Judgment :- 1. The plaintiffs 2 to 5 in O.S. No. 75 of 1374 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Thanjavur, are the appellants in this appeal. The respondents are the defendants. The original plaintiff died and plaintiffs 2 to 5 were brought on record as his legal representatives. The original plaintiff laid the suit for cancellation of the sale deed dated 16th May, 1973 marked in the case as Ex. B1, for recovery of possession and for profits. 2. The suit was filed on the following allegations: One Nagarajan was appointed as the agent of the original plaintiff under the deed of power dated 14th April, 1970, marked in the case as Ex. B5, under which the agent was empowered to Took after the principals affairs in the village. The said agent is a close relation of the defendants. The defendants father and their fathers mother Nagammal, who represented the defendants as guardian ad litem, colluded with the original plaintiffs agent Nagarajan and brought about the collusive sale deed signed by the agent, purporting to sell the suit land to the defendants. The sale was created while the original plaintiff was in Singapore, where he was working. There was no necessity or need for the principal to sell away the suit land. The agent Nagarajan had played a fraud in selling the suit land in absence of any compulsion or advantage for the principal, who gave the power. Under the invalid sale, the principal-cum-owner had not received any benefit through the agent. The guardian of the defendants, Nagammal did not pay any consideration and act in good faith. She was really an ally and mere alias of the agent Nagarajan. The defendants did not derive any title under the invalid, fraudulent and bogus sale deed. The recitals therein are quite untrue and fictitious. The principal, the original plaintiff, did not owe any debt to one Govindarajulu, as alleged in the sale deed. With regard to O.S. No. 154 of 1970 filed against the original plaintiff, the agent Nagarajan did not spend as high a sum as Rs. 4,500. The guardian of the defendants was aware that a money decree was finally given in favour of the original plaintiff in O.S. No. 154 of 1970. The agent did not receive any money from the guardian of the defendants for getting the sale deed, Ex. B1. 4,500. The guardian of the defendants was aware that a money decree was finally given in favour of the original plaintiff in O.S. No. 154 of 1970. The agent did not receive any money from the guardian of the defendants for getting the sale deed, Ex. B1. The guardian of the defendants knew well that the agent had no necessity to spend or borrow for any purpose connected with the original plaintiff, who always had good resources, income and savings. The agent acted illegally and out of his bounds in executing the sale deed with tell tale and false items of consideration. The agent did not consult the original plaintiff nor his wife, the second plaintiff. The suit land is very valuable and the consideration quoted in the sale deed being Rs. 15,120 is too inadequate. Hence the sale deed is liable to be cancelled as invalid, collusive and a sham document. 3. The defendants, through their guardian ad litem put forth the following defence. The purchase was a bona fide one; the consideration was paid to the agent as reeled in the sale deed: the guardian of the defendants did pay the agent in full the consideration, split into four items; the defendants were satisfied with the truth of every one of the items of consideration mentioned in the sale deed and they denied that there was any collusion between their guardian Nagammal and the agent of the original plaintiff Nagarajan. According to them, enquiries were made about the existence of the debts and the necessity for the sale. They claimed that they acted bona fide and honestly and they denied that the value of the suit land was more than what is quoted in the sale deed. The defendants wanted to sustain the sale deed in their favour and would repel the contention that it was tainted by illegality. 4. To decide the controversy between the parties, the Court below formulated the following issues: 1. Whether the sale deed is liable to be cancelled? 2. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled? 5. The parties placed their evidence, oral and documentary. That was the subject-matter of consideration by the Court below. 4. To decide the controversy between the parties, the Court below formulated the following issues: 1. Whether the sale deed is liable to be cancelled? 2. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled? 5. The parties placed their evidence, oral and documentary. That was the subject-matter of consideration by the Court below. It came to the conclusion that the price paid for the suit land was an appropriate one; that every one of the items of consideration quoted in the sale deed was true and binding on the plaintiffs and that even assuming that the agent had not really acted in the manner of a faithful agent, it would not affect the title of the defendants unless it was shown that the bad conduct of the agent was actually known to the defendants and that the purchase was a bona fide one. In this view, the Court below answered issue No. 1 against the plaintiffs and on issue No. 2, the suit was dismissed but without costs. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the Court below. 6. Mr. A. Ramanathan, learned counsel for the appellants, would first submit that the agent had no power to sell at all. But the learned counsel could not proceed further because there is an express power given to the agent in the deed of power, marked in the case as Ex. B, under Cl. 2 thereof. Further, learned counsel would contend that though the power to sell could be spelt out from the deed for the agent, yet, the agent was not clothed with the authority to receive the consideration for the sale. Learned counsel would place reliance on the pronouncement of a Bench of this Court, consisting of Sir Charles Arnold White, C.J., and Abdur Rahim, J., reported in G. Narasimhulu Chetti v. K. Sundarachariar 1. It is true that in the said pronouncement, it has been recognized that an agent who has been constituted to sell certain properties is not thereby also authorised without special authority to receive the purchase money on behalf of the principal, so as to bind him by that receipt, and when the authority to sell is with regard to immovable property, it does not ordinarily imply an authority to receive the purchase money. But in the instant case, with regard to the authority to receive the consideration under the sale, Mr. But in the instant case, with regard to the authority to receive the consideration under the sale, Mr. R. Krishnamurthy, learned Advocate General, who appears for the respondents herein, would draw my attention to the clauses in the deed of power, Ex. B5 and in particular the following clauses as found in the copy in the authenticated typed set of documents filed by the learned counsel for the appellant: “(2) to take possession of all freehold and leasehold property of or to which I am now or may hereafter become possessed or entitled in the Indian Union and to manage, superintendent, cultivate and to develop the same for building purposes or otherwise, to mortgage, charge, sell, lease, let and otherwise dispose of the same, to cut timber, open and work quarries and mines, erect, repair, alter and pull down buildings, fences and other erections, upon or under the same, to collect, distrain, or enforce payment of and recover the rents and profits of the same, to accept surrenders of leases and tenancies affecting the same, and enter into contracts, covenants and arrangements of all kinds in relation to the same. (The subsequent clause is also given the number (2)). (7) To receive, accept the transfer of demand, sue or enforce payment of and give receipts and discharges for all sums of money, securities for money debts, legacies, stocks, shares, annuities, dividends, interest and other property now due or belonging, or which may hereafter become due or belong to us (whether solely or jointly with any other person). (8) To bring or defend any section or other proceedings in any court of law in respect of or affecting our said properties or any part thereof and to enforce by foreclosure, sale, the appointment of a Receiver or Receiver and Manager or otherwise, any mortgage or other security vested in us (whether solely or jointly with any person) and to complete any such transaction by the execution of all proper deeds or instruments and the doing of any proper or necessary act including the registration of any matter in any registry and to give a good discharge for any payment made and to apply the same according to the interests of the persons respectively entitled thereto. (9) To examine, settle, liquidate, compromise, adjust or submit to arbitration all accounts, claims and disputes between us and any other person or persons, firm, company or corporation whatsoever. (12) In our name, to sign and execute any contract, conveyances, assignments, transfers, leases, mortgages, charges, deeds and instruments, and where necessary to register the same. (14) To borrow such sum or sums of money as our said Attorney shall think fit from any person or persons, firms, company or corporation and in particular to overdraw any account that we may have for the same whether by mortgage, charge, lien, or otherwise upon any movable or immovable property as my said attorney may think fit. (18) Upon the recovery or receipts under the powers herein contained of any monies, goods, chattels, effects or things due, owing, payable or belonging to us, to sign and give or sign, seal and deliver such good and sufficient receipts, releases or reconveyances, re-assignments or surrenders of mortgage or other property as may be necessary or expedient which receipts shall exempt the person or persons making such payment or delivery from all responsibility of seeing to the application of the monies there in expressed to be received or obtained by sale of any mortgaged properly vested in us solely or jointly with any other person or persons or to be held by us or on our behalf then to execute and deliver such conveyances to purchasers, assignments, transfers, sub-mortgages or other assurance as the nature of the case shall require. A cogent reading of the clauses in Ex. B5 do convey that the agent did have the power to receive the moneys on behalf of his principal. But this Court need not exercise more strain on this aspect because even assuming that the agent was not clothed with the power to receive the sale consideration, it cannot be stated that the sale will automatically fall to the ground. Even in the pronouncement relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants, such a proposition has not been countenanced. Even in the pronouncement relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants, such a proposition has not been countenanced. In fact, I find in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice, a reference is made to the case of Viney v. Chaplain 1, and the observations of the Lord Chancellor Cranworth on page 437 stand extracted as follows: “It is quite clear that if a purchaser pays his purchase money to a person not authorised to receive it, he is liable to pay it over again...” Hence, even on the assumption that the agent was not clothed with the authority to receive the consideration under the sale, it is not possible to eschew and set aside the sale as such. 7. Next, learned counsel for the appellants contended that the agent was authorised only to receive cash consideration and not any consideration other than cash. This submission is factually futile because the items of consideration quoted in the deed of sale, Ex. B1 are amounts paid only into the hands of the agent, the first three items for the purpose of discharging various obligations and the last item which was the amount paid into the hands of the agent at the time of the registration of the document for the purpose of meeting the family expenses of the original plaintiff and the educational expenses of his children. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants plaintiffs, would then submit that the agent had played a fraud and the guardian of the defendants, who represented them in the sale transaction, also did not act in good faith and hence, the sale must be ignored and set aside. If the agent acted within the scope of his actual or apparent authority, that act will not cease to bind his principal merely because the agent was acting fraudulently and in furtherance of his own interests. A principal is bound by dispositions of properties made by his agent acting within the scope of his actual or apparent authority. The principal is bound though the contract may be entered into or act done fraudulently in furtherance of the agents own interests, and contrary to the interests of the principal, unless the person dealing with the agent has also not acted in good faith and has been a privy to the fraud. The principal is bound though the contract may be entered into or act done fraudulently in furtherance of the agents own interests, and contrary to the interests of the principal, unless the person dealing with the agent has also not acted in good faith and has been a privy to the fraud. In Hambro v. Burnand 2, it has been countenanced that: “Where an agent, in contracting on behalf of his principal, has acted within the terms of a written authority given to him by the principal, but the existence of which was not known to the other party to the contract, the principal cannot, if the other party has acted bona fide, repudiate liability on the contract on the ground that the agent, in making it, acted in his own interests, and not in those of his principal.” 9. To substantiate the theory that the defendants represented by their guardian did not art in good faith when they entered into the transaction with the agent, the endeavour of the learned counsel for the appellants was to bring to the forefront two aspects. One is that the items of consideration quoted in the sale deed were fictitious to the knowledge of the vendees and they cannot stand judicial scrutiny. X X X X [The discussion of facts is omitted—Ed.] In the said circumstances, I could not uphold the contention put forth on behalf of the plaintiffs through their counsel here that the items of consideration quoted in the deed of sale are fictitious. Therefore, I do not find any convincing evidence placed on behalf of the plaintiffs to substantiate their plea that the suit land was undervalued, and that too, to the knowledge of the defendants, so as to spell out lack of good faith on the part of the defendants. 11. If the plea of undervaluation and the items of considerations being fictitious could not be accepted, I do not find any other factor substantiated to hold that there was a fraud or collusion or lack of good faith involving the vendees represented by their guardian. The parties belong to the same place and they were bound to know about encumbrances, if any, really created. These features in any event cannot make out lack of good faith. 12. The parties belong to the same place and they were bound to know about encumbrances, if any, really created. These features in any event cannot make out lack of good faith. 12. The learned Advocate General appearing for the defendants, would submit that it has come out in evidence that the sale transaction was struck only after the second plaintiff was put on notice of the same and after she gave consent for it. He drew my attention to the evidence of the guardian of the defendants, examined as D.W.1. She has deposed that one Ramachandran, who is also an attestor to the deed of sale Ex. B1, contacted the second plaintiff, talked with her and intimated that the second plaintiff had agreed for the sale and only thereafter, further steps were taken for completing the sale. This part of the evidence of D.W.1 stands unimpeached. The said Ramachandran himself has been examined as D.W. 2 and he has given evidence to the same effect. Here again, the evidence of D.W. 2 stands unimpeached. 13. The cumulative effect of the evidence discussed above in the light of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs, leaves me with no other alternative than to concur with the conclusions reached by the Court below. Accordingly, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs.