JUDGMENT I.P. Singh, J. - This petition of heabeas corpus has been filed by one Faheem Ahmad, petitioner (hereinafter referred to as the detenu) under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of detention order dated 17-1-1985 passed by the District Magistrate, (Kanpur City) under sub-sec. (2) of S. 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 (Act 65 of 1980). (hereinafter referred to as the Act), directing the petitioner detenu's detention in District Jail, Kanpur (which is annexure 1' to the writ petition). 2. The grounds of detention appear in annexure 2' to the writ petition which are :- 1. After the detenu was released from jail on 1-12-84 he along with his companions, namely, Akil, Naseem, Mohd. Ahmad, Farid, Shamim, Anwar alias Maulana and Naimuddin on 8-12-1984 at 8 p.m. arrived at Nai Sarak, which is a thickly populated area, carrying pistols and bombs in their hands and challenged Haji Layeek and Nafis who were standing in front of the scooter shop of Chanda by shouting that they salas belong to the party of Naseemuddin Qureshi and also do pairvi for him, so they should be done to death. Saying so, the detenu and his above-named companions attacked them. Haji Layeek started running away but bullets and bombs were showered at him in front of house of Chanda. Haji Layeek died on the spot. The detenu and his companions then ran away along the road going to pech-bagh firing shots in the air. By their above action terror was struck in the entire area, people started running helter-skelter. On account of the said fear the shop-keepers and the residents of the locality immediately closed the doors of their houses and shops. With respect to the said incident, crime case No. 228 of 1984 under S. 147/148/149/302 IPC. With reference to F.I.R. No. 31 dated 8-12-1984 was registered at Police Station Bekanganj, Kanpur city. The said case was under investigation. 2. On 9-12-1983 (the correct date seems to be 9-12-1984, as clarified in the counter- affidavit of Sri C. K. Sharma, the District Magistrate. Kanpur City) at about 2.30 p.m. the detenu along with his companion Minhajuddin alias Mannu were proceeding from the side of Nai Sarak to Paradechauraha within Police Station, Bekanganj, Kanpur city. Station Officer, Police Station Bekanganj, along with the police party was present there. Kanpur City) at about 2.30 p.m. the detenu along with his companion Minhajuddin alias Mannu were proceeding from the side of Nai Sarak to Paradechauraha within Police Station, Bekanganj, Kanpur city. Station Officer, Police Station Bekanganj, along with the police party was present there. On seeing the police party the detenu and his companion turned back. At this the police interrupted them to stop. At this, they, with the intention of threatening the police party, fired one shot each in the air from their respective revolver. On hearing the shots being fired the public present there got scared and started running helter-skelter. Out of fear, the shops in the bazar were closed and the public life became insecure ("Jan Jeevan Asurakshit Hone Lage'). The police party advanced and arrested the detenu and his companion in front of the house of Dr. Jagdish Chandra situated at Nai Sarak. One English .38 bore Webley Scott revolver with one spent cartridge and five live cartridges of .38 bore were recovered from the hand of his companion Minhajuddin. Criminal Cases Nos. 229 of 1984 and 230 of 1984 under S. 25 Arms Act were registered against the detenu and his companion, respectively at police station Bekanganj. Kanpur city. Charge-sheets in the said cases were already submitted to the Court. 3. It was also mentioned therein that bail application of detenu was pending in the Court concerned and it was apprehended that he would soon be released on hail. 4. On the above grounds that the District Magistrate recorded his subjective satisfaction there was every possibility of the detenu acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and it was necessary to detain so as to prevent him from acting in that manner. 5. The detenu was arrested on 9-12-1984. It is evident from the facts mentioned in the writ petition as well as in the counter-affidavit of the Distt. Magistrate and counter-affidavit of Chander Pal Singh, Upper Division Assistant in confidential section VI. Up Secretariat. Lucknow, that Station Officer concerned had submitted his report dated 18-12-1984 for the detention of the detenu under the Act. The Senior Superintendent, of Police forwarded that report with his letter dated 19-12-1984 to the Distt. Magistrate, Kanpur city. As is obvious, the District Magistrate passed the detention order in question on 17-1-1985. Up Secretariat. Lucknow, that Station Officer concerned had submitted his report dated 18-12-1984 for the detention of the detenu under the Act. The Senior Superintendent, of Police forwarded that report with his letter dated 19-12-1984 to the Distt. Magistrate, Kanpur city. As is obvious, the District Magistrate passed the detention order in question on 17-1-1985. After his arrest the detenu while in custody was admitted to Government Civil Hospital Ursila, Kanpur city in connection with diaognosis and treatment. He was served with detention order and the grounds thereof in the said hospital on 18-1-1985. Thus, his present detention came into operation from 18-1-1985. This detention was approved by the State Government on 24-1-1985. 6. On 25-1-1985 the petitioner demanded copies of certain papers through an application from the District Magistrate. Kanpur City, which was rejected by the Distt. Magistrate. 7. On 5-2-1985, the petitioners counsel under instruction of the petitioner. submitted his representations for the revocation of the detention order in question through registered post, one to the Central Government addressed to the President of India and the Prime Minister of India delivered on 8-2-1985 and the second to the State Government addressed to the Governor and the Chief Minister of the State which was delivered on 7-2-1985. The State Government sent the said representation dated 5-2-1985, received through registered post on 7-2-1985 to the Confidential Department of the State which was received there on 16-1-1985 and the same was forwarded on 22-3-1985 to the District Magistrate, Kanpur city, for his comments. The comments of the District Magistrate were received back by the State Government on 2-4-1985. April 3, 1985 was a holiday. The State Government sent the comments of the District Magistrate to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi on 4-4-1985. Its disposal is still pending. 8. In the meanwhile, on 7-2-1985 the detenu himself submitted his representation against the said detention to the Superintendent, Jail. Kanpur who forwarded one copy of the said representation direct to the Advisory Board of that very date i.e. on 7-2-1985. The said representation was received in the office of the Registrar. Advisory Board. that very day i.e. on 7-2-1985. 9. The other copy of the representation dated 7-2-1985 was sent by the Superintendent, District Jail, Kanpur to the District Magistrate. Kanpur City. which was received there on 8-2-1985. The said representation was received in the office of the Registrar. Advisory Board. that very day i.e. on 7-2-1985. 9. The other copy of the representation dated 7-2-1985 was sent by the Superintendent, District Jail, Kanpur to the District Magistrate. Kanpur City. which was received there on 8-2-1985. The District Magistrate sent the said representation along with his comments to the State Government on that very date. i.e. on 8-2-1985 which was received in the Confidential Section concerned on 11-2-1985. The said representation was examined by the section concerned and the detailed note was put up on 13-21985. It received the consideration of the Joint Secretary (Home) and Home Secretary on 15-2-1985. The representation was finally rejected by the State Government on 16-2-1985. The fact of the rejection of the representation was communicated to the District Magistrate as well as to the Advisory Board on 18-2-1985. The petitioner was informed of that rejection order on 28-2-1985. 10. The Advisory Board hearing took place on 26-2-1985. It recommended the detention of the detenu on 26-2-1985. The State Government confirmed the detention of the detenu for 12 months vide its order dated 13-3-1985. 11. Sri Daya Shanker Misra. learned counsel for the petitioners, has challenged the detention of the detenu on the following points- 1. That grounds of detention relate to 'law and order' only and not to 'public order'. 2. The copies of the documents which were required by the petitioner through his application dated 25-1-1985 from the District Magistrate. Kanpur City were not supplied to him. with the result that the petitioner could not make an effective representation against his detention and as such the detention was invalid. 3. The following material documents namely - (i) Detenu's bail application, (ii) order dated 20-12-1984 refusing bail to the detenu. (iii) copies of the statements of the witnesses recorded under section 161 Cr. P.C. in Crime Cases Nos. 228. 229 and 230 of 1984 and other evidence collected during investigation of the said cases, and (iv) Copy of the affidavit of eye-witness. Arif son of Mohd. Ibrahim in Crime Case No. 228 of 1984 which was filed in the Court concerned on 2-1-1985 were not placed before the detaining authority i.e., the Dist. Magistrate. 228. 229 and 230 of 1984 and other evidence collected during investigation of the said cases, and (iv) Copy of the affidavit of eye-witness. Arif son of Mohd. Ibrahim in Crime Case No. 228 of 1984 which was filed in the Court concerned on 2-1-1985 were not placed before the detaining authority i.e., the Dist. Magistrate. Kanpur City, before the detention order was passed by him which made the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority illusory and, therefore, the detention of the detenu was invalid. 4. The document and material referred to in point No. 3 above were also not placed before the State Government at the time of approval and as such the said 'orders bye the State Government were mechanical and violative of Ss. 3(4) and 12(1) of the Act respectively which rendered the detention invalid. 5. The detention order was violative of S. 3(5) of the Act. 6. Non-disposal of the representations dated 5-2-1985 of the petitioner sent through his counsel through registered post to the Central Government as well as to the State Government rendered the continued detention of the detenu invalid. 7. The representation dated 5-2-1985 which was sent through registered post to the State Government and was received there on 7-2-1985 was not placed before the Advisory Board and this violated the provision of S. 10 of the said Act and rendered the detention invalid. 12. We shall now discuss the above points as follows : Point No. 1 : Under S. 3(2) of the Act the detaining authority is enabled to make the order directing that the person be detained only in case it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so with a view to prevent such person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the : (a) security of the State : (b) maintenance of public order and (c) supplies of services essential to the community. 13-14. The impugned detention order purports to record subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that there was every possibility of the detenu acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order and, therefore, it was necessary to detain him so as to prevent him from acting in that manner. The said satisfaction was based on the grounds appearing in annexure 2' to the writ petition which have already been detailed above. 15. The said satisfaction was based on the grounds appearing in annexure 2' to the writ petition which have already been detailed above. 15. Learned counsel for the detenu has contended that both the incidents which have been treated as grounds of detention are such which only relate to "maintenance of law and order" and not to "maintenance of public order". It has pointed out that the first incident of 8-12-1984 indicates only that on account of mutual enmity the detenu and his companions murdered Haji Layeek. It is further argued that this incident could at best be like other murders to be the outcome of previous enmity and could only affect the individual murdered and as such could afford an ordinary problem pertaining to 'law and order' and could not to beyond (sic) it to be considered as the problem touching 'public order. 16. Similarly it has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the detenu that the second incident of 9-12-1983 (which according to the Distt. Magistrate's counter-affidavit, was in fact, of 9-12-1984) was again 'a problem of law and order' inasmuch as fires were shot in the air simply with the object of threatening the police party concerned and it did not go beyond that to involve. 'problem of public order'. 17. To understand the subtle difference between 'law and order' and 'public order' we refer with advantage to the following decisions : 1. Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 1228 . In the above case, it was held that: "The question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society. An act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be very different. Similar acts in different contexts affect differently law and order on the one hand and public order on the harm and its effect upon the community. An act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be very different. Similar acts in different contexts affect differently law and order on the one hand and public order on the harm and its effect upon the community. Individual act can be a ground for detention only if it leads to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as to amount a disturbance of the public order and not if it affects merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed. Public order embraces more of the community than law and order. Public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquillity. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order." 2. Ram Ranjan Chatterji v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 609 . In this case the Court held that : "It may be remembered that qualitatively, the acts which affect 'law and order' are not different from the acts which affect 'public order'. Indeed, a state of peace or orderly tranquillity which prevails as a result of the observance or enforcement of internal laws and regulations by the Government is a feature common to the concepts of 'law and order' and 'public order. The distinction between the areas of 'law and order' and 'public order' is one of degree and extent of the reach of the act in question on society. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. If the contravention in its effect is confined only to a few individuals directly involved as distinguished from a wide spectrum of the public, it would raise a problem of law and order only. If the contravention in its effect is confined only to a few individuals directly involved as distinguished from a wide spectrum of the public, it would raise a problem of law and order only. These concentric concepts of 'law and order' and 'public order' may have a common 'epicenter', but it is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror-wave unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder that helps distinguish it as an act affecting 'public order' from that concerning 'law and order'". 3. Wasi Uddin Ahmed v. District Magistrate. Aligarh, U.P., AIR 1981 SC 2166 . The Supreme Court in this case held that: "The distinction between concepts of 'law and order' and 'public order' is one of the degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society. An act by itself is not determinant of its gravity. In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be very different. Any contravention of law always affects order but before it could be said to affect 'public order' it must affect the community or the public at large. In order to appreciate the extent and scope of each one of the three concepts viz.. 'law and order'. 'public order' and 'the security of the State' generally used in preventive detention laws, three concentric circles have to be conceived of, the largest of them representing 'law and order', the next representing 'public order' and smallest representing 'the security of the State'. An act may affect 'law and order, but not 'the security of the State.' The true distinction between the areas of law and order and public order lies not merely in the nature of quality of the act but on the degree and extent of its reach upon the society. The acts similar in nature but committed in different reactions. In one case. it might affect specific individuals and. therefore, touches the problem of law and order only. while in another it might affect public order. In order to see whether an act has affected 'public order' what has to be seen is whether the detenu's activities have any impact upon the local community or in other words 'disturb the even tempo of the life of the community of that specified locality' ". 4. Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1982 SC 1143 . In order to see whether an act has affected 'public order' what has to be seen is whether the detenu's activities have any impact upon the local community or in other words 'disturb the even tempo of the life of the community of that specified locality' ". 4. Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1982 SC 1143 . In the above case the Court held that : "The true distinctions between the areas of 'public order' and 'laws an d order' lies not in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. The distinction between the two concepts of 'law and order' and 'public order' is a fine one but this does not mean that there can be no overlapping. Acts similar in nature but committed in different context and circumstances might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only and therefore touch the problem of law and order, while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself therefore is not determinant of its own gravity. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order......... What essentially is a problem relating to law and order may due to sudden sporadic and intermittent acts of physical violence on innocent victims in the metropolitan city result in serious public disorder. It is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror-wave unleashed by a particular act or violence creating disorder that distinguishes it as an act affecting public order from that concerning law acid order. Some offence primarily injure specific individuals and only secondarily the public interest, while others directly injure the public interest and affect individuals only remotely. The question is of the survival of the society and the problem is the method of control. Whenever there is an armed hold up by gangsters in an exclusive residential area of the city and persons are deprived of their belongings like a car. wrist-watch, or cash, or ladies relieved of their gold-chains or ornaments at the point of a knife or revolver, they become victims of organised crime. Whenever there is an armed hold up by gangsters in an exclusive residential area of the city and persons are deprived of their belongings like a car. wrist-watch, or cash, or ladies relieved of their gold-chains or ornaments at the point of a knife or revolver, they become victims of organised crime. Such particular acts when enumerated in the grounds of detention clearly show that the activities of the detenu cover a wide field and a fall within the contours of the concept of public order". 5. Ajai Dixit v. State of U.P., AIR 1985 SC 18 . In the above case the Court observed as follows : "A large number of acts directed against persons or individuals may total up into a breach of public order. In Dr. Rain Manollar Lohia's case, AIR 1966 SC 740 examples were given by Sarkar and Hidayatullah. JJ. They show how similar acts in different contexts affect differently law and order on the one hand and public order on the other. It is always a question of degree of the harm and its effect upon the community. The question to ask is: Does it lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed'. This question has to be faced in every case on facts. There is no formula by which one case can be distinguished from another". 6. Shiv Shanker v. In charge Police Station Hasanganj Lucknow, 1985 All LJ 132 (Lucknow Bench). It was held in the above case that: "The act of firing on the police party which is supposed to be the custodian of law and order and is responsible for maintaining public order too is a serious act, and has to be distinguished from firing on an individual with whom the culprit may have a grievance. Similarly firing on a person who has appeared as a witness and has thereby performed a public duty will naturally have the effect deterring others from performing their duty and consequently such an incident has wider ramifications compared to the effect 'an incident of this nature' will have on an individual with whom there was any previous enmity. Similarly firing on a person who has appeared as a witness and has thereby performed a public duty will naturally have the effect deterring others from performing their duty and consequently such an incident has wider ramifications compared to the effect 'an incident of this nature' will have on an individual with whom there was any previous enmity. These have the effect of causing disturbance to public order and cannot be termed as mere-law, and order' affairs. AIR 1982 SC to and AIR 1982 SC 1143 Rel. on. In order to detennie whether the instances related to 'law and order' or 'public order' what was to be considered was the effect of the incident on the individual and the public including likely effect that such incidents were to cause. The two incidents certainly had the effect of adversely affecting 'public order' inasmuch as public servants were being deterred in the performance of their public duty and individuals were being deterred from appearing as witnesses and these incidents would certainly have wider ramifications than merely affecting the individuals concerned." 18. From the above decisions the law on the point becomes well settled that there is no formula by which one case can be distinguished from another in discriminating between the 'law and order' and 'public order'. The Act by itself is not determinant of its gravity. It is its potentiality and its reach upon the society that matters. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb even tempo of the life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The impact of the detenu's activities upon the local community is to be seen as to whether it has the effect on the normal flow of life of the community in the locality. 19. The exploding of bomb and showering of bullets in a thickly populated area or in the bazar during shopping hours making the public run helter-skelter to save their lives, forcing the inhabitants to close the doors of their houses and shops had a nexus with disturbance of public order in the locality. The incidents in question had disturbed tranquillity and even tempo and flow of life of the public in the locality. 20. The incidents in question had disturbed tranquillity and even tempo and flow of life of the public in the locality. 20. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the grounds of detention taken into consideration by the detaining authority in passing the detention order in question are not relatable to public order or that they are not germane. We are of the opinion that the said incidents make out a case of 'public order'. 21. Under S. 3(2) of the Act it is the satisfaction of the detaining authority which is supreme in the matter. If the detaining authority, in the circumstances. was satisfied that the two incidents make out a case of breach of public order and if in that background he felt satisfied that it was necessary to detain the detenu with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, we find no infirmity in the said order. Accordingly. this point raised by the learned counsel for the detenu has no force. Point No. 2' : Article 22(5) of the Constitution runs as follows : "5. When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order." (Emphasis supplied)* 22-23. It is therefore, obvious that under above cl. (5) the detenu is entitled to be afforded an earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. The clause means that the detenu is entitled to be furnished sufficient particulars and facts about the grounds of his detention to be in a position to make an effective representation against the order of detention. 24. As seen above, the detention order dated 17-1-1985 along with the grounds thereof was served on the detenu on 18-1-1985. 25. In the case of Khudi Ram Das v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 550 the Hon'ble court explained what is meant by' grounds on which the order is made' in the context of the duties cast upon the detaining authority and the corresponding rights according to the detenu under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. 25. In the case of Khudi Ram Das v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 550 the Hon'ble court explained what is meant by' grounds on which the order is made' in the context of the duties cast upon the detaining authority and the corresponding rights according to the detenu under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. The Court ruled that in that context the expression 'Grounds' does not merely mean a recital and the reproduction of grounds of satisfaction of the authority in the language of S. 3, nor is its connotation restricted to a bare statement of facts but "nothing less than all the basic facts and materials which influenced the detaining authority in making the order of detention" and that is the plain requirement of the first safeguard in Article 22(5) of the Constitution. 26. Again what would be comprised in "all the basic facts and materials" has been elaborated by the Supreme Court in Smt. Icchu Devi Choraria v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1983 by holding that the documents, statements and other materials referred to or relied upon in the grounds of detention by the detaining authority in arriving at its subjective satisfaction get incorporated and become part of the grounds of detention by reference and the right of the detenu to be supplied all such documents statements and other materials flows directly as a necessary corollary from the right conferred on the detenu to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the detention, because unless the former is available the latter cannot be meaningfully exercised. 27. Thus. it is clear that the expression grounds does not merely mean the recital of the grounds of satisfaction of the detaining authority but it means "all the basic facts and materials which influenced the detaining authority in making the order of detention." Again, all the documents. statements and other materials referred to or relied upon in the grounds of detention by the detaining authority in arriving at its subjective satisfaction get incorporated and become part of the grounds of detention by reference. 28. Grounds of detention (annexure 2' to the writ petition) does indicate that with respect to the two respective incidents mentioned therein cases were registered at the police station. It also mentions that copies of the respective F.I.Rs. 28. Grounds of detention (annexure 2' to the writ petition) does indicate that with respect to the two respective incidents mentioned therein cases were registered at the police station. It also mentions that copies of the respective F.I.Rs. and the G.D. entries were attached to the grounds of detention and supplied to the detenu. It was also mentioned therein that the two incidents detailed in the grounds were the only material on the basis of which subjective satisfaction was arrived at by the detaining authority. Thus, those were the only basic facts and materials which were considered by the detaining authority and which can be said to have influenced it in making the detention order in question. No other document, statement or any other material was referred to or relied upon in the grounds of detention by the detaining authority in arriving at its subjective satisfaction. Accordingly, on the face of it, the detaining authority was not to supply the copy of any other document, statement or material to the detenu to enable him to make an effective representation against the detention order. 29. However, learned counsel for the detenu has raised the point that copies of certain documents which were required by the petitioner through his application dated 25-1-1985 (vide paragraphs 31 and 51 of the writ petition) from the District Magistrate, Kanpur City, were not supplied to him, with the result that the petitioner could not make an effective representation against his detention. Unfortunately neither the details of those documents whose copies were asked for in the said application dated 25-1-1985. were disclosed nor the copy of that application was annexed. In this way, this court does not find itself in a position to appreciate the nature of the documents whose copies were required by the detenu from the detaining authority. The District Magistrate refuted the above contention of the detenu in paragraph 22 of his counter-affidavit by deposing that all the documents on which the detaining authority, had placed reliance had been furnished to the detenu. The detenu had no doubt demanded copies of certain documents but they were not necessary and had no bearing on the order of detention so they were not furnished to the detenu. The detenu had no doubt demanded copies of certain documents but they were not necessary and had no bearing on the order of detention so they were not furnished to the detenu. In paragraph 24 of the rejoinder affidavit, while repudiating paragraph 22 of the counter-affidavit, it was vouched that the copies were refused so that the detenu could not be in a position to make an effective representation against the order of detention. However, the fact remains that till date the Court has not been supplied the particulars of the documents whose copies were asked for by the detenu through his application dated 25-1-1985. Therefore, we hold that this point has no force. Points Nos. 3 & 4 The learned counsel for the detenu has raised the point that : (i) detenu's bail application: (ii) order dated 20-12-1984 refusing the said bail application: (iii) copies of the statements of the witnesses recorded under S. 161 Cr. P.C. in Crime Cases Nos. 228, 229 and 230 of 1984 and other evidences collected during investigation of the said cases such as post-mortem examination report and the like; (iv) copy of the affidavit of eve-witnesses Arif, son of Mohd. Ibrahim in Crime Case No. 228 of 1984 which was filed in the Court concerned on 2-1-1985 were not placed before the detaining authority for consideration prior to the passing of the detention order so these material documents were kept out of consideration and therefore the detention order becomes vitiated (sic) because it is not know how the above mentioned documents would have influenced the mind of the detaining authority in the matter of formation of subjective satisfaction and it might as well be that above documents, if considered, would have produced opposite result. 30-31. In the same strain it is pointed out that the above documents were also not placed before the State Government at the time of 'approval' and 'confirmation' of the detention order and as such the said orders of the State Government were mechanical and violative of Ss. 3(4) and 12(1) of the Act respectively which rendered the detention invalid. 32-33. We need not enter into the merits of these points because we feel that this writ petition can effectively be disposed of on the merits and demerits of the other points. 3(4) and 12(1) of the Act respectively which rendered the detention invalid. 32-33. We need not enter into the merits of these points because we feel that this writ petition can effectively be disposed of on the merits and demerits of the other points. Point No. 5 : Section 3(5) of the Act requires that when any order (detention order) is made or approved by the State Government under S. 3. the State Government shall, within seven days report the fact to the Central Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in the opinion of the State Government, have a bearing on the necessity for the order. 34. It has been seen above that detention order dated 17-1-1985 which was served upon the detenu on 18-1-1985 was approved by the State Government on 24-1-1985. This fact should have been reported to the Central Government by 31-1-1985. This fact was not specifically raised in the writ petition. It was nowhere specifically alleged that approval though accorded on 24-1-1985 was not reported to the Central Government within seven days thereof. It was simply alleged in paragraph 66 of the petition that S. 3(5) of the Act was not complied with. Paragraph 46 of the counter- affidavit of the District Magistrate it is vouched that its compliance was duly made. This paragraph was verified on the basis of perusal of records. There seems no reason to disbelieve the above assertion in the counter-affidavit. We, therefore. hold that S.3(5) was duly complied with. This point has no force. Point No. 6': It has been laid down in the case of Pabitra N. Rana v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 798 that : "The constitutional right to file a representation to the Government carries with it impliedly a right that the representation must be disposed of as quickly as possible and any unexplained delay would amount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee contained in Article 22(5). The obligation of the appropriate detaining authority to take a decision on the representation filed by the detenu is quite apart and distinct from its obligation to constitute a Board and to send the representation to it. The detaining authority is not entitled to wait for the opinion of the Board but has to take its decision without the least possible delay". 35-36. The detaining authority is not entitled to wait for the opinion of the Board but has to take its decision without the least possible delay". 35-36. On the instructions and under the authority of the detenu his counsel Sri Daya Shanker Misra had sent representations dated 5-2-1985 under registered covers to the State Government as well as to the Central Government for revocation of the detention order in question. They were received by the State Government on 7-2-1985 and by the Central Government on 8-2-1985. In para 4 of the counter-affidavit of Sri Chandra Pal Singh, Upper Division Assistant in Confidential S. 6, U.P. Secretariat, Lucknow, submitted on behalf of the U.P. Government, respondent No. 3, it is admitted that the said representation was received in the section concerned on 16-3-1985 and the same was forwarded on 22-3-1985 to the District Magistrate, Kanpur City, for his comments. The comments of the District Magistrate were received back by the State Government on 2-4-1985. April 3, 1985 was a holiday. The State Government sent the comments of the District Magistrate to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi on 4-4-1985. Its disposal is still pending. 37. There is no counter-affidavit on behalf of the Union of India, respondent No. 4. Thus it would be reasonable to hold that the Central Government has not disposed of the said representation dated 5-2-1985, delivered to the Central Government on 8-2-1985, till today. 38. Section 14(1) of the Act provides : "Revocation of detention orders.- Without prejudice to the provisions of S. 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), a detention order may, at any time, be revoked or modified. (a) notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer mentioned in sub-sec. (3) of S. 3, by the State Government to which that officer is subordinate or by the Central Government, (b) notwithstanding that the order has been made by a State Government, by the Central Government". 39. Since the detention order was made by an officer mentioned in sub-sec. (3) of S. 3. it could be revoked by the State Government concerned as well as by the Central Government. This process necessarily involved the disposal of the representations dated 5-2-1985 made by the learned counsel of the detenu both to the State Government and Central Government. 39. Since the detention order was made by an officer mentioned in sub-sec. (3) of S. 3. it could be revoked by the State Government concerned as well as by the Central Government. This process necessarily involved the disposal of the representations dated 5-2-1985 made by the learned counsel of the detenu both to the State Government and Central Government. These representations have not so far been disposed of and there is no satisfactory explanation why they have not been disposed of. This renders the continued detention of the detenu invalid. Point No. 7' Section 10 of the Act provides :- "Reference to Advisory Boards.- Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, in every case where a detention order has been made under this Act, the appropriate Government shall, within three weeks from the date of detention of a person under the order, place before the Advisory Board constituted by it under S. 9. the grounds on which the order has been made and the representation, if any, made by the person affected by the order, and in case where the order has been made by an officer mentioned in sub-sec. (3) of S. 3, also the report by such officer under sub-sec. (4) of that section". 40-41. There were two representations of the detenu made to the State Government. One dated 5-2-1985 sent by his counsel through registered post to the State Government received there on 7-2-1985, the other dated 7-2-1985 which the detenu personally delivered to the Superintendent, District Jail, Kanpur. Thus both the representations were in the hands of the relevant authorities on 7-2-1985. 42. Detention came into effect on 18-1-1985. Three weeks, therefore, lasted up to 8-2-1985. Under S. 10 both these representations should have reached the Advisory Board by 8-2-1985. 43. The Superintendent, District Jail, Kanpur forwarded one copy of the said representation dated 7-2-85 directly to the Advisory Board the same day which was delivered in the office of the Registrar, Advisory Board, that very day. So far as this representation was concerned, there was sufficient compliance of S. 10. (See Dwarika Pd. v. State of U.P., 1984 All LJ 799). 44. However, the other representation dated 5-2-1985 sent by registered post and received by the State Government on 7-2-85 (at Lucknow) was never placed before the Advisory Board (at Lucknow). So far as this representation was concerned, there was sufficient compliance of S. 10. (See Dwarika Pd. v. State of U.P., 1984 All LJ 799). 44. However, the other representation dated 5-2-1985 sent by registered post and received by the State Government on 7-2-85 (at Lucknow) was never placed before the Advisory Board (at Lucknow). Nothing has been said about it in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State. 45. It is argued on behalf of the State that when one representation of the detenu was placed before the Advisory Board in time, there was no necessity to place the second representation of the detenu before the Advisory Board. 46. We, however, fail to appreciate the contention in view of the wordings employed in said S. 10. It clearly enjoins that representation. if any, made by the person affected by the order i.e. detenu has also to be placed before the Advisory Board along with the grounds on which the order has been made within three weeks from the date of detention. The words 'if any' in the context are not and cannot be confined to only one representation. These words must necessarily mean 'all' the representations which have been made by the detenu and received in time to be placed before the Advisory Board within three weeks. 47. The representation dated 5-2-1985 made by the counsel of the detenu through registered post was also in the hands of the State Government on 7-2-1985 at Lucknow and in the circumstances of the case it could have been placed before the Advisory Board on that very day. But it has never been so placed. 48. We therefore hold that there has been non-compliance of S. 10 of the Act which is a mandatory provision. It renders the continued detention of the detention illegal. 49. In the result, the present writ petition succeeds and we allow the same. The respondents are directed not to keep Faheem Ahmad detenu under detention any longer (in) pursuance of the detention order dated 17-1-1985 passed by the District Magistrate, Kanpur City under S. 3(2) of the National Security Act and affirmed by the State Government. It is made clear that if the petitioner's detention is required under some other authority of law. the order passed today by us shall not entitle him to be physically released.