JUDGMENT K.P. Singh, J.- By means of this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order of the District Judge, Saharanpur dated 17-1-1981 whereby the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal before the appellate court has been refused. 2. Brief facts giving rise to the present writ petition are that the petitioner had filed a suit for injunction against the defendants-opposite parties with regard to agricultural plots which have been characterised as bhumidhari land. During the pendency of the suit it appears that the plaintiff-petitioner made an allegation that he was evicted and therefore, a relief of possession was added in the suit. One of the pleas raised by the defendants in the suit is that the civil court had no jurisdiction to proceed with the suit. 3. The Trial court through its order dated 22-1-1980 accepted the pleas raised on behalf of the defendants and held that the civil court had no jurisdiction to proceed with the suit and ordered for return of the plaint. Against the order of the Trial court the plaintiff-petitioner preferred a revision petition which was dismissed by the revisional court through its order dated 21-2-1980. Thereafter the petitioner preferred an appeal along with an application and affidavit for condonation of delay under section 5 read with Section 15 of the Indian Limitation Act. The appellate court has refused to condone the delay through its order dated 17-1-1981. Against the order of the appellate court the plaintiff-petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that the appellate court has patently erred in passing the impugned order and thereby rejecting the petitioner's prayer for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal in the circumstances of the present case. He has emphasised that the reasonable view has not been taken by the appellate court in negotiating the claim of the petitioner. 5. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has tried to support the impugned judgment. According to him there is no ground for interference with the impugned order at least in exercise of writ jurisdiction by this court. 5. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has tried to support the impugned judgment. According to him there is no ground for interference with the impugned order at least in exercise of writ jurisdiction by this court. He has placed reliance on a ruling of this Court reported in 1933 A.L.J. 876 Mohammad Ismail v. District Judge, Bijnor and others, wherein a learned Single Judge has made the following observation in paragraph 6 :- "............normally if delay occurs on account of bona fide advice given by a counsel the party should not be allowed to suffer, but to me it appears that it is not an invariable rule that whatever may be the nature of the mistake and even if it was apparent that the advice was given in a negligent manner the delay should nonetheless be condoned as a matter of rule." 6. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties I think that an important aspect involved in this case has escaped notice of the learned District Judge, Saharanpur. It is a matter of common knowledge that when a party approaches against the judgment of a district court to the High Court, there is a limitation of 90 days. In the present case the plaintiff-petitioner had approached an Advocate of this Court and on his advice he again preferred the appeal before the appellate court and filed an application for condonation of delay alleging material facts in the application and affidavit. The learned District Judge has made the following relevant observation in the impugned order:- ' .........The contention of the plaintiff in the affidavit filed by him is that he went to the High Court on November 20, 1980 to take advice for further course of action against the order dated 21-8-1980. This intervening period of nearly three months in between cannot be said to be satisfactorily explained. The appeal ultimately came to be filed on 26-11-1980. In face of this, it cannot be said that the plaintiff has been persuing his remedy with due diligence and hence he cannot be said to be entitled to the benefit under Section 5 or Section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. The application is, therefore, rejected." 7. The appeal ultimately came to be filed on 26-11-1980. In face of this, it cannot be said that the plaintiff has been persuing his remedy with due diligence and hence he cannot be said to be entitled to the benefit under Section 5 or Section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. The application is, therefore, rejected." 7. In my opinion if the plaintiff petitioner had come with relevant documents to a senior counsel of this Court who adviced him to comply with the order of the revisional court and since three month's time is ordinarily available to a litigant to approach the High Court against the judgment of the district court I think that the learned District Judge has acted illegally in observing that the intervening period of nearly three months in between could not be said to be satisfactorily explained. To my mind there is an ample explanation for the delay of three months between the order of the revisional court dated 21-8-1980 and the date of filing the appeal before the appellate court, on 26-11-1980. It is also necessary for the appellate court to give allowance to a period for the time in obtaining a certified copy of the relevant judgment which is attached with the memo of appeal. There is no discussion in the impugned order about the time taken in obtaining certified copy of the judgment against which the appeal had been preferred before the appellate court. As the appellate court has not taken into account an important fact based on common experience that three months' time is ordinarily granted to a litigant against the judgment of district court for approaching the High Court and he also does not appear to have given due allowance for the time spent in obtaining the certified copy of the order attached with the memo of appeal I think that there is patent error in the impugned order whereby the delay in preferring the appeal by the plaintiff-petitioner has not been condoned. 8. In the result the writ petition succeeds and the impugned order of the appellate court dated 17-1-1981 is hereby quashed and the appellate court is directed to examine the question of condonation in the light of the observations made above. There would be no order as to costs.