JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE plaintiff-non-applicant, Dr. Om Prakash Gupta, filed a suit in the court of District Judge, Gwalior, under Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code), in which a claim of Rs. 34,000/- was made against the defendant-applicant. Within ten days from the service of the notice of the suit, under Sub-rule (3) of Rule 3 of Order 37 of the Code, the defendant entered appearance and sought leave to defend. Leave was granted to him by the trial Court on condition that he should deposit amount. The impugned order can be quoted conveniently as below : - "ubhay PAKSHA PURVAVAT. WADDHAN VA KHARCHE KI MOUTBIR JAMANAT DENE PAR pratiwad1 KO BACHAV KARNE KA HAQ IS MAMLE KI paristhitiyon ME DENA NYAYOCHIT PAYA JATA HAI ATHAH jamanat PESH KARNE PAR YADOTTAR DT. 28-11-1983 KO PESH ho. UP ASTHITA JAN SOOCHIT HO. " Sd/- D. J. " aggrieved by this order, the defendant/petitioner has invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under section 115 of the Code. ( 2. ) IT was contended by the learned counsel for the defendant/petitioner Shri R. D. Jain that the inpugned order is not a judicial order, it is also not a speaking order because no reasons have been assigned as to why the defendant should deposit the secutity amount. As the impugned order is not a reasoned order, it should be quashed, as it is not maintainable in law. Besides this, other points have also been raised, but they are not material to decide the issue. ( 3. ) SHRI K. S. Tomar, appearing for the plaintiff-non-applicant has submitted that though the trial Court has not given reasons, yet the order for furnishing security is not prejudicial to the plaintiff and it should not be interfered in revision by this Court, because it was passed by trial Court using the judicial discretion. ( 4. ) THE Court has under Order 37, rule 3 (5) of the Code granted the defendant/petitioner leave to defend the suit on the condition of his furnishing security. ( 4. ) THE Court has under Order 37, rule 3 (5) of the Code granted the defendant/petitioner leave to defend the suit on the condition of his furnishing security. Sub-rule (5) of Rule 3 of order 37 of the Code reads as under : " (5) The defendant may, at any time within ten days from the service of such summons for judgment, by affidavit or otherwise disclosing such facts as may be deemed sufficient to entitle him to defend, apply on such summons for leave to defend such suit, and leave to defend may be granted to him unconditionally or upon such terms as may appear to the Court or judge to be just. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 5. ) THE use of word "just" is an indication that it has been entirely left to the judicial discrection of the Court. Though before the Amending Act No. 104 of 1976 of code of Civil Procedure, the Code provided for an absolute reasoned order, but the amended provision is an indication that the trial Court may not give a reasoned order. It is always undesirable and indeed impossible, to lay down hard and fast rules in matters that affect discretion. But it is necessary to understand the reason for a special procedure of this kind in order that the discretion may be properly exercised Taken by and large, the object is to see that the defendant does not unnecessarily prolong the litigation and prevent the plaintiff from obtaining an early decree by raising untenable and frivolous defences in a class of cases where speedy decisions are desirable in the interests of trade and commerce. In general, therefore, that is to see whether the defence raises a real issue and not a sham one, in the sence that if the facts alleged by the defendant are established, there would be a good, or even a plausible, defence on those facts. (See Santosh Kumar v. Mool Singh, AIR 1958 SC 321 ). ( 6. ) THE argument advanced by the learned counsel Shri R. D. Jain is obviously without any merit. It may here be stated that the provisions of Rules (2) (3) of Order 37 of the Code as stand amended by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act (10 of 1976), are materially different from those, as had originally stood before the said amendment. It may here be stated that the provisions of Rules (2) (3) of Order 37 of the Code as stand amended by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act (10 of 1976), are materially different from those, as had originally stood before the said amendment. However, considering the provisions, as now stand amended, it is obvious that sub-rule (5) and (6) of R. 3 of Order 37 of the Code are intended for different stages of the suit. Sub-rule (5) ibid is attracted when the defendant appears in the trial court within ten days from the service of summons for judgment, i. e. on the date of seeking leave to defend the suit, whereas sub-rule (6) ibid can be invoked only at the hearing of such summons for judgment i. e. on the date of hearing as mentioned in the summons for judgment, which is required to be served on the defendant in Form No. 4-A of Appendix B of the Code. It is in this sub-rule that there was provision for furnishing security, but not in sub-rule (5) ibid Leave to defend suit may be granted either Unconditionally or upon such terms, as may appear to the Court to be just. The trial Court, hence is not bound to impose appropriate terms as the Court may deem fit. The discretion exercised by the trial Court must be based upon the circumstances, which appears to him to be just for passing such order. The discretion exercised by the trial Court cannot be said to be erroneous or even harsh. ( 7. ) AS laid down in AIR 1977 SC 577 Mechalee Eng. and Manf. v. Basic Eq. Corpn,, it would not be just and proper to interfere in revisional jurisdiction that the impugned order which has been passed by the trial Court, using the judicial discretion. ( 8. ) NO doubt, it is true that the trial Court has not in so many words said that the defence of the applicant is not tenable or that it does not raise a triable issue. However, while imposing a condition as regards furnishing security, the trial Court has taken into consideration the matters before it. Therefore, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, the trial Court exercised the jurisdiction vested in it to grant leave to the applicant to defend the suit on furnishing security. However, while imposing a condition as regards furnishing security, the trial Court has taken into consideration the matters before it. Therefore, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, the trial Court exercised the jurisdiction vested in it to grant leave to the applicant to defend the suit on furnishing security. There is, therefore, no jurisdictional error in the impugned order. In the instant case, the discretion exercised by the Court below cannot be said to be arbitrary. Furthermore, if the order is allowed to stand there seems to be no occasion for failure of justice or causing irreparable injury to the applicant. I am, therefore, of view that it is not a fit case in which this court, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, interfere in the impugned order. ( 9. ) IN the result, the revision is dismissed However, there shall be no order as to costs. Revision dismissed.