N. N. SHARMA, J. ( 1 ) BOTH the above cases are being disposed of by this common order as common questions of facts and law are involved. ( 2 ) THE revisionist and the applicant in both the cases is Sri Dinkar Rao, Chairman, Prathama Bank, Head-Office, Prathama Bhawan, Nainital Road, Moradabad. ( 3 ) SRI Vijai Kumar Goel, opposite party No. 1, used to be probationary Manager in the said bank who has been placed under suspension on 10. 3. 1981 by the revisionist-applicant while posted at Dilari Branch of the said bank. Charge-sheets drawn against O. P. No. 1 are dated 2. 2. 1981 and 20. 7. 1981 (Annexures 4 and 5 of the affidavit ). ( 4 ) ON 20. 8. 1981, a complaint was filed in the court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Moradabad by Sri Vijai Kumar Goel against one Karan Singh and the revisionist applicant under sections 500 and 500 read with Section 109 of Indian Penal Code. Sri Karan Singh, against whom the complaint was filed under Section 500 of Indian Penal Code, is not applicant or revisionist before me. Co-accused Dinkar Rao, summoned under Section 500 read with Section 109 of Indian Penal Code, is the applicant and revisionist. The order of summoning the revisionist-applicant was recorded on 10. 8. 1981 by Sri Dhani Ram, Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Moradabad in Criminal Case No. 2774/9 of 1981. ( 5 ) THE complainant alleged that he was well educated and a man of status and was Probationary Branch Manager in the said bank in the scale of Rs. 700-1250/ -. On 22. 6. 1979, the revisionist- applicant, without any rhyme or reason, transferred him to Dilari Branch. The complaint challenged that order by filing Civil Suit No. 342 of 1979 of the Court of Munsif, Moradabad and sought an adinterim injunction also against the Chairman restraining him from giving effect to the transfer order. On 14. 2. 80, at about 9. 00 a. m. complainant found co-accused Karan Singh standing in front of the house of revisionist; he was informed by Karan Singh that he was standing there to make entreaties before revisionist to re-employ his son as a Clerk and not to strick to termination order of the clerical job recorded by him earlier. 2. 80, at about 9. 00 a. m. complainant found co-accused Karan Singh standing in front of the house of revisionist; he was informed by Karan Singh that he was standing there to make entreaties before revisionist to re-employ his son as a Clerk and not to strick to termination order of the clerical job recorded by him earlier. ( 6 ) ACCUSED No. 1 further informed the complainant that accused No. 2 Chairman was, ready to reemploy his son provided he signed and verified an affidavit to the prejudice of complainant. On 24. 2. 1980, accused No. 1 again met complainant at his residence and apprised him that he had no axe to grind against the complainant but was actuated by a desire to reemploy his son only. ( 7 ) ON 1. 5. 1980, complainant received Banks letter No. PBHO/2238/com/dev/80 dated 28. 4. 1980 along with a copy of the affidavit dated 4. 3. 1980 inviting his comments. The relevant paras of the said affidavit extracted 10 para 16a of the complainant disclosed that the complainant requested accused No. 1 to advance hi m a loan of Rs. 4,000/- with promise to repay the same within one month of the date of advance, viz. , 27. 1. 1978. On account of dire need of money, this amount was advanced by accused No. 1 to complainant on 27. 1. 1978. However, this money was not deposited by complainant in the account of accused No. 1 on return from Delhi as was promised by him. ( 8 ) THE loan remained unpaid as the complainant told that he had been very kind to his son while posted under him at Prathama Branch as a Clerk from May 1978 to July 1978 for training. The loan was parole and so remained unpaid. ( 9 ) THE contents of the affidavit were false and highly defamatory and published to several persons. When complainant wanted to proceed against accused No. 1, in a court of law, the accused No. 2 did not supply him the original affidavit despite demand and further disapproved such proceeding without the permission by the head of office. So the complainant believed that that affidavit was drafted either by revisionist-applicant or by some one under his command. When complainant wanted to proceed against accused No. 1, in a court of law, the accused No. 2 did not supply him the original affidavit despite demand and further disapproved such proceeding without the permission by the head of office. So the complainant believed that that affidavit was drafted either by revisionist-applicant or by some one under his command. Learned Magistrate recorded the statement of complainant at the back of complaint under Section 200 of Code of Criminal Procedure and passed a brief order in following words: Perused the documents and statement of complainant. Prima facie case for the offence under Section 500 Indian Penal Code is made out. Summons to accused for 20. 8. 81 steps within 3 days. Sd. Dhani Ram, Addi. C. J. M. , Moradabad. ( 10 ) THIS order has been assailed before me. ( 11 ) PARTIES exchanged their affidavits in both the cases. Relevant annexures were also filed by the parties in support of their rival contentions. ( 12 ) I have heard learned counsel for parties and perused the record. ( 13 ) ON behalf of opposite parties, the contention put forward was that the order summoning the accused was merely an interlocutory order and no revision would have lain against such order vide Section 397 (2) of Code of criminal Procedure. ( 14 ) IN this connection, reliance was also placed upon Smt. Swam Anand and others v. Chief Judicial Magistrate and another1. It was held in that case that an order summoning the accused under Section 204 of Criminal Procedure Code was an interlocutory order and was not revisable. It was further laid that ail application under Section 482 against the order to circumvent the provisions of Section 397 (2) was not maintainable. ( 15 ) IT appears that the aforesaid view was departed from in Ram Yash and others v. State of U. P. 2 The learned Judge based himself or Amar Nath v. State of Haryana3. In that case, a Judicial Magistrate had issued summons, to the applicant therein. In para 10 it was observed: The Magistrate on receiving the order of the Sessions Judge summoned the appellants straightway which meant that the appellants were to be put on trial. So long as the Judicial Magistrate had not passed this order, no proceedings were started against the appellants, nor were any such proceedings pending against them. In para 10 it was observed: The Magistrate on receiving the order of the Sessions Judge summoned the appellants straightway which meant that the appellants were to be put on trial. So long as the Judicial Magistrate had not passed this order, no proceedings were started against the appellants, nor were any such proceedings pending against them. It was only with the passing of the impugned order that the proceedings started and the question of the appellants being put up for trial arose for the first time. This was undoubtedly a valuable right which the appellants possessed and which was being denied to them by the impugned order. It cannot, therefore, be said that the appellants were not at all prejudiced, of that any right of theirs was not involved by the impugned order. It is difficult to hold that the impugned order summoning the appellants straightway was merely an interlocutory order which could not be revised by the High Court under subsections (l) and (2) of Section 397 of the 1973 Code. The order of the Judicial Magistrate summoning the appellants in the circumstances of the present case, particularly having regard to what had preceded was undoubtedly a matter of moment, and a valuable right of the appellants had been taken away by the Magistrate in passing an order prima fade in sheer mechanical fashion without applying his mind. We are, therefore, satisfied that the order impugned was one which was a matter of moment and which did involve a decision regarding the rights of the appellants. If the appellants were not summoned, then they could not have faced the trial at all, but by compelling the appellants to face a trial, without proper application of mind, cannot be held to be an interlocutory matter but one which decided a serious question as to the rights of the appellants to be put on trial. ( 16 ) IN the said case, reference was also made to Modhu Limaya v. State of Maharastara4, and V. C. Shukla v. State through C. B. 15. ( 16 ) IN the said case, reference was also made to Modhu Limaya v. State of Maharastara4, and V. C. Shukla v. State through C. B. 15. After a detailed discussion, it was observed at page 311: Having given a thoughtful consideration my humble view is that the Supreme Court in V. C. Shuklas case (supra) has upheld the view taken by Honble Untwalia, J. (as he then was) in Madhu Limayes case (supra) that sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the new Code kept purely interlocutory orders beyond the purview of sub-section (1) of Section 397 and not intermediate orders. In other words, intermediate orders are amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of either the Sessions Court or the High Court, What is an intermediate order? The meaning of this term is contained in volume 60 of the Corpus Juris Secondum. It says: An intermediate order has been de lined as the one made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment. And this has been approved by the Supreme Court in V. C. Shuklas case (supra) in para 22. As shown above, the criminal proceedings against a person commence only when a summons is issued against him by a competent court under Section 204 of the new Code. Therefore, the conclusion is inevitable that an order passed under Section 204 of the new Code issuing a process to a person to appear as an accused is an intermediate order within the meaning of sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the new Code. The instant revision application is, therefore, maintainable in this Court. ( 17 ) I am in respectful agreement with the said view. ( 18 ) PASSING on to the merits of the case, I find that the learned Magistrate while taking the cognizance of the offence under S. 190 (l) (a) of Code of Criminal Procedure recorded the statement of the complainant under Section 200 and proceeded to summon the accused. ( 19 ) ON behalf of revisionist-applicant, it was pointed out that so far as accused No. 2 was concerned, there was hardly anything to connect him with the crime. Mere taking the loan was not a defamatory act. ( 19 ) ON behalf of revisionist-applicant, it was pointed out that so far as accused No. 2 was concerned, there was hardly anything to connect him with the crime. Mere taking the loan was not a defamatory act. It was highly improbable that co-accused Karan Singh would have disclosed this entire conspiracy to the complainant to his own prejudice and even reached the house of complainant to inform him about the plot which was being hatched by both the accused. There was no corroborative evidence to support the interested statement of complainant, who in the list of witnesses, also did not mention the name of any witness as is obvious from the list dated 10. 8. 1981 paper No. 5/14 of the trial court record. Learned Magistrate recorded the statement of complainant mechanically and did not discharge his responsibility faithfully in appreciating the role attributed to the revisionist. Such growing tendency of litigants and Magistrates was deplored in A. S. Nayal and others v. Khem Chand6. ( 20 ) AT the stage of issuing process against the accused, the scope of the inquiry under Section 202 is extremely limited only to the ascertainment of the truth or falsehood of the allegations made in the complaint: (i) on the materials placed by the complainant before the Court; (ii) for the limited purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case for issue of process has been made out; and (iii) for deciding the question purely from the point of view of the complainant without at all adverting to any defence that the accused may have. ( 21 ) AT the stage of enquiry the accused have no locus standi but can assail such an order of Magistrate on following grounds: (1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statement of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not, disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused; (2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (3) whether discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority, and the like. Vide Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and others7. ( 22 ) IN this instant case, it is obvious that Sri Dinkar Rao had already suspended the complainant. Every act attributed to him by the uncorroborated statement of complainant purports to have been done by him in the scope of his employment. He was a public servant being the employee of nationalised bank as was held in S. C. Agarwal v. the State of U. P8. ( 23 ) ANNEXURES 2 and 3 appended to the affidavit of Sri C. P. Vishnoi shall go to disclose that as Chairman of Prathama Bank, appointment of revisionist was made by Central Government and he was not removable from his post except by the approval of Central Government. There is evidence on record to show that the aforesaid bank had been nationalised by the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976 (Act No. 21 of 1976 ). Section 11 of therefore said Act relates to the appointment of Chairman of Regional Rural Bank. In para 8 of his counter affidavit dated 14. 9. 1981, such status of revisionist was not disputed by complainant. ( 24 ) LEARNED Advocate for complainant has pointed out that it was not the function of the Chairman to procure false affidavit and so he could not claim immunity under Section 197 (I) Cr. In para 8 of his counter affidavit dated 14. 9. 1981, such status of revisionist was not disputed by complainant. ( 24 ) LEARNED Advocate for complainant has pointed out that it was not the function of the Chairman to procure false affidavit and so he could not claim immunity under Section 197 (I) Cr. P. C. In this connection reliance was placed upon S. B. Saha and others v. M. S. Kochar9. That was a case of dishonest misappropriation by a public servant. So that ruling is distinguishable. In the instant case, all the acts were done by the revisionist in the discharge of his public duty. So section 197 of Code of Criminal Procedure came into play and the sanction for prosecution of revisionist by the Central Government was necessary. It has been shown above that all the acts enumerated above by complainant bears necessary connection of revisionist with the performance of his official duties. So the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence against the revisionist-applicant except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. Thus, this affords sufficient ground for allowing the revision. ( 25 ) IN order to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of this Court, under Section 842 of Code of Criminal Procedure, it has to be shown that: (i) either it is a case in which the institution or continuance of proceedings amounts to abuse of the process of the court; or (ii) there is a legal bar against the institution of continuance of the proceedings; or (iii) where the allegations in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in its entirety, do not constitute an offence; or (iv) there is no legal evidence in support of the case. ( 26 ) IN the instant case, firstly, there was want of sanction of the Central Government for prosecution of revisionist; secondly, the complainant had obvious reasons to drag the Chairman in the proceedings and thirdly, there was no corroborative evidence to support the statement of complainant so as to satisfy the Magistrate to make out a prima facie case for proceeding against the revisionist. ( 27 ) ANNEXURE 7 is copy of affidavit on be half of Karan Singh co-accused to falsity the story of complainant. ( 27 ) ANNEXURE 7 is copy of affidavit on be half of Karan Singh co-accused to falsity the story of complainant. The acts attributed to revisionist, as enumerated, shall go to show that there is no oral or documentary evidence to corroborate the interested statement of complainant to anyhow drag the revisionist-applicant in the case. It has been shown above that Karan Singh, having conspired with Chairman to injure the complainant, would have been the last person to make a clear breast of the plot to him without any rhyme or reason. Karan Singh was simply an accomplice and never made any statement to engender any belief in the mind of the complainant about any such conspiracy between the accused. Statement of complainant about the utterance of Karan Singh to him was simply hear-say, and could not have been acted upon by any court of law, while exercising its judicial discretion to summon any person as an accused in the case. It was simply a contrivance by the complainant to set at naught the proceeding by Chairman which could result in the dismissal of his service. Thus, all the allegations made in the complaint, even if taken at their face value and accepted in its entirety, could not constitute any offence against the applicant- revisionist nor there was any legal evidence at all in support of the case put forward in the complainant. Such gross abuse of the process of law cannot be countenanced by this Court. ( 28 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, the revision as well as the application under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure are allowed. The proceedings against the revisionist-applicant only are quashed. ( 29 ) SEND the record atonce to the court below for disposal of the case in accordance with law against Karan Singh. ( 30 ) THE interim order dated 31. 8. 1981 in revision is vacated herewith. Revision allowed.