This is a petition relating to set off under section 428, Cr. P. C. of the prior detention under the army custody before the conviction and sentence under the Army Act. 2. It is stated in the petition that a general court-martial, on 16.12.1982, convicted the petitioner and sentenced him to suffer R.I. for 10 (ten) years under sections 304 and 326, IPC read with section 69 of the Army Act. It is also stated in the petition that he was kept in the army custody as under-trial prisoner for a period of 8 (eight) months and one day in con­nection with the case before conviction. 3. The relevant provisions are sections 167 and 169 of the Army Act and section 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under section 167 of the Army Act, the term of sentence of imprisonment awarded by a court-martial shall be reckoned to commence on the day on which original proceedings were signed by the presiding officer or, in the case of summary court-mar­tial, by the Court. Section 169 of the Army Act relates to the execution of sentence of imprisonment. Under section 169 of the Army Act, the sentence shall be carried out by confinement in a military prison or a civil prison as provided there under. Sec­tion 5 of the Code saves special or local laws unless there is any "specific provision to the contrary". 4. In P.P. Chandrasekaran vs. Union of India, 1977 Cri.L. J. 677 (DB), the Madras High Court was construing section 151 (1) of the Navy Act, the language of which is substantially the same as that of the section 167 of the Army Act. and has held that the Navy Act is a special enactment within the meaning of section 5 of the Code, therefore, the application of the Code is excluded; and that the Navy Act prescribes procedure for trial and execution of sentence and as such, a convict cannot claim the benefit of section 428 of the Code. 5. In F. R. Jesuratnam vs. Chief of Air Staff, 1976 Crl. L.J. 65 (DB), the Delhi High Court has also similarly held that where a person is convicted under the Air Force Act and sentenced to imprisonment, the period of pre-detention cannot be set off against the term of the imprisonment. 5. In F. R. Jesuratnam vs. Chief of Air Staff, 1976 Crl. L.J. 65 (DB), the Delhi High Court has also similarly held that where a person is convicted under the Air Force Act and sentenced to imprisonment, the period of pre-detention cannot be set off against the term of the imprisonment. Section 164 of the Air Force Act, section 167 of the Army Act and sec­tion 151 (1) of the Navy Act are in pari materia relating to the same subject matter, namely, commencement of sentence. 6. The question which arises for consideration is whether section 428 of the Code will be applicable/extended to the sen­tence under the Army Act. Under section 4(1) of the Code, all offences under the Indian Penal Code shall be investigated, enquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the provision contained in the Code. Under section 4 (2) of the Code all the offences under any law shall be investigated, enquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions of the Code, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigation, enqui­ring into, or trying or otherwise dealing with such offences. 7. Section 5 of the Code runs : "Nothing contained in this Code shall, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, affect any special or local law for the time being in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred or any special form of procedure prescribed, by any other law for the time being in force." (emphasis added) An analysis of section 5 of the Code shows that the Code shall govern the matter covered by it. If any special or local law exists covering the same field or area, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by any special or local law, the special or local law will prevail. However, the Code will override any special or local taw, if there is any "specific provision to the contrary". The specific provision may be in the Code itself. 8. The next question which arises for consideration is whether section 428 of the Code is a "specific provision to the contrary '. As already stated above the specific provision may be in the Code itself. The specific provision may be in the Code itself. 8. The next question which arises for consideration is whether section 428 of the Code is a "specific provision to the contrary '. As already stated above the specific provision may be in the Code itself. For example, in Central Talkies vs. Dwarka, AIR 1961 SC 603, the Supreme Court has held that the provision in section 10(2) of the Old Code (section 20(2) of the New Code) is "a specific previous to the contrary" within the meaning of section 1(2) of the Old Code (section 5 of the New Code)„ ID that case, the Supreme Court was dealing with the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. Under section 3 of the U. P. Act, no suit shall, with­out the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more grounds provided there under. Un­der section 2(d) of the U. P. Act, "District Magistrate '' in­cludes an officer authorised by the "District Magistrate'' to perform any of his functions under the U. P. Act. In that case permi­ssion was given by the Additional District Magistrate. The ques­tion which arose was whether the permission given by the Addi-tiona1 District Magistrate was valid or not. Under section 10(2) of the Old Code, an Additional District Magistrate shall have all or any of the powers of the District Magistrate under the Code or any other law as the State Government may direct. In view of section 10(2) of the Old Code, the Supreme Court has held that the permission was valid and that the provision in section 10(2) of the Old Code is " a specific provision to the contrary “within the meaning of section I (2) of the Old Code, and an Additional District Magistrate must be regarded as poss­essing the power of District Magistrate under any law inclu­ding the U. P. Act, 9. The decision of the Supreme Court above is that alth­ough "District Magistrate'' has been defined in the U. P. Act differently, section 10(2) of the Old Code is a specific provision to the contrary within the meaning of section 1 (2) of the Old Code. The decision of the Supreme Court above is that alth­ough "District Magistrate'' has been defined in the U. P. Act differently, section 10(2) of the Old Code is a specific provision to the contrary within the meaning of section 1 (2) of the Old Code. The Army Act does not expressly or impliedly bar the jurisdiction of Criminal Courts in respect of the offences punish­able under the Army Act, if they are also punishable under any law in force in India. If such an offence is tried by the ordinary Criminal Court and the accused is sentenced to impr­isonment, the accused is entitled to the benefit under section 428 of the Code. But if the offence is tried under the Army Act and if the accused is not entitled to the benefit of sect­ion 428 of the Code, it will be an unhappy or unfair state of affairs. The objects and reasons for introducing section 428 of the Code are : "The Committee has noted the distressing fact that in many cases accused persons are kept in prison for very long period as under-trial prisoners and in some cases the sentence of imprisonment ultimately awarded is a fraction of the period spent in jail as under-trial prisoner. Indeed there may even be cases where such a person is acquitt­ed. No doubt, sometimes courts do take into account the period of detention undergone as under-trial prisoner when passing sentence and occasionally the sentence of imprisonment is restricted to the period already undergone. But this is not always the case so that in many cases, the accused person is made to suffer jail life for a pe­riod out of all proportion to the gravity of the offence or even to the punishment provided in the statute. The Committee has also noted that a large number of persons in the over-crowded jails of today are under-trial prisoners. The new clause seeks to remedy this unsatisfactory state of affairs. The new clause provides for the setting off of the period of detention as an under-trial prisoner against the sentence of imprisonment imposed on him. The Committee has also noted that a large number of persons in the over-crowded jails of today are under-trial prisoners. The new clause seeks to remedy this unsatisfactory state of affairs. The new clause provides for the setting off of the period of detention as an under-trial prisoner against the sentence of imprisonment imposed on him. The Committee trusts that the provision contained in the new clause would go a long way to mitigate the evil.'' (emphasis added) Section 428 of the Code is a remedial provision in nature as shown in the objects and reasons quoted above, and it conf­ers benefit on a convict as provided there under. Therefore, liberal construction of the provision of section 428 of the Code would further or advance the object of the provision and meet the ends of justice. The liberal construction of this provision also would remove the aforesaid unhappy or unfair state of affairs. There is no provision in the Army Act which is con­trary to section 428 of the Code. In this view of the matter, section 428 of the Code is a "specific provision to the con­trary'' within the meaning of section 5 of the Code and the petitioner shall be entitled to the benefit under section 428 of the Code. 10. In view of the discussion above, with great respect I find myself unable to agree with the decisions of the Madras High Court and the Delhi High Court. In Subramanian vs. Officer Commanding, 1979 Cri. L. J. 617, a Single Bench of Ker­ala High Court also granted set off under section 428 of the Code to a convict sentenced under the Army Act of the civil offences although the reason given is different from that of mine. 11. For the foregoing reasons, the petitioner is entitled to set off under section 428 of the Code. Accordingly, the petit­ion is allowed. However, the period of detention is to be verified by the jail authority when the occasion arises. With this observation, the petition is disposed of. Let a copy of this order be furnished to the petitioner.