JUDGMENT M. Wahajuddin, J. 1. These are two connected petitions under Section 482, CrPC, arising out of the same criminal proceedings. The Misc. Case no. 8130 of 1982 has been filed by some Directors and the Secretary of Rajesh Paper Mills Ltd., Shikohabad. This application has been brought with prayer that further proceedings in complaint case no. 995 of 1981, pending in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mainpuri, be quashed. It would appear that the complaint has been filed by the Secretary of the U. P. Water Pollution Prevention and Control Board, Nirala Nagar, Lucknow, against the six applicants in Misc. case no. 8130 of 1982, and two others, namely, the Company M/s. Rajesh Paper Mills Ltd. and Sri R.C. Misra, the Manager of the Company concerned under Sections 42 (1) and 44 of the aforesaid Act, namely. Act no. 6 of 1974 (hereinafter mentioned as Act 6 of 1974). The facts leading to the present proceedings may be briefly laid down. 2. M/s. Rajesh Paper Mills started a Paper Mill at Shikohabad. It obtained sanction from the Witter Pollution Prevention and Control Board. That sanction is annexed as Annexure CA 1 to the counter affidavit. It is dated 20-12-1980 and in response to letter dated 15-8-80 of Rajesh Paper Mills Ltd. seeking sanction, giving reference to the contents of the application of the Paper Mills it is mentioned that the Mill informed that (1) the factory is likely to be commissioned by April 1981 (2) the entire work of completion and commissioning of effluent treatment plant will be completed by March 1981 and (3) the undertaking that the production in the Paper Mill will be started only after completion and commissioning of the complete effluent treatment plant. Thereafter information and compliance is sought by the Board and it is then stated that subject to such compliance of the conditions annexed to the enclosed form, consent is given to discharge treated effluents from the date of commissioning of complete effluent treatment plant. It was also mentioned that if the Mill starts production without making the aforesaid arrangements and compliance of the conditiors of consent, it will amount to breach of the provisions of the Act, namely, Act 6 of 1974 punishable under Section 44 of the Act. There will be also liability under Section 43 of the Act. The provisions were quoted. It was also mentioned that if the Mill starts production without making the aforesaid arrangements and compliance of the conditiors of consent, it will amount to breach of the provisions of the Act, namely, Act 6 of 1974 punishable under Section 44 of the Act. There will be also liability under Section 43 of the Act. The provisions were quoted. Thereafter it was again stressed that suitable arrangement for treatment of trade effluent etc. be made and in case treatment plant is not started, legal actions will be taken. It would appear from the annexure to the supplementary affidavit in Misc. case No. 3755 of 1982 that Sri S. K. Tikmani, one of the Director applicants, furnished certain informations in compliance to the aforesaid directions of the Board to the effect that the Factory is likely to commence normal production by April 1981 and the work of the installation of the treatment plant has already been started and will be completed by March 1981 and a schedule of programme for construction of treatment plant was also given. The Assistant Engineer of the Water Pollution Prevention and Control board wrote to the company that the information is incomplete and vague, and again stressed that the work should be completed by the schedule time:. There are various correspondence exchanged in between and it will be needless to refer to all of them and I may now pass on to the material averments made in the complaint. Paragraph 4 of the complaint states that the opposite party (in the complaint) submitted an application for grant of consent for discharge of the effluent of the Paper Mill, which was incomplete hence details concerning the same, treatment plant and disposal system were required. It is then stated in paragraph 6 of the complaint that such details were submitted. It is, further, stated in paragraph 7 of the complaint that the Secretary of the Company, Sri M. S. Sharma, submitted that the production will be started after installation of the treatment plant seeking provisional consent. Thereafter it is further stated that consent was given subject to the various conditions in the consent order also laying down that the Company shall start its production only after the completion and commissioning of the treatment plant. Thereafter it is further stated that consent was given subject to the various conditions in the consent order also laying down that the Company shall start its production only after the completion and commissioning of the treatment plant. It was further stated that this has to be done before bringing into use a new outlet for discharge of its highly polluted effluents. The stress is in the complaint that the discharge from the outlet could start only after the completion of the installation of treatment plant:, and this was not done and the Paper Mill started discharging effluent by the outlet made. It is, further, stated that the company premises was got inspected and the Inspecting Officer reported that only it has been dug and there is no treatment plant ami yet the Paper Mill has started production. It is then stated that the opposite side (Company) falsely represented that the treatment plant has been installed. The opposite side also did not comply with the various conditions of the sanctions and the provisions contained in Sections 25 and 26 of Act no 6 of 1974 have been contravened and the opposite side are, therefore, guilt, under Section 42 (1 (g) and Section 44 of the said Act. In this very complaint a prayer was also made that the opposite side be restrained from causing pollution of water by reason of disposal of the matters discharged from their Paper Mill through the cutlet. As many as 13 documents by way of correspondence, the application of the opposite side, assurances, the consent imposing conditions etc. were also annexed with the complaint. 3. Section 25 of the Act provides for restrictions on new outlets and new discharges, laying down that no person shall, without the previous consent of the State Board, bring into use any new or altered outlet for the discharge of sewage or trade effluent into a stream or well. There are other sub-sections regarding enquiries by the Boards so forth so on, alterations of discharge of the effluent and the outlet etc. New discharge, new or altered outlet are also defined in that section. Section 26 provides for existing discharge of sewage or trade effluent and for consent in that connection. In Section 25 also there is a provision for consent by the Board. Sec. 44 of the Act makes any contravention of the provisions of Secs. New discharge, new or altered outlet are also defined in that section. Section 26 provides for existing discharge of sewage or trade effluent and for consent in that connection. In Section 25 also there is a provision for consent by the Board. Sec. 44 of the Act makes any contravention of the provisions of Secs. 25 and 26 of the Act punishable. The pith and substance of the arguments on behalf of the complainant is that a consent was required, which would be brone out by the fact that an application for the same was made and when the conditions were imposed giving the consent and the consent was given on certain undertaking, in particulars that the treatment plant for the effluent will be installed and completed by a certain period and the work would start only after compliance ; and non compliance of the conditions and non-observance of the various undertakings would per se amount to contravention of SECTIONs 25 and 26 of the Act as to be punishable under SECTION 44 of the Act. It is, further, urged that as for the purpose of obtaining such sanction false statement was made regarding installation of treatment plant and also that the work will start only after the installation of treatment plant; such false state- ment made wilfully in material particulars would fall within section 42 (g) and is punishable. It would be relevant at this stage to also refer to SECTION 28 of the Act which lays down that any person aggrieved by any order u/Secs. 25 to 27 of the Act can prefer an appeal to such authority as is constituted by the State Government and the decision of the appellate authority would be final. 4. It is noteworthy that considering the importance of the matter of pollution, which may affect the health of public at large, a provision has been made that such appellate authority shall consists of not a single person, but consist of three persons. Section 29 of the Act provides for revision by State Government suo moto as well. IT is noteworthy that, admittedly, the Company or the petitioners did not prefer any appeal under section 28 of the Act. Section 29 of the Act provides for revision by State Government suo moto as well. IT is noteworthy that, admittedly, the Company or the petitioners did not prefer any appeal under section 28 of the Act. The learned counsel for the applicant urged in this connection that sections 25 and 26 are to be read with Section 2 (e) of the Act defining 'pollution' and also with section 24 making prohibition for use of stream or well for disposal of polluting matters. IT is further urged that there is a standard concerning pollution and unless it is shown that the dischrge from the outlet, i.e., the effluent, is polluted within the meaning of the Act, no offence will be made out. IT is, further urged that in this background the complaint cannot be taken to disclose a prima facie case. I have given my anxious consideration to the matter. If the order of the Board was bad, the applicants had a statutory remedy provided under section 28 of the Act no. 6 of 1974 and could have resort to that. This has been by passed and it may 'weigh when the exercise of inherent powers is invited. When there is a special statute also providing certain remedies and expressly laying down the constitution of the appellate authority, such special statutory provision cannot be by passed, as it would in itself amounts to abuse of legal process, while the inherent powers are to prevent abuse of legal process. 5. It was argued that once a prosecution has been launched for penal consequences and the complaint is cognizable by the Magistrate, it has necessarily to be proved that there has been a real contravention of the provisions of section 25 and 26 of the Act and in that connection the question whether the effluent will have the effect of polluting water will arise for consideration. IT cannot be disputed that for any conviction and sentence all the ingredients of an offence have to be proved before the trial court and only then conviction can be made and to that extent the argument may have some force, but the crux of the matter is whether this court will set as a trial court and proceed to decide the case itself. This obviously is neither possible nor permissible. The Company itself sought the consent meaning thereby that a consent was required. This obviously is neither possible nor permissible. The Company itself sought the consent meaning thereby that a consent was required. The Board gave consent imposing conditions on the assumption that consent is needed and will not be availed of unless the conditions are fulfilled. If during the trial any plea arises for consideration whether pollution of the water and the degree of pollution is a must, naturally each side will lead evidence and only then the trial court will be in a position to adjudicate one way or the other. This Court will not deal with the facts, nor can it, in absence of evidence which may be lead during the trial, say about any pollution or its degree, nor it can adjudicate upon it here. Any party may choose to have an analysis made as contemplated in the provisions of the Act itself and the result of analysis held under the provisions of this Act by the concerned authority may become relevant. This Court will not base upon any other report of any other official in any other context, i. e. under the Factories Act. The Legislature has realised and rightly so the importance of pollution of water by discharge made by the factories etc. as they may act as slow poison to the human health and safety, and the ignorant and innocent thousand of people may go on consuming polltuted water or the thing effecting their heath and life. With such consciousness the legislature has taken pains to enact this special Act no. 6 of 1974 and this is necessarily to be borne in mind. If any test or analysis is to be made, it would necessarily be made under the provisions of this very Act concerning the degree of pollution. 6. Reliance has been placed by the applicants' Counsel also upon the pronouncement of Delhi Municipality v. Ram Kishan, AIR 1983 SC 67 . It deals with the scope of inherent powers and its exercise. It has been expressly laid down in that ruling that the Court sitting in exercise of its inherent powers would simply look into those materials alone, which were before the Magistrate who passed the summoning order, and nothing beyond that. It deals with the scope of inherent powers and its exercise. It has been expressly laid down in that ruling that the Court sitting in exercise of its inherent powers would simply look into those materials alone, which were before the Magistrate who passed the summoning order, and nothing beyond that. The complaint and the materials annexed with it disclose a prima facte case under Section 42 (g) of the Act and this Court in exercise of its inherent powers, therefore, would not interfere so far as the complaint as such is concerned. 8a. I may mention that it is not that no mention of an pollution has been made in the complaint. In paragraph 10 of the complaint, it is expressly averred that the Paper Mill was bound to construct and commission the complete treatment work, as proposed before bringing into use a new outlet for discharge of its highly polluted effluents. It is however, urged that in any case the complaint does not disclose any prima facie case against the present applicants. It is noteworthy that the application has not been preferred by the Paper Mill company or the Manager of the Company and only other six persons have preferred this application. It is urged that it has to be alleged in the complaint itself that in such and such manner the applicants are also liable for punishment on vicarious liability. Section 47 provides offences by the Companies and it has been laid in sub-section (1) that besides the company, every person who at the time of the offence was committed was incharge of and was responsible Co the company for the conduct of the business of the company would be liable. It is noteworthy that expression 'and' not 'or' has been used, so both the conditions have to be satisfied. Sub-section (2: of the aforesaid section further provides as follows :- "47 (2) Nothwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of or is attributable to any neglect on the part of. any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Explanation For the purposes of this section- (a) Company means any body corporate, and includes firm or other association of individuals, and (b) "director" in relation to a firm means a partner in the firm." I have quoted this sub-section simply to stress that the liability of the Director, Manager, Secretary or other Officer has been dealt with under this sub section and the use of the word 'such' itself signifies that not all the directors or all Officers would be punsihed, but only such directors, Officers etc. with whose consent or connivance or on account of whose neglect the offence has been committed, alone would be punished. 7. I may also observe that prior to amendment of 1976, the similar provisions concerning vicarious liability under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, Section 17 were identical. There is a direct pronouncement of the Supreme Court on this point, namely the case of Delhi Municipality (supra) dealing with analogous provisions of the Food Adulteration Act, Section 17 as it existed prior to the commencement of 1976 In that case prosecution was launched against the Company, its Directors and Manager for offence by Company under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Application was made under section 482, CrPC by the Manager and the Directors for quashing the proceedings against them, as there were no clear allegations against them. It was observed on page 70 in paragraph 15 that so far as manager is concerned form the very nature of its duties, it can safely be inferred that he would undoubtedly vicariously liable for the offence, but so far as the Directors are concerned, there is not a whisper nor shred of evidence apart from the presumption drawn by the complainant that there was any act committed by the Director from which reasonable inference can be drawn that they could also be vicariously liable. The proceeding against the Director was quashed. 8. When I have referred to this ruling, I may also deal with the aspect of the mantainability of the petition under section 482 CrPC. The proceeding against the Director was quashed. 8. When I have referred to this ruling, I may also deal with the aspect of the mantainability of the petition under section 482 CrPC. The learned counsel for the opposite parties urged that it is not maintainable relying upon Amar Nath v. State, AlR 1977 SC 2185, Hari Ram Satpathi v. Teeka Ram, AIR 1978 SC 1568 , Shukla v. State, AIR 1980 SC 962 and Yadav Ram v. Ashok, 1984 ALJ 88. Besides; these pronouncements, the Counsel for the opposite parties has also relied upon the case of Delhi Municipality (supra) and Madho Limaya's case, AIR 1978 SC 47 . In the case of Madho Limaya the petition has been made very clear and explained. The inherent powers are so wide that they would not admit of any absolute restrains. The powers are conferred to serve the ends of justice and they are much wider than powers in revision. In the very case of Delhi Municipality (supra) inherent powers were exercised holding that they should be exercised and the case of Madho Limaya (supra) was considered and interpreted. When that is the position of law, if the complaint itself does not disclose any offence as regards any particular individual, the Court can well exercise its inherent powers, as was done in the case of Delhi Municipality (supra). I may at the same time hasten to add that as per the very authority as well as the case of Yadav Ram (supra), in which a number of other pronouncements have been considered, this Court would not enter into any question of facts or adjudicate upon the same. It will simply examine the complaint and other materials before the Magistrate at the stage of passing the order of summoning. At th is very stage I may mention that the applicants Counsel had also cited some other rulings as well regarding the inherent powers, but it will be needless to refer all those pronouncements regarding exercise of inherent powers, when the applicants counsel also itself relied upon the Litest pronouncement of the Supreme Court namely, Delhi Municipality (supra), to which I have referred. I now again proceed to consider whether any prima facie case against all or any of the applicants is disclosed by the complaint and the materials on record. So far as applicant no. I now again proceed to consider whether any prima facie case against all or any of the applicants is disclosed by the complaint and the materials on record. So far as applicant no. 6 Megh Shyam Sharma is concerned, he has been actively involving himself in the matter of sanction and corresponded with the board so forth so on, so his knowledge and connivance etc. is apparent and can well be inferred. So far as applicant no. 1, S. K. Tikmani is concerned, he was actually addressed a letter dated 14-12-1980 annexed with the complaint as Annexure "7" giving a written undertaking that the production will be started only after the completion and commissioning of the installation for treatment. These two persons were, thus, in- charge of and responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business of the Company in this connection and the offence as per averments of the complaint has been committed by the Company with their connivance and neglect etc. So far as applicant no. 2, namely, the Managing Director of the Company, he is also prima facie similarly involved in view of the averments in paragraph 6 of the complaint and Annexure 5 annexed with the complaint. Thus, so far as applicants nos. 1, 2 and 6 are concerned, their involvement in the particular matter is prima facie disclosed by the averments in plaint as well as annexures with it as leading to prima facie inference against them for their vicarious liability under section 47 of Act no. 6 of 1974. 9. So far as applicants 3 to 5 are concerned, namely, Sri M. K. Tikmani, R. K. Paliwal and M. M. Rajgarhia are concerned, there are no averment of facts against these Directors that they were really incharge and responsible for the conduct of the business or the offence has been committed by their connivance, neglect etc. Of course, a presumptive statement is contained in certain paragraphs of the complaint, but on the authority of Delhi Municipality (supra) that would not lead to any inference regarding the ingredients of section 47 of the Act and it can, therefore, be safely held that the complaint does not disclose a prima facie case against applicants 3 to 5 Aforesaid, 10. In the result and in view of my aforesaid discussion, Misc. Application no. In the result and in view of my aforesaid discussion, Misc. Application no. 8130 of 1982 is allowed only to the extent that the criminal proceedings against M. K. Tikmani, applicant no. 3 R. K. Paliwal, applicant no, 4 and M. M. Rajgarhia, applicant no. 5, is quashed; while the prayer far quashing the entire criminal proceedings and the prayer for quashing the proceedings against applicants nos. 1, 2 and 6 and all other prayers in this petition are dismissed. Now I pass to consider the other Misc. Case no. 3755 of 1982. The impugned restraining order is Annexure 2 dated 18-8-1981. The Magistrate referred to the complaint and the various annexures to it and thereafter observed that he has found that M/s. Rajesh Paper Mills, Shikohabad, district Mainpuri, are continuously causing the pollution of water of the stream leading to river Yamuns. and they are directed to desist from discharging their nexious and polluting effluents in the said stream till they make their adequate arrangements for proper treatment of their effluents so as to conform to the standard laid down by U. P. Water Pollution and Control Board, It would appear that section 33 of Act 6 of 1974 empowers the court for restraining apprehended pollution of water and to desist from taking such action as is likely to cause pollution as the case may be so forth so on. So far as the powers are concerned, the court was fully vested with such powers. As regards satisfaction for exercise of such powers, the court has expressly recorded such satisfcation. The subordinate court is, thus, in no way exceeded its jurisdiction. 11. The order is attacked, firstly, on the ground that Section 33 provides for application, so there should have been a separate application. One has to give wider meaning to such expression than mere technical or restricted meaning. Once such request is premissible and could be made under Section 33 of the Act, it would be too technical to say that instead of being contained in the complaint itself, there should have been necessarily a separate application with such prayer and I do not find any force on this point urged before me. 12. The next point that has been urged that the principles of natural justice have been violated. 12. The next point that has been urged that the principles of natural justice have been violated. It would appear that on the complaint summons were issued twice, but received back unserved and ultimately publication had to be made. In this background and context the Magistrate was prompted to pass an ex parte order. It was argued that though in very emergency situation it could be done, in the present case there was no emergency, because firstly the Board itself aid not pass any such order, though empowered to do so u/Sec. 32 of the Act and the Magistrate also did nut pass the impugned order on the very date of she presentation of the complaint. So far as the first argument is concerned, it is noteworthy that the Legislature in its wisdom has itself provided two alternatives, i.e. the Board could pass an order before filling of the complaint and if it chooses to file a complaint, it could well make such prayer to the court itself for restrain orders. If the Board with the sense of justice and fair play, instead of passing any order itself before complaint, prayed for such order by the court, that in any way would not stand in the way of the court passing such orders under Section 33 of the Act. As regards the second argument, actually it amounts to breathing hot and cold at the same time. On the one hand it is urged that principles of natural justice demanded that a notice should have been given first, and on the other hand adverse inference is urged simply on the consideration that the court did not pass an order then and these and rather at first issued summons twice. Now coming to the aspect of emergency, if the effluent is in. fact causing pollution to the water of river Yamuna, which is even taken for drinking by hundred and thousand of people, obviously there would be utmost urgency to restrain such pollution. Public health cannot be allowed to suffer for the consideration of any industry or company and its interest. 13. 19. Reliance was placed, upon a number of pronouncements on principles of natural justice. Public health cannot be allowed to suffer for the consideration of any industry or company and its interest. 13. 19. Reliance was placed, upon a number of pronouncements on principles of natural justice. Maneka Ghandhi's case, AIR 1978 SC 597 , Suneel Batra's case, AIR 1978 SC 1675 , S. L. Kapoor's case, AIR 1981 SC 126, Swadeshi Cotton Mills case, AIR 1981 SC 818 and AIR i983 SC 473. The law has been well elaborated on the point of natural justice The substance of the principles of natural justice that a party whose right is affected in any manner, should have been afforded an opportunity to place its case. It is, however, laid down in the midest of the very pronouncements that the degree, the extent, the stage at which opportunity is to be afforded will all depend upon the individual facts of the case. In the present case there being emergency and the matter involved concerned the public health of the citizens, so the ex parte order was passed. But once the applicant turned up, opportunity was not denied opportunity or refused. A prayer was made that the operation of the order be suspended. Obviously, the Magistrate could not act whimsically as to one day pass an order and on the second day when approached by the other side stay it and on the third day when again approached by the other side enforce it. The judicial propriety demanded that he should have asked for a written objection laying down the grounds. The applicants are themselves to be blamed for not filing any objection than inspite of being afforded the opportunity. In the circumstances of the present case, principles off natural justice were served the moment the Magistrate directed the applicants to file objection and entertain them. If the applicants did not themselves avail of it, they are to be blamed. They rushed in revision and from the observations in the revision it would appear that there also they adopted a wavering attitude, at one time stating before the court that they may well stop the discharge or instal the treatment. If the applicants did not themselves avail of it, they are to be blamed. They rushed in revision and from the observations in the revision it would appear that there also they adopted a wavering attitude, at one time stating before the court that they may well stop the discharge or instal the treatment. When this is the conduct of the applicants, this Court will not interfere in exercise of its inherent powers, but I must further observe that the applicants are at liberty to file; any objection against the impugned order before the Magistrate laying down all the grounds of objections and the Magistrate in such situation will, expeditiously dispose it of. 14. With these observations the Misc. Case no. 3755 of 1982 is dismissed. The stay order is vacated.