it follows that the provisions of S. 6 would apply to expiry of an Ordinance in the same manner as they apply to repeal of an enactment. Accordingly any unpaid fee due for a period the Ordinance was in force would remain outstanding as an enforceable responsibility even after expiry of the Ordinance. 5. It was next urged that because of interim orders granted by this Court the petitioners who are traders have not been able to realise additional market fee from purchasers. As such even if the writ petitions were to be dismissed it should be laid down that the authorities should consider this aspect of the matter before realising additional market fee from the petitioners. We do not think any observations are called for on this point. If the petitioners obtained stay orders it was at their own risk and responsibility and they cannot take advantage of any such orders in case the petitions are ultimately dismissed. 6. Thirdly, it was urged that the Market Samities were not rendering adequate services in respect of which they were charging market fee and additional market fee. In the absence of a correspondence between income and expenditure the fee would assume the character of a tax. We find, however, that no adequate factual accommodation has been laid for this plea in these writ petitions beyond a vague averment that huge funds are lying with the Market Samities and that no services are being rendered. No details are given even about approximate income from market fee or additional market fee or expenditure incurred or planned to be incurred by the Samities. On the other hand counter-affidavits have been filed showing details of income and expenditure, and the same stand unrebutted. We, therefore, do not find any good ground to hold that the fee has assumed the character of a tax on the ground of non-providing of the services. Indeed as observed by us few days back in Writ Petition No. 10 of 1984 U.P. Khandsari Manufacturers Association v. State connected with several other matters, the Mandi Samities are still in the process of expansion and there is also further scope of expansion or improvement of services. In the absence of sufficient material the levy cannot in the eye of law be held to be excessive. 7. In the absence of sufficient material the levy cannot in the eye of law be held to be excessive. 7. Lastly it was urged that the levy of additional market fee was in violation of the provisions of S. 17 of the principal Act which fixes a ceiling to the rate of market fee. As above pointed out by us in U.P. Khandsari Manufacturers Association (Supra), no question of inconsistency between an Act and Ordinance arises, the latter not being a piece of Subordinate Legislation. Both the Act and the Ordinance have to be given effect to. Of course, the said Ordinance was an indirect method of amending the Act and bowing to the pressure of public opinion the Government has refrained from replacing it by an Act of Legislature. Legislature has however, not repealed the Ordinance retrospectively. As such there is no scope of challenging of payment of additional market fee for the period during which the Ordinance remained in force. 8. In this view of the matter these writ petitions are, dismissed. Stay orders are also vacated.