Judgment K. S. LODHA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a revision filed by the accused Bheru Singh against the order of the learned Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Abu Road, dated 6-11-81 by which cognizance for offence under sections 406, 420 and 468 I. P. C. has been taken against him. ( 2 ) BRIEFLY stated that the facts of the case are these: According to the complainant Babu Bhai, the accused Bheru Singh had entered into an agreement to sell a house for a sum of Rs. 85,000/- to him on 31-7-80. The description of the house is given in para 1 of the complaint. According to the complainant, a sum of Rs. 9,000/- was received by the accused as earnest money in pursuance of this agreement and a document was executed by Bheru Singh to evidence this agreement on 31-7-80, It was agreed that the house will be got vacated from the tenants and the sale deed would be executed by 30-12-80 by receiving the remaining amount of Rs. 76,000/- and delivering the possession of the house to the complainant Babu Bhai. His case further is that, however, this could not be done by 30-12-80 as the house was not vacated by the tenant and, therefore, Bheru Singh again executed an agreement in his favour on 26-12-80 agreeing to deliver the possession and get the sale deed registered by 30-4-81. It appears that the tenant vacated the house by 30-4-81 but the agreement was not executed and the possession was not handed over to the complainant whereupon he served a notice on Bheru Sigh on 1-4-81 calling upon him to execute the sale deed, receive the balance of the sale consideration and handover the possession to him. The complainant goes on to state that Bheru Singh did not do any of these things. On the other hand, he granted a lease of this property to a third party on 11-4-81 and by his reply dated 15-4-81, he while admitting the execution of the two agreements, denied the receipt of Rs. 9,000/ -. The complainant goes on to state that Bheru Singh did not do any of these things. On the other hand, he granted a lease of this property to a third party on 11-4-81 and by his reply dated 15-4-81, he while admitting the execution of the two agreements, denied the receipt of Rs. 9,000/ -. He also alleged in the reply that as a matter of fact, there was no agreement for the sale of this house but the so called agreement was only a fictitious document entered into between the parties as a device to get the house vacated from the tenant as according to the accused Bheru Singh, the complainant was a friend of both Bheru Singh as well the tenant. He also stated in the reply that the house did not exclusively belong to him but was a joint Hindu family property in which, his widowed daughter-in-law find grandson had also a right. Thereupon the present complaint was filed before the learned Magistrate on 24-4-81. The learned Magistrate sent this complaint for investigations u/s 156 (3) Cr. P. C. to the police station Mount Abu. The police after making investigations, filed a final report stating that it was only a case of civil nature relating to a breach of contract. The complainant also filed a protest petition against this final report. The learned Magistrate after hearing the parties, took cognizance against the accused as aforesaid. Hence this revision. ( 3 ) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties as also the learned P. P. and have gone through the record. ( 4 ) IT has been urged by the learned counsel for the accused-petitioner that the learned Magistrate was entirely wrong in taking cognizance of the offences u/ss. 420, 406 and 468 I. P. C. against the accused petitioner. He urged that co far as the offence u/s 420 is concerned, it has nowhere been the case of the complainant that at the very inception of the alleged agreement, the accused Bheru Singh did not intend to enter into any agreement with him as such and his intention was merely to fraudulently deprive him of the sum of Rs. 9,000/- and thus cheating him. He offences u/ss 406 and 468 I. P. C. are at all made out on the facts stated in the complainant. 9,000/- and thus cheating him. He offences u/ss 406 and 468 I. P. C. are at all made out on the facts stated in the complainant. There was no entrustment of the money nor any document can be said to have been forged. The learned counsel contended that by no stretch of imagination, these two offences can be said to have been made out by the facts stated above. In support of his first contention he placed reliance upon a few authorities. ( 5 ) ON the other hand, the learned counsel for non-petitioner No. 2, the complainant, contended that at the stage of taking cognizance, the learned Magistrate is not required to go deep into the matter and has only to see whether there is some evidence to support the complaint and when he exercises his discretion in taking cognizance against the accused, this Court should not interfere with it. In this connection, he placed reliance upon a few authorities. He further contended that the offence under Section 420 was clearly made out inasmuch as the accused had clearly made representations, which were false to his knowledge at the time the agreement was entered into and by these representations he induced the complainant to pay him, Rs. 9000/-, therefore, the learned Magistrate was perfectly justified in taking cognizance of this offence against him. So far as the other two offences are concerned, after some arguments, he conceded that these two offences cannot be said to have been made out. ( 6 ) I have given my careful consideration to the rival contentions. The first question, which arises for consideration is whether it would be proper for this Court to interfere with the order of the learned Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence under Sections 420, 406 and 464 Indian Penal Code in the circumstances of this case. The learned counsel for the non-petitioner No. 2 had placed reliance upon Kanailal v. Harkrishnadas, R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab2 and Nagawa v. Veeranna3. The learned counsel for the non-petitioner No. 2 had placed reliance upon Kanailal v. Harkrishnadas, R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab2 and Nagawa v. Veeranna3. In my opinion, it is not necessary for me to discuss all these authorities because the latest authority relied upon by the learned counsel for non-petitioner No. 2 itself lays down that where the allegations made in the complaint or the statement of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value makes out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused, this Court would be justified in quashing the order taking cognizance. Now it may at once he stated that in the present case, from the complaint as also the evidence recorded by the police, the ingredients of Section 420 Indian Penal Code cannot at all be said to have been made out. It will not be out of place to mention here that although the complainant had filed a protest petition, he did not adduce any evidence except that which had already been recorded by the police and, therefore, we are only to look into this evidence. I may also state here that the learned Magistrate while taking cognizance of the aforesaid offences, failed to see whether in fact the ingredients of these offences have been made out or not. ( 7 ) INSTEAD of going into details, I would straightaway refer to Han Prasad v. Bishun Kumar4. The sine quo non of the offence under Section 420 is the dishonest intention of the person concerned at the time the other party parted with the money on the inducement made to him. If at the aforesaid time, the real intention of the accused was to cheat the other party, the offence can be said to have been made out but if at that time, he had no such intention the fact that at a later stage for one reason or the other he has gone back upon the representation made by him, would not result into an offence under Section 420 Indian Penal Code. Their Lordships have observed as under: There is the nothing in the complaint to show that the respondents had dishonest or fraudulent intention at the time the appellant parted with Rs. 35,000/ -. Their Lordships have observed as under: There is the nothing in the complaint to show that the respondents had dishonest or fraudulent intention at the time the appellant parted with Rs. 35,000/ -. There is also nothing to indicate that the respondents induced the appellant to pay them Rs. 35000/- by deceiving him. It is further not the case of the appellant that a representation was made by the respondents to him at or before the time he paid the money to them and that at the time the representation was made, the respondents knew the same to be false. The fact that the respondents subsequently did not abide by their commitment that they would show the appellant to be the proprietor of Drang Transport Corporation and would also render accounts to him in the month of December might create civil liability for them, but this fact would not be sufficient to fasten criminal liability on the respondents for the offence of The authorities relied upon by the learned counsel for non petitioner No. 2, namely, Mahadeo Prasad v. State of West Bengal5, Khacheru Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh6, and Ram Avtar Gupta v. Gopal Das Paliwal7, do not in any way depart from this statement of law and, therefore, I need not refer to these authorities in any further detail. Now if this criteria is to be applied to the present case, we will find that neither in the complaint nor in the statement under Section 161 Criminal Procedure Code, the complainant has ever stated that at the time the agreement was entered into and the amount of Rs. 9,000/- was paid, the accused in fact did not intend to enter into such an agreement and merely wanted to dishonestly deprive the complainant of that amount. On the other hand from the averments made and the statement of the complainant himself, it appears that at that time, the parties had entered into this agreement, with a view to carrying it out but at a later stage for the reasons, which we shall presently try to explore, the accused may have rescinded from this agreement and may have committed breach of agreement or breach of contract. ( 8 ) BEFORE I proceed to consider these grounds, it will be convenient to consider the contention of the learned counsel for the non-petitioner No. 2 to the effect that in the agreement executed by Bheru Singh on 31-7-80, he had clearly stated that the property in respect of which the agreement was entered into, exclusively belonged to him, that he had purchased the plot on which, the property stands, that he had raised the construction thereon from his own money and that nobody else his sisters or sons widow etc. had any claim over it and he had also in clear words admitted the receipt of the sum of Rs. 9,000/- but in the reply to the notice sent by the accused on 15-4-81, he asserted that the property did not belong to him exclusively. It was a joint Hindu family property in which his widowed daughter-in-law and grandson had a right and he also denied having received the sum of Rs. 9,000/ -. This according to the learned counsel, clearly goes to show that the petitioner-accused had made a representation at the time of entering into this agreement, which he knew to be false and thus he has cheated the non-petitioner. Now, if we consider these representations, we find that the earlier representations are not such as may be said to be known to be false to the petitioner at the time he made them. On the other hand, the later representation may be false and may have been made to riggle out of the agreement. It is common knowledge that when a person purchases a property in his own name as has been stated in the agreement dated 31-7-80, he can certainly state that this property belonged to him exclusively but at the same time, it may be possible that at a later thought, he may say that his sons or daughters or widow of the son has a right in that property in as much as he may at a later stage try to resile or get out of the agreement by asserting that not only he himself but some other members of the family also have a right in that property but that does not necessarily mean that the representations made in the initial agreement were false. So far as the amount of Rs. So far as the amount of Rs. 9,000/- is concerned, this again is a common knowledge that persons having executed documents after receiving consideration may at a latert stage, deny the receipt of consideration but, that by itself does not mean that they at that time had the guilty intention of cheating the other party. Even if the later representation of the persons setting up joint title in others or denying the receipt of the consideration may be found to be wrong but that would not necessarily mean that at the time the agreement was executed, he had an intention of depriving the other party of the amount of the consideration wrongfully or with any ulterior motive. Therefore, the mere fact that at a later stage, the executant of the agreement denies consideration, it cannot be said that at the time of the execution of the document, he really had no intention to fulfill the obligations undertaken by him in the agreement and had the only intention to cheat the other person. ( 9 ) THE learned counsel for Tnon-petitioner No. 2 had placed treat reliance on Ram Avtars case (supra) but that case is clearly distinguishable. In that case, the accused had obtained the delivery of a consignment by false representation after paying a part of the money. The trial court took cognizance of the offence u/s 420. The accused went in revision against that order but the learned Addi. Session Judge dismissed the revision. However, in exercise of powers u/s 482 Cr. P. C. , the High Court quashed the proceedings. When the matter went before the Honble Supreme Court, a sufficiently long time was granted to the accused to pay up the balance of the money but that was not paid and in those circumstances, their Lordships were of the opinion that it was a clear case of cheating and not merely belated payment and the High Court was wrong in quashing the proceedings. Such is not the case here. ( 10 ) THE learned counsel for non-petitioner No. 2 also urged that even if the false representation of the accused is not made in express terms, it has to be gathered from the circumstances of each case. In this connection, he has placed reliance upon Shivanarayan v. State of Madras8. Such is not the case here. ( 10 ) THE learned counsel for non-petitioner No. 2 also urged that even if the false representation of the accused is not made in express terms, it has to be gathered from the circumstances of each case. In this connection, he has placed reliance upon Shivanarayan v. State of Madras8. There cannot be any quarrel with this proposition but as already pointed out above, in the circumstances of this case, the mere fact that later the accused committed a breach of the agreement by refusing to se 11 the property, the initial intention of cheating cannot be inferred and it cannot be said that the representation made by him in the agreement was a misrepresentation in order to cheat the cc m p Ia in ant. ( 11 ) IT may be possible that after the accused had entered into the said agreement with the complaint he may have changed his mind. The price of the property may have increased or the members of his family may not have agreed to the sale of the property. There may be a variety of reasons but the later change of intention of the accused cannot render him liable u/s 420 I. P. C. If at the inception of the transaction he had no such intention to cheat. ( 12 ) PACED with this situation, the learned counsel for non petitioner No. 2 at the fag end of the arguments submitted that if the offence u/s 420 cannot be said to be made out, the offence u/s 406 must be deemed to be made out, I am unable to agree with this contention. In the first place, the two submissions are mutually inconsistent. If it is urged that the money had been obtained by cheating, then the question of entrustment does not at all arise. On the other hand, if it is held that the money was entrusted to the petitioner, then the very case of the non-petitioner No. 2 would fall to the ground. Then it will clearly be a case of mere breach of contract. ( 13 ) IN these circumstances, I am clearly of the opinion that the learned Magistrate was not at all justified in taking cognizance of the offences u/ss 420, 406 and 468 I. P. C. against the petitioner. Then it will clearly be a case of mere breach of contract. ( 13 ) IN these circumstances, I am clearly of the opinion that the learned Magistrate was not at all justified in taking cognizance of the offences u/ss 420, 406 and 468 I. P. C. against the petitioner. The order of the learned Magistrate dated 6/11/81 and the proceedings thereafter are -quashed. This may be made clear that these observations would not in any way affect any civil litigation between the parties. Petition allowed.