Judgment :- 1. This Civil Revision Petition emerges out of B.R C. O.P. No. 11 of 1975 on the file of the Rent Control Court, Changanacherry. There were four Petitioners of whom petitioners 1 to 3 are the children of the 4th petitioner, 4th petitioner being the father. They are the revision petitioners before this Court. 2. There were two shop rooms, which are items 1 and 2 in the petition schedule. Item No.l was at first rented out to the respondent by the wife of the 4th petitioner on 10-11-1957 for conducting a barber shop. Rent deed was also executed. Item No. 2 is a room in the same building adjacent to item No. 1. At the time of rent transactions in 1957, item No. 2 was outstanding with some other tenant. Subsequently the tenant vacated and in the year 1961 item No.2 was also rented out to the respondent for the same purpose and he was using both rooms together for his barber shop. The original rent was enhanced and subsequently rent for item No.1 was Rs.60/-per month and item No. 2 was Rs. 25/-per month. 3. It was alleged that the first petitioner is a photographer depending upon the income from that business as the main source of his livelihood. It was also alleged that he was conducting the business in photography in his own residential building. The further allegation was that item No.2 is required for the photographic business which was intended to be conducted jointly by all the petitioners. On this ground, eviction was sought for. 4. The respondent resisted the claim by raising the following contentions. Both rooms were taken together on rent and that too not in 1957 but in 1954. He is treating both the rooms as a single unit and is running a barber shop in those rooms together. Item No.1 alone is not sufficient for the purpose of conducting the barber shop. The claim of the landlords for eviction on the ground of bona fide necessity for own use is not supported by bona fides. The petition for eviction was filed only because he did not agree for the demand to enhance the rent. He is depending solely on the income derived from the barbershop for his livelihood and he has no other suitable accommodation available in the locality for carrying on the barber shop. The petition for eviction was filed only because he did not agree for the demand to enhance the rent. He is depending solely on the income derived from the barbershop for his livelihood and he has no other suitable accommodation available in the locality for carrying on the barber shop. On these contentions he wanted the petition to be dismissed. 5. At first, the rent controller allowed eviction on the following findings namely, (i) items 1 and 2 were held by the respondent under separate rental arrangements, (ii) the bona fide requirement of the landlord for own use is genuine and (iii) therefore the tenant is liable to be evicted. The contentions raised by the respondent on the basis of the second proviso to S.11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act was not at all considered by the rent controller. 6. From that decision the tenant took up the matter in appeal before the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Kottaym, in B.R.C.A.S.3 of 1976. The appellate authority found that the rent control court failed to consider the questions whether the tenant is solely depending upon the income derived from the barber shop as the main source of his livelihood and whether alternate accommodation is available in the locality for the respondent to shift his business. While confirming the finding regarding bona fide necessity for own use, the order was set aside and the matter was remanded for fresh disposal after considering the grounds under second proviso to S.11(3). From that decision, the landlords took up the matter in revision before the District Court, Kottayam, in B.R.C.45 of 1976. The revision was dismissed and as such the matter came up before the rent control court for fresh consideration. 7. After remand, both sides let in further evidence. The rent control court again disposed of the petition by order dated 13-2-1978 dismissing the petition with costs. It was found that both the rooms were being used by the respondent as a single unit for conducting his barber shop. It was also found that the respondent is depending for his livelihood solely on the income derived from the business carried on in the premises let out and that what is carried on in the premises is a business. The further finding is that no other suitable accommodation is available for him in the locality inorder to carry on the said business. The further finding is that no other suitable accommodation is available for him in the locality inorder to carry on the said business. It was consequent on these findings that the petition was dismissed. 8. Against that decision, the landlords took up the matter in appeal before the appellate authority in R.C.A. 16 of 1978. By judgment dated 31-1-1979, the appellate authority ordered eviction of item No.2 with costs. Relying on the decision reported in Sethurama Menon v, Meenakshi Amma (1966 KLT 665), the appellate authority found that the barber shop conducted by the respondent in the building in question is not a business or trade so as to attract the second proviso to S.11(3) and hence the respondent is not entitled to get the benefit of the proviso. At the same time it was found that the respondent is depending upon the income that is obtained from the profession conducted in the building mainly for his livelihood. So also it was found that the respondent has not proved that no other suitable accommodation is available in the locality. It was consequent on these findings that the appeal was allowed. 9. From that decision, the respondent took up the mat in revision before the District Court, Kottayam, in R. C. R. P. No. 10 Of 1979. The revisional authority disagreed with the appellate authority in the matter of application of second proviso to S.11 (3). Relying on the decision reported in 5. Mohan Lal v. R. Kondiah (AIR 1979 SC 1132), it was held by the revisional authority that the decision in Sethurama Menon's case (1966 KLT 665) cannot be taken as laying the correct law on the point and that the tenant, who is carrying on the profession of a barber in the rented premises is carrying on a "business" there and hence entitled to the benefits of second proviso to S.11 (3). The finding of the appellate authority that the tenant failed in proving the non-availabilty of alternate accommodation was also reversed. It was found that though item Nos.1 and 2 were taken on rent on two different occasions under two different transactions, they are being used together as a single unit for the same purpose and hence the purpose cannot be divided. It was also found that instead of room No. 2 another one far away from the place will not serve the purpose. It was also found that instead of room No. 2 another one far away from the place will not serve the purpose. On the basis of the evidence of CPWS. 4 and 5 as well as from the admission of PW.1, the revisional authority held that non-availability of alternate accommodation was proved satisfactorily. Ultimately, the tenant was given the benefit of second proviso to S.11 (3) and the revision was allowed, dismissing the rent control application. 10. The concurrent findings that the necessity for own use claimed by the landlords is genuine was not challenged before me. But the finding that the two rooms are being used as a single unit for the same purpose and the further finding that the purpose cannot be divided, were questioned before me by the revision petitioners. But in the limited revisional jurisdiction under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, those findings which are supported, by materials cannot be interfered with. It is true that room No.1 was taken on rent in 1957 and the other one was taken only a few years later. Admittedly in 1957, when room No.1 was taken on rent, room No. 2 was not available as it was outstanding with some other tenant. As soon as that tenant vacated, the respondent took that room also on rent for the additional necessities in connection with his business. The contention of the revision petitioners that room No. 2 is only a luxury unconnected with the necessities of the business cannot be accepted when the evidence in that respect is taken into account. It is proved by the evidence adduced on either side and even from the admission of PW 1 that 4 or 5 barbers are engaged by the respondent and hair cutting and shaving are done in room No.l. In that room there is no facility for the customers to wait when all the barber chairs are engaged. Facility for the customers for that purpose is admittedly arranged in room No. 2, where they could read papers also. It is also admitted that room No. 2 is used by the barbers as a waiting and resting place. For the past nearly 20 years, the tentant was using room No. 2 for those purposes paying Rs. 25/-as rent per month. It is also admitted that room No. 2 is used by the barbers as a waiting and resting place. For the past nearly 20 years, the tentant was using room No. 2 for those purposes paying Rs. 25/-as rent per month. It cannot be said that so far as the barber shop is concerned, item No. 2 is a luxury unconnected with the business or profession. It is not for the court to say or for the landlords to contend that the respondent could very well do even without item No. 2. 11. It is not correct to say that in a trade, business or profession, what is requited is only the actual space required for transacting the business. Allied needs also will have to be taken into account; For a person conducting a barber shop with 4 or 5 employees, additional accommodation for the customers or employees cannot be taken as luxuries. It is clear from the evidence that two rooms were taken on rent on different occasions. But the evidence further shows that they were being used as a single unit for the same purpose. It is not upto the landlord to dictate that room No.1 alone will suffice for the barber shop: The mere fact that on account of non-availability of room No.2, the tenant satisfied himself with room No.1 at the initial stages is no reason to find that room No. 2 is not at all a necessity so far as the business purposes are concerned. The finding of the revisional authority in this respect appears to be correct and does not require any interference in revision. 12. Therefore, the only remaining question for consideration is whether the tenant is entitled to the benefit of second proviso to S,11 (3). It was argued by the counsel for the respondent-tenant that since the order of remand directed only the two ingredients to the second proviso to be considered and since the landlords have not raised any specific contention that the barber shop is not a trade or business, the only questions to be considered in this context are dependence for livelihood on the income and availability of alternate accommodation and nothing else. I do not think that there is much merit in this contention. I do not think that there is much merit in this contention. What was directed to be considered by the remand order was the availability of the benefits under the second proviso to S.11(3) and whether the landlords are entitled to get recovery of the rooms. The landlords, by the remand order, are not precluded from raising contentions denying availability of the benefits under the second proviso. 13. Second proviso to S.11 (3) consists of two parts. The first one is whether the tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and second one is whether there is other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business. On both these points, the burden is definitely on the tenant and it is not disputed. It was so held in the decision reported in Kochappan Pillai v. Chellappan (1976 KLT 1). The question is whether that burden has been satisfactorily discharged by the tenant. 14. Before dealing with that question, it is necessary for me to consider whether the barber shop conducted in the premises is a "trade" or "business" as stated in the proviso. According to the landlords, it is only a profession and not a trade or business which connotes a commercial activity. The decision reported in Sethurama Menon's case (1966 KLT 665) was relied on in support of this contention. In that decision the Division Bench held: "The expression "trade or business" connotes a commercial activity. The expression "profession" does not, and is virtually at the other end of the scale. What is important in deciding whether a person is carrying on a profession or not, is whether he is a member of an organised body with a recognised standard of ability enforced before he can enter it and a recognised standard of conduct enforced while he is practising it. This is certainly not the test in deciding whether a person is carrying on a trade or business. "Profession" is a vocation in which a professed knowledge of some department of science or learning is used by its practical application to the affairs of others, either in advising, guiding, or teaching them, or in serving their interests or welfare in the practice of an art founded on it. "Profession" is a vocation in which a professed knowledge of some department of science or learning is used by its practical application to the affairs of others, either in advising, guiding, or teaching them, or in serving their interests or welfare in the practice of an art founded on it. Even assuming that the word "business" is a word of ambiguous import and that it takes its content from its context, it cannot be said that the word "business" in the expression "trade or business" occurring in the proviso will include the profession of an advocate. The proviso does not speak of any "area". The expression "locality" denotes something very much smaller than the expression "area", and the emphasis on the locality in which the trade or business is carried on apparently indicates that the expression "trade or business" relates to activities dependent for their success and continued existence on the locality of their operation. As far as a commercial activity is concerned the place where it is being carried on is of significance and may well prove the foundation of its good will. Such is not the case with a profession like that of an advocate. The place where an advocate has his chambers is not what is important. It is his equipment and personality, his performance in Court, and all those imponderables that ensure forensic success that are of significance. In this view also, the expression "trade or business" should be interpreted as the carrying on of a commercial activity and not the practice of a profession." 15. In that decision the Division Bench was concerned only with the question whether the expression "trade or business" occurring in the proviso will include the profession of an advocate. The scope and ambit of the expression "trade or business" in contradistinction with "profession" was considered only in that perspective. The profession of a barber was not the subject matter for consideration in that case. The Division Bench gave stress on the word "locality" occurring in the proviso and said that availability of an alternate accommodation in the locality indicates that "trade or business" mentioned therein relates to activities dependent for their success and continued existence in the locality of their operation and the expression "locality" is something very much smaller than the expression "area". The Division Bench gave stress on the word "locality" occurring in the proviso and said that availability of an alternate accommodation in the locality indicates that "trade or business" mentioned therein relates to activities dependent for their success and continued existence in the locality of their operation and the expression "locality" is something very much smaller than the expression "area". So also it was held that: "As far as a commercial activity is concerned the place where it is being carried on is of significance and may well prove the foundation of its goodwill. Such is not the case with a profession like that of an advocate. The place where an advocate has his chambers is not what is important. It is his equipment and personality, his performance in court, and all those imponderables that ensure forensic success that are of significance. In this view also we think the expression "trade or business" should be interpreted as the carrying on of a commercial activity and not the practice of a profession". It is clear from the above discussions that the concentration was mainly on the noble profession of advocacy. That discussion may be true with the profession of an advocate, but it need not necessarily be true with the business of a barber. So far as the barber is concerned, the area of his operation may have much relevance in getting work especially when he is facing competition from others. The principles laid down in that decision in relation to the profession of an advocate need not necessarily fit in with the business of a barber. It has to be noted that the nobility of the advocate profession was also one of the considerations that weighed with the Division Bench in finding that it is not a trade or business. The question of commercial activity was imported only in that context, probably it was considered demeaning to equate the noble profession with an import of commercial or business activity by which the person claiming benefit must prove himself to be dependent for his livelihood mainly on the income. In my opinion, those considerations have no application while dealing with a case of a barber which does not in any way stand comparison to the profession of an advocate. Of course, while saying so, I am not forgetful of the dignity of labour. 16. In my opinion, those considerations have no application while dealing with a case of a barber which does not in any way stand comparison to the profession of an advocate. Of course, while saying so, I am not forgetful of the dignity of labour. 16. Even if the import of "commercial activity" is an absolute necessity in order to bring a particular transaction within the expression, the case in hand definitely satisfies it. It was held in Mansuri Ismail Gulamnabi v. Heirs of Deceased Vithalbhai Laljibhal (1975 All India Rent Control Journal S. N. 51): "Surely the profession of a barber is the one which is used as a means of livelihood and therefore, according to the dictionary meaning this profession of a barber would be Covered by the term "business". Therefore, the profession of a barber is "a business" within the meaning of S.6 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947." It is true that this decision was rendered on the basis of the provisions in a different statute applicable in a different State. But the interpretation given to the term business could be considered for our purpose also. 17. In this context, it may be advantageous to extract the connotation of "barber" given in Black's Law Dictionary wherein it is stated: "One who makes a business of shaving and trimming beards and cutting and dressing hair". The following meanings were given to the term "business" in that dictionary: "Activity of some continuity, regularity and permanency", "constant or continuous or habitual employment or occupation", "employment occupying substantial portion of time and attention, that which habitually busies or occupies or engages the time, attention, labour and effort of men as a principal serious concern or interest or for livelihood or profit, etc." It is thus clear that the profession of a barber implies a business transaction. 18. Admittedly, respondent is conducting the barber shop. It is further admitted that there are five barber chairs in room No.1 and five barbers are employed by the respondent. Respondent is the proprietor and the others are only his employees. Therefore, it is not merely a case of carrying on a profession, but of carrying on a business engaging labourers for the purpose. This fact is admitted by PW. 1 and it is so stated in Para.20 of the order of the rent controller. Respondent is the proprietor and the others are only his employees. Therefore, it is not merely a case of carrying on a profession, but of carrying on a business engaging labourers for the purpose. This fact is admitted by PW. 1 and it is so stated in Para.20 of the order of the rent controller. Thus this is a case in which the respondent is conducting a barber shop by engaging labourers, paying them and making profit out of transactions. It is definitely a business even going by the principles laid down in Sethurama Menon's case (1966 KLT 665). As I have already stated the two rooms are being used as a single unit for that purpose was admitted even by PW.1. 19. The revisional authority found that the decision in Sethurama Menon's case (1966 KLT 665) does not lay down the correct law in view of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in S. Mohan Lal's case (AIR 1979 SC 1132). But it was argued on behalf of the revision petitioners that the decision in Sethurama Menon's case (1966 KLT 665) was not over-ruled by the Supreme Court even by implication. For this purpose, reliance was placed on the decision reported in Krishnankutty Menon v. Malathi (1985 KLT 6). In that decision it was held: "It is impossible to accede to the contention that a member of the legal profession is carrying on a trade or a business, to eke out his livelihood from the 'business', of the practice of the profession. To equate a member of the learned profession as a businessman eking out his livelihood from his profession would be to completely ignore the history ;and glory of a noble profession. A concept that a member of the profession is depending for his livelihood on the profession is supremely inapposite to the context of a profession which holds a high an d hoary tradition". It was further held: 7. The question arising for decision in this case, viz, the second proviso to S.11(3) of the Kerala Act, had been clearly and squarely covered by a binding decision of a Bench of this Court reported in Sethurama Menon v. Meenakshi Amma 1966 KLT,665: AIR 1967 Ker. 88. The Supreme Court had adverted to the above decision. It is significant that even then the Supreme Court had not overruled its decision in AIR 1979 SC 1132 supra. 88. The Supreme Court had adverted to the above decision. It is significant that even then the Supreme Court had not overruled its decision in AIR 1979 SC 1132 supra. There is nothing in the decision of the Supreme Court to suggest that the decision of the Division Bench of this Court has been overruled, even by implication. 8. The reasoning of the Division Bench of this Court is clear, cogent and powerful. It is impossible to accede to the contention that a member of the profession is carrying on a trade or a business, to eke out his livelihood from the 'business', of the practice of the profession. To equate a member of the learned profession as a businessman making out his livelihood from his profession would be to completely ignore the history and glory of a noble profession. A concept that a member of the profession is depending for his livelihood on the profession is supremely inapposite to the context of a profession which holds a high and hoary tradition. It is unnecessary for the purpose of the present case to extract passages from the legal literature, sketching the history of the profession throughout the ages. Professor E.J. Hobsbawn of the University of London refers to the lead given by the lawyers in shaping history, both in the East and the West. See "The Age of Capital; pages 18-19-Regarding a House of Commons from which all lawyers were excluded, Lord Coke declared "that the whole of its legislation was not worth two pence." (See 'The English Bar', a speech delivered at the Inner Temple Hall in 1908 by Right Hon. H. H. Acquith, vide Occasional Addresses' 1918 page 121)." 20. But that was also a case in which the question came up for consideration was whether a member of the legal profession is carrying on a trade or business, to eke out his livelihood from the "business", of the practice of the profession. The principles laid down in that decision also cannot be said to have any applicability to the facts of the present case for we are concerned only with the profession of a barber and whether it amounts to a business or not. 21. Of course, it is true that S. Mohan Lal's case (AIR 1979 SC. The principles laid down in that decision also cannot be said to have any applicability to the facts of the present case for we are concerned only with the profession of a barber and whether it amounts to a business or not. 21. Of course, it is true that S. Mohan Lal's case (AIR 1979 SC. 1132) was dealing with a different statute, viz, Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act with different provisions. The Supreme Court said: "The expression business has not been defined in the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. It is a common expression which is some, times used by itself and sometimes in a collocation of words as in ‘business, trade or profession'. It is a word of large and wide import, capable of a variety of meanings. It is needless to refer to the meanings given to that term in the Dictionaries except to say that everyone of them notices a large number of meanings of the word. In a broad sense it is taken to mean 'everything that occupies the time, attention and labour of men for the purpose of livelihood or profit." 22. The question whether the decision in Sethurama Menon's case (1966 KLT 665) has been overruled by their Lordships of the Supreme Court expressly or even by implication does not at all arise in this case. Therefore, what was found in Krishnankutty Menon's case (1985 KLT 6) that the decision in Sethurama Menon's case (1966 KLT 665) has not been overruled even by implication, is no ground for referring the case to a Division Bench as requested at the fag end of the arguments by learned counsel for the revision petitioners. We are not concerned with the question whether the decision in Sethurama Menon's case was either overruled or dissented from. Such a reference is called for only if it is necessary to take a view different from the principles laid down in Sethurama Menon's case (1966 KLT 665) and Krishnankutty Menon's case (1985 KLT 6). I have already stated that 1966 KLT 665 and 1985 KLT 6 decided the question in a different context. The principles enunciated in those decisions, while considering the profession of an advocate in relation to the second proviso to S.11(3) need not necessarily be made applicable in a case where the business of a barber is being considered. I have already stated that 1966 KLT 665 and 1985 KLT 6 decided the question in a different context. The principles enunciated in those decisions, while considering the profession of an advocate in relation to the second proviso to S.11(3) need not necessarily be made applicable in a case where the business of a barber is being considered. 23. The principles enunciated on the basis of the facts of a particular case need not necessarily fit in with the facts of other cases. In applying principles courts will always have to take into consideration the peculiar facts and circumstances available in each case. There may be exactly identical cases wherein the principles applied in a former case may exactly fit in. But most of the cases are not like that. Courts generally evolve principles, keeping in mind the facts dealt with therein. Therefore simply because some particular principles were formulated on the basis of the facts of a case, it need not necessarily follow that those principles will have to be applied without any deviation to the facts of identical cases. I said so because, so far as this case is concerned, I am of opinion that the interpretation given to the term "business" in some previous decisions referred to by me may not be exactly applicable to the facts of the present case where we are dealing with a different set of facts. 24. Further, it has to be noted that the Act is intended to give protection to tenants from unreasonable eviction by landlords. If a petty shop owner is entitled to protection under the said proviso, it cannot be expected that the legislature intended to deny similar protection to a barber who is eking out his livelihood from his profession. 25. As a result of the foregoing discussions, I come to the conclusion that the profession run by the respondent in the premises is a business coming within the second proviso. Item No. 2 which is sought to be recovered is used by the respondent as a single unit along with item I for that business. 26. The further question to be considered while dealing with the first part of the second proviso is whether the respondent is mainly depending for 'his livelihood on the income derived from his business. For this purpose, nothing more than the admission of the 4th petitioner as PW.1 is necessary. 26. The further question to be considered while dealing with the first part of the second proviso is whether the respondent is mainly depending for 'his livelihood on the income derived from his business. For this purpose, nothing more than the admission of the 4th petitioner as PW.1 is necessary. He admitted in unequivocal terms that the respondent and his family are maintaining themselves from the income derived from the barber shop, which is conducted by the respondent. 27. Then what is required to be proved is only non-availability of alternate accommodation. I have already found that both rooms are used as a single unit. Only one room is sought to be evicted. It is true that a contention was not raised that such a prayer is not maintainable for eviction of a portion of a single unit. But, still, in my opinion, second part of the second proviso is not strictly applicable in this case. What is required to be proved is non-availability of suitable building in the locality. In Sethurama Menon's case (1966 KLT 665), it was held that the expression "locality" denotes something very much smaller than the expression "area". If so, the building required must be of Very close proximity. 28. But, even if eviction is ordered, the barber shop will have to continue in item No. 1. What is sought to be evicted is only item No. 2. As I have already stated, it is amply proved that item No. 2 which is sought to be evicted is used as an anti-room for the barber shop conducted in item No.1 for the purpose of accommodating the waiting customers, for dumbing hair etc. For these needs the respondent cannot be asked to be satisfied with another accommodation unless it is at very close range; otherwise it may materially affect his business. No such accommodation is available is clear from the evidence. 29. It is true that as held in the decision reported in Kochappan Pillai's case (1976 KLT 1), this type of negative evidence is not an impossibilty. So also that decision laid down that the burden could be discharged by examining the accommodation controller and getting the necessary documents produced. The appellate authority found this point against the tenant since he did not examine the accommodation controller and get the concerned register produced. So also that decision laid down that the burden could be discharged by examining the accommodation controller and getting the necessary documents produced. The appellate authority found this point against the tenant since he did not examine the accommodation controller and get the concerned register produced. But it is common knowledge that availability of very few buildings alone are reported to the rent controller and made available for allotment by him. 30. C. Pw. 4 is a local newspaper agent and C. pw.5 is a reputed chitty foreman in the locality. From their evidence, it is clear that in spite of earnest efforts they were not able to find any rooms from 1965 onwards for shifting their business. Non-availability was spoken to by the respondent also while he was examined as C. pw.1. There is no reason to disbelieve these witnesses. Even according to the evidence of pw.1, only two rooms fell vacant in the locality and they were taken on rent by others. According to him, the rates of monthly rent of these buildings were Rs. 100/- and Rs. 120/-. The respondent was using item No. 2 on a monthly rent of Rs. 25/-. That room was the maximum advantageous to him and his business. I do not think that it will be proper to ask him to vacate and take the above said rooms at distant places, even if they are available. It cannot be said that suitable accommodation is available. From the evidence, it has to be taken as proved that the tenant was able to establish that alternate accommodation as mentioned in the proviso is not available. 31. The contention that the second proviso is applicable only in relation to the principal place of business namely, item No.1 and not in relation to item No. 2 has absolutely no force. So also, the further contention that the proviso is intended to protect only the livelihood and not intended to encourage profit making and hence not available in this case is also devoid of merit because the proviso has to be understood as being applicable to a business premise as a whole. 32. It is clear from the evidence that in case of eviction from item No. 2, what is necessary for the tenant is an adjacent convenient accommodation. The evidence clearly establishes that such accommodation is not at all available. 32. It is clear from the evidence that in case of eviction from item No. 2, what is necessary for the tenant is an adjacent convenient accommodation. The evidence clearly establishes that such accommodation is not at all available. Therefore, the second part of second proviso must also be taken as proved. It follows that the decision of the revisional authority is perfectly correct and does not require any interference at all. In the result, the revision petition is dismissed with costs. Dismissed.